Digitized by Google THE LIBRARY 192 P94 f05 urn SIX BOOKS OF PROCLUS, ... ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO, TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK » TO WHICH A SEVENTH BOOK IS ADDED, IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE DEFICIENCY OP ANOTHER BOOK ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH « « «R!TTEV BY VKOCIA'S, ULT MSCE KMT. i ALSO, A TRANSLATION FROM THE CREEK OF PROCLUS' ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY. A TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE OF PROCLUS, £>n protMDcncc ano jTate; A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE, ENTITLED, TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE; AND A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL; As preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricius. BY THOMAS TAYLOR. A>£ «rr»v, «m, run tij tyyiKa Tlierc are, there are, though laugh the w offer roar, Jove and the God*, who mortal ills survey. axnif nvt Jmi to Wit, xau xujmi rsXXix. Corinlh. 1. Cap, 8. v. i. At there be Gods many, and Lord* : TWO VOLUMES. VOL I. LONDON : PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, By A. J. I'afpy, Tooket Court, Chancery Lane. AND SOLD BY MESSRS. LAW AND Co.; LONGMAN AND Co.; BALDWIN AND Co.; AND ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS. 1816. Digitized by Google Q'7 Digitized by Google TO I WILLIAM MEREDITH, ESQUIRE, WHO WITH A FIRMNESS AND MUNIFICENCE, UNPARALLELED IN MODERN TIMES, HAS PATRONIZED THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE, AND ITS ENGLISH PROMULGATOR ; AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NO COMMON ESTEEM FOR HIS CHARACTER, AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR HIS PATRONAGE, THIS WORK IS DEDICATED BY THE TRANSLATOR, THOMAS TAYLOR. i Digitized by Google Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. I rejoice iu the opportunity which U afforded me of presenting the truly philosophic reader, in the present work, with a treasure of Grecian theology ; of a theology, which was first mystically and symbolically promulgated by Orpheus, afterwards disseminated enigmatically through images by Pythagoras, and in the last place scientifically unfolded by Plato and his genuine disciples. The peculiarity indeed, of this theology is, that it is no less scientific than sublime j and (bat by a geo- metrical scries of reasoning originating from the moat self-evident trutlw, it developes all the deified progressions from the ineffable principle of things, and accurately exhibit* to our view all the links of that golden chain of which deity is the one extreme, and body the other. That also which >. most admirable and laudable in this theology is, that it produces in the mind properly prepared for iu reception the most pure, holy, venerable, and exalted conceptions of the great cause of all. For it celebrates this immense principle as something superior even to being itself; as exempt from the whole of things, of which it is nevertheless ineffably the source, and does not therefore think fit to connumerate it with any triad, or order of beings. Indeed, it even apologises for attempting to give an appropriate name to this principle, which is in reality in enable, and ascribes the attempt to the imbecility of human nature, which striving intently to behold it, gives the appellation of the most simple of its conceptions to that which is beyond ail knowledge and all conception. Hence it denominates it the one, and the good,- by the former of these names indica- ting its transcendent simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the object of desire to all beings. For all things desire good. At the same time however, it asserts that these appellations are in reality nothing more than the parturitions of the soul which standing as it were in the vestibules of the Prod. Vol. I. 6 INTRODUCTION. adytum of deity, announce nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but only indicate her spontaneous tendencies towards it, and belong rather to the immediate offspring of the first God, than to the first iuelf. Hence, as the result of this most venerable conception of the supreme, when it ventures not only to denominate the ineffable, but also to assert something of its relation to other things, it con- sider* this as pre-eminently its peculiarity, that it is the principle of principles ; it being necessary that the characteristic property of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle of all principles. Conformably to this, Proclus, in the second book of this work' says, with match- leas magnificence of dictiou :" Let us as it were celebrate the first God, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generation of all animals j for be produced these indeed, but among the last of things ; but prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of Gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities as the God of all Gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,1 — as more inefieble than all silence, and more unknown than all essence,— as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible Gods." The scientific reasoning from which this dogma is deduced is the followiug : As the principle of all things is the one, it is necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum should intervene either in incorporeal or corporeal natures. It is also necessary that every thing which has a natural progression should proceed through similitude. In consequence of this, it is likewise necessary that every producing principle should generate a number of the same order with itself, vut. nature, a natural number; toul, one that is psychical (i. c. belonging to soul); and uittUtti, an intellectual number. For if whatever possesses a power of generating, generates simi- lars prior to dissimilar*, every cause must deliver its own form and characteristic peculiarity to its progeny ; and before it generates that which gives subsistence to progressions far distant and separate from its nature, it must constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and con- joined with it through similitude. It is therefore necessary from these premise,, since there is one unity the principle of the universe, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to every thing else, a multitude of natures characterized by unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause ; and these natures are no other than the Gods. According to this theology tlierefore, from the immense principle of principles, in which all ' P. 190. . * L e. The highest order of intelUgibks. INTRODUCTION. li thing? causally subsist, absorbed in supcreaseotial light, and involved in unfathomable depths, a beauteous progeny of principles proceed, aU largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fulness of good. From these dazzling sum* mils, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, being, life, intellect, soul, uature, ami body depend ; monads suspended from uniliet, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of thing*, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and returns to its leader. And all these principles aVid all their progeny are finally centered and rooted by their summits in the first great all-compre- hending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended in the first being; aU intel- lects emanate from one first intellect ; all souls from one first soul ; all natures blossom from one first nature ; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which both they and all their depending •cries are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of Gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all. No objections of any weight, no arguments but such as are sophistical, can be urged against this most sublime theory which is so congenial to the unperverted conceptions of the human mind, that it can only be treated with ridicule and contempt in degraded, barren, and barbarous ages. Igno- rance and priestcraft, however, have hitherto conspired to defame those inestimable works,' in which this and many other grand and important dogmas can alone be found ; and the theology of the Greeks has been attacked with all the insane fury of ecclesiastical ?eal, and all the jmbecd flashes of mistaken wit, by men whose conceptions on the subject, tike those of a man between sleeping and waking, have been turbid and wild, phantattic and confuted, prtpotterotu aud tain. Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible cause of all, a divine multitude subsists, co-operating with this cause in the production and government of the universe, has always been, and is still admitted by all nations, and all religions, however much they may differ in thoir opinions respecting the nature of the subordinate deities, and die veneration which is to be paid to them by man ; and however barbarous the conceptions of some nations ou this subject may be when compared with those of others. Hence, says the elegant Maxim us Tyrius, " You will see one according taw and assertion in all the earth, that there is one God, the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of God, ruling together with him. This the Greek says, and the Barbarian says, the inhabitant of the Continent, ' Via. the present and other works of Protlus, together with those of Plolious, Porphyry, Jambluihus, Syruaus, Ammonius, Damascrus,01ympu>dorus, and Simplicms. Digitized by Google ■ I K TnODUCTIO N. and he who dwells near the sea, the wise and the unwise. And if you proceed as far as to the utmost shores of the ocean, there also there arc Gods, rising very near to some, and setting very near to others." ' This dogma, too, is so far from being opposed by either the Old or New Testament, that it is admitted by both, though it forbids the religious veneration of the inferior deities, and enjoins the worship of one God alone, whose portion is Jacob, and Israel the line of his inheritance. The following testimonies will, I doubt not, convince the liberal reader of the truth of (In, assertion. In tl»e first place it appears from the 3fid chapter of Deuteronomy, v. 8. in the Septuagint version, that " the divition of the nations teas made according to the number of the angels of Cod," and not according to the number of the children of Israel, as the present Hebrew text asserts. This reading was adopted by the most celebrated fathers of the Christian church, such as, among tlie Greeks, Origen, Basil, and Chrysostom, and among the Latins, Jerom aud Gregory. That litis too, is the genuine reading, is evident from the 4th chapter of the same book and the I9tb verse, in which it is said, " Awl lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and wbeu thou sent the sun and the moon, and the stars, even all the host of heaven, sbouldsl be driven to worship them, and serve them, which the Lord % God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven." Here it is said that the stars are divided to all the natioas, which is equivalent to saying that the nations were divided according to the number of the stars ; the Jewish legislator at the same time, considering his own nation as an exception, and as being under the government of the God of Israel alone. For iu the following verse it is added, " But the Lord liath taken you (i. e. the Jews), and brought you forth out of the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheri- tance, as ye are to this day." By the angels of God therefore (in Deuteron. 32. v. 8.) ihe stars arc signified ; and these in the same book (chapter 17- v. 3.) arc cxprr-stly called Gods; " And hath gone and served other Gods, and worshipped them, either the tun or moon, or any of the host of heaven, which I have not commanded.'" I u the 3d chapter also, and llic l24lh verse, it is implied in tlie question which is there asked, that the God of the Jews is superior to all the celestial and terrestrial Gods : " For what God is there in heaven, or in earth, that cau do according to thy works, and according to thy might r" As the attention of the Jews was solely confined to the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they but little regarded the powers whom they conceived to be subordinate to this God, and considering all of them as merely the messengers of their God, they gave them the general appellation of angel* ; though as we shall shortly prove from t t mt n»i»it f*« «*rd, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool." If therefore the heavens are the throne, and the sun the tabernacle of deity, they must evidently be deified. For nothing can come into immediate contact with divinity without being divine. Hence, says Siroplicius,' " That it is connascent with the human soul to think the celes- tial bodies are divine, is especially evident from (hose, (the Jews) who look to these bodies through preconception* about divine natures. For tbey also say that the heavens are the habitation of God, and the throne of God, and are alone sufficient to reveal the glory and excellence of God to those «tho are worthy ; than which assertions what can be more venerable ?" • In his eommeBUry on the second book of Ari»UiuV«. treaiKc On the Hovn v Digitized by Google IHTBODOCMOM. Indeed, that lb* heavens are not the inanimate throne and residence of deity, is also evident from the assertion in the 19th Psalm, " That the heavens declare the glory of God." For R. Moses, a very learned Jew, says/ " that the word utphar, to declare or set forth, is never attributed to is no other than that of those blessed intelligences, who govern the stars, and dispose them into such letters as Cod has ordained ; declaring unto us men by means of this writing, what events we are to expect. And hence, this same writing is called by all the ancients cktlab kamtlachim, that is to say, the writing of the angeli." The Gods therefore, which were distributed to all the nations but the Jews, were the sun and moon, and the other celestial bodies, yet not so far as they are bodies, but so far as they are ani- mated beings. Hence the Hebrew prophets never leprobate and prohibit the worship of the stars as things which neither see, nor hear, nor understand, as they do the worship of statues. Thus in Deuteron. iv. and 28. " And there ye shall serve Gods the work of men's hands, wood and stone, which neither see nor hear, nor eat, nor smell." And the Psalmist, " They have a mouth but apeak not, &c.« These, and wany other things of the like kind arc said by the prophet, of the Jews against the worship of images and statues, but never of the sun and moon, and the other stars. But when they blame the worship of the heavenly bodies, they assign as the cause (hat the people of Israel are not attributed to them as other nations are, in consequence of being the inheritance of the God that brought them out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house of bondage. This is evident from the before cited passage in the 4th chapter of Deuteronomy, in which it is said that the stars are divided unto ail nations under the whole heaven but the Jews. Indeed, as the emperor Julian* justly observes, " unless a certain ethnarchic God presides over every nation, and under this God there is an angel, a daemon, and a peculiar genus of souls, sub- arises, — unless this is admitted, let it be shown by any other how this difference is produced. For it is not sufficient to say, " God said, and it was done," but it is requisite that the natures of things which are produced should accord with the mandates of divinity. But I will explain more clearly what I mean. God, for instance, commanded that fire should tend upward, and earthly masses downward ; is it not therefore requisite, in order that the mandate of God may be aceom- « See Gaflarcl-s Unheard-*! CuriosiUes, p. 391. » A pud Cyril. IITTiOBUCtroH. XT plished, that die formed should be light, and the latter heavy t Thus also in a similar manner in other things, tllus too, m' divine concerns. But the reasori of (his is, because the human race is frail and corruptible. Hence also, the works oP man are corruptible and mutable, and subject to all-various revolutions, But God being eternal, it is also fit that his mandates should be eternal. And being such, they are either the natures of things, or conformable to the natures of things. For how can nature contend with the mandate of divinity } How can it fall off from this concord ? If, there- fore, as he ordered that there should be a confusion of tongues, and that they should not accord i other, so likewise he ordered that the political concerns of nations should be dis- l; he has not only effected this by his mandate, but has rendered us naturally adapted to this dissonance. For to effect this, it would he requisite, in the first place, that the natures of those should be different, whose political concerns among nations are to be different. This, indeed, is seen in bodies, li an> one directs his attention to the Germans and Scythians, ami considers how much the bodies of these differ from those of the Lybi&ru and Ethiopians. Is this therefore, a respect to the celestial bodies f " Julian adds, " Moses, however, though he knew the truth of this, concealed it ; nor doea he ascribe the confusion of tongues to God alone. For he says, that not only God descended, nor one alone with him, but many, though he does not say who they were. But it is very evident, that he conceived those who descended with God to be similar to him. If, therefore, not the Lord only, but those who were with him contributed to this confusion of tongues, they may justly be lh R C ft U 8 ^ - S of llllA ' In short, that the heavens and the celestial bodies are animated by certain divine souls, was not only the opinion of the ancient poets and philosophers, but also of the mo?l celebrated fathers of the church, and the most learned and acute of the schoolmen. Thus for instance, this is asserted by Jerom in his exposition of the 6th verse of the first chapter of Ecclesiastes. And by Origen in his book On Principles, who says that the heavenly bodies must be animated, because they are said to receive the mandates of God, which is only consentaneous to a rational nature. This too is inserted by Eusebius in his Theological Solutions, and by Augustine in bis Enchiridion. Among the schoolmen too, this was the opinion of Albert us Magnus in his book De quatuor Coteqiuwis ; of Thomas Aquinas in his treatise De Spiritualibus Creaturis; and of Johannes Scotus Super Sccundo Sententiarum. To these likewise may be added, the most learned Cardinal Nicolaos i indeed strenuously contends for the truth of this < Digitized by.Google IKTXODCCTIOH. ( the celestial bodies with outward worship (dulia cultu) and to implore says, that he has no other objection to thin : be the occasion of idolatry. Hence, though it may seem ridiculous to most of the present time, that divine souls should be placed in the stars, and preside over regions and cities, tribes and people, nations and tougues, yet it did not appear so to the more intelligent Christians of former times. I had almost forgotten however tlie wisest of the ancient Christians, but as he was the best of them, I have done well hi reserving liioi to the last ; and this u no other than the Platonic bishop Syncsiuf . This cither of the church therefore, in his third hymn, sings as follows : Si, irartg xwpaw, OUT Ml I it 'Ml, ciMcyc; amur. f»Uua; reran estlcstia Digitized by Google I KTtOOVCTION. ixi • also a roc ei red iMm of «he Pythagoreans and Platonic*, (bat there is no chasm in nature, bat a chain or >cal« of beings rising bj gentle uninterrupted gradations from the lowest to the highest, each nature being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher. Aa air becomei igneous, ao the purest fire becomes animal, and the animal soul become* intellectual, which is to be understood, not of la* change of «m nature iato another, but of the connection of differ eot natures, each lower nature being, according to those philosophers, aa it were, a receptacle or object for the next above tt to reside and act m. u It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that intellect is the very life of living things, die first principle and esemplar of all, from whence, by different degrees, are derived the inferior classes of life ; fir* the rational, then Ike sensitive, after that the vegetable, but so a* m the rational animal there is still somewhat intellectual, again in the sensitive there is somewhat rational, and in the vegetable somewhat sensitive, and lastly in mixed bodies, as metals aud mineral*, somewhat of vegetation. By 'which means the whole is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which doe- trine implies that all the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their several " Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive, though sometimes it be mentioned as a sentient animal, sometimes as a plant or vegetable. Hut in this, notwithstanding what has been surmised by some learned men, there stem) to be no atheism. For to long a* the world it sup- posed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, which it itself animated by son/, and directed by understanding, it follows that all pmrtt thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced unto, the tame indivisible stem or principle, to wit, a tupreme mind; which it the concurrent doctrine of Pulkaporeans Platonics and Stoici " *^n^n*n * _J 9 *> S } • u" Compare now the Newtonian with this theory, that the heavenly bodies are vitalized bv their informing souls, that their orderly morion is the result of this vitality, and that the planets move harmonically round the sun, not as if urged by a centripetal force, but from an animated tendency to the principle and fountain of their right, and from a desire of partaking as largely as possible of his influence and power, in the former theory all the celestial morions are the effect of violence, in the latter they are all natural. Hie former is attended with insuperable difficulties, the biter, when the principle on which it is founded is admitted, with none. And the former is unscientific and merely hypothetical ; but the latter is the progeny of the most accurate science, and is founded Digitized by Google 1 XTKODfCTION. I have said diat I should prove from the testimony of the Apostle Paul, that the Jews were not consistent in confounding angels properly so called with Gods. And this appears to me to be evident , in the first place from the following passage in Hebrews ii. v.S.mvru nwpjn asmjf/rssvcu rtoftuma; ?"!,"«» ••"'i **f « f"I « ♦«uwft»«r to fStoropom ytynmsu. This in the English version is erro- neously rendered; " Tliroogh faith we understand, that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen, were not made of things which do appear." I say this is erro- neously translated, because in the first place, the world* is evidently a forced interpretation of «(»v«{ ; and even admitting it is not, leaves the passage very ambiguous, from the uncertainty to what worlds Paul alludes. If we adopt agei, which is the general sense of the word in the New Testament, we shall indeed avoid a forced and ambiguous interpretation, but we shall rentier the meaning of the Apostle trifling in the extreme. For as he his elsewhere said, « that all things were framed by the word of God," what particular faith does it require to believe, that by the same word he framed the ages ? In the second place, from the definition of faith, given in the first verse of this chapter, that it is « the evidence of things not teen," it is clear, that Paul is speaking in this passage of something invisible. Since then eumac is neither worlds nor ages, what shall we say it is ? I answer, the (tones of the Valentinians. And agreeably to this, the whole passage should be translated as follows : " 13v faith we understand, that the stones were framed bv the word of God, in order that things which are seen, might be generated from such as do not appear (i. e. from things invisible)." Every one who is much conversant with Greek authors, must certainly be convinced that «; t» means m order that ; and Bishop Pearson translates as I have done the latter part of this verse. Now we learn from the second book of In-nxus against the heretics, that according to the Valentinians, all created things are the images of the (tones, resident m the pleroma, or fulness of deity. And does it not clearly follow from the above version, that according to. Paul too, the icoues arc the exemplars of visible or created things i To which we may add, that this sense of the passage clearly accords with the assertion that " faith is the evidence of things not seen." For here the things which do not appear are the aones; these, according to the Valentinians, subsisting in deity. So that from our version, Paul might say with great propriety, that " we understand by faith, that the (tones were framed by the word of God, in order that things which are seen, might be generated from such as do not appear," for this naturally follows from his definition of faith. 1 farther add, that among these tones of the Valentinians were wuj, fU»s, cr/ys, «A,«.-«, INTRODUCTION. XXlii i. e. intellect, a profundity, rilence, truth, and witdon, which as Gale well observe* in his note* ou lamblichua de Mysteriis, &c. prove their dogmas to be of Chaldak origin. For these words per- petually occur in the fragments of the Chaldaic oracles. And the middle of die Chaldean intelli- gible triad is denominated «*» «eon,' i. e. eternity, aud is also perfectly conformable to the theology of Plato, at is very satisfactorily shown by Proclus in the third book of the following work. According to the Chaldeans therefore, the a-ones are Gods ; and considered as the exem- plars of the risible universe, they are analogous to the ideas of Plato, which also are Gods, as is evident from the Parmenides of that philosopher.1 According to Paul too, as die teones are the i of the visible world, they must be beings of a much higher order than angels, and con- be Gods ; productive power being one of the great characteristics of a Again, m the Epistle to the Ephesiaiis, chap. i. v. 21. Paul says that God has exalted Christ « for »»»/»«» every principality, and power, and might, and dominion," mftan s-arq; agW **» i Suwumsw «" wgtvnrrtf. And in the 6th chapter and 12th verse be conjoins with princi- powera, the rulers of the world, i. e. the seven planets, «-po( to; ufxaf, tqo; t«$ #fow- 'jet t*{ xtsaftQxqttTogai. Augustut' c oof esses that he is ignorant what the difference is between those four words, (principality, power, might, and dominion,) in which the Aposde Paul seems to comprehend all the celestial society. " Quid inter se distent quatuor Ula vocabula, quibua univcraam ipsam caelestem societatem videtur Apostolus esse complexus, dicant qui poasunt, Trallianos) speaks of the angelic orders, the diversities of archangels and armies, the differences of the orders characterised by might and dominion, of thrones and powers, the magnificence of the etonet* and the transcendency of Cherubim and Seraphim," tuu yoy ryes eu xaS' o, ri &tS§fuu, xai Uirau.ai vofir r» treufana, xjxi toj ayytKtn.au T«{"5> »« t«j rauv agyayytA** not OTftmsv rfoMwyo;, ■ Proelos begins the ilxth book of die following werk with o Wring that he hat celebrated in the preceding book the bebdanadlc «m at the intellect sal Godj, The »> IMTIODDCTIOW. The opinion of Grotius' therefore, is highly probable, that the Jews obtained the names of Powers, Dominations, and Principalities, from their Babylonic captivity; ami Gale in his notes on Iamblichos* says, that certain passages of Zoroaster and Ostanes cited by the author of Arithm. Theolog. confirm this opinion of Grotius- Indeed, the appellation of aftpu principle*, which are the first of the four powers mentioned by Paul, was given by the < called by the Grecian uWogists supermundane and assimilative, the nature of i by Produs in the sixth book of the following work ; and Prod us in the fourth book of bis MS. Commentary On the Parmenides of Plato shows that the order of Gods denominated roersc nmt »o»f4f, intelligible and at the tome time intellectual, is according to the Chaldean oracles' princi- pally characterized by domination. In proof of this, the two following oracles are cited by him, the first, concerning the empyrean, and the , EiMfi hvknwr; wrrgof mini&t /buAi. i. e. " All things yield ministrant to the intellectual prcsters of intellectual fire, through (he per- wiU of the father." And i. e. " But likewise such as are m subjection to the material Synoches.'* Farther still, Paul m the Epistle to the Romans, chap. viii. v. 38, says, " For 1 am that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to wparate us from the love of God, &c." From this arrangement therefore, it is evident that principalities and powers are not the same with angels ; and as according to Paul they are beings *o exalted, that in his Epistle • Ad Cap. IB. sftattfcaL > D« My»t. ». «*6. : .Hm my Collection of tbt*« Or»de» in th« old Montldy Mag»»D*. « The SyuKlK. fo™ tht secoed triad of Uw mUUir.,bW, aad at UM sum USM iataOectusI trdei of God.. Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. Co the Epb«i»ft.,he could not find nn> thing more magnificent lu say of Christ, than that he is raised even above them, it follows that ihey must be Gods, since they are superior to the angelic order. It is remarkable too, that he courtages height and depth (vfout »** fia6a;) with | ties and powers ; and is one of the *o«« a« curdiug to the Valentinians. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians likewise, chap. viii. v. j. Pmil t xprrs*ly assert* that tier* is a divine multitude. For be says, « Though there be that arc called ( W», whether in heaven or in earth, fas there l>e Gods many uud Lord, many ;)" i„ the pu.cuthcsi, of which verse, it i» incon- trovertibly evident that he adn.its the existence of a plurality of Gods, though as weU as the heathens he believed that . ue Coa only m supreme and the father of all things. Nor am I singu- lar in asserting that this wa, admitted by Paul. For the Pwido-Dionysius the Arcopagile in the second oliapterof his treatise O., the Divi::e Name* observe! concerning what is here said by Paul a* follows : « Again, from the deife ev^y of God, by which «vry thing according to its »bili:y become, dciform, many Gods are generate □ : in consequence of which there appears and ia said to be a separation and multiplication of ihe one [spireme] God. Nc\eilhelc?s, God himself, who is the chief deity, and is supereiiehlially die suprcm-, is >till one G mI, remaining impartible w the Gods distributed from him, united to iiimsdf, unmiugleH witli th* many, and void of multitude." And he afterwards adds, " mat litis was in a transcendent manner understood by Paul, who was the leader both of him and hli preceptor, to divine illumination," in the above cited verse. And, « that in divine natures, unions vanquish and precede separations, and yet nevertheless tbey are' united, after the separation wliich does not in proceeding depart fioru the one, and is unical."1 Pad therefore, according to this Dionysiu*, considered the Gods, conformably to Plato and the best of his disciples, as deiform processions from the one, and which at the same time that they have a dis- tinct subsistence from, are profoundly united to their great producing cause. Dionysius also employs tlie very same expression which Proclus continually uses when speaking of the separation of the Gods from iheir source ; for he says -bat the divine multitude rsv „„, i. e. doe, not depart from, but abides in the on. Hence Proclus in the fifth book of his MS Commentary Oo the Parmenides of Plato, speaking of tlie divine unities says, " Whichever among these you assume, it is the same with ihe others, because all of them are in each other, and are rooted in tht • IUU. rn ,( um rw M» Jw r.w„.,f *,„ fu. urn. «, Tw ^ , rr>; — «x^«r.:. „vt. „.,,*,.e „»,„{ , ,„>K %fua „, „„ „t T„ 4llM , ' »t. rx, K.. r-f nr. tw. .. „.„,; l„^rmn «..,„,,„ w ,r«T.a.:.„, v.. «... w„, ,,t., S«i-». *U7. .V TW „H ...»^T,r„ „. *«,.#,». Proc- Vol. I. rf Digitized by Google Ufi miKODUCTlOlt. Mr. For u 1mm by their •ummiu (i. a. tbeir rooU) we fixed in lb* earth, and through the* are earthly, after the wine manner al*o divine nature* are rooted by their aumaiu m the one, and each of then ia a unity aad one, through uncoofuaed union with the one ittdf." H* ya* m, rwrm km- fiji, tv camp rmi aXXtuc Aop£«n«, turn wturai hi n «AAaAjuf ttrt, xcu m^orreu rueru Kmtang yaq ra hvlpa Taif Montn K»gw$«jf mSgvrrai Tp yy, xcu i«ti yima x«t" txuraf, Toy sutov Tpoiroy imu t» ftia nu< Mimr* ««f*n]Ttv iM^itwM t» r»i, mi m««ym> «vrwy rv«f «m, am r», Si« ran t» ** awtiyxuro* Thia Dioayaiui, who certainly lived posterior to Proclus, became he continually borrow* from kia worki, barbaroutly confounding that scientific arrangement of theae deiform pioceesions from I he -one, which is so admirably unfolded by Proctus in the following work, classes i\vem a* follows, like first order, according to him, conaist* of Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. The second of the divine essence* characterized by dominion, might, and power. Ami tba third of Principalities, Archangels, end Angels. Hence he haa transferred the character- ise* of the iotclIigibU triad of Goda to Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. For symmetry, train, aad beastly, which characterize this triad, are raid by Plato in the Phikbua to subsist ia the veetibule of the good ; (eri u*» tcij t fin vty&ZwMH yt>«^«f Jt»/«t«t, turn? nmn um.,wMMf» *•» rv »|«rx«»'. D« CoUatt. Mitrarch. c.ip. 7. Digitized by Google IrfTBODtfCTlOH. Xivii ■ Vestiges therefor* of the theology of Plato nay be seen both i. the Jewish u tad in a similar manner, a resemblance m the religions of all other nations to it might be easily pointed out, and it* universality be clearly demonstrated. Omitting however, • discussion of this kind for the preterit, I (hall farther observe respecting this theology, that the deification of dead men, and the worshipping men at Gods form no part of it when it ia eooaidered according to it* getrume purity. Numerous instances of the truth of thu might be adduced, but I shall mennon for thu purpose, as unexceptionable witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric wees/ and the treatise of Plutarch On Isis and Osixi*. All the works of Plato indeed, evmce the truth of this position, but this is particularly manifest from his Laws. The Gulden verses order, that the immortal Gods be honoured first as (hey are disposed by law ; afterwards the illastrious Heroes), under which appellation, the author of the verses comprehends also angels and daemon* property v to called : and in the last place the terrestrial damons, i. e. such good men as transcend in virtue the But to honour the Gods as they are disposed by taw, is, as Hieroele* observe*, i they are arranged by their fabricator and father j and this ia to honour them a* beings superior to man. Hence, to honour inert, however excellent they may be, as Gods, is not to honour the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by their Creator, for it is con- founding the divine with the human nature, and is thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagorie • " Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, Tkat he charged kit ditcipUt net to grot equal drgreu of honour I* Ms iiodt and heroes. Herodotus (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, Thai they worthtpptd Ucrtvlu two meyt, mimjs imnurtal dcxty and to they HfriSrtJ to Mik : ami another at a Hero, and to they celebrated hit memory. Isoerata* (Enoom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods, when he speaks of Menelaus and Helena. But the distinction is no where more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon she statue of RegUla, wife to Herodes Atticu*. as Salmasiua thinks, which was set up in his temple at Triopium, and taken from tha statue itself by Sirroondus; where it is said, That tka had ntUhar tka konour of a mortal, nor ytt that which vat proper to the Goth : n>i turn •»»*•<;, m*~f *«•»'» It usilll by the inscription of Herodes, and by the testament of Epicteta extant in Greek in the Collection of Inscription*, that it was in the power of particular families to keep festival days in honour of seme of their own family, and ra give ktroiaU konourt to th.-m. In that noble inscription at Venice, we find three days appointed every year to be kept, and a confraternity established for that purpose with the laws of it. The first day to bo observed in honour of die Mutes, and sacrifices to be ofJcred to them as dritiej. The second and third days in honour of the Scroti <>f the family ; between which honour and tkat of deities, the/ shewed the difference by th? distance of time between them, and tho preference given to the other. But wherein soever the differmca lay, that there w n mttincliun acknowledged among them spears by this passage of Valerius in his excellent oration extant in i>iouyaius llalicainass. Antiq Roiu. lit>. 11. p. 694. I call, says Ua,the Godt toaUxtt,mhou tem/>letand oitareamr ■amUy hat, uurthipped a ilk conmnn tocrifcet; and next after them, J eoil tka Ganii of our natation, to whom . e give lHT.r{ f^ij, the tetond honenrt nest to the Gods, as Celsus calls those w^ tka duo honmri that belong to the lower damom. From which we take notice, that the Heathens did not confound all '"'greet of' divina wonkip, giving to the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the calnttai deities, or the supreme Gad. So tnat if the distinction of divine worship will excuse from Idolatry, the Heathens were not to blame for iL" See StilttngHeefs answer to a book entitled Catholic* bo Idolater*, p. 510,8 18,&c. Digitized by Google xnv'di INTRODUCTION. precept. Plutarch too in his above-mentioned treatise most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety of worshipping men as Gods, as is evident from die following extract : " Those therefore, wbo tliink that things of this kind [i. e. fabulous stories of the Gods as if they were men] are but so many commemorations of the actions and disasters of kings and tyrants, who through transcendency in virtue or power, inscribed die title of divinity on their renown, and after- wards fell into great calamities and misfortunes, these employ the most easy method indeed of eluding the story, and not badly transfer things of evil report, from the Gods to men ; and they are assisted in so doing by the narrations themselves. For the Egyptians relate, that Hermes was as to his body, with one arm longer than the other; that Typhon was in his complexion red; but Orus white, and Osiris black, as if they had been by uature men. Farther still, lliey also call Otiria a commander, and Canopus a pilot, from whom they say the star of that name was denomi- nated. The ship likewise, which the Greeks call Argo, being the image of die ark of Osiris, and which therefore in honour of it is become a constellation, they make to ride not far from Orion and the Dog ; of which they consider the one as sacred to Orus, but the other to Isis. " I fear, however, that this [according to the proverb] would be to move things immoveable, and to declare war, not ouly, as Simouides says, against a great length of time, but also against many nations and families of mankind wbo are under the influence of divine inspiration through piety to these Gods; and would not in any respect fall short of transferring from heaven to earth, such grta! and venerable names, and of thereby shaking and dissolving that worship and belief, which has been implanted in almost all men from their very birth, would be opening great doors to the tribe o# atheists, who convert divine into human concerns; and would likewise afford a large license to the impostures of Eucuicrus of Messina, who devised certain memoirs of an incredible and fictitious ' mythology,* and thereby spread every kind of atheism through the globe, by inscribing all the received God», tvithout any discrimination, by the names of generals, naval-captain*, and kingt, who lived iu remote perituh of time. He further adds, that they arc recorded in golden characters, in a certain country called Panchoa, at which neither any llarburian or Grecian ever arrived, except Euemcnis alone, who, as it beems, sailed to the Pnnchuaus and Tiiphyllians, that neither have, nor ever bad a being. Ami though the gnat actions of Semiramis are celebrated by the Assyrians, and those of Scs-jstris in Egypt ; and though the Phrygians even to the present time, call ' B .Hi Arnobius therefore- and Mimrci-.:* Felix wtrc very- unfortunate in .;i:e:;-g this impov.or to prove that ir.e4.ir:;«i Cem«, « .Mlnxii Fc«:«;» O.-is-i.i, J>. 3j0. 8vo. r*i'W'-, KH'j. INTRODUCTION. tltoir ancient king*, whom some call Masdes, was a brave and powerful man ; and farther atill, though Cyrus among the Persians, and Alexander atnon^ the Macedonians, proceeded in their vic- tories, almost at far as to the boundaries of the earth, yet they ouly retain the name of good king*, and arc remembered as such, [and not as God*.] " But if certain persons, inflated by ostentation, as Plato soys, having their soul at one and the same lime inflamed with youth and ignorance, have insolently assumed the appellulion of Gods, and had temples erected in their honour, yet this opinion of them flourished but for a short time, and afterwards they were charged with vanity and arrogance, in conjunction with impiety and lawless con luct j and thus, Like smoke they flew away with swift-pae'd fate. And being dragged from temples and altars like fugitive slave*, they have now nothing left them, but their monuments and tombs. Hence Arttigonus the elder said to one llermodotus, who had celebrated him in his poems us the offspring of the sun ami a God, 'he who empties my close-stool-pan knows no such thing of me.' Very properly also, did I.) sip pus the sculptor blame Apelles the painter, for drawing the picture of Alexander with a lliunder-bolt in his hand, whereas he had represented him with a spear, the glory of which, as being true and proper, no time would take away." In another part of the same work also, he admirably reprobates the impiety of making the Gods to be things inanimate, which was very common with Latin writers of the Augustan age, and of the ages that accompanied the decliue and fall of the Roman empire. But what he says on this sub- ject is as follows : " In the s-ccond plac*. which is of still greater consc-nuence, men should be careful, and very much afraid, lest before they are aware, they tear in pieces and dissolve divine natures, into blast* of wind, streams of water, semination*, t arings of land, accidents of the earth, and mutations of the season*, us those do « ho male Bacchus to be vt ine, ami Vulcan flame. Cleanlhes also some- where says, that Persephoue or Proserpine is the spirit or air that pasttt through ($tf«/*n»r) the fruits of the earth, and is then tlaitt, (4cnv5firvc>'.) Aud a certain poet says of reapers, Then when the youth the limb* of Ceres cut. Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. For the*; men do not m any respect differ from those who conceive the tail*, the cable*, and the anchor of a ship, to be the pilot, the yarn and the web to be the weaver, and the bowl,1 or the mead, or the ptisan, to be the physician. But they also produce dire and atheistical opinions, by •firing the names of Gods to natures and things deprived of sense and Soul, and that are necessarily destroyed by men, who are in want of and use them. For it is not portable to conceive that these things are Gods; since, neither can any thing be a God to men, which is deprived of soul, or is subject to human power. From these things however, we are led to conceive those beings to be Gods, who both use them and impart them to us, and snpply them perpetually and without ceasing. Nor do we conceive that the Gods who bestow these, aie different in different countries, nor that some of them are peculiar to the Barbarians, but others to the Grecians, nor that some are southern, and others northern ; but as the sun and moon, the heavens, the land, end the $e«, are common to all men, yet are differently denominated by different nations; so the one reason that preside over all nations, have different appellations and honours assigned them according to law by different countries. Of those also that have been consecrated to their service, some employ obscure, but others clearer symbols, not without danger thus conducting our inteDectual concep- tions to the apprehension of divine natures. For some, deviating from the true meaning of these symbols, have entirely slipt into superstition ; and others again flying from superstition as a quag- mire, have unaware fallcu upon atheism as on a precipice. Heucc, in order to avoid these danger*, it is especially necessary that resuming the reasoning of Philosophy as our guide to mystic know- ledge, we should conceive piously of every thing that is said or done in religion ; lot that, as Theodorus said, while he extended his arguments with his right hand, some of his auditors received them with their left, so we should fall into dangerous errors, by receiving what the laws have vvr'l instituted about sacrifices and festivals in a manner different from their original intention." The Emperor Julian, as well as Plutarch appears to have been perfectly aware of this confusion in the religion of the Heathens arising from the dedication of men, and in the fragments of his treatise against the Christians, preserved by Cyril, he speaks of it as follows : " If any one. wishes to consider the truth respecting you [Christians,] he will find that your impiety is composed of the Judaic audacity, and the indolence and cuii/mion of the Ileathtnt. For deriving from both, not that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web of evils. Willi tl.. Hebrew* ndeed, there are accurate and venerable laws pertaining to religion, ami inuuiiieral.lv precepts which require a in-jst holy life and deliberate choice. But ulnvn the Jewish legislator forbids the serving all the Gods, and eisjoius the worship of one alone, whose portion is Jacob, and Digitized by Google IKT ft«»«C*IOH. Uli Israel ttwlim of k» nafc*ritsmce, end not only say* tkos, but also omits to odd, I think, yea not revise the Cod., the detestable wickedness and Mdacity of those in after times, wiping to take •way all religious reverence from (be mukitude, (bought that not to worship should be followed by blaspheming the Gods. Thia you hare alone tl>e»ce derived ; bat there ia no srtnihivtde in any ihiug else between you bik! them. Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you bare seized blasphemy toward* the venerable Goda; but from our religion you hare coat tuidt reverence to tvx'rtf nature more excellent thou man, and the iov€ of paternal tHetttsstes - " So great au apprehension indeed, rays Dr. Stillingfleet,' had the Heathen? of ihe Mceaarty of appropriate acts of divine worihip, that some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them to what they did not believe to be God. We have a remarkable rtorv to this purpose in Arrian and Curtius* concerning CaUiathenes. Alexander arriving at that degree of vanity, as to desire to have divine worship given him, and the matter being started out of design among the courtiers, either by Anaxarchua, aa Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian, as Curtius says ; and the way of doing it proposed, viz. by incense and prostration; CaOUtheaea vehemently opposed it, at that which would confound' the difference of human and divine worship, which had been preserved inviolable among them. The worship of the Gods had been kept up in temples, with altars, and images, and sacrifices, and hymns, and prostrations, and such like ; but it it by no meant fitting, says he, for U4 to confound thete things, either by lifting up nun to the honours of the Gods, or depressing the Gods to the honours of men. For neither would Alexander suffer any man to usurp his royal dig- nity by the votes of men ; how much more justly may the Gods disdain for any man to take their houonra to himself. And it appears by Plutarch,1 that the Greeka thought it a mean and base thing for any of them, when sent on an embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate themselves before them, because this was only allowed among them in divine adoration. Therefore, says he, when Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent to Arlax erics, Pelopidas did nothing unworthy, but Ismeniaa let fall bis ring to the ground, and stooping for that was nought to make his adoration ; which was altogether as good a shift as Use Jesuits advising the crucifix to be held in the Mandarin*' hands while they made their adoration* in the Heathen temples in China. " Conon* also refused to make his adoration, ns n disgrace to his city; and Isocrates' accuses ' Answer to Catholics no Idolaters Lond. 1876. p. tit. 1 Arrian.de Exped. Alex. I. 4. et Curt. lib. 8. • Viu Aruxen. /Elian. Var. hist. lib. 1. c. tl. ♦ Justin, lib. 6. > Paaegyr. : Digitized by Google IXTROBUCTIO M. the Persians for doing it* because hertin they shewed, that they despised the Gods rather than men, by prostituting their honours to their princes. Herodotus* mentions Sperchius and Brdis, who could not with the greatest violence bo brought to give adoration to Xerxes, because it was against the lavs of their country to give divhie honour to men.' And Valerius Maximus* says, the Jthe- . mans put Timagorat to death for doing it ; so strong an apprehension had possessed them, that . the manner of worship which the) used to their Gods, should be preserved sacred and inviolable." The philosopher Sallusl also in his treatise On the (Jods and the World says, " It is not unreasona- ble to suppose that impiety is a species of punishment, and that those who bave had a knowledge of the Gods, and yet despised ineni, will in another life be deprived of this knowledge. And it is requisite to make the punisliment of those who have honoured their kings as Gods to consist in being expelled from the Gods."' When the ineffable transcendency of the first God, whith was considered as the grand principle in the Heathen theology, by iu most ancient promulgators Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was forgotten, this oblivion was doubtless the principal cause of dead men being deified by the Pagans. Had they properly directed their attention to this tram cendency they would have perceived it to be so immense as to surpass eternity, infinity, self-subsistence, and even essence itself, and that these in reality belong to those veiu-rable natures which are as it were first unfolded into light from the unfathomable depihsof that truly mystic unknown, about which all kuowledgc is refunded into ignorance. For as Simplicius justly observes, " It is requisite that he who ascends to the princi- ple of things should investigate whether it is possible there cau be any thing better than the sup- posed principle : and if something more excellent is found, the same enquiry should again be made respecting that, till we arrive at the highest conceptions, Uian which we have no longer any more venerable. Nor should we stop in our asceiit till we find this to be the case. For then- is no occasion to fear that our progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving some- thing about the first principles which is greater and more transcendent than their nature. For it is not possible for our conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less to pass beyond the dignity of the first principles of things." He adds, '« This therefore is oue and the best extension [of the soul] to [ihe highest] God, and is as much as possible irreprel.enrille ; viz. to know firmly, lliat by ascribing to him the n,o.-t venerable excellencies we can couceive, and the mmt holy and primary names and things, we ascribe nothing to hi.n which is suitable to bis dignity. ' r.ib.T. ' l.:h. 6 Cap. 3. Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. xixiii It is sufficient however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt,] that we can attribute to him superior.'" If it is not possible therefore to form any idea, equal to tbe dignity of the : progeny of the ineffable, i. e. of the first principle* of things, how much less can our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkuess, in the reverential language of the Egyptians,1 which is even beyond these? Had the Heathens therefore considered as they ought this trans- cendency of the supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with the divine nature, and consequently would never have worshipped men aa'Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause of this impiety, but their forgetfolness of the sub- of its dogmas, and tbe confusion with which this oblivion wa r i lu the last place, I wish to adduce a few respectable testimonies to prove that statues were not considered nor worshipped by any of the intelligent Heathens as Gods, but as the resemblance* of the Gods, as auxiliaries to tbe recollection of a divine nature, and tbe means of procuring its assist- ance and favour. For this purpose, I shall first present the reader with what the philosopher Sallust says concerning sacrifices and the honours which were paid to the divinities, in his golden treatise On the Gods and the World. " The honours, says he, which we pay to the Gods are per- formed for the sake of our advantage ; and since the providence of the Gods is every where extended, a certain habitude or fitness is all that is requisite in order to receive their beneficent communications. But all habitude is produced through imitation and simiUtude. He imitate the heavens, but altars die earth ; statues resemble life, and on this account to animals; prayers imitate that which is intellectual; but characters superior ineffable power* ; herbs and stones resemble matter ; and animals which are sacrificed the irrational life of oar souls. But from all these nothing happens to the Gods beyond what they already possess ; for what acces- sion can be made to a divine nature ? But • conjunction with our souls and the Gods is by these " I think however, it will be proper to add a few things concerning sacrifices. And in the first ■ Kat xf rn l¥' ni "fX*! »»fimmrm ^v>'», »• Ivwit "w *> *f*m m s/mitunt «fX'r "f* ,l,f**ft ■»«•» fittir, live *' "C T*r lmt*f n ■wriSnw^n «{uw urn., it vur I* wrfif-K, n pvtn iXn. nuixw WfTi/w. Siniplic. in Epiet. Enchir. p. 307. Lond. 1670. 8vo. 1 Of the first principle, says Dam&scius (in M. S. «f» "fx4") the Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it a* a darkness beyond all intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness, »^nt«/x" mim—n; nan; v*f «•#« SM|m>, gn*rtv «y»o»9r>f, T»t{ ravrt**i4SfA«^ifT':. Proc. Vol. 1. e Digitized by Google IMtV INTRODUCTION. place, fince we pones* every thing from the Gods, ami it U but just to offer the first fruits of gifts to the givers ; hence, of our possession* we offer the first fruitit through consecrated gifts ; of our bodies through ornaments ; and of our life through sacrifices. Besides, without sacrifices, prayers are words only ; but accompanied with sacrifices they become animated words ; the words indeed corroborating life, but life animating the words. Add too, that the felicity of every thing is its proper perfection ; but the proper perfection of every thing consists in a conjunction widi its cause. And on this account we pray that we may be conjoined with the Gods. Sbce therefore life pri- marily subsists in the Gods, and there is also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be united to the former, a medrum is required ; for natures much distant from each other cannot be conjoined without a medium. And it is necessary that the medium should be similar to the con- necteri natures. Life therefore must necessarily be the medium of life ; and hence men of the present day that are happy, and all the ancirnts, have sacrificed animals. And this indeed not rashly, but in a manner accommodated to every God, with many other ceremonies respecting the cultiva- tion of divinity.'" In the next place, the elegant Maximum Tyrius admirably observes concerning the worship of statues ' as follows : " It appears to me that as external discourse has no need, in order to its com- position, of certain Phoenician, or Ionian, or Attic, or Assyrian, or Egyptian characters, but human imbecility devised these marls, in which inserting its dulness, it recovers from them its memory ; in like manner a divine nature has no need of statues or altars ; but human nature being very imbe- cile, aud as uiucb distant from divinity as earth from heaven, devised these symbols, in which it inserted the names and the renown of the Gods. Those, therefore, whose memory is robust, and who are able, by directly extending their soul to heaven, to meet with divinity, have, perhaps,* uo need of statues. This race is, however, rare among men, and in a whole nation you will not find one who recollects divinity, and who is not in want of this kind of assistance, which resembles that devised by writing masters for hoys, who give them obscure marks as copies ; by m riling over • See chap. 15 and 16, of my translation of this excellent work. * See Vol. t of my translation of his Dissertations, Disserlat. 38, the title of which i«, " Whether statues should be d«dicatcd to the Gods." » The philosopher hidoru* was a man of this description, as we are informed by Damnum? in the extracts front his life preserved by Photius. For he says of him i ™ .*•>*,, ,i, „• ,vtw( Tlw>. TW?i»T»Kf trrmt ; tjvn Jiipw aTr^yTf Mat Tot***" tat r*f ti »X>.ff * aytatrn; t/tt • ifttf j xai rtm rturt $a^i„, tvaetr u mufw inf.- i.»n» imlsmm, mi m**< y> nit, \. e. " He was not willing to adore statues, hut approached to the God. themselves, w ho aie inwardly concealed not in adyta, but in the occult itscllj whatever it may be of alt- perfect ignorance. Uow therefore 10 them being such did he approach ? Through vehement love, this also being occult. And what else indeed, could conduct him to them than a love which is also unknown f What my meaning i§ those who have experienced this love know ; but it is impossible to reveal it by words «"1 >* no less difficult to understand what it is." Di INTRODUCTION. «hicb, their hand being guided by that of the matter, they become, through memory, accustomed to the art. It appear* to me therefore, that legislator* devised these statues for men, as if fur a certain kind of boys, as tokens of the honour which should be paid to divinity, und a certain duction as it were and path to rcaiiuiscctice. He then observes, " Unit with respect to the Barbarian*, all of them in like manner admit the subsistence of divinity, but different nations among these adopt different symbols." After which lie adds, " O many and all-various statue* ! of which some are fashioned by art, and other* are embraced through indigcoce : some arc honoured through utility, ami others are venerated through the astonishment which they excite ; some arc considered as divine tlirough their magnitude, and others are celebrated for their beauty ! There is not indeed any nice of men, neither Barbarian nor Grecian, neither maritime nor continental, neither living a iwstonil life, nor dwelling in cities, which can endure t<> be without some symbols of the hononr of the Gods. How, therefore, dial! any one discuss the question whether it is proper that statues of the Gods should be fabricated or not ? For if we were to give laws to other men recently sprung from the earth, aud dwelling beyond our boundaries and our air, or who were fashioned by a certain Prometheus, ignorant of life, and law, and reason, it might perhaps demand consideration, whether this race should be permitted to adore tlicse spontaneous statues alone, which are not fashioned from ivory or gold, aud which are neither " Of statues however, there is neither one law, nor one mode, nor one art, nor one matter. For the Greeks think it Jit to honour the Gods from things the most beautiful in the earth, from a pure matter, the human form, and accurate art : and their opinion is not irrational who fashion statues in the human resemblance. For if the human soul is most near and most similar to divinity, it is not reasonable to suppose that divinity would invest that which is most similar to himself with a most deformed body, but rather with one which would be an easy vehicle to immortal souls, light, and adapted to motion. for this alone, of all the bodies on the earth, raises its summit on high, is magnificent, superb, and full of symmetry, neither astonishing through its magnitude, nor terrible through its strength, nor moved with difficulty through its weight, nor slippery through its smooth- ness, nor repercussivc through its hardness, nor groveling through its coldness, nor precipitate through its beat, nor inclined to swim through its laxity, nor feeding on raw flesh through its fero- city, nor on grass through its imbecility ; but is harmomcally composed for its proper works, and is dreadful to timid animals, but mild to such as arc brave. It ia also adapted to walk by nature, but winged by reason, capable of swimming by art, feeds on com and fruits, and cultivates the earth, is of a good colour, stands firm, has a pleasing countenance, and a graceful beard. In the resemblance of such a body, die Greeks think fit to honour the Gods." Digitized by Google INTBOBUCTION. oaks nor cedars, nor rivers, nor bird*, but the rising sun, (be splendid moon, the variegated heaven, the earth itself and the air, all fire and all water ; or shall we constrain these men also to the nec ea- sily of honouring wood, or stones or images ? If, however, this is the common law of all men, let bola a* well as their names. " For divinity indeed, the father and fabricator of a)i things, is more ancient than the sun and the heavens, more excellent than time and eternity, and every flowing nature, and is a legislator with* out law, ineffable by voice, and invisible by the eyes. Not being able, however, to comprehend his silver, to plants and rivers, to the summits of mountains, and to streams of water ; desiring indeed to understand his nature, hut tlu-ough imbecility calling him by the names of such things as appear to us to be beautiful. And in thus acting, we are affected in the same manner as lovers, who are delighted with surveying the images of the objects of their love, and with recollecting the lyre, the dart, and the seat of these, the circus in which they ran, and every thing in short, whkh excites tho memory of the beloved object. What then remains for me to investigate and determine respecting statues f only to admit the subsistence of deity. But if the art of Phidias excite* the Greeks to the recollection of divinity, honour to animals the Egyptians, a river others, and fire others, I do not condemn the dissonance : let them ouly know, let them only love, let them only be mindful of the object they adore." With respect to the worship of animals, Plutarch apologizes for it in the following excellent man- ner in hi, treatise On Isis and Osiris. " It now remains that we should speak of the utility of these animals to man, and of their sym- bolical meaning ; some of them partaking of one of these only, hut many of them of both. It is e\idcnl therefore tlifit tilt El^yptiHns worsliijir/jcti tlic ox^ tlic she*?^] sod tlic ic b DC Uikk 00 j OD 3fcCC OUf) t of their use and benefit, as the Letnnians did larks, for discovering the eggs of caterpillars and breaking them ; and the Thessalians storks, because, as their land produced abundance of ser- pents, the storks destroyed all of tbem as soon as they appeared. Hence also ibey enacted a law, that whoever killed a stork should be banished. But the Egyptians honoured the asp, the weezle, and the beetle, in consequence of observing in them certain dark resemblances of the power of the Gods, like that of the sun in drops of water. For at present, many believe and assert that the weezle engenders by the ear, and brings forth by the mouth, being thus an image of the generation of reason, [or the productive principle of things.] But the genus of beetles has no female; and Digitized by Google r ■ INTRODUCTION. XII VII all the males emit their sperm into a spherical piece of earth, which they roll about thrusting it backwards with their hind feet, while they themselves move forward ; just as the sun appears to revolve in a direction contrary to that of the heavens, in coasequence of moving from west to east. They also assimilated the asp to a star, is being esempt from old age, and performing its motions 1 by organs with agility and ease Nor was the crocodile honoured by them without a > ; but is said to have been considered by them as • resemblance of divinity, as being the only animal that is without a tongue. For the divine reason is unindigent of voice, and proceed- ing through a silent path, and accompanied with ' justice, conducts mortal affairs according to it. They also say it is the only animal living in water mat has the sight of its eyes covered with a thin film which descends from his forehead so thjt he sees without beinsr seen which r with the first God. But in whatever place the female crocodile may lay her eggs, this may with certainty be concluded to be the boundary of the increase of the Nile. For not being able to lay their eggs in the water, and fearing to lay them far from it, they have such an accurate pre-sensation of futurity, that though they enjoy the benefit of the river in its access, during the time of their laying and hatching, yet they preserve their eggs dry and untouched by the water. Tbey also lay sixty eggs, are the same number of days in hatching them, and those that are the *em, live just so many years ; which number ia the first of the measures " Moreover, of those animals that were honoured for both reasons, we have before spoken of the dog. But the ibis, killing indeed all deadly reptiles, was the first that taught men the use of medi- cal evacuation, in consequence of observing that she is after this manner washed and purified by herself. Those priests also, that are most attentive to the laws of sacred rites, when they coose- crate water for lustration, fetch it from that place where the ibis had been drinking ; for ahe will neither drink nor come near unwholesome or infected water ; b t with the distance of her feet from each other, and her bill she makes an equilateral triangle. Farther still, the variety and mixture of her black wings about die white represents the moon when she is gibbous. " We ought not, however, to wonder if the Egyptians love such slender similitudes, since the Greeks also, both in their pictures and statues, employ many such like resemblances of the Gods. Thus in Crete, there was a statue of Jupiter without ears. For it is fit that he who is the ruler and lord of all things, should bear no one.* Phidias also placed a dragon by the statue of • Instead of «» I read * i. e. Should be perfectly impartial. Digitized by Google xxxviii INTRODUCTION. Minerva, and a snail by that of Venus at Elis, to show that virgins require a guard, and that keep* ing at home and silence become married women. But the trident of Neptune is a symbol of the third region of the world, which the sea possesses, having an arrangement after the heavens and the air. Hence also, they thus denominated Amphitritc and the Tritons. The Pythagoreans likewise adorned numbers and figures with the appellations of the Gods. For they called the equilateral triangle Minerva Coryphagenes, or begotten from the summit, and Tritogeneia, because it is divided by three perpendiculars drawn from tbe three angles. But they called die one Apollo, being per- •uaded to this by the obvious meaning of the word Apollo [which signifies a privation of multi- tude] and bv the simplicity of the monad.' Hie duad they denominated strife and audacity ; and the triad justice. For since injuring and being injured are two extremes subsisting according to excess and defect, justice through equality has a situation in the middle. But what is called the tctractys, being the number 36, was, as is reported, their greatest oath, and was denominated the world. For this number is formed from tbe composition of the four first even, and the four first odd numbers, collected into one sum.1 If therefore the most approved of the philosophers did not think it proper to neglect or despise any occult signification of a divine nature when" they perceived it even in things which are inanimate and incorporeal, it appears to me, that they in a still greater degree venerated those peculiarities depending on manners which they saw in such natures as had sense, aud were endued with soul, with passion, and ethical habits. We must embrace therefore, not those who honor these kings, but those who reverence divinity through these, as through most clear mirrors, and which are produced by nature, in a becoming manner, conceiving them to be the instru- ments or the art of the God by whom all things arc perpetually adorned. But we ought to think that no inanimate being cau be more excellent than one that is animated, nor an insensible than a sensitive being, not even though some one should collect together all the gold and emeralds in the universe. For tlie divinity is not ingeuerated either in colours, or figures, or smoothness; but such things as neither ever did, nor are naturally adapted to participate of life, have an allotment more ignoble than that of dead bodies. But the nature which lives and sees, and has the principle of motion from itself, and a knowledge of tilings appropriate and foreign to its being, has certainly derived an efflux and portion of that wisdom, which, as Heraclitus says, considers how both itself, aud the universe is governed. Hence the divinity is not worse represented in these animals, than in the workmanships of copper and stone, which in a similar manner suffer corruption ami decay, hut arc naturally deprived of all sense and consciousness. This then I consider as the best defence that cau be given of the adora- tion of animals by the Egyptians. ■ Instead of J'tm*™i as in the original, which is nooscim, it is necetsary to r*aJ, as in the above translation ««>*t^ti tic pWo:. 1 For»+4+6+8=l«0; and 1+S+S+7=1«; and 20+16=30. Digitized by Google I INTRODUCTION. uiii With respect however to the sacred vestments, those of Iais are of various hue* ; for her power is about matter, which becomes and receives all things, as light and darkness, day and night, fire and water, life and death, beginning and end ; but those of Osiris are without a shade and have no variety of colours, but have one only which is simple and luciform. Hence when the latter have been once used, they are laid aside and preserved ; for the intelligible is invisible and intangible. But the vestments of Isis are used frequently. For sensible things being in daily use and at hand, present us with many developements and views of their different mutations : but the intellectual perception of that which is intelligible, genuine, and holy, luminously darting through the soul like a coruscation, is attended with a simultaneous contact and vision of its object. Hence Plato and Aristotle call this part of philosophy epoplic or intuitive, indicating that those who have through the exercise of the reasoning power, soared beyond these doxastic, mingled and all- various natures, raise themselves to that first, simple, and immaterial principle, and passing into contact with the pure truth which subsists about it, they consider themselves as having at length obtained the end of philosophy.' And that which the present devoted and veiled priests obscurely manifest with great reverence and caution is that this God is the ruler and prince of the dead, and is not different from that divinity who is called by the Greeks Hades and Pluto, the truth of which assertion not being understood, disturbs the multitude, who suspeet that the truly sacred and holy Osiris dwell* in and under the earth, where the bodies of those are concealed who appear to have obtained an end of their being. But he indeed himself is at the remotest distance from the earth, unstained, unpolluted, and pure from every essence that receives corruption and death. The souls of men however, being here encompassed with bodies and passiuu*, cannot participate of divinity except as of an obscure dream by intellectual contact through philosophy. But when they are liberated from the body, and pans into the invisible, impassive, and pure region, this God is then their leader and king, from whom they depend, insatiably beholding him, and desiring to survey that beauty which cannot be expressed or uttered by men ; and which lsis, as the ancient discourse evinces, always loving, pursuing, and enjoying fills such things in these lower regions as participate of gene, ration with every thing beautiful and good." And lastly, the Emperor Julian, in a fragment of an Oration or Epistle on the duties of a priest, has the following remarks on religiously venerating statues : " Statues and altars, and the preser- vation of unextinguished fire, and in short, all such particulars, have been established by our fathers as symbols of the preseuce of the Gods; not that tee should believe that thete tymboU art Gods, but that through thete we should vorthip the God$. For since we are connected with body, * For T-Xf •xi.M Digitized by Google xl INTRODUCTION. it is alio Decenary that our worship of the God* should be performed in a corporeal manner; but they are incorporeal. And they indeed have exhibited to us aa the first of statues, that which ranks as the second genus of Gods from the first, and which circularly revolves round the whole of heaven.1 Since, however, a corporeal worship cannot even be paid to these, because they are naturally unindigenl, a third kind of statues was devised on the earth, by the worship of which we render the Gods propitious to us. For as those who reverence the images or kings, who are not in want of any such reverence, at the same time attract to themselves their benevolence ; thus also those who venerate the statues of the Gods, who are not in want of any thing, persuade the Gods by this veneration to assist and be favourable to them. For alacrity in the performance of tilings T in our power is a document of true sanctity ; and it is very evident that he who accomplishes the former, will in a greater degree possess the latter. But he who despises things in his power, and i pretends to desire impossibilities, evidently does not pursue the latter, and overlooks the For though divinity is not in want of any thing, it does not follow that on this account ; is to be offered to him. For neither is he in want of celebration through the ministry of words. What then I (Is it therefore reasonable that he should be deprived of this ? By no means. Neither therefore is he to be deprived of the honour which is paid him through works; which honour has been legally established, not for three, or for three thousand years, but in all preceding ages, among all natiotis of the earth. " But [the Galilssans will say,] O ! you who hai whom, though according to you tbey are formless and unfigured, you have fashioned in a corporeal resemblance, it is not fit that honour should be paid to divinity through such works. How, then, do not we [heathens] consider as wood and stones thaw statues which are fashioned by the hands of men* O more stupid than even stones themselves ! Do you fancy that all men are to be drawn by the nose at you are drawn by execrable dwmont, so as to think that the artificial resem- blances of the Gods are the Gods themselves* Looking therefore to the resemblances of the Gods, we do not think them to be either stones or wood ; for neither do we think that the Gods are these resemblances; since neither do we say that royal images are wood, or stone, or brass, nor that tbey are the kings themselves, but the images of kings. Whoever, therefore, loves his king, beholds with pleasure the image of his king ; whoever loves his child is delighted with his image ; loves his father surveys bis image with delight* Hence also, he who is a lover of at bodies the celestial orbs, which in const quence of participating a divine life from the corporeal powers from which they are suspend* * Dt. Sullingteet quotes this part of the extract, in his i Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. divinity gladly surveys the statues and image* of the Gods; at the i with a holy dread the Gods who invisibly behold hint.' The Catholics have employed arguments similar to these, in defence of the reverence which they pay to the images of their saints. Indeed, it is the doctrine of the Church of England,* that the 1 " Dio Chrysostome (says Dr. Stillingfleet in the before-cited work, p. 414) at large debates the case images, in bis Olympic Oration; wherein he first show*, thmt all me a have a natural apprehension of one supreme God the father of all things; and that this Cod was represented by the statue made by Phidias of Jupiter Olympius, for so he said *«f' r mnpnt btfert n-aom ire note art; and then describe* him to be the ting, ruler, and father of all, both Gods and men. This image be calls the roost blessed, the most excellent, the most beautiful, the most beloved image of God. He says there are four ways of comiug to the knowledge of God, by nature, by the instructions of the poets, by the laws, and by images; but neither poets, nor lawgivers, nor arti- ficers were the best interpreters of the deity, but only the philosophers who both understood and explained the divine nature most truly and perfectly. After this, he supposes Phidias to be called to account for making such an image of God, as unworthy of him; when Iphitus, Lycurgus, and the old Eleans, made none at all of him, as being out of the power of man to express his nature. To this Phidias replies, that no man can express miud and understanding by figures, or colours, and therefore they are forced to By to that in which the soul inhabits, and from thence they attribute the *«»t of wisdom and reason to God, having nothing better to represent him by. And by that means joining power and art together, they endeavour by something which may be seen and painted, to represent that which is invisible and inexpressible. But it may be said, we had better then have no image or representation of him at all. No, says be ; for mankind doth not love to worship God at a distauce, but to come near and feel him, and with assurance to sacrifice to him and crown him. Like children newly i their parents, who put out their hands towards them in their dreams as if they were still present; so do i of the sense of God's goodness and their relation to him, love to have him represented as present with them, and so to converse with him. Thence have come all the 'representations of God among the barbaruus nations, in mountains, and trees, and stones." The same conceptions also about statues are entertained by the Brachmans in Benares on the Ganges. For Monsieur Bernier when he was at their university, and was discoursing with one of the most learned men among tbem, proposed to him the question about the adoration of their idols, and reproaching him with it as a thing very unreasonable, received from him this remarkable answer : " We nave indeed in our temples many different statues, as those of Brahma, Mahadeo, Genick, and Gavani, who are some of the chief and most perfect Deutas (or Deities) ; and we have also many others of less perfection, to whom we pay great honour, prostrating our- selves before them, and presenting them flowers, rice, oylcs, saffron, and the like, with much ceremony. But we do not believe these statues to be Brahma or Becben, Arc. themselves, but only their images lions, and we only give them that honour ou account of the beings they represent. They are in our because it is necessary in order to pray well, to have something before our eyes that may fix the mind. And when we pray, il is not the statue we pray to, but be that is represented by it." The Brahmans have also ano- ther way of defending their worship of statues, of which the same author gives the following account: " That God, or that sovereign being whom they call Achar (immutable) has produced or drawn out of his own substance, not only souls, but also whatever is material and corporeal in the universe, so that all things in the world are but one and the same thing with God himself, as all numbers are bat one and the same unity repeated.'' Ber- nier Metnoires, tome 3. p. 171. 178' From this Utter extract it appears that the Brachmans as well as the ancient Egyptian*, believe that the supreme principle is all things. According to the best of the Platonists likewise, this principle is olitkingt prior to ait. For by being tie one, it is oil Miagi after the most umpU manner, 1. e. so as to transcend i » See its Homilies, tome «. p. 40. Proc. Vol. I. / Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. Catholic* form the game opinions of the saints whose images they worship as the Heathens did of their Gods ; and employ the same outward rites in honouring their images, as the Heathens did in the religious veneration of their statues. Thus as the Heathens had their luttlar Gods, such as were Belus to the Babylonians and Assyrians, Osiris and lsis to the Egyptians, aad Vulcan to the Leronians, thus also the Catholics attribute the defence of certain countries to certain saints. Have not the saints also to whom the safeguard of particular cities is committed, the same office as the Dii Provides of the Heathens.' Such as were at Delphi, Apollo; at Athens, Minerva; at Carthage, Juno ; and at Rome, Quirinus. And do not the saints to whom churches arc built and altars erected correspond to the Dii Palrooi of the Heathens ? Such as were in the Capitol, Jupiter, in the temple at Paphos, Venus, in the temple of Ephesus, Diana. Are not likewise, our Lady of Walsingham, our Lady of Ipswich, otir Lady of Wilsdon, and the like, imitations of Diana Agrotera, Diana Coripbca, Diana Ephesia, Venus Cypria, Veuus Paphia, Venus Gnidin, and the like ? The Catholics too, have substituted for the marine deities Neptune, Triton, Xereus, Castor and Pollux, Venus, 8tc. Saint Christopher, Saint Clement, and others, and especially our Lady, as she is called by them, to whom seamen sing Ave Maris stella. Neither has the fire escaped their imitation of the Pagans. For instead of Vulcan and Vesta, the respective guardians of tire according to the Heathens, the Catholics have substituted Saint Agatha, ou the day of whose nati- vity they make letters for the purpose of extinguishing lire. Every artificer likewise and profession has a special saint in the place of a presiding God. Thus scholars have Saint Nicholas and Saint Gregory; painters Saint Luke; nor are soldiers in want of a saint corresponding to Mars, nor lovers of one who is a substitute for Venus. All diseases too haTc their special saints instead of Gods, who arc invoked as possessing a healing power. Thus the venereal disease has Saint Roche ; the falling sickness Saint Cornelius, the tooth- ach Saint Apollin, &c. Beasts and cattle also have their presiding saints : for Saint Loy (says the Homily) is the horse-leach, and Saint Antony the swineherd, &c. The Homily adds,' " that in many points the Papists exceed the Gentiles in idolatry, and particularly in honouring and wor- shipping the relics and bones of saints, which prove that they be mortal men and dead, and there- fore no Gods to be worshipped, which the Gentiles would never confess of their Gods for very shame." And after enumerating many ridiculous practices of the Catholics in reference to these relics, the Homily concludes with observing, " that they are not only more wicked than the Gen- tile idolaters, but also no wiser than asses, horses, and mules, which have no understanding." In the wcond place the Homilies shew* that the rites and ceremonies of the Papists in honour ' Tome a. p. 54. 1 p- *9- Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION, xkfii ing and worshipping their images or saints, are the same with the rites of the Pagans. " This, say (hey, is evident in their pilgrimages to visit images which had more holiness and virtue in them than others. In their candle-religion, burning incense, offering up gold to images, hanging up crutches, chairs, and ships, legs, arms, and whole men and women of war, before images, as though by Ihem, or saints (as they say) lliey were delivered from lameness, sickness, captivity, or shipwreck." In spreading abroad after the manner of the Heathens, the miracles that have accompanied, images. " Such an image was sent from heaven, like the Palladium, or Diana of the Epbesians. Such an image was brought by angels. Such a one came itself far from the east to the west, as Dame Fortune Bed to Rome. Some images though they were hard and stony, yet for tender-heart and pity wept. Some spake more monstrously than ever did Balaam's ass, who had life and breath in him. Such a cripple came and saluted this saint of oak, and by and by he was made whole, and here hangeth his crutch. Such a one in a tempest vowed to Saint Christopher, and scaped, and behold here is bis ship of war. Such a one, by Saint Leonard's help, brake out of prison, and see where his fetters bang. And infinite thousands more miracles by like, or more shameless lies were reported." After all this, I appeal to every intelligent reader, whether the religion of the Heathens, accord- ing to its genuine purity as delineated in this Introduction, and as professed and promulgated by the best and wisest men of antiquity, is not infinitely preferable to that of the Catholics ? And whether it is not more holy to reverence beings the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of all things, and which are eternally centered and rooted in him ; and to believe that in reverencing these, we at the same time reverence the ineffable, because they partake of his nature, and that through these as media we become united with him,' than to reverence men, and the images of men, many of whom when living, were the disgrace of human nature? The Church of England a» we sec prefers the Pagans to the Pap 11 is , and 1 trust that every other sect of Protestant Christians will unanimously subscribe to her decision. And thus much in defence of the theology of Plato, and the religious worship of the Heathens. It now remains that I should speak of the following work, of its author, and the translation. The work itself then is a scientific development of the deifonn processions from the meltable principle ' The ineffable principle of things, as is demonstrated in tbe Elements of Theology io this work, is beyond self-subsistence. Hence the first ineffable eroluliou from him consists of self-subsistcnt natures. As we therefore are only the dregs of the rational tialure, many media arc necessary to conjoin us with a yrimiple so hnmeoscly exalted above us. And these media are the golden chain of powers that have deified summits, or (hat have the ineffable united with the citable. Digitized by Google xllV INTKODUCTION. of things, and this, as k appears to me id (he greatest perfection possible to mm. For the reason- ing ia every where consummately accurate, and deduced from eelf-evident priiiciplei ; and the conclusions are the result of what Plato powerfully call* geometrical neceaaitiei. To the reader of thia work indeed, who haa not been properly disciplined io Eleatic and Academic studies, and who haa not a genius naturally adapted to such abetruae speculations, it will doubtless appear to be perfectly unintelligible, and in the language of critical cant, nothing but jargon and revery. Thia, however, ia what Plato the great bierophant of this theology predicted would be the caae, if ever it was unfolded to the multitude at large. " For a$ it appears to me,^iayi he, there art ££0^C£^£f ^^GfiifltfafM ^pA^^A 6f tOJl4Wsw^,rl WlO^t r^^s^l^We^Otf^J fA^US t^9£9£ * to perceive them."' In his seventh epistle also he oWrves a* follows : " Thus much, however, I shall &ay respecting all thoae who either have written or shall write, affirming that they know those thinga which are the objects of my study (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves) thnt they have not heard any thing about these things conform- able to my opinion : for I never have written nor ever shall write about them.1 For a thing of ibis kind cannot be expressed by words like other discipline*, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light* as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself." And shortly after he adds ; " But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, ao as to be obvious to all men i I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small veatigea previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of manund, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain venerable things."4 Km nttvtamtomf*. Epist. 9. * Plato means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about imuUigMa or true being; toe proper objects of intellect. ' This light is a thing of a very different kind from that which is produced by the evidence arising from truths perceptible by the multitude, as those who have experienced it well know. mnn:, m\Xm, «>•' wc mptnc «itk, twnut in wti am y th» tt im ntn ymrnr font yuf nimj*f irr», «( a>x» l*M>*lx*n, «>J.' a mxx« rvmjniunc Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. The prediction of Plato therefore, has been but too truly fulfilled in the fate which baj attended the writing! of the best of bis disciples, among whom Proclut certainly maintains the most distin- guished rank. This indeed, these disciples well knew would be the case ; but perceiving that the hand of Barbaric and despotic power was about to dettroy the school* of the philosophers, and foreseeing that dreadful naht of ifuorancc and folly which succeeded so nefarious an undertaking they benevolently disclosed in as luminous a manner as the subject would permit, toe arcana of their master's doctrines, thereby, as Plato expresses it, giving assistance to Philosophy, and also preserving it as a paternal and immortal inheritance, to the latest posterity. Proclus in the first book of this work has enumerated the requisites which a student of it ought to possess ; and it is most certain that be who does not possess them, will never fathom the depths of this theology, or perceive his mind irradiated with that admirable light, mentioned by Plato in the foregoing extract, and which is only to be seen by that eye of the soul which is better worth saving than tea thousand corporeal eyes. With respect to the diction of Proclus in this work, its general character is that of purity, clearness, copiousness, and magnificence ; so that even the fastidious critic, who considers every Greek writer as partially barbarous who lived after the fall of the ever unwillingly, be forced to acknowledge that Proclus is a splendid exception. The i Kepler, whose decision on this subject, outweighs in my opinion, that of a sown of mo critics, after having made a long extract from the commentaries of Proclus on Euclid, gives the following animated encomium of his diction. " O ratio fluit ipsi torrcntis instar, ripas bundans, et gurgitesque occulta ns, dum mci it." i. e. " His language flows like a torrent, i hiding the dark fords and whirlpools of doubts, while his mind full of the majesty of things of such a magnitude, struggles in the straits of language, and the conclusion never satisfying him, exceeds by the copia of words, the simplicity of the propositions." If we omit what Kepler here says about the struggle of the mind of Proclus, and his never being satisfied with the conclusion, the rest of bis eulogy is equally applicable to the style of the present work, so far as it is possible for i to be combined with the rigid accuracy of geometrical i 9tf rt »fayp> *vr«, »i wu rv{i« rp""» *' "•»"•£ *f* ■>« rir"< T1 ■"vrmi aaXfeir nil|w' «i v"> " «F fiv, V ra; T« arfftmtri fuym rr*4**> *■» *<*" ■* f»r *** *{♦« W» i >vn attfmt wynpM, m mxuf wit Wf um \tyifxmt ayafa, h pi r-nt "mi Jnani minftn mtm 1m> paf>< niu(im,f «ai n 1 Digitized by Google xlvi INTBODOCT10N. With respect to the life of Proclus, it his been written with great elegance by his disciple Mari- ons ; and a translation of it by me prefixed to my version of the commentaries of Proclus was pub- lished in 1788. From the edition of that life therefore, by Fabricius, the following particulars relative to this very extraordinary man are extracted, for the information of the reader who may not have the translation of it in his possession. According to the accurate chronology then of Fabricius, Proclus was born at Byzantium in the year of Christ 412, on the 6th of the Ides of February, and died in the one hundred and twenty-fourth year after the reign of the empe- ror Julian, on the seventeenth day of the Attic Munichion, or the April of the Romans, Nicagoran the junior, being at that time the Athenian archon. His father Patriciua, and his mother Marcella, were both of them of the Lyc'tan nation, and were no le*s illustrious for their virtue than their birth. As soon as he was bom, his parents brought him to their native country Xantbus, which was sacred to Apollo. And this, says Martinis, happened to him by a certain divine allotment. " For, he adds, I think it was necessary that he who was to be the leader of alt sciences, should be nourished and educated under the presiding deity of the Muses." The person of Proclus was uncommonly beautiful ; and he not only possessed all tbe moral and intellectual virtues in the highest perfection, but the veatigies of them also, which are denominated the physical virtues, were clearly seen, says Marinus, in his last and shelly vestment the body. Hence he possessed a remarkable acuteness of sensation, and particularly in the most honourable of the senses, sight and hearing, which, as Plato says, were imparted by the Gods to men for the purpose of philosophising, and for the well being of the animal life, in the second place, he possessed so great a strength of body, that it was neither injured by cold, nor any endurance of labours, though these were extreme, both by night and day. In the third place, he was, as we have before observed, very beautiful. " For not only, says Marinus, did his body possess great symmetry, but a living light as it were beaming from his soul was efflorescent in his body, and shone forth with au admira- ble- splendor, which it is impossible to di-scribe." Marinus adds, " Indeed he was so beautiful, that no painter could accurately exhibit his resemblauce ; and all the pictures of him which were circulated, though very beautiful, were very inferior to the beauty of the original." And in the fourth place, he possessed health in such perfection, that he was not ill above twice or thrice in the course of so long a life as seventy-five years. Such then were the corporeal prerogatives which Proclus possessed, and which may be called the forerunners of the forms of perfect virtue. But he possessed in a wonderful manner what Plato calls the elements of a philosophic genius.' For he had an excellent memory, learned with facility, was magnificent and graceful, and the friend and ally of truth, justice, fortitude, and tern, ■ See the sixth bouk of the Republic of Plato. Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. pemnce. Having for a short space of time applied himself in Lycia to grammar, he weal to Alex- andria in Egypt, and was there instructed in rhetoric by Leonas who derived his lineage from lsauru*, and in grammar by Orion, whose ancestors discharged the sacerdotal office among the Egyptians, and who composed elaborate treatises on that art. A certain good fortune however, says iMarinun, brought him back to the place of his nativity. For on his return his tutelar Goddess exhorted him to philosophy, and to visit the Athenian schools. Having therefore, first returned to Alexandria and bade farewell to rhetoric, and the other arts which he had formerly studied, he gave himself up to the discourses of the philosophers then resident at Alexandria. Here, he became an auditor of Olyrnpiodorus,1 the most illustrious of philosophers, for the sake of imbibing the doc- trine of Aristotle ; and was instructed in the mathematical disciplines by Hero, a religious man, and eminently skilful in teaching those sciences. Prod us however, not being satisfied with the Alexandrian schools, went to Athens, " with a certain splendid procession, says Martnus, of all elo- quence and elegance, and attended by the Gods that preside over philosophy, and by beneficent daemons. For that the succession of philosophy, might be preserved legitimate and genuine, the Gods led him to the city over which its inspective guardian presides." Hence Proclua was called x«r' htf way of eminence, the Platonic Succetsor. At Athens therefore, Proclus fortunately met with the first of philosophers, Syrianus,* the son of Philoxenus, who not only much assisted him in his studies, but made him his domestic as to other concerns, and the companion of his philo- sophic life, having found him such an auditor and successor as he had. a long time sought for, and one who was capable of receiving a multitude of disciplines and divine dogmas. In less than two whole years therefore, Proclus read with Syrianus all the «orks of Aristotle, vii. his logic, ethics, politics, physics, and theological science. And being sufficiently instructed in these as in certain proteleia, or things preparatory to initiation, and lesser mysteries, Syrianus led him to the mystic discipline of Plato, in an orderly progression, and not according to the Chaldean oracle with a transcendent foot. He likewise enabled Proclus to survey in conjunction with him, says Marinus, truly divine mysteries, with the eyes of his soul free from material daikness, and with undefiled intellectual vision. But Proclus employing sleepless exercise and attention, both ' This Olympiodorus is not the fame with I he philosopher of that nunc whose leurnrd commentaries on cer- tain dialogues of Plato are extant in manuscript ; as in these, not only Proclus, but Darnascius who flourished after Proclus is celebrated. * This truly great man appears to luu o been ihe first who thoroughly penetrated the profundity contained in the writings of the moie ancient philosophers, contemporary with and prior to Plato, and to have demon- strated the admirable agreement of their doctrines with each other. Unfortunately but few of bis works are INTRODUCTION. by night and by tiny, arid avnoptically and judiciously committing to writing what be beard from Syria ii in, made so great a progress in a little time, that by then he wu twenty-eight year* of age, he had composed a multitude of work* and among the rest hit commentarie are truly elegant and full of science. But from men a discipline as this, his adorned ; and a.s he advanced in science he ; Marinus after this, shows how Proclus possessed all the virtues in the greatest possible perfec- tion; and how be proceeded from the exercise of the political virtues, which are produced by reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument, to the cathartic virtues which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. He then adds, " Proclus having made a proficiency, through these virtues, as it were by certain mystic steps, recurred from these to such as are greater and more telestic, being con- ducted to them by a prosperous nature and scientific discipline. For being now purified, rising above generation, and despising its thyrsus-bearers,' be was agitated with a divinely inspired fury, about the first essences, and became an inspector of the truly blessed spectacles which they coutain. No longer collecting discursively and demonstratively the science of them, but surveying the in u* it were by simple intuition, and beholding through intellectual energies tbe paradigms in a divine tC.ll^£t p H-SSU til 1 ^lj^ ^ VlF ^Fs>llCs>l 0U2 110 lOO^CT a^^ dcUOIHittea1 sjC^sI wWlCUl 0£ a bttsi ^rYa*adl OU|j^ ll t Flat.}] CP to be called wisdom, or something still more venerable than this. The ; gizing according to this virtue, easily comprehended all the theology of the Greeks and and that which is adumbrated in mythological fictions, aud brought it into light, to those who are willing and able to understand it. He explained likewise every thing in a mora enthusiastic man- ner, and brought the different theologies to an harmonious agreement. At the same time also, investigating the writings of the ancients, whatever he found in them genuine, he judiciously adopted ; but if he found any thing of a spurious nature, this, he entirely rejected as erroneous. He also strenuously subverted by a diligent examination such doctrines as were contrary to truth. In his associations too with others, he employed no less force and perspicuity. For he was a man laborious beyond measure ; as, in one day, he gave five, and sometimes more lectures, and wrote ■ Socrates in the Phardo of Plato, Orphically calls the multitude thyrsus-bearers as living TilannicaMy. For tbe thyrsus, says Olymjriodorn*, (in MS. comment in Pliasd.) is a symbol uf material and partible fabrication, on account of its divulaed continuity, whence also it is a Titannic plant. " For it is txteaded, says he, before Bac- chus, instead of his paternal sceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. He adds, " Besides the Titans are thyrsus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a read, whether by this we an to understand that he draws down celestial light into generation, or impels soul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is l Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION. as many as seven hundred verse*. Betides this, he went to other philosophers, and spent the evening in conversation with them. And all these employments he executed in such a manner as not to neglect his nocturnal and vigilant piety to the Gods, and assiduously supplicating the huh when rising, when at his meridian altitude, and when he sets." M annus farther observes of this most extraordinary man, " that be did not seem to be without divine inspiration. For words similar to the most white and thick-tailing snow ' proceeded from his wise mouth, his eyes appeared to be filled with a fulgid splendor, and the rest of his face to partici- pate of divine illumination. Hence Rufinus, a man illustrious in the Republic, and who was also .1 man of veracity, and in other respects venerable, happening to be present with him when he was lecturing, perceived that his bead was surrounded with a light. And when Proclus had finished his lecture, Rufinus rising, adored him, and testified by an oath the truth of the divine vision which tie had seen." Marians also informs us, "that Proclus being purified in an orderly manner by the Chaldean puri- fications, was an inspector of the lucid Heratic visions, as he himself somewhere mentions in one of his writing*. By opportunely moving Likewise a certain Hecatic spharula,* he procured shower* of rain, and freed Athens from an unseasonable heat. Besides tins, by certain phylactcria or charms, he stopt an earthquake, and had made trial of the divining energy of the tripod, having been instructed by certain verses respecting its failure. For when he was in his fortieth year, be appeared in a dream to utter the following verses : High abo?e a-ther there with radiance bright, A pure immortal splendor wings its flight ; 1 Whose beams divine with vivUI force aspire, And leap resounding from a fount of hre. * Alluding to the beautiful description given of Ulysses in the third book of the Iliad, v. n. which is thus elegantly paraphrased by Pope. But when he speaks what elocution flows! 8oft as the fleeces of descending snows The copious accents fall with easy art : Melting they fall and sink into the heart. * Nicephorus in bis commentary on Synesius de Insomniis, p. 3da. informs us that the Heratic orb is a golden sphere, which has a sspphire'stooe inclosed in its middle part, and through its whole extremity characters, aod various figures. He adds, that turning this sphere round, the Chaldeans perform invocations which they call Ijnga:. Thus too, according to Suidas, the magician Julian of Chalda-a, and Arnuphis the Egyptian brought down showers of rain, by a magical power. And by an artifice of this kind, Empedvcles was accustomed to restrain the fury of the winds; on which account tie was called t>»«Ji»if«,-( mu erptlltr of wind. * This signifies that the divine splendor which is the cause of the prophetic energy, would leave the earth, in consequence of the then Misting inaptitude of persons, places, and instruments, to receive it. Proc. Vol. I. g Digitized by Google I INTRODUCTION. And io the beginning of his fortj-secoud year he appeared to himself to pronounce with a loud Lo ! on my soul a sacred Arc descends, Whose vivid power the intellect estends ; From whence far beaming thro' dull body's night, It soars to xthcr deck'd with starry light ; And with soft murmurs thru' tbeaiura round. The lucid regions of tlie Gods resound. • Besides, he clearly perceived that tie belonged to the Mercurial series ; and was persuaded from \ dream, that he possessed the soul of Nicomachus the Pythagorean."' In the last place, M annua adds, " that the lovers of more elegant studies may be able to conjec- ture from the position of the stars under which he was bom, that the condition of his life, was by no means among the but or middle, but among the first orders, we have thought lit to expose in this place the following scheme of his nativity." 0 16° «6* « > 17 29 n ■ No opinion is more celebrated, than that of the metempsychosis of Pythagoras ; but perhaps no doctrine is more generally mistaken. By most of the present day it is exploded as ridiculous ; and the few who retain some veneration for its founder, endeavour to destroy the literal, and to confine it to an allegorical meaning. By some of the ancients this mutation was limited to similar bodies; t*> that thry conceived the human soul might trans- migrate into various human bodies, but not into those of brutes. And this was the opinion of Hicroclcs, as may be seen in his Commentary on the Golden Verses. But why may not the Iti'inan soul l>ecome connected with subordinate, as w ell as wiili superior lives, by a tendency of inclination ? Do not similars love to be united; aod is there not in all kinds of life something similar and common ? Hence when the affections of the soul verge to a baser nature, whilf connected with a human body, these affections on the dissolution of such a body, become envelo|>cd as it were, in a brutal nature, and the rational eye, in this case, clouded with perturbations, is oppressed bv the irrational entries of the bmlc, and surveys nothing but the dark phantasms of a degraded imagination. But this doctrine is viudica'ed by Proclus with his usual acutenes*,ui his admirable Commentaries on the Tima-us, lib. s. p. 3»9, aslollowsi " It is tiMial, says he, to enquire bow human souls can descend into brute animals. And some indeed, think that there are certain similitudes of men to brutes, which they call savage lives : for they by no means think it possible that the rational essence can become the soul of a savage animal. On the contrary, others allow it may be sent into brute;, because all souls are of one and the same kind; so that they may become wolves and panthers, and ichneumons. But true reason indeed, asserts that the human soul may be lodged in brutes, yet in such a manner, as that it may obtain its own proper life, and that the degraded soui may, as it were, be canied above it, and be bound to the baser nature by a propensity aod similitude of affection. And that tins is tl.c only mode of insinuation, we have proved by a multitude of arguments, in our Commentaries on the rim drtis. If however, it lie requisite to take notice, that this is the opinion of I'lato, we add that in his Republic he *;iys, that the it is evident ,„., Pfoc|ua M wrmen seventh book,- as ,ome chapters of it are mere «id to be e.tan, in that library. These I have endeavoured, bu, without success, to obtain. The want of this seventh book by Produs, wi oubtless be considered by all the friends of Greek literature, and particularly by all who are lovers of the doctrme, of Plato, a, a loss of „o common magnitude. It is, however, a fortunate crcumstancc, that in the composition of the seventh book I have been able to supply the deficiency ansmg from the want of that which was written by Proclus, in . great measure from other works of Proclu, himself, and particularly from his very elegant and scientific commentaries on the IWus of Plato. So that I trust the loss is in some measure supplied ; though 1 am sensible, very madequately, could i, be compared with the book which was written by a man of such gigantic him whtUhB4!.,hCe,!d0fthte «mbwkofthi»^My.. «Uia« divine™*™ will I* accuracy discoid bv Zl are ~ 1 T I luT "J*""' P0Wm" ™S' Wer'» ■otdMebyhim in any onsoflbe »u book, Hat are extant ; which shows that another book is warning. T Digitized by Google u. 1NTBODUCTIOV. powers of mind as Proclus, and who had also sources of informatiou ou the subject, which at the present period, it is impossible to obtain. A translation of the Elements of Theology is added in order to render the treatise On the Theology of Plato, more complete, and to assist the reader who wishes to penetrate the depths of that most abstruse and sublime work; for the former elucidates, and is elucidated by the Utter. In translating the treatise of Proclus On Providence and Fate, I had great difficulties to encoun- ter, as the original Greek is lost, and nothing but a Latin translation, which Fabricius observes, is all but barbaroia, remains. If the reader compares that translation with mine, he will at once acknowledge the truth of my remark. Indeed, that translation is in some parts so barbarous, that nothiug but an intimate acquaintance with the writings of Proclus, and the philosophy of Plato could enable any one to render them intelligible in another language. The same observation is partially applicable to the translation of the Extracts from two other treatises of Proclus. The Greek text of Proclus abounds with errors, so that the emendations which I have made, and the deficiencies which 1 have supplied in this volume, amount to more than four hundred. And the Latio translation of Portus is so very faulty, as to be almost beyond example bad. Having discovered this to be the case, and having in so many places corrected the original, I scarcely think that any of my critical enemies will be hardy enough to say, that any part of this volume was translated from the Latin, where the Greek could be obtained. As I am conscious however, that in what is now offered to the public, I had no other view man to benefit those who are capable of being benefited by such sublime speculations; that wishing well to all mankind, and " particularly to iny country, I have laboured to disseminate the philosophy and theology of Plato, as highly favourable to the interests of piety and good government, and most hostile to lawless conduct and revolutionary principles; and that I have done my best to deserve the esteem of the wise and worthy part of mankind, 1 am wholly unconcerned as to the reception it may meet with from the malevolent, though I wish for the approbation of the candid critics of the day. For in all my labours I have invariably observed the following Pythagoric precept : " Do those things which you judge to be beautiful, though m doing them you should be without renown ; for the rabble is a bad judge of a good thing."' Digitized by Google CONTENTS or THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK I. CHAPTER I. The Preface, in which the scope of the treatise is unfolded, together with die praise of Plato him- self, and of those that received the philosophy from him. CHAPTER U. What the mode of the discussion is in the present treatise, and what preparation of the auditors of it is previously necessary. CHAPTER III. What a tneologist is according to Plato, whence he begins, as far as to what hypostases be ascends, and according to what power of the soul be particularly energizes. CHAPTER IV. The theological types or forms according to all which Plato disposes the doctriuc concerning the Gods. CHAPTER V. What the dialogues are from which the theology of Plato may especially be assumed ; and to what orders of Goda each of these dialogues refers us. Digitized by Google lit CONTENT*. CHAPTER VI. collecting the Platonic tlicologv from many dialogue*, in consequence of it* " into minute parts. CHAPTEK VII. A solution of the before ineiitiooed objection, referring to one dialogue, the Parmeuides, the whole truth concerning the Gods according to Plato. CHAPTER VIII. numeration of the different opinion* concerning the Parmenides, aud a division of the objec- tion, to then,. CHAPTER IX. A confutation of those who assert that the Parmenides is a logical dialogue, and who admit that the i in it is argumentative, proceeding through subjects of opinion. CHAPTER X. How far they are right who assert that the hypotheses of the Parmenides are concerning the princi- plea of things, and what is to be added to what they say from the doctrine of our preceptor [Syrianus.] CHAPTER XI. Many demonstrations concerning the conclusions of the second hypothesis, and of the divuiou of it according to the divine orders. CHAPTER XII. The intention of the hypotheses, demonstrating their connexion with each other, and their coascut with the things themselves.' CHAPTER XIII. What the common rules concerning the Gods are, which Plato delivers in die Laws. And also concerning the hyparxis of the Gods, their providence, and their immutable perfection. CHAPTER XIV. How the hyparxis of the Gods is delivered in the Laws, and through what recurs to the truly existing Gods. How the providence of die Gods is the Laws, aud what the mode of their providence is according to Plato.* ' The 12th chapter is not market! in the original ; but it begins conformably to my translation. 1 The 15th chapter also is nut marked in the original ; aud ia comprehended in my translation in the Uth ter. Perhaps it should begin at the word*, " If tlierefore the Gods produce all things," in p. 40. Digitized by Google f CONTENTS. CHAPTER XV. Through what argument* in the tune treatise [the Law*] it is demonstrated that the Godi provide [for all things,] immutably. CHAPTER XVI. What the axioms are concerning the Gods which are delivered in the Republic, and what order they have with respect to each other. CHAPTER XVII. What the goodness of the Gods u, and how they are said to be the causes of all good ; and that evil according to every hypostasis is itself adorned and arranged by the Gods. CHAFFER XVIII. What the immutability is of the Gods ; where also it is shown what their self-sufficiency, and firm impassivity are ; and how we are to understand their possessing an invariable sameness of CHAPTER XLX. What the simplicity is of the Gods ; and how that which is simple in them appears to be various in secondary natures. CHAPTER XX. What the truth is m the Gods ; and whence falsehood is introduced in the participations of the Gods by secondary natures. CHAPTER XXI. From tbe axioms in the Phsedrus concerning every tiling divine [it follows] that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good. CHAPTER XXII. A discussion of the dogmas concerning the goodness [of the Gods,] and an investigation of the elements of the good in the Philebus. CHAPTER XXIII. What the wisdom of the Gods is, and what elements of it may be assumed from Plato. CHAPTER XXIV. nd tbe elements of it, as delivered by Plato. Digitized by Google l«i CONT1NTI. CHAPTER XXV. Whit the triad is which is conjoined with the good, the wise, and the beautiful, and what auxili- aries to the theory of it, Plato affords us.' CHAPTER XXVI. Concerning the axioms delivered in the Pruedo,* respecting an invisible nature. What the divine nature is. What the immortal, and the intelligible > are ; and what order these possess with CHAPTER XXVII. What the uniform and indissoluble are, and how sameness of subsistence [and the unbegotteu are] to be assumed in divine natures. CHAPTER XXVIII. How paternal, and bow maternal causes arc to be assumed in the Gods. CHAPTER XXIX. Concerning divine names, and the rectitude of them as delivered in the Cratjlu*. CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK II. CHAPTER I. A method leading to the superessential principle of all things, according to the intellectual concep- tion of the one and multitude. CHAPTER II. A second method unfolding the hypostasis of the one, aod demonstrating it to be exempt from all corporeal and incorporeal essences. • Such is the tide of this chapter in the Greek, which is obviously erroneous. For the proper title is, « What that is which unites us to tktgood ; and that it is divine faith." What is said indeed in the Greek to be the con- tents of this, belong to the preceding chapter. » For " f^'fr it is necessary to read nfthnt. Mn the Greek r. f-wnfc, tk* uniform, but it should evidently be »• »*t», Ike intclligMe, Digitized by Google CONTENTS. Ivu CHAPTER III. Many arguments in confirmation of the Mine thing, and evincing the irreprehensible hypothesis of the one. CHAPTER IV. A confutation of those who say that the first principle is not according to Plato above intellect, ami demonstrations from the Republic, the Sophists, the Philebus, and the Parmcnidci, of the superessential hypostasis' of the one. CHAPTER V. What the modes are of ascent to the one according to Plato ; and that the modes are two, through analogy, and through negations. Likewise, where Plato treats of each of these, and through what cause. CHAPTER VI. By what, and by how many names Plato unfolds the ineffable principle, and why he unfolds it by such and by so main names. And how these names accord with the modes of ascent to it. CHAPTER VII. What the assertions are in the Republic concerning the first principle, through its analogy to the sun ; where also it is shown, how it is celebrated as the good, and as the most splendid of being. How the sun is the offspring of the good; and that according to each order of divine natures, there is a monad analogous to the first principle. And how the first principle is the cause of all beings, and is itself prior to power and energy. CHAPTER VIII. What Plato in his Epistle to Dionysius says the first king is. And admonitions, that the first God is discussed in that Epistle. CHAPTER IX. What the three conceptions arc which arc delivered [in that Epistle] concerning the first king. How all things are about him. How all things are for his sake. How he is the cause of all beautiful things. What the order is of these conceptions. And from what hypotheses they CHAPTER X. How in the first hypothesis of the Parmenidcs, Plato delivers the doctrine concerning ike one, employing for this purpose negations. And on what account the negations are such and so many. ' For ym>.n«tl read nim»^. Proc. Vol. I. A Digitized by Google CONTENTS. CHAPTER XI. How it is nereiiary to eotwr on the theory concerning the one, through negations. And what dis- position of the soul is most adapted to discussions of th CHAPTER XII. A celebration of the one, demonstrating through negative conclusions that it U exempt from all the orders of beings, according to the order delivered in the CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK III. CHAPTER I. That after the discussion in common of the one principle of things, it is requisite to treat of the divine orders, and to show how many they are, and how they are divided from each other. CHAPTER II. That the multitude of unities according to which the Gods have their hypostasis, subsists after the one. CHAPTER III. How many the particulars are which ought to be demonstrated previous to the discovery of the ! of the divine orders, and an uninterrupted narration of the doctrine of these. CHAPTER IV. That all the unities are participate. And that there is only one truly su|ieressenlial one ; but that all the other unities are participated by essences.' CHAPTER V. That the participations of the unities which are nearer to the one, proceed into moi tases ; but the participations of those that are remote from the one, proceed into more posite hypostases. 1 These four chapters are comprehended in one in my translation, as they are not marked in the Greek; and I bad not divided them, when this work »u sent to the press, as I have done the chapters of the other books, in wukh there is a similar defect in the ordinal. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. CHAPTER VI. What the natures are which participate of the divine unities, and what the order of them is with res- pect to each other. And that being indeed, is the most ancient of these ; life, the second; intellect, the third; soul, the fourth ; and body, the last. And that there aie also as many CHAPTER VII. A resumption of the doctrine concerning the one, and a discussion of the biformod principles pos- CHAPTER VIII. What the two principles are of all things posterior to the one ; how Socrates the Philebus calls them bound and infinity ; and of what things they are the causes* to beings.' CHAPTER IX. What the third thing is which is produced from the two principles. Why Socrates in the Philebus calls it that which it mixed. That it is nothing else than that which is primarily being.* And how this proceeds from the two principles, and from the one. CHAPTER X. How from image* also, it may be inferred, that the first thing which subsists from bound and infi- nity is being. How this may be demonstrated. And how bound and infinity are twofold ; one order of these subsisting in being, but the other existing prior to being.' CHAPTER XI. What the triad is, which Socrates in the Philebus says is inherent in erery thing that is mixed * CHAPTER XII. Concerning the first intelligible triad in common ; and how the second triad proceeds analogous to this.* * For mntmt, it is necessary to read mtmu. > The seventh and eighth chapters form the third in my translation. * For w, it is necrssary to read •». » And die ninth and tenth an the fourth and fifth chapters in my translation. ' This is the sixth chapter in my translation. ' It appears from this account of the contents of the twelfth chapter, that a -considerable part of it is wanting in the original ; because nothing is said in it about the manner in which the second triad proceeds tualogou* to the firrt. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. CHAPTER XIII. What the second intelligible triad is. A more accurate account of it, as subsisting from that predominates, from that which is participated, and from that which characterizes the mixture. CHAPTER XIV. What the third iutclligible triad is ; what that is which predominates, and is participated in this. And at the end, a discourse in common concerning die distinction of the three triads. CHAPTER XV. How the intelligible triads are delivered in the Timeus. And itself, [evincing] that it has the third order in intelligible*. CHAPTER XVI. Many demonstrations that eternity subsists according to the middle order of intelligible*. CHAPTER XVII. That the one in which eternity abides is the summit of intelligibles. CHAPTER XVIH. all the intelligible orders in common, according to the doctrine of Timarus. And a of the peculiarities m the i CHAPTER XIX. intelligible forms, and the doctrine unfolding the peculiarity of them. How likewise they are four, and from what causes they i CHAPTER XX. That also from what is said in the Sophista, it is possible to discover die three intelligible orders; viz. in that part of the Sophista, in which it is shown what the one being, what whole, and what ail are. CHAPTER XXI. A summary account of .what has been said concerning the intelligible triads. And admonitions from Plato that it is possible to divide them into father, power, an CHAPTER XXII. How in the Phxdrus it is said that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good. What triple i of these Plato delivers. And how from these it is possible to accede to the I separation of the intelligible triads. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXIII. How Parmenides delivers the multitude of Gods in the second hypothesis. And how we should about each order of them, employing for this purpose the conclusions of that CHAPTER XXIV. What the first intelligible triad is according to Parmcuidcs. Whence be begins, and how far he proceeds, teaching concerning it. CHAPTER XXV. What the second intelligible triad is. How it is delivered by Parmenides in triad prior to it. And how far be produces the discourse concerning it. CHAPTER XXVI. What the third intelligible triad is. And bow Parmenides unfolds it throngh the third conclusion. CHAPTER XXVII. the three conclusions in common, through which the three orders of intelligible* are characterized. And how through these it is possible to dissolve the most difficult of theolo- gical doubts. CHAPTER XXVIII. A celebration of the intelligible Gods, unfolding at the same time tite union of intelligible!) themselves with the good, and their exempt hyparais. CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK IV. CHAPTER I. What the peculiarity is of the intelligible and intellectual Gods. How they illuminate imparticipa- bleliie, and are in continuity with the intelligible Gods. CHAPTER II. How the intelligible and intellectual Gods subsist from the intelligible Gods. And how they roni- Digitized by Google ltii CONTENT CHAPTER III. What the division is of the intelligible and intellectual God. according to triad*. And what the dif- ference is of these triads with respect to the intelligible triads. CHAPTER IV. How Socrates in the Phssdra* leads us to this order of Gods. CHAPTER V. That it U not proper to understand the Heaven, and celestial circulation [celebrated in the Ph*- drus] as pertaining to sensibles ; and many admonitions from the Platonic words themselves, that these are to be referred to the first order of Heaven. CHAPTER VI. That the supercelestial place is not simply intelligible ; but demonstrations from what is delivered about it [in the Phcdrus,] that it is allotted an intelligible order at in intellectuals. CHAPTER VII. That the subcclestial arch is the boundary of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, evinced from the peculiarities of it. CHAPTER VIII. Why Plato characterizes this order of Gods from the middle which it contains, and deliver* the CHAPTER IX. That Plato delivers tbe same mode of ascent to the intelligible, as is delivered by initiators into the CHAPTER X. What the supercelestial place is. How it proceeds from the first intelligible*. How it is supreme in intellectual*. And how Plato demonstrates its prolific power. CHAPTER XI. How Plato has indicated the unknown peculiarity of the summit of intelfigibles and intellectuals, and why he celebrates it at one and the same time affirmatively and negatively. CHAPTER XII. What the negations are of the supercelestial place. That they are produced from the divine orders. What kind of negations also designate the uncoloured, what, the unfigured, and what, the pri, valiou of contact. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. luii CHAPTER XHf. What the things are which Plato affirm* of the s upercelcstial place, and from liarities, he ascribes to it affirmative sign*. CHAPTER XIV. What the three deities of the virtues, viz. science, temperance, and jujticf, are in the supercelestial place ; what order the; have with respect to each other ; and what perfection each of them imparts to the Gods. CHAPTER XV. What the plain of Truth, and what the meadow- are. What the unical form of intelligible nutri- ment is. What the twofold nutriment of the Gods Lt which is distributed from this intelligible food. CHAPTER XVI. Many admonitions that the supercelestial place is triadic. And what the signs are of the three hypostases in it. CHAPTER XVII. Who Adrastia is. What the sacred law of Adrastia is. That she ranks in the supercelestial place. And on what account she does so. CHAPTER XVIII. A summary account of what is said about the sup CHAPTER XIX. Demonstrations that the connected! jr -containing order is in the intelligible and intellectual Gods. And that it is necessary there should be three connective causes of wholes. CHAPTER XX. That according to Plato the celestial circulation is the same CHAPTER XXI. How we may obtain auxiliaries from what is said by Plato of the triadic division in the connective deity. And why he especially venerates the union b tb CHAPTER XXII. What the theology in the Cratylus is concerning Heaven. And how it is possible to collect from it by a reasoning process the middle of the intelligible and intellectual Gods. Digitized by Google Ixiv CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXIII. Thai the most diviiiel) -inspired of the interpreter* have defined the subceleslial arch to be a certain liar order. And that our preceptor has unfolded it in the most perfect manner. CHAPTER XXIV. Many admonitions that the peculiarity of the subcelestial arch is perfective, from whit Plato ba« ; it, and from the souls that are elevated to it. CHAPTER XXV. What the triadic division is of the perfective order, which Plato has delivered in the subcelestial arch. CHAPTER XXVI. What the elevation is of souls separate from bodies to the intelligible and intellectual triads. What the most blessed tthtt is. What mueas, and cpopteia are. What the entire, simple, and unmoved visions are. And what the end is of all this elevation. CHAPTER XXVII. How Plato unfolds in the Pannenides, from rotelligibles the intelligible and intellectual orders. i is common, and that which is different are, in the theology < CHAPTER XX VIII. How the intelligible and intellectual number proceeds from intelligible*. And in what it differs from intelligible multitude. CHAPTER XXIX. How divine number adorns all beings. And what the powers in it are which are symbolically deli- i the division of number. CHAPTER XXX. How Pannenides has delivered the feminine and generative peculiarity [of first number] in what he CHAPTER XXXI. How we may discover in what is delivered concerning number, the triadic division of the summit of mtelligibles and intellectuals. CHAPTER XXXII. Whether it is proper to place number prior to animal itself, or in animal itself, or posterior to it. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. Uv CHAPTER XXXIII, Whence Parmcnidrs begins to speak about uuinber. Uuw tar Ik- proceeds in what he says about iL And Imw lie unfold* the different orders in it. CM \PTF.K XX XIV. What the unknown is in divine numbew. What the generative lain them. And admonitions of these tilings from what in elsewhere said by Plato concerning number*. CH APT till XXXV. How Parmcnidca delivers the middle order of intelligible* and intellectuals through the one, whole, and Jiiute. And what the peculiarities are of these. chapter xxxvr W hence Parnienidcs begins to apeak about this order. And hoy* fai lie proccedi in what he say a about it. How he likewise unlolda the three monad* in it conformably to what is *aid iii the Phaedrus concerning them. CHAPTER XXXVII. How Partnenides delivers the third order of intelligible* and intellectuals. Ami how he unfolds the perfective peculiarity, and tiiadic division of it. CHAPTER XXXVIII. An admonition what the union is of the three intelligible and intellectual triads, from the conclu- sion', of Piiinienides. CM A I'TKK XXXIX. How many theological dogmas wc may assume, through the order of the conclusions delivered by Parruenidcs in his discourse concerning the intelligible and intellectual God*. CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK V. CH AP I KK I. How the intellectual order* proceed from the intelligible and intellectual God.-. And according to what peculiarities they subsist. CHAPTER II. What the division is of the intellectual Gods. And the progression according to hebdomads in this order of Goda, Proe. VOL. II. i CONTENTS. chapter nr. Who tbe three intellectual fathers are according to Plato. What the three tmdefiled i deity is, that it co-arranged w ith tbe two CHAPTER IV. How from the writing* of Plato, the procession of the intellectual Gods into .ere be collected by a reasoning process. CHAPTER V. Who the mighty Saturn is, according to the theology in the Cratylaa. And how he is in a . respect intelligible, and in a certain respect intellectual. In which also, the dogmas are dis- cussed concerning the uniou of intellect with the intelligible, and its separation from it. CHAPTER VI. What the kingdom of Saturn is. In what manner it is defirered by Plato in the Politkus. And of what it is the cause to the world, to the mundane Gods, asm to partial souls. CHAPTER VII. What the Satumian life of souls is. And what peculiarities of this circulation the Elean Guest CHAPTER VIII. How souls are said to be nourished by ioleUigibles. And what the difference is of the CHAPTER IX. Wlut the ordors are which the mighty Saturn causes to preside over wholes. In which also, who the Satumian intellect is that is delivered in the Gorgias is unfolded. CHAPTER X. How this God (Saturn] is peculiarly called by thoologisU insenescible, or free from old agr. And bow Plato has delivered this peculiarity of him. CHAPTER XI. Who the t ivitV Goddess it- How she is the collector of the Satumian and Jovian kingdoms. And what orders she possesses conjoined with bodt I CHAPTER XII. Who the third father in intellectuals ia. How be proceeds from the causes prior to him. Aud Digitized by Google CHAPTER XIII. Demonstrations thai lh« whole demiargtu of the universe, is the third father of the intellectual God*. CHAPTER XIV. through man)' arguments that the in the third order of intellectuals. CHAPTER XV. That Timcus especially delivers the peculiarity of the demiurgus, by calling him intellect. And that this pertains to the third of the intellectual i CHAPTER XVI. How according to another method it is requisite to discover the peculiarity of the demiurgus. And how the demiurgus is called in the Tunaeus effector aud father. In which also, it is clearly shown, where the paternal, where the paternal and at the same time effective, wliere the effec- tive and uatcnial aud where the effective oulv are. acconiimr to Plato. Anil in short in CHAPTER XVII. How following Timeeus, according to a third method, we may purify our the demiurgic monad. CHAPTER XVIII. A theological explanation of the speech of the demiurgus in the Tinraus, distinctly evolving our conceptions about the demiurgic energy. CHAPTER XIX. What the second speech of the demiurgus is to divisible souls. In what it differs from the former. And bow in this all the measures of the life of souls are defined. CHAPTER XX. of all that is said about the demiurgus, following the " '"■.1 .J CHAPTER XXI. from what is said iu the Cratylus, that Plato attributes fabrication to Jupiter. Digitized by Google Ufili COHTIKTI. CHAPTER XXII. Admonitions from what is said in the Cratylus of tbe fsbricatioo of Jupiter. In which also the concord is demonstrated of the theology from name*, with the arrangement of the demiurgim in the Tinwus. CHAPTER XXIII. Admonitions of the fabrication of Jupiter from what is demonstrated in the Philebiu. In which also it is shown, what the royal soul, and the royal intellect are. CHAPTER XXIV. Demonstration* of the same thing, from what is said in the Protagoras about the political science. CHAPTER XXV. An argument shewing that Jupiter is the demiurgus and father of tbe universe* according to Plato, from what is said in the Politic us concerning the twofold circulation [of the uniTcrse.] CHAPTER XXVI. Admonitions of the same things, from what is said in the Laws concerning analogy, viz. that it is the judgment of Jupiter. CHAPTER XXVII. How Jupiter subsists according to cause in animal itself, and how animal itself is in Jupiter. CHAFrER XXVIII. How Tim ecu j attributes to the demiurgus die unknown and ineffable. CHAPTER XXIX. Why Timaus thinks fit to denominate animal itself, and is of opinion that it may be known, but leaves the demiurgus unkuowu and ineffable. CHAFrER XXX. Concerning the Crater in the Tiuiaras, a theology teaching w hat tbe genera are that are mingled in it, and how it is the tausc of the essence of souls. CHAFrER XXXI. Thai tlie Craler in the Timaius is fontal. And admonitions from the writings of Plato, concerning the principle and fouutaii) of souls. Ivt * »««•[, it is necessary to read ««»t*. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXXH. That the three vWific fountains co-arranged with the demiurgua, may be assumed from what is said in the Timaeas, via. the fountain of souls, the fountain of the virtues, and the fountain of natures. CHAPTER XXXIII. Admonitions concerning the undc filed Gods ; that there are such Gods according to Plato; and what the peculiarity is of their essence. CHAPTER XXXIV. More manifest demonstrations of the hypostasis of the untie filed Gods, according to Plato. CHAPTER XXXV. Admonitions through many arguments how it is proper to denominate the undented Gods accord- ing to Plato. In which also, the tuiion of tbcm, what their separation, and what their pecu- liarity are, is delivered. CHAPTER XXXVI. How from what is mystically asserted by Plato, auxiliaries may be obtained, concerning the seventh monad of intellectuals. CHAPTER XXXVII. How Plato delivers in the Parmcnides the summit of the intellectual Gods.' CHAPTER XXXVIII. How Parroenidcs unfolds the middle order of the intellectual breadth, and through what signs CHAPTER XXXIX. How Parmenides defines the third order of intellectuals, and through that peculiarities. CHAPTER XL. A common theory of the intellectual hebdomad, from the conclusions of Parmenides. ' The contents of chapter thirty-seren in the original erroneously form the conclusion of the contents of chapter thirtv-sit. And instead of «K »m it is therefore necessary to read .n- m ■prn, Uence what are marked «».»,',«». x,, and «f . >», should be marked «*. *», anrt «*. ^. It will be found also Uiat ehspter lojiy is wantiug. Digitized by Google CONTENTS. CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK VI. CHAPTER L That the ruling order of God* is in continuity with the intellectual God*. And that the division .and principles may be CHAPTER n. How the ruling Gods proceed. And that the supermundane peculiarity pertain* to these God* CHAPTER HI. What tie peculiarity is of the ruling Gods. That the aantnilaUve i. especially characteristic of them. And how the causes of assimi how to .Unintelligible paradigm. CHAPTER IV. What the powers are of the assimilative Gods. What their energies, imparted by them to the world, and to all mundane natures. CHAPTER V. What the divisions are of the assimilative Gods. And that the greatest part of the discourse about i middle orders in them. CHAPTER VI. Many demonstrations, that both according to Plato and other theologists, there is ont CHAPTER VII. That Jupiter is twofold ; one indeed, being prior to the three sons of Saturn, [but the one of them.] And bow the three proceed from Saturn, and the one Jupiter. CHAPTER V1U. That according to Plato also, the demiurgic monad subsists prior to the three sons of Demonstrations of this from what is said in the Politicus, and in the Laws. Digitized by Google CONTBWT*. Uxi CHAPTER IX. More manifest admonitions of the game things from what is said in the Gorgias, nod in the Cratyius. CHAPTER X. Who the three demiurp are, and what order they have with reference to each other. CHAPTER XI. What the rivific triad is among the ruling Gods. And whence we may derive i of Plato concerning the union and division of this triad. CHAPTER XII. What the cottvertrve triad of the ruling Gods is; and what die monad which it contains. In which also, the union of Apollo with the sun is demonstrated ; and it is shewn, how from what is wid about Apollo we may be led to the theory of the solar orders. CHAPTER XIII. What the undented order is of the ruling Gods. And how from the writings of Plato conceptions about it may be obtained. CHAPTER XIV. How Parmcnidcs forms his conclusions about the ruling Gods, in continuity with the demiurgic order. And that he characterizes the whole order of them, through similitude and dis- CHAPTER XV. Wlut the supermundane and at die same time mundane genus of Gods is. And how through their own medium they preserve the continuity of the Gods that proceed from the demiargus. CHAPTER XVI. How die liberated Gods are characterized. And how from their liberated peculiarity they are : from the- universe, and arc co-arranged with the mundane Gods. CHAPTER XVII. Wliat the common power*, and what the common energies are of the liberated Gods, according with the essence that has been dehSeied of them. Digitized by Google bsii CONTENT CHAPTER XVIII. Concerning the twelve leaders or ruler* mentioned in the Phasdrus, and that they have a liberated CHAPTER XIX. Man; and clearer demonstrations that the great leader Jupiter, and all the dodecad of leaden, are liberated. CHAPTER XX. An explanation from precedaueous causes whence the number of the dodecad in the liberated Gods is derived. CHAPTER XXI. What the division of the liberated leaders is into two monads and one decad. And what the one division of them is. CHAPTER XXII. The theology concerning each of the twelve Gods, unfolding the peculiarities of them from the subjects of their government. CHAPTER XXIII. ing the mother of the Fates mentioned in the Republic. Likewise concerning the triad of the Fates. What orders they have with reference to each other. What powers of them are delivered through divine symbols. What their energies are. And how Plato ■ the liberated peculiarity. CHAPTER XXIV. now Pannenides forms his conclusions concerning the liberated Gods immediately after the milatiTe Gods. And how he characterizes the order of them by touching and not touching CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK VII. CHAPTER I. On the mundane Gods in general,— the source of their progression, — their orders, powers, ami spheres. CHAPTER II. On the division, and allotments of the mundane Gods. Digitized by Google COKTKHTS. llini CHAPTER nr. That (he mundane do not differ from the supermundane Gods in habitudes to bodies, &c. — That the providence of the Gods is not circumscribed by place.— That h pervade* all things, and like the light of die sun, fills whatever is capable of receiving it. CHAPTER IV. After what manner the visible celestial orbs are Gods.— That a celestial body is eminently allied to the incorporeal essence of die Gods.— That the visible are connected with tire intelligible Gods. — And that the perfectly iurorporcal are united to the sensible Gods, through the essence of each being characterized by the one. CHAPTER V. The nature of the mundane Gods unfolded from the speech of the Demiurgus to them, in the Timcus. — And what the whole conception of the speech is according to Proclus. CHAPTER VI. What the demiurgus effects in the multitude of mundane Gods by the first words of his speech*— That the words of the Demiurgus are addressed to the composite from soul and animal, via. to the animal which is divine and partakes of a soul. — The meaning of the words, " Of whom [ am the demiurgus and father," 8cc. CHAPTER VII. The meaning of the words unfolded in the speech of the Demiurgus, " Every thing therefore which is bound is dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized and well composed, is the province of an ill nature." CHAPTER VIII. The following part of the speech of the Demiurgus to the mundane Gods unfolded.— The differ' ence between the primarily and secondarily immortal, and the primarily and secondarily mdissoluble.-And that the mundane Gods are neither primarily immortal, nor primarily indissoluble. CHAPTER IX. That part of the speech of the Demiurgus uufolded, in which be says to the mundane God.«, «' Learn now therefore what I say to you indicating my desire." CHAPTER X. The developetneat of the remaining part of the speech of the Demiurgus. Proc. Vol. I. k Digitized by Google txiiv CONTIXTI. CHAPTER XI. Who the junior God* are, and why they are thus called. CHAPTER XII. Farther important particulars respecting the fabrication of the mundane Gods, collected from the Timseus, and unfolded. CHAPTER XIII. Continuation of the deYelopement of these particulars. CHAPTER XIV. The peculiarities of the celestial Gods separately discussed.— Why the one sphere of the fixed stars cotuprcheuds a multitude of stars, but each of the planetary spheres convolves only one star. —And that in each of the planetary spheres, there is a number of satellites, analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsisting with proper circulations of their own. CHAPTER XV. The nature of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, and the Sun unfolded. CHAPTER XVI. Extract from the Oration of the Emperor Julian to the Sovereign Sun. CHAPTER XVII. Extract from the MS. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato concerning Apollo, in which the principal powers of the God are unfolded. CHAPTER XVIII. The nature of ihc Muses unfolded from the above MS. Scholia. CHAPTER XIX. The nature of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, unfolded. The manner in which ea«-h of the seven plane- tary divinities becomes an animal, and in suspended from a more divine soul ; and what kind of perfection it affords to the universe. CHAPTER XX. That all the celestial Gods nre beneficent, and after a similar manner the causes of good.— And that the participation of them, and the mixture of material with immaterial influences, become the causes of tbe abundant difference in secondary natures. Digitized by Google CONTMNTS. lllT CHAPTER XXI. Tlie nature of Minerva unfolded from the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeu*. — The spear and shield with which this Goddess, in the statues of her, ia represented aa armed, CHAPTER XXII. The nature of the great mundane divinity, the earth, unfolded from Proclus on the Timams of Plato. CHAPTER XXIII. The manner in which the earth is said to bo the most ancient, and the first of the Gods within the s, explained. CHAPTER XXIV. On the essence of the sublunary deities.-What Plato says of them in the Timwis unfolded. CHAPTER XXV. Where the sublunary Gods are to be arranged.— And the meaning of the subsequent words of Plato developed. CHAPTER XXVI. The nature of the sublunary Gods more fully unfolded.— On the dscmoniacal order.— And that about each of the fabricators of generation, there ia a co-ordinate angelical, demoniacal, sod beroical multitude, which retains die appellation of its producing monad. CHAPTER XXVII. What Pythagoras says in the Sacred Ditcours*. — What the Orphic traditions are concerning Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus — That Plato begins the Theogony of the sublunary Gods from Heaven and Earth, and not from Phanes and Night.— And whv he does so. CHAPTER XXVIH. On die two principles Heaven and Earth. — What each of them is ; and particularly concerning the power of Heaven. CHAPTER XXIX. The wb«le theory of Earth unfolded— And also the theory of Ocean and Tethys That the causes i are in the intellectual Gods, and likewise in the sensible i Digitized by Google Uxvi CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXX. The theory of Phorcjs, Saturn, and Rhea, unfolded. CHAPTER XXXf. The nature of the sublunary Jupiter aud Juno unfolded. — And why Plato comprehends in this ennead, viz- Heaven aud Earth, Ocean aud Tetfays, Phorcys, Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, and Juno, the Gods who are the fabricators of generation. CHAPTER XXXII. Why Plato denominates the sublunary deities, " such as become apparent when they please."— General observations respecting the Gods that govern generation. CHAPTER XX XI 1 1. On the summit, or monad of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus.— And on the mundane soul which is the immediate participant of the Bacchic iutellect. CHAPTER XXXIV. How the mundane Gods arc characterized in the Parmenides of Plalo. CHAPTER XXXV. A developement of what Plato says m the Pha*driu, about Boreas and Orkhya, the Centaurs, Chimaras, Gorgons, Pegasuses, Typbons, Acbelous, and die Nymulis. CHAPTER XXXVI. The meaning of Plato unfolded, in what lie says about Pan, Tartarus, Prometheus, the Syrens. CHAPTER XXXVII. A developement of Plato's theological conceptions respecting Nature, Fate, aod Fortune. CHAPTER XXXVIH. What Time, Day and Night, Month and Year are, so far as tbey are deities, according to the theology of Plato. CHAPTER XXXIX. A discmsion of the order of divioe souls, who are deified by always participating of the Gods. Digitized by Google COMTIHTI. IWVS CHAPTER XL. A derelopement of the Rata re of Love, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the FurX Alcj- CHAPTER XLI. of the same subject. CHAPTER XLII. The nature of demon* more fully disclosed.— An extract from the MS. Commentary of Prod us on the First Alcibiades, on this subject. CHAPTER XL1H. On the daemons who are allotted the superintendence of mankind. CHAPTER XUV. On the daemon of Socrates.— The peculiarily^of this daemon ; and that it belonged to the Apolio- niacal series. CHAPTER XLV. Important information concerning daemons from the MS. Scholia of Prod us on the Cralylus of Plato. — And also from the MS. Commentary of Olympiodorus on the Pluedo of Plato. CHAPTER XLVI. The nature of those human souls that are of an heroic characteristic unfolded. —What Plato says of these souls in the Cratylus.— His meaning elucidated from the MS. Scholia of Proclua on that dialogue. CHAPTER XLVII. How the triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, are indicated in the Parma* nidea of Plato. CHAPTER XLVIH. ■ ■ * An elucidation from Proclus of what Plato says in the Tinwus, in celebration of the divinity of die World, ao far as the whole of it is a God. CHAPTER XLIX. A further elucidation from Proclus of the same subject Digitized by Google lliriii COMIIKTI. CHAPTER L. Tfae atoning of the words of Plato, " And casing circle to revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i. e. the world) one, only, solitary nature," unfolded from Proclus. CHAPTER hi. Whit Plato says in the Timreus about the name of the World,— with the elucidations of Proclus. Digitized by Google hui* An explanation of certain terms which are unusual, or have a meaning dif- ferent from their common acceptation, and which there was a necessity of introducing in the translation of this work. Composite, fft/vtrrsc. 1 have used the word composite iiutcad of compounded, became the Utter rather denotes the mingling than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the former, through its derivation from the Latin word compositui, solely denotes. Demihrcus op wholes, &]/M«»fys; raw t*jm. The artificer of the universe is thus denomi- nated, because be produces the universe so far as it is a whole, and likewise all the wholes it con- tains, by his own immediate energy ; other subordinate powers co-operating with him iu the pro- duction of parts. Hence he produces the universe totally and at once. Dksire, twtfo/ua. Is an irrational appetite solely directed to external objecU, and to the gratification arising from the possession of them. Diaxoia, hemm, from whence dionottic,\* the discursive energy of reason; (Swfofcxi) too Xsyw tvipyn*) or according to its most accurate signification, it is that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of iu reasoning from intellect, or the power which sees truth intuitively. Do x a stic, formed from !*£«, opinio*, is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul ; and knows thai a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or why it is. The knowledge of the fan, or a-Ay a thing is, being the province of dianoia. CJn est, £«ef. This word, iu its more ample signification in the Greek, tleuolrs a »t ranger, but properly implies one »lip receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the dia- logue of Plato therefore, (and consequently in this work of Pioclus when he cites the dialogues in which this word occurs) wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a £•»»$, I have translated this word gutit, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in thcTimaus, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests from having been feasted with discourse. Hvpabxis, vwaebi. The first principle, or foundation as it were, of the esseuce of a thing. Hence, also, it is the summit of essence. Digitized by Google Ixxx Impahticipadle, «p»J#xTOf. Oi>e tiling i* said to be imparticipable with respect to another, to which it i« superior, when it is not consubsistent with it. Intellectual projection. The immediate energy of intellect is thus denorniniled, because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to its proper object, the intelligible. Monad, ftora,-, in divine natures is that which contains distinct, but at the same time pro- foundly-united multitude, and which produces a multitude exquisitely allied to itself. But in lite ncnsible universe, the first monad is (he world itself, which comprehends in itself all the multitude of which it is the cause (in conjunction with the cause of all). The second monad is the iuerratic sphere. In the third place, the spheres of the pluncts succeed, each of w hicb is also a monad, com- prehending an appropriate multitude. And in the fourth and last place are the spheres of the elements, which are in a similar manner monads. All these mounds likewise are denominated •^onrrtf, wholenesses, and have a perpetual subsistence. Permanency, rratrif. The proper word for rest, in Greek, is qpifiia. And Simplicity justly observes, that not every a-rowij is ljftfuo, but that only which is after motion, 'litis word is employed by Plato in the Sophista, to express one of the five genera of being, viz. essence, perma- nency, (orairi;), motion, sameness, and difference ; in which place it evidently does not signify rest. PriANTAfcT, or Imagination, ^amairia, is, /a4;pivri»i| voijvi;, i. e. a Jigured intelligence, because all the perceptions of this power are intcard, and not external, like those of sense, and are accom- panied with figure. Psychical, ^ux*xef, i. c. pertaining to soul, in the same manner as fuvmec, physical, is some- thing pertaining to nature. Reason, Aoy»r. This word in Platonic writers signifies either that inward discursive energy called reasoning ; or a certain productive and seminal principle ; or that which is indicative and definitive of a tiling. Hence Knyot or reasons in the soul, are, gnoslically producing principles. Unical, man;, that whkh is characterized by unity. Uniform twxiJijj. This word when it occurs in Proclus, and other Platonic writers, signifies that which has the form of the one, and not as ii> Johnson, that which keeps its tcnour, or is similar to itself. PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR, ON Cije Cfjeolosp of $lato. BOOK I. CHAPTER I. o PERICLES, to me the dearest of friends, I am of opinion that the whole philosophy of Plato was at first unfolded into light through the beneficent will of superior natures, exhibiting the intellect concealed in them, and the truth subsisting together with beings, to souls conversant with generation (so far as it is lawful for thein to participate of such supernatural and mighty good); and again, that afterwards having received its perfection, returning as it were into itself, and becoming unapparent to many who professed to philosophize, and who earnestly desired to engage in the investigation of true being, it again advanced into light. But I particularly think that the mystic doctrine respecting divine, concerns, which is purely established on a sacred foundation, and which perpetually subsists with the gods themselves, became thence apparent to such as are Proc. Vol. I. A Digitized by Google 2 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. capable of enjoying it for a time, through one man,' whom I should not err in calling the primary leader and hierophant of those true mysteries, into which souls separated from terrestrial places are initiated, and of those entire and stable visions, which those participate who genuinely embrace a happy and blessed life. But this philosophy shone forth at first from him so venerably and arcanely, as if established in sacred temples, and within their adyta, and being unknown to many who have entered into these holy places, in certain orderly periods of time, proceeded as much as was possible for it into light, through certain true priests, and who embraced a life corresponding to the tradition of such mystic concerns. It appears likewise to me, that the whole place became splendid, and that illuminations of divine spectacles every where presented themselves to the view. These interpreters of the epopteia (or mystic speculations) of Plato, who have unfolded to us all-sacred narrations of divine concerns, and who were allotted a nature similar to their leader, I should determine to be the Egyptian Plotinus, and those who received the theory from him, I mean Amelius and Porphyry, together with those in the third place who were produced like virile statues from these, viz.: Jamblichus and Theodoras, and any others, who after these, following this divine choir, have energized about the doctrines of Plato with a divinely-inspired mind. From these, he* who, after the gods, has been our leader to every thing beautiful and good, receiving in an undented manner the most genuine and pure light of truth in the bosom of his soul, made us a partaker of all the rest of Plato's philosophy, communicated to us that arcane information which he had received from those more ancient than himself, and caused us, in conjunction with him, to be divinely agitated about the mystic truth of divine concerns. To this man, therefore, should we undertake to return thanks adequate to the benefits which we have received from him j the whole of time would not be sufficient. But if it is necessary, not only' that we should have received from others the transcendant good of the Platonic ' Meaning Plato. * Meaning his preceptor Syrian us. ' The word jmwv is omitted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. II. OF PMTO 3 philosophy, but that we should leave to posterity monuments of those blessed spectacles of which we have been spectators, and emulators to the utmost of our ability, under a leader the most perfect of the present time, and who arrived at the summit of philosophy ; perhaps we shall act properly in invoking the gods, that they will enkindle the light of truth in our soul, and in supplicating the attendants and ministers of better natures to direct our intellect and lead it to the all-perfect, divine, and elevated, end of the Platonic theory. For I think that every where he who participates in the least degree of intelligence, will begin his undertakings from the Gods, and especially in explications respecting the Gods : for we can no otherwise be able to understand a divine nature than by being perfected through the light of the Gods ; nor divulge it to others unless governed by them* and exempt from multiform opinions, and the variety which subsists in words, preserving at the same time the interpretation of divine names. Knowing therefore this, and complying with the exhortation of the Platonic Timteus, we in the first place establish the Gods as leaders of the doctrine respecting themselves. But may they in consequence of hearing our prayers be propitious to us, and benignantly approaching, guide the intellect of our soul, and lead it about the Vesta of Plato, and to the arduous sublimities of this speculation ; where, when arrived, we shall receive all the truth concerning them, and shall obtain the best end of our parturient conceptions of divine concerns, desiring to know something respecting them, inquiring about them of others, and, at the same time, as far as we are able, exploring them ourselves. CHAPTER II. Akd thus much by way of preface. But it is necessary that I should unfold the mode of the proposed doctrine, what it is requisite to expect it will be, and define ihe preparatives which a hearer of it ought to possess ; that being properly adapted, he may approach, not to our discourses, but to the intellectually-elevated and deific philosophy of Digitized by Google 4 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. Plato. For it is proper that convenient aptitudes of auditors should be proposed according to the forms of discourses, just as in the mysteries, those who are skilful in concerns of this kind, previously prepare receptacles for the Gods, and neither always use the same inanimate particulars, nor other animals, nor men, in order to procure the presence of the divinities ; but that alone out of each of these which is naturally capable of participating divine illumination, is by them introduced to the proposed mystic rites. The present discourse, therefore, will first of all be divided by me into three parts. In the beginning, considering all those common conceptions concerning the Gods, which Plato summarily delivers, together with the power and dignity every where of theological axioms ; but in the middle of this work, speculating the total orders of the Gods, enumerating their peculiarities, defining their progressions after the manner of Plato, and referring every thing to the hypotheses of theologists ; and, in the end, speaking concerning the Gods which are in different places celebrated in the Platonic writings, whether they are supermundane or mundane, and referring the theory respecting them to the total genera of the divine orders. In every part of this work, likewise, we shall prefer the clear, distinct, and simple, to the contraries of these. And such things as are delivered through symbols, we shall transfer to a clear doctrine concerning them ; but such as are delivered through images, we shall transmit to their exemplars. Such things too as are written in a more affirmative way, we shall examine by causal reasonings ; but such as arc composed through demonstrations, we shall investigate ; and besides this, explain the mode of truth which they contain, and render it known to the hearers. And of things enigmatically proposed, we shall elsewhere discover perspicuity, not from foreign hypotheses, but from the most genuine writings of Plato. But with respect to the things which immediately occur to the hearers, of these we shall contemplate the consent with things themselves. And from all these particulars, one perfect form of the Platonic theology will present itself to our view, together with its truth which pervades through the whole of divine intellections, and the one intellect which generated all Digitized by Google CliAP. II. OF PLATO. 5 ■ the beauty of this theology, and the mystic evolution of this theory. Such, therefore, as I have said, will be my present treatise. But the auditor of the proposed dogmas is supposed to be adorned with the moral virtues, and to be one who has bound by the reason of virtue all the illiberal and inharmonious motions of the soul, and harmonized them to the one form of intellectual prudence : for, as Socrates says, it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. But every vicious man is perfectly impure ; and the contrary character is pure. He must likewise have been exercised in all the logical methods, and have contemplated many irreprehensible conceptions about analyses, and many about divisions, the contraries to these, agreeably, as it appears to me, to the exhortation of Parmenides to Socrates. For prior to such a contest in arguments, the knowledge of the divine genera, and of the truth established in them, is difficult and impervious. But in the third place, he must not be unskilled in physics. For he who has been conversant with the multiform opinions of physiologists, and has after a manner explored in images the causes of beings, will more easily advance to the nature of separate and primary essences. An auditor therefore of the present work, as I have said, must sot be ignorant of the truth contained in the phenomena, nor unacquainted with the paths of erudition, and the disciplines which they contain ; for through these we obtain a more immaterial knowledge of a divine essence. But all these must be bound logether in the leader intellect. Being likewise a partaker of the dialectic of Plato, meditating those immaterial energies which arc separate from corporeal powers, and desiring to contemplate by intelligence* in conjunction with reason [true] beings, our auditor must genuinely apply himself to the interpretation of divine and blessed dogmas, and fill his soul, according to the Oracle, with profound love; since, as Plato somewhere observes, for the apprehension of this theory, a better assistant than love cannot be obtained. He must likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through all things, and must excite his intelligible eye to real and perfect truth. He •• * Instead of tws >"t* Aoyw, iU» necessary to read, vo^w prr* Xayov. Digitized by Google 6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. must establish himself in a firm, immovable, and safe kind of divine knowledge, and must be persuaded not to admire any thing else, nor even to direct his attention to other things, but must hasten to divine light with an intrepid reasoning energy, and with the power of an unwearied life ; and in short, must propose to himself such a kind of energy and rest as it becomes him to possess who intends to be such a coryphaeus as Socrates describes in the Theaetetus. Such then is the magnitude of our hypothesis, and such the mode of the discourses about it. Before, however, I enter on the narration of the things proposed, I wish to speak about theology itself, its different modes, and what theological forms Plato approves, and what he rejects ; that these being previously known, we may more easily learn in what follows, the auxiliaries of the demon- strations themselves. CHAPTER III. All, therefore, that have ever touched upon theology, liave called things first, according to nature, Gods ; and have said that the theological science is conversant about these. And some, indeed, have considered a corporeal essence, as that alone which has any existence, and have placed in a secondary rank with respect to essence, all the genera of incorporeal natures, considering the principles of things as having a corporeal form, and evincing that the habit in us by which we know these, is corporeal. But others, suspending indeed all bodies from incorporeal natures, and defining the first hyparxis1 to be in soul, and the powers of soul, call (as it appears to me) the best of souls, Gods ; and denominate the science which proceeds as far as to these, and which knows these, theology. But such as produce the multitude of souls from another more ancient principle, and establish intellect as the leader of wholes, these assert that the best end is a union of the soul with intellect, and consider the intellectual form of life as the most honourable of all things. They ■ Hrparxis, it the summit of any nature, or blossom, as it were, of Its essence. Digitized by Google CHAP. III. OF PLATO. 7 doubtless too consider theology, and the discussion of intellectual essence, as one and the same. All these, therefore, as I have said, call the first and most self-sufficient principles of things, Gods, and the science respecting these, theology. The divine narration however, of Plato alone, despises all corporeal natures, with reference to principles. Because, indeed, every thing divisible and endued with interval, is naturally unable either to produce or preserve itself, but possesses its being, energy, and passivity through soul, and the motions which soul contains. But Plato demonstrates that the psychical essence [i.e. the essence pertaining to soul] is more ancient than bodies, but is suspended from an intellectual hypostasis. For every thing which is moved according to time, though it may be self-moved, is indeed of a more ruling nature than things moved by others, but is posterior to an eternal motion. He shows, therefore, as we have said, that intellect is the father and cause of bodies and souls, and that all things both subsist and energize about it, which are allotted a life conversant with transitions und evolutions. Plato, however, proceeds to another principle entirely exempt from intellect, more incorporeal and ineffable, and from which all things, even though you should speak of such as ore last, have necessarily a subsistence. For all things are not naturally disposed to participate of soul, but such things only as are allotted in themselves a more clear or obscure life. Nor are all things able to enjoy intellect and being, but such only as subsist according to form. But it is necessary that the principle of all things should be participated by all things, if it does not desert any thing, since it is the cause of all things which in any respect are said to have a subsistence. Plato having divinely discovered this first principle of wholes, which is more excellent than intellect, and is concealed in inaccessible recesses ; and having exhibited these three causes and monads, and evinced them to be above bodies, I mean soul, the first intellect, and a union above intellect, produces from these as monads, their proper numbers ; one multitude indeed being uniform,' but the second intellectual, and the third psychical. For every monad is the leader of a multitude * Wherever this word occurs in this translation, it signifies that which is characterized by unity. Digitized by Google 8 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. coordinate to itself. But as Plato connects bodies with souls, so likewise he connects souls with intellectual forms, and these again with the unities of beings. But he converts all things to one ira participate unity. And having run back us far as to this unity, he considers himself as having obtained the highest end of the theory of wholes ; and that this is the truth' respecting the Gods, which is conversant with the unities of beings, and which delivers their progressions and peculiarities, the contact of beings with them, and the orders of forms which are suspended from these unical' hypostases. But he teaches us that the theory respecting intellect, and the forms and the genera revolving about intellect, is posterior to the science which is conversant with the Gods themselves. Likewise that the intellectual theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms which are capable of being known by the soul through the projecting energy of intellect ; but that the theological science transcending this, is conversant with arcane and ineffable hyparxes, and pursues their separation from each other, and their unfolding into light from one cause of all : whence, I am of opinion, that the intellectual peculiarity of the soul is capable of apprehending intellectual forms, and the difference which subsists in them, but that the summit, and, as they say, dower of intellect and hyparxis, is conjoined with the unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of all the divine unities. For as we contain many gnostic powers, through this alone we are naturally capable of being conjoined with and participating this occult union. For the genus of the Gods cannot be apprehended by sense, because it is exempt from all bodies ; nor by opinion and dianoia,' for these are divisible and come into contact with multiform concerns ; nor by intelligence in conjunction with reason, for knowledge of this kind belongs to true beings; but the hyparxis of the Gods rides on beings, and is defined according to the union itself of wholes. It remains, therefore, if it be admitted that a divine nature can be ,in any respect known, that it must be apprehended by the hyparxis of the soul, and through this, as far as it is possible, be known. For wo * i. e. Of the nature of the one. * i. e. The ducursire energy of reason, or the power of the soul that reasons scientifically, Digitized by Google II CHAP. Ji. OF PLATO. 9 say that every where things similar can be known by the similar ; viz. the sensible by sense, the doxastic' by opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia, and the intelligible by intellect So that the most unical nature must be known by the one, and th«: ineffable by that which is ineffable. Indeed, Socrates in the [First] Alcibiades rightly observes, that the soul entering into herself will behold all other things, and deity itself. For verging to her own union, and to the centre of all life, laying aside mul- titude, and the variety of the all manifold powers which she contains, she ascends to the high.«.„(, it is necwaaiy to read «*««,. Digitized by Google CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 15 all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first philosophy, venerable, clear, and snpernatural, are disseminated, in some indeed, more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously ; con* ceptions which excite those that are in any respect able to participate of them, to the immaterial and separate essence of the Gods. And, as in each part of the universe, and in nature herself, the demiurgus of all that the world contains, established resemblances of the unknown hyparxis of the Gods, that all things might be converted to a divine na- ture, through their alliance with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions about the Gods in all his writings, and leaves nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of them, a reminiscence of wholes may be obtained, and imparted to the genuine lovers of divine concerns. If however, it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods, I should not err in ranking among this number, the Phsedo and Phedrus, the Banquet, and the Philebus, and together with these, the Sophista and Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are full through the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato. But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras ; likewise the assertions about the providence of the Gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the universe, in the tenth book of the Republic. Again, you may, if you please, place in the third rank those Epistles, through which we may be able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention is made of the three kings ; and very many other divine dogmas worthy the Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, looking to these, to explore in these each order of the Gods. Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one good, and the two first principles of things, together with the triad* which is unfolded into light from these. For you will find all these ' rpm&>( is omitted in the origin*]. Digitized by Google !6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Ti- njaeus, you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the demiurgic monad: and the most full truth about the mundane Gods. But from the Phaedrus, [you may acquire a scientific knowledge of] all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and of the liberated orders of Gods, which are proximately established above the celestial circula- tions. From the Politicus, you may obtain the theory of the fabrica- tion in the heavens, of the uneven periods of the universe, and of the intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista, the whole sublunary generation, and the peculiarity of the Gods who are allotted the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. But with respect to each of the Gods, we may obtain many conceptions adapted to sacred concerns from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phsedo. For in each of these dialogues, more or less mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process the peculiarities of each. It is necessary however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic tradition of Or- pheus ; Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the orgies of the Gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the Philebus referring the theory about the two species of principles [bound and infinity] to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the Gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus therefore, the Pythagorean, has left us in writing many admirable conceptions about these principles, cele- brating their common progression into beings, and their separate fabri- cation of things. But in the Timjeus, Plato endeavouring to teach us • about the sublunary Gods, and their order, flies to theologists, calls them the sons of the Gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about those divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublu- nary Gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression deli- vered by them of the intellectual kings. Again, in the Cratylus he fol- Digitized by Google CHAP. VI. OF PLATO. yj lows the traditions of theologtsts, respecting the order of the divine pro- cessions. But in the Gorgias, he adopts the Homeric dogma, respect- ing the triadic hypostasis of the demiurgi. And in short, he every where discourses concerning the Gods agreeably to the principles of theologists ; rejecting indeed, the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establislung first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables. CHAFrER VI. Perhaps, however, some one may here object to as, that we do not in a proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and' that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different dia- logues, as if we were studious of collecting together many things into one mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For if this were the case, we might refer different dogmas to different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a preccdaneoos doc* trine concerning the Gods,' nor will there be any dialogue which presents us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and their co-ordination with eacH other. But we shall be similar to those who "en- deavour to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior to parts, and to weave together the perfect from things imperfect; when,' on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its genera- tion in the perfect. For the Timseus, for instance, will teach us the theory of the intelligible genera; and the Phaedrus appears to present us with a methodical account of the first intellectual orders. But where will' he the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles ? And what will be the generation of second from first natures ? In short, after what manner the progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all things, and how in the generations of the Gods, the orders between the one, and .all-perfect number, are -filled up, we 'shall be unable to' evince. Farther still, it may be said, where- will -be the venerableness of your Troc. Vol. I. C Digitized by Google IB ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. boasted science about divine natures ? For it is absurd to call these dog* mas which are collected from many places Platonic ; and which, as yoo acknowledge, are introduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato ; nor are you able to evince one whole entire truth about divine na- tures. Perhaps, indeed, they will say, certain persons, junior to Plato, hare delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one perfect form of theology. You, therefore, are able to produce one entire theory about nature from the Timoeus ; but from the Republic, or Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about manners, and which tend to one form of philoso- phy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated, as to boast on account of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic dialogues ; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake of the politic science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like manner, the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; but in the Gorgias, for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the in- tellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, bat that the divine, part of the soul may more perfectly receive the knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. For, from other dis- courses, we appear similar to those who are compelled to the reception of truth ; but from fables we suffer in an ineffable manner, and call forth our un perverted conceptions, venerating the mystic information which they contain. Hence, as it appears to me, Timoeus with great propriety thinks it fit that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of fa- bles as the sons of the Gods,' and subscribe to their always generating • tmhm, m omitted is tbt original. Di CHAP. VI. OP PLATO. secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak with- out demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, but entheastic, and was invented by the ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not regarding mere discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if you are willing to speculate not only the, causes of rabies, but of other theological dogmas, you will find that some of them nre scattered in the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical,' and others for the sake of physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning bound and the infinite, for the sake of pleasure and a life according to intellect For I think the latter are species of the for- mer. In the Timams, the discourse about the intelligible Gods, is assum-. ed for the sake of the proposed physiology. On which account it is every where necessary that images should be known from paradigms; but that the paradigms of material things should be immaterial, of sen- sibles, intelligible, and that the paradigms of physical forms should be separate. But again in the Phaedrus, Plato celebrates the supcrcclcstial place, the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this, for the sake of amatory mania : the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes place, and the passage to these from hence. But every where, as I may say, the leading end is either physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures take place, either for the sake of invention or per- fection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural* and worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is.precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is violent and not sppntaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an ad- ventitious order, as in a drama ? And such are the objections which may be urged against our design. • For fuAtam, k U aetmrj to read, ra nhnm*. OH THE THEOLOGY UOOK I. CHAPTER VII. I, hoveteb, to an objection of this kind, shall make a just and per- spicuous reply. I say then, that Plato every where discourses about the Gods agreeably to ancient rumour, and to the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of the dogmas ; and thence, as from a watch. tower, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But some- times he establishes the theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading from thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory order. But if it be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue, the all-per- fect, whole, and connected, extending as far as to the com pleat number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have entered on such like arguments, and affirm against our opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions it contains, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine genera proceed in- order from the first cause, and evince their mutual connexion and de- pendence on each other. And those which are highest indeed, connate with the one, and of a primary nature, are allotted a unica), occult and simple form of hyparxis ; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distri- buted into many parts, and are exuberant in number, but inferior in power to such as are of a higher order ; and such as are middle, accord- ing to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their.proper progeny. And in short, all the axioms of the theologic science, appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is no- thing else than the. celebraled; generation of the Gods and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes. The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before men- tioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods, Digitized by Google CHAP. VIII. OF PLATO. and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is ne- cessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogue*, and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timacus, they are interpreters, Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us ; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides ; just as the* Timams is acknowledged by all who are in the least degree intelligent, to' contain the whole science about nature. ■ - - - CHAPTER VIII. I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a two- fold contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of Plato ; and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been said. One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign from its intention. But the other sort, who are more venerable than these, and lovers of forms assert, that one of the hypotheses is about the first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an intellec- tual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this, whether they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind of beings. For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain to the present discourse. These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner. But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore Digitized by Google 12 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. them. For according to them, though Plato in the second hypothesis* treats about intellectual beings, yet the nature of intellect is one, simple and indivisible. Against both these therefore, must be contend, who entertains that opinion of the Parmenides, which we have before men* tioned. The contest however against these is not equal. But those who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again attacked by those, who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And those who do upt, unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of divine natures, are in- deed, as Homer says, is every respect venerable and skilful menj but yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy, we must doubt against them,' following in this our leader to the most holy and mystic truth. It is proper likewise to relate as far as contributes to our purpose, what ap- pears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses of the Parmenides \ for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace the whole the- ology of Plato. CHAPTER IX. , Ijr the first place then, let us consider those, who draw down the design of this dialogue from the truth of things to a logical exercise, and see whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato. It is therefore evident to every one, that Parmenides proposes to himself to deliver in reality the dialectic method, and that with this view he curso- rily assumes it in a similar manner in each of the things which have a real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion, and permanency, &c. ; exhorting at the same time, those who desire to discover the nature of each of these in an orderly method, to this exercise, as to a great contest. He likewise asserts that it was by no means an easy undertaking to him who was so much advanced in years, assimilates him- self to the Ibycean horse, and presents us with every argument to prove that this method is a serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in Digitized by Google CHAP. IX. OP PLATO. S3 mere words. How therefore, is it possible, that we can refer to empty arguments those conceptions ' about which the great Parmenides, evin- cing that they require much serious discussion, composed this discourse ? How likewise is it reasonable to suppose that an aged man would busy himself with mere verbal contests, and that he who loved to speculate the truth of things, would bestow so much study on this method,— he who considered every thing else, as having no real existence, and who ascended to the high watch-tower of being itself? Indeed, he who ad- mits this must suppose that Parmenides is satirized by Plato in this dia- logue, by thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from the most intellectual visions of the soul. But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what ***rmenidei ^ onuses, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered on thb discussiOw- Wp., it potthen about being according to his doc- trine, and the unity of all beiugsTtj WlUtliwwiondjnp; himself, his design was concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to conSP^ipPMfc tude of beings into one undivided union ? If, therefore, this is the one being, or that which is the highest, and which is perfectly established above the reasons conversant with opinion, is it not absurd to confound dogmas about intelligibles with doxastic arguments? Tor indeed, such a form of discourse is not adapted to the hypothesis about true beings, nor does the intellection of unapparent and separate causes harmonise with dialectic exercises; but these differ from each other, so far as intellect is established above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only, but likewise the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of this kind, exhorts us to make our investigations, ueitber about things perfectly unapparent to us, nor about such as are more known. It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those who rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge to an intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious, various, and unstable ; or that he- should speculate true being with this doxastie ■ For nurrcXoi, it if uecxttuj to read rr<0»A«f. Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. wisdom, and inane discussion. For a varioiw fnrm ~f i , , not harmonise' with th*r *,hi,h " • ?^ rf knofW8« docs ., ,a\ Umt whlch *« simple, nor the multiform with t)„ un.fonn, nor the doxastic with the intelligible lth But still further, nor must this be omitted, that such » mnA ^ course i, perfectly foreign from the discussion of discourses about all beings and deliver, the order of *ZT\u Does it not therefore appear, *a Plato nZ £ Z ant hypothesis to Parme^es, if it ^ 8aTd th^ L^"^ * dUcorf- exercise through opposite arguments, and tha^ tLTkl of T* ^ employed in this exercise, he excites the- whole of ^ evil IT" attributes hypotheses to each of the pWIosonhenLaL**^ bar tenets. Thus to TW»* _ jg}LL^flVnio their pecu- Sf^T-atp^diMtf ^^^^p^^P^ffffT^TiTthp. doctrine about nature ; to Republic; to the Elean guest, that about being ; and to the priestess Diotiraa, that respecting love. Afterwards, each of the other dialogues confines itself to those arguments which are adapted to the writings of the principal person of the dialogue. But Parmenides alone will appear to us wise in his poems, and in his diligent investiga- tion of true being, but in the Platonic scene, he will be the leader of a juvenile muse. This opinion, therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude of imitation, though he himself condemns the poets, for ascribing to the sons of the Gods a love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of the passions. How, therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and empty arguments to the leader of the truth of beings ? But if it be necessary that omitting a multitude of arguments, we should make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will cite if you please what is written in the Thcaetetus and Sophista ; for from these dialogues what we assert will be apparent In the Tbesetetus then Socrates being excited by a young man to a confutation of those who assert that being is immoveable, attacks among these an opinion of this kind ■ For pm* cLfiuHrnot, it is necemry to rod t»k$ Digitized by Google CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. entertained by Parmenides, and at the same time assigns the cause. " I blush," says he, " for Parmeoides, who is one of these, more than for all the rest ; for I, when very young, was conversant with him when ■he was very elderly, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profun- dity perfectly generous. 1 am afraid therefore, lest we do not under- stand what, has been asserted, and much more am I fearful that we fall short of the meaning of Parmenides." With great propriety therefore do we assert, that the proposed discussion does not regard a logical exer- cise, and make this the end of the whole, but that it pertains to the science of the first principles of things. For how could Socrates using a power of this kind, and neglecting the knowledge of things, testify that the discourse of Parmenides possessed a depth perfectly generous P And what venerableness can there be in adopting a method which proceeds doxastically through opposite reasons, and in undertaking such an inven- tion of arguments ? Again, in the Sophista, exciting the Elean guest to a perspicuous evo- lution of the things proposed by him, and evincing that he was now Accustomed to more profound discourses : " Inform me," says he, " whe- ther it is your custom to give a prolix discussion of a subject which you are able to demonstrate to any one by interrogations ; I mean such discussions as Parmenides himself formerly used, accompanied with all-beautiful reasons, and of which I was an auditor when I was very young, and he was very elderly ?" What, reason then can be assigned, why we should not believe Socrates, when he asserts that the arguments of Parmenides were all-beautiful, and possessed a generous profundity, and why we should degrade the discussion of Parmenides, hurl it from essence and being, and transfer it to a vulgar, trifling, and empty contest, neither considering that discourses of this kind are alone adapted to youth, nor regarding the hypothesis of being characterized by the «n«, nor any thing else which opposes such an opinion ? But I likewise think it is proper that the authors of this hypothesis, should consider the power of dialectic, such as it is exhibited by Socra- tes in the Republic ; — how, as he says, it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and elevates those that use it, to the good itself, and Proc. Vol. I. D Digitized by Google ■ 36 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK t the first unities, purifies the eje of the soul, establishes it in true being*, and the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is no longer hypothetical. For if the power of this dialectic is so great, and the end of this path so mighty, it is not proper to confound doxastic arguments, with a method of this kind. For the former regards the opi- nions of men, but the latter is called garrulity by the vulgar. And the one is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science, but the other is the defen- sive enclosure of such sciences, and the passage to it is through these. Again, the doxastic method of reasoning has for its end * the apparent, but the dialectic method endeavours to arrive at the one itself, always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last, beautifully ends in the nature of the good. By no means therefore, is it fit that we should draw down to doxastic arguments, a method which is established among the most accurate sci- ences. For the merely logical method which presides over the demon- strative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and is alone pleased with contentious discussions ; but our dialectic, for the most part, employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as imitating the progres* sion of beings from the one, and their conversion to it again. But it likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and the dividing method prior to this. On the contrary, the doxastic method is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration. Is it not, therefore, necessary that these powers must be separated from each other, and that the discussion of Parmenides, winch employs our dialectic, must be free from the empty variety of mere argument, and must fabricate its reasonings with a view to being itself, and not to that which is apparent? And thus much may suffice in answer to those who reprobate our hypotheses. For if all this cannot convince them, we shall in vain endeavour to persuade them, and urge them to the speculation of things. • tiM{ is omitted in the origin*]. •Digitized by Google CHAP. X. OF PLATO. CHAPTER X. But a greater and more difficult contest remains for me, against those lovers of the speculation of beings, who look to the science of first causes, as the end proposed in the hypothesis of the Platonic Parmenides ; and this contest we will accomplish, if you please, by numerous and more known arguments. And in the first place, we shall define what that is, about which our discourse against them will be employed ; for this, I think, will render the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning divine natures, apparent in the highest degree. There are, therefore, nine hypotheses which are dis- cussed by Parmenides in this dialogue, as we have evinced in our com- mentaries upon it. And the five precedaneous hypotheses suppose that the one has a subsistence, and through this hypothesis, that all beings, the mediums of wholes, and the terminations of the progressions of things, may be supposed to subsist. But the four hypotheses which follow these, introduce the one, not having a subsistence, according to the exhortation of the dialectic method, show that by taking away the one, all beings, and such things as have an apparent existence, must be entirely subvert- ed, and propose to themselves the confutation of this hypothesis. And some of the hypotheses evidently conclude every thing according to rea- son, but others (if I may be allowed the expression) perfectly evince things more impossible than impossibilities ; which circumstance some prior to us perceiving, as it appears to me, necessarily to happen in these hypotheses, have considered it as deserving discussion/ in their treatises on this dialogue. With respect to the first of the hypotheses therefore, almost all agree in asserting, that Plato through this celebrates the superessential princi- ple of wholes, as ineffable, unknown, and above all being. But all do not explain the hypothesis posterior to this after the same manner. For the ancient Platonists, and those who participated the philosophy of * For toajTv, I read tiarfifa. Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. Plotinus assert that an intellectual nature presents itself to the view in this hypothesis, subsisting from the superessenti&l principle of things, and endeavour to harmonize to the one and all-perfect power of intellect, such conclusions as are the result of this hypothesis. But that leader of ours to truth about the Gods, and confabulator of Plato (that I may use the language of Homer) who transferred what was indefinite in the theory of the more ancient philosophers, to bound, and reduced the confusion of the different orders to an intellectual distinction, in the writings which he communicated to his associates this our leader, in his treatise on the present subject, calls upon us to adopt a distinct division of the con- clusions, to transfer this division to the divine orders, and to harmonize the first and most simple of the things exhibited to the first of beings; but to adapt those in the middle rank to middle natures, according to the order which they are allotted among beings ; and such as are last and multiform, to ultimate progressions. For the nature of being is not one, simple, and indivisible ; but as in sensibles, the mighty heaven is one, yet it comprehends in itself a multitude of bodies ; and the monad con- nectedly contains multitude, but in the multitude there is an order of progression ; and of sensibles, some are first, some middle, and some last ; and prior to these, in souls, from one soul a multitude of souls subsists,- and of these, some are placed in an order nearer, but others more remote from their wholeness, and others again fill up the medium of the ex- tremes ; — in like manner, it is doubtless necessary that among perfectly true beings, such genera as are uniform and occult, should be established in the one and first cause of wholes, but that others should proceed into all multitude, and a whole number, and that others should contain the bond of these, in a middle situation. It is likewise by no means proper to harmonize the peculiarities of first natures with such as are second, nor of those that possess a subject order, with such as are more unical, but it is requisite that among these, some should have powers different from others, and that there should be an order in this progression of true beings, and an unfolding of second from first natures. In short, being which subsists according to, or is characterized by the one, proceeds indeed from the unity prior to beings, but generates the Digitized by Google CHAP. X. OF PLATO. whole divine genus, viz. the intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, and that which proceeds as far as to the mundane order. But our preceptor likewise asserts, that each of the conclusions is indicative of a divine pe- culiarity. And though all the conclusions harmonise to all the progres- sions of the one being, or of being characterized by the one, yet I am of opinion, it is by no means wonderful, that some conclusions should more accord with some hypotheses than with others. For such things as ex- press the peculiarity of certain orders, do not necessarily belong to all the Gods ; but such as belong to all, are doubtless by a much greater reason present with each. If, therefore, we ascribe to Plato, an adventitious division ot the divine orders,' and do not clearly evince that, in other dialogues, he celebrates the progressions of the Gods from on high to the extremity of things, sometimes in fables respecting the soul, and at other times, in other theological modes, we shall absurdly attribute to him, such a division of being, and together with this, of the progression of the one. But if we can evince from other dialogues, that he (as will be manifest in the course of this work) has celebrated all the kingdoms of the Gods, in a certain respect, is it not impossible, that in the most mystic of all his works, he should deliver through the first hypothesis, the exempt transcendency of the one with respect to all the genera of beings, to being itself, to a psychical essence, to form, and to matter, but that he should make no mention of the divine progressions, and their orderly separation ? For if it is proper to contemplate last things only, why do we touch on the first principle before other things ? Or if we think fit to unfold the multitude of the proper hypotheses, why do we pass by the genus of the Gods, and the divisions which it contains ? Or if we un- fold the natures subsisting between the first and last of things, why do we leave unknown the whole orders of those divine beings, which subsist between the one, and natures that are in any respect deified ? For all these particulars evince, that the whole discourse is defective, with re- spect to the science of things divine. But still farther, Socrates, in the Phiiebus, calls upon those that love ' For wp«(.w, it i$ necessary to read «.£•«». Digitized by Google so ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. the contemplation of beings, to use the dividing method, and always to explore the monads of total orders, and the duads, triads, or any other numbers proceeding from these. If this then is rightly determined, it is doubtless necessary that the Parmenides, which employs the whole dia- lectic method, and discourses about being which is characterized by the one, should neither speculate multitude about the one, nor remain in the one monad of beings, nor in short, introduce to the one which is above all beings, the whole multitude of first beings immediately, but should unfold, as in the first order, such beings as have an occult subsistence, and are allied to the one ; but as in the middle rank, those genera of the Gods which subsist according to progression, and which are more divided than the extremely united, but arc allotted a union more perfect, than such as have proceeded to the utmost ; and should unfold as in the last rank, such as subsist according to the last division of powers, and together with these, such as have a deified essence. If, therefore, the first of the hypotheses is about the one which is above all multitude, it is doubtless necessary that the hypothesis which follows this, should not unfold being itself in an indefinite and indistinct manner, but should deliver all the orders of beings. For the dividing method does not admit, that we should introduce the whole of multitude at once to the one, as Socrates tcsclics us in the Philebus. Besides, we may evince the truth of what we assert from the very method of the demonstrations. For the first of the conclusions become immediately manifest from the least, most simple, most known, and as it were com- mon conceptions. But those which are next in order to these, become apparent through a greater multitude of conceptions, and such as are more various, And the last conclusions are entirely the most composite. For he always uses the first conclusions, as subservient to the demonstra- tion of those that follow,1 and presents us with an intellectual paradigm of the order observed in geometry, or other disciplines, in the connexion of these conclusions with each other. If, therefore, discourses bring with fliqm an image of the things of which they are interpreters, and if, as are ' For ixww, it is necessary to read x*p4mr. Digitized by Google Chap. xi. of PLATO. 31 the evolutions from demonstrations, such must the order necessarily be of the things exhibited, it appears to me to be necessary, that such things as derive their beginning from the most simple principles, must be in every respect of a more primary nature, and must be arranged as con- joined with the one ; but that such as are always multiplied, and suspend- ed from various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the subsistence* of the one. For the demonstrations which have two conclusions* must necessarily contain the conclusions prior to themselves ; but those which contain pri- mary, spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily united with such as are more composite, which are exhibited through more abundant media, and which are farther distant from the principle of beings. It appears therefore, that some of the conclusions are indicative of more divine orders, but others, of such as are more subordinate; some, of more united, and others, of more multiplied orders ; and again, some, of more uniform, and others, of more multiform progressions. For demonstrations are universally from causes, and things first. If, there- fore, first are the causes of second conclusions, there is an order of causes, and things caused, in the multitude of the conclusions. For, indeed, to confound all tilings, and speculate them indefinitely in one, neither ac- cords with the nature of things, nor the science of Plato. CHAPTER XI. Again, therefore, let us discuss this affair in another way, and view with the dianbetic power, where any thing futile is delivered. For let it be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the conclusions of this second hypothesis are about true being. But as this is multitude, and* not only one itself, like the one prior to beings ; for being is that • For acmetoffmi, it U necessary to read wm»i«(. 32 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. which is passive to the one, as the Elcan guest in theSophista informs us ; and as it is universally acknowledged by our opponents, who establish that which is first as the one, but intellect, as one many, soul, as one and many, and body, as many and one : — as therefore, this has been asserted a thousand times, I mean that in true being there is multitude together with union, whether will they say that these things harmonise with the whole of being, but not with its parts, or both with the whole and its parts ? And again, we ask them, whether they attribute all things to each part of being, or whether they ascribe different things to different parts ? If, therefore, they are of opinion, that each particular should alone harmonize with the whole of being, being will consist of non-beings, that which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things de- prived of permanency, and universally, all tilings will consist of their opposites, and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of Parmenides, who says that the parts of being characterized by the one, are in a certain respect wholes, and that each of them is one and being, in a manner similar to the whole. But if we attribute all things to each part, and there is nothing which we do not make all things, how can the summit of being, and that which is most eminently one, contain a wholeness, and an incomprehensible multitude of parts ? How can it at one and the same time contain the whole of number, figure, motion and permanency, and in short all forms and genera? For these differ from each other, and the hypothesis will assert things impossible. For things near to, will be simi- larly multiplied with things remote from the one, and that which is first, will not be a less multitude than that which is last ; nor again, will the last of things be a less one than the first, and things in the middle will have no difference with respect to division from the extremes. As therefore, it is not proper to ascribe all this multitude of conclu- sions to the whole alone, nor to consider all things in a similar manner in all the parts of being, it remains that different conclusions must harmonize with different things. It is necessary, therefore, that either the enume- ration of the conclusions should be inordinate, or ordinate. But if they say they are inordinate, they neither speak agreeably to the dialectic method, nor to the mode of demonstrations, which always generate things Digitized by Google CHAP. I. OF PLATO, 33 secondary from such as are first, nor to the science of Plato, which always accompanies the order of things. But if they say the conclusions are re- gular, I think it is entirely necessary, that they should either begin from things first according to nature, or from things last. But if from things last being characterised by the one will be the last, and that which is moved according to time, the first. This, however, is impossible. For that which participates of time, must by a much greater priority participate of first being. But that which participates of first being, does not neces- sarily participate of time. First being, therefore, is above time. If then Plato begins from first being, but ends in that which participates of time, he proceeds supernal ly from the first to the last parts of true being. Hence, the first conclusions are to be referred to the first orders, the middle, for the same reason, to the middle orders, and the last, as is evi- dent, to such as are last. For it is necessary, as our discourse has evinced, that different conclusions should be assigned to different things, and that a distribution of this kind should commence from such things as are highest. But likewise, the order of the hypotheses, as it appears to me, is a suffi- cient argument of the truth of our assertion. For with us the one which is exempt from all multitude, is allotted the first order, and from this the evolution of all the arguments commences. But the second order after this, is about true beings, and the unity which these participate. And the third order in regular succession, is about soul. Whether, therefore, is it about every soul or not? In answer to this, we shall observe, that our leader Syrianus has beautifully shown, that the discourse about whole souls is comprehended in the second hypothesis. If, therefore, the order of these three hypotheses proceeds according to the nature of things, it is evident that the second is produced from the first, and the last from the second. For I would ask those who are not entirely unskilled in discourses of this kind, what can be more allied to the one, than being characterized by the one, which the first of the conclusions of the second hypothesis un« folds? Or what can be more allied to soul, than that which participates of time, which subsists divisibly, and which is the last thing exhibited in this hypothesis? For the life of partial as well as of total souls is according Proc. Vol. I. E Digitized by Google 34 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. to time. And first being is that which first participates of the one, and through its connexion with being, has a redundant hyparxis with respect to the imparticipable unity. But if this hypothesis is the middle, and if we aptly harmonize the highest conclusions with things highest, we should doubtless harmonize middles with middles. For this hypothesis com- mencing from first being, proceeds through all the genera posterior to it, till it ends in a nature participating of time. But, farther, from the common confession of those interpreters of Plato, who were skilled in divine concerns, we can demonstrate the same things ns we have above asserted. For Plotinus, in his book On Numbers, en- quiring whether beings subsist prior to numbers, or numbers prior to beings, clearly asserts that the first being subsists prior to numbers, and that it generates the divine number. But if this is rightly determined by him, and being is generative of the first number, but number is produced by being, it is not proper to confound the order of these genera, nor to collect them into one hypostasis, nor, since Plato separately produces first being, and separately number, to refer each of the conclusions to the same order. For it is by no means lawful, that cause and the thing caused, should have either the same power, or the same order : but these are distinct from each other; and the science concerning them is likewise distinct, and neither the nature, nor the definition of them is one and the same. But, after Plotinus, Porphyry in his treatise On Principles, evinces by many and beautiful arguments, that intellect is eternal, but that at the same time, it contains in itself something prior to the eternal, and through which it is conjoined with the one. For the one is above all eternity, but the eternal has a second, or rather third order in intellect. For it appears to me to be necessary that eternity should be established in the middle of that which is prior to the eternal, and the eternal. But of this hereafter. At the same time, thus much may be collected from what has been said, that intellect contains something in itself better than the eternal. Ad- mitting this, therefore, we ask the father of this assertion, whether this something better than the eternal is not only being characterized by the one, but is a whole and parts, and all multitude, number and figure, that which is moved, and, that which is permanent; or whether we are to Digitized by Google CHAP. XI. OF PLATO. 35 ascribe some of the conclusions to it, but not others ? For it is impossible that all these can accord with a nature prior to eternity, since every in- tellectual motion, and likewise permanency, are established in eternity. But if we are to ascribe some of the conclusions to it, and not others, it is evident that other orders in intellect are to be investigated, and that each of the conclusions is to be referred to that order, to which it appears par- ticularly adapted. For intellect is not one in number, and an atom, as it appeared to be to some of the ancients, but it comprehends in itself the whole progression of first being. But the third who makes for our purpose after these, is the divine Jam- blichus, who, in his treatise Concerning the Gods, accuses those who place the genera of being in intclligibles, because the number and variety of these is more remote from the one. But afterwards he informs us where these ought to be placed. For they are produced in the end of the intellectual order, by the Gods which there subsist. How the genera of being, how- ever, both are, and arc not in intclligibles, will be hereafter apparent. But if, according to his arrangement of the divine orders, intelligibles are exempt from the genera of being, much more are they exempt from similitude and dissimilitude, equality and inequality. Each of the con- clusions, therefore, ought not in a similar manner to be accommodated to all things, so as to refer them to the whole breadth of the intelligible, or intellectual order. Hence from what the best of the interpreters have said, when philosophizing according to their own doctrines, both the multitude of the divine orders, and of the Platonic arguments, are to be considered as proceeding according to an orderly distinction. In addition, likewise, to what has been said, this also may be asserted, that we cannot, on any other hypothesis, obtain a rational solution of the many doubts which present themselves on this subject, but shall igno- rantly ascribe what is rash and vain to this treatise of Plato. For in the . first place, why are there only so many conclusions, and neither more nor less ? For there are fourteen conclusions. But as there are so many, we cannot assign the reason of this, unless we distribute them in conjunction with things themselves. In the second place, neither shall we be able to find the cause of the order of the conclusions with respect to each other, 3d ON THE THEOLOGY hook f. and how some have a prior, and others a posterior establishment, accord- ing to the reason of science, unless the order of the conclusions proceeds in conjunction with the progression of beings. In the third place, why do some of the conclusions become known from things proximately de- monstrated, but others from preceding demonstrations ? For that the one is a whole and contains parts, is demonstrated from being, which is cha- racterized by the one ; but its subsistence in itself and in another, is placed in a proximate order, after the possession of figure, but is demonstrated from whole and parts. Or why are some things often demonstrated, from two of the particulars previously evinced, but others from one of them ? For we shall be ignorant of each of these, and shall neither be able scien- tifically to speculate their number, nor their order, nor their alliance to each other, unless following things themselves, we evince that this whole hypothesis is a dialectic arrangement, proceeding from on high through all the middle genera, as far as to the termination of first being. Again, if we should say, that all the conclusions demonstrate syllogisti- cally only, in what respect shall we differ from those, who assert that the whole of this discussion consists of doxastic arguments, and only regards a mere verbal contest ? But if it is not only syllogistic, but likewise de- monstrative, it is doubtless necessary, that the middle should be the cause of, and by nature prior to the conclusion. As, therefore, we make the conclusions of the preceding reasons, the media of those that follow, the things which the arguments respect, must doubtless have a similar order as to being, and their progeny must be the causes of things subject, and generative of such as are secondary. But if this be admitted, how can we allow that all of them have the same peculiarity and nature ? For cause, and that which is produced from cause, are separated from each other. But this likewise will happen to those who assert that one nature is to be explored in all the arguments, that they will by no means perceive how in the three first conclusions, the one remains unseparated from being, but is first separated in the fourth conclusion. But in all the following conclusions, the one is explored considered as subsisting itself by itself. Is it not therefore necessary, that these orders must differ from each Digitized by Google CHAP. xt. OF PLATO. 37 other? For that which is without separation, in consequence of having an occult and undivided subsistence, is more allied to the one, hut that which is separated, has proceeded farther from the first principle of things. Again, if you are willing to consider the multitude of the arguments, and the extent of the hypothesis, how much it differs from that which follows it, — neither from this will it appear to you to be entirely about one and an unseparated nature. For reasonings about divine concerns, are con- tracted in the more principal causes, because in these the occult is more abundant than the perspicuous, and the ineffable than the known. But they become multiplied and evolved, by proceeding to divine orders more proximate to our nature. For such things as are more allied to that which is ineffable, unknown, and exempt iu inaccessible places, are allotted an hyparxis more foreign from verbal enunciation. But such things as have proceeded farther, are both more known to us, and more apparent to the phantasy, than such as have a prior subsistence. This, therefore, being abundantly proved, it is necessary that tlie second hypothesis, should unfold all the divine orders, and should pro- ceed on high, from the most simple and unical to the whole multitude, and all the number of divine natures, in which the order of true being ends, which indeed is spread under the unities of the Gods, and at the same time is divided in conjunction with their occult and ineffable pecu- liarities. If, therefore, we are not deceived in admitting this, it follows, that from this hypothesis, the continuity of the divine orders, and the pro- gression of second from first natures, is to be assumed, together with the peculiarity of all the divine genera. And indeed, what their communion is with each other, and what their distinction proceeding according to measure, likewise, the auxiliaries which may be found in other dialogues respecting the truth of real beings, or the unities which they contain, are all to be referred to this hypothesis. For, here we may contemplate the total progressions of the Gods, and their all-perfect orders, according to theological science. For as we have before shown that the whole treatise of the Parmenides has reference to the truth of things, and that it was not devised as a vain evolution of words, it is doubtless necessary, that the nine hypotheses which it discusses, employing the dialectic method, Digitized by Google 38 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. but speculating with divine science, should be about things and certain natures, which are either middle or last. If, therefore, Parmenides ac- knowledges that his whole discourse will be about the one, and how it subsists with respect to itself, and all other things, it is evident that the speculation of the one, must commence from that which is highest, but end in that which is the last of all things. For the hyparxis of the one proceeds from on high, as far as to the most obscure hypostasis of things. CHAPTER XII. As the first hypothesis, however, demonstrates by negations the inef- fable supereminence of the first principle of things, and evinces that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge, — it is evident that the hypothesis after this, as being proximate to it, must unfold the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essen- tial peculiarity of the Gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their hyparxis through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other one can that be which is participated by being, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the imparticipable one ? For as bodies through their life are conjoined with soul, and as souls through their intellective part, are extended to total intellect, and the first , intelligence, in like manner true beings through the one which they contain are reduced to an exempt union, and subsist in unproceeding union with this first cause. But because this hypothesis commences from that which is one being, or being characterized by the one, and establishes the' summit of intelligibles as the first after the one, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is ne- cessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate by various con- clusions, the whole multitude of partial souls, and the diversities which Digitized by Google CHAP. XH. OF PLATO. ^ they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis proceeds. After this follows that nature which is divisible about bodies, and in- separable from matter, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally suspended froni the Gods. And the last hypothesis is the procession of matter, whether considered as one, or as various, which the fifth hypo- thesis demonstrates by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude' to the first But sometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and sometimes the exempt causes of all the productions. And what is the most wonderful of all, the highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and others according to deficiency. But each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative ; the one para- digmatically, but the other iconically, or after the manner of an image. But the middle corresponds to the order of soul, for it is composed from affirmative and negative conclusions. But it possesses negations co-or- dinate to affirmations. Nor is it alone multiplied, like material natures/ nor does it possess an adventitious one ; but the one which it contains, though it is still one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are the hypo- theses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, together with the causes of wholes, as well exempt, as subsisting in things them- selves, according to the hyparxis of the one. But there are four other hypotheses besides these, which by taking away the one, evince that all things must be entirely subverted, both beings and things in generation, and that no being can any longer have any subsist- ence ; and this, in order that he may demonstrate the one to be the cause of being and preservation, that through it ail things participate of the nature of being, and that each has its hyparxis suspended from the one. And in short, we syllogistically collect this through all beings, that if the one is, all things subsist as far as to the last hypostasis, and if it is not, no being has any subsistence. The one, therefore, is both the hypostatic and • For owfMwnjTa, it is necessary to read ' Ixtitead of or? a* ra read tvri w; t« nvKx. 40 ON THE THKOLOGY hook r. preservative cause of all things ; which Parmeoides also himself collects at the end of the dialogue. With respect, however, to the hypothesis of the Parmenides, its division, and the speculation of its several parts, we have sufficiently treated in our commentaries on that dialogue ; so that it ' would be superfluous to enter into a prolix discussion of these particulars at present. But as from what has been said, it appears whence we may assume the whole of theology, and from what dialogues we may collect into one the theology distributed according to parts, we shall in the next place treat about the common dogmas of Plato, which are adapted to sacred concerns, and which extend to all the divine orders, and shall evince that each of these is defined by him according to the most perfect science. For things common are prior to such as are peculiar, and are more known according to nature. CHAPTER XIII. In the first place, therefore, we shall assume the things which are de- monstrated in the Laws, and contemplate how they take the lead, with respect to the truth about the Gods, and are the most ancient of all the other mystic conceptions about a divine nature. Three things, therefore, are asserted by Plato in these writings ; that there are Gods ; that their providence extends to all things ; and that they administer all things ac- cording to justice, and suffer no perversion from worse natures. That these then obtain the first rank' among all theological dogmas, is perfectly evident. For what can be of a more leading nature, than the hyparxis of the Gods, or than boniform providence, or immutable and undeviating power ? Through which they produce secondary natures uni- formly, preserve themselves in an undefiled manner, and convert them to themselves. But the Gods indeed govern other things, but suffer nothing ' For «pX? ifurffa, it U necessary to read Digitized by Google CHAP. XIII. OF PLATO. 41 from subordinate natures, nor are changed with the variety of the things to which their providence extends. We shall learn, however, how these things are defined according to nature, if we endeavour to embrace by a reasoning process the scientific method of Plato about each of them ; and prior to these, survey by what irrefragable arguments he proves that there are Gods ; and thus afterwards consider such problems as are conjoined with this dogma. Of all beings, therefore, it is necessary that some should move only, but that others should be moved only, and that the natures situated be- tween these, should both move and be moved. And with respect to these test it is necessary, either that they should move others being themselves moved by others, or that they should be self-motive. These four hypo- stases likewise, are necessarily placed in an orderly series, one after another; that which is moved only and suffers, depending on other primary causes ; that which moves others, and is at the same time moved, being prior to this ; that which is self-motive, and which is beyond that which both moves and is moved, beginning from itself, and through its own motion imparting the representation of being moved, to other things ; and that which is immoveable, preceding whatever participates either producing or passive motion. For every thing self-motive, in consequence of pos- sessing its perfection in a transition and interval of life, depends on an- other more ancient cause, which always subsists according to sameness, and in a similar manner, and whose life is not in time, but in eternity. For time is an image of eternity. If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves, are moved ac- cording to time, but the eternal form of motion is above tluit which is carried in time, the self-motive nature will be second in order, and not the first of beings. But that which moves others, and is moved by others, must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature : and not this alone, but likewise every alter-motive fabrication, as the Athenian guest demonstrates. For if all things, says he, should stand still, ualess self- motive natures had a subsistence among things, there would be tin such thing as that which is first moved. For that which is immoveable, is by no means naturally adapted to be moved, nor will there then be that Proc. Vol. I. F - Digitized by Google 42 OS THE THEOLOGY BOOK L which is first moved ; but the alter-motive nature is indigent of another moving power. The self-motive nature, therefore, alone, as beginning from its own energy, will move both itself and others in a secondary manner. For a thing of this kind imparts the power of being moved to alter-motive natures, in the same manner as an immoveable nature im- parts a motive power to all beings. In the third place, that which is moved only, must first of all be suspended from things moved by another, but moving others. For it is necessary, both that other things, and the series of things moved, which extends in an orderly manner from on high to the last of things, should be filled with their proper media. All bodies, therefore, belong to those things which are naturally moved only, and are passive. For they are productive of nothing, on account ©f possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating of magnitude and bulk ; since every thing productive and motive of others, naturally produces and moves, by employing an incorporeal power. But of incorporeal natures, some are divisible about bodies, but others are exempt from such a division about the last of things. Those incorporeals, therefore, which are divisible about the bulks of bodies, whether they subsist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the number of things moved by another, but at the same time moving others. For these, because they possess an incorporeal allotment, parti- cipate of a motive power ; but because they are divided about bodies, are deprived of the power of verging to themselves, are divided together with their subjects, and are full of sluggishness from these, they are indigent of a motive nature which is not borne along in a foreign seat, but possesses an hypostasis in itself. Where, therefore, shall \vc obtain that which moves itself? For things extended into natures possessing bulk and interval, or which are divided in these, and subsist inseparably about them, must necessarily either be moved only, or be motive through others. But it is necessary, as we have before observed, that a self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is perfectly established in itself, and not in others, and which fixes its energies in itself, and not in things different from itself. There is, therefore, another certain nature exempt from bodies, both in the heavens and in these very mutable elements, from which bo- dies primarily derive the power of being moved. Hence, if it be requisite Digitized by Google CHAP. XIII. OF PLATO. 43 to discover what such an essence as this is, (rightly following Socrates, and considering what the end of things is,) which by being present to alter- motive natures, imparts to them a representation of self-motion, to which of the above mentioned natures shall we ascribe the power of things being moved from themselves? For all inanimate natures are alone alter-motive, and whatever the}' suffer, they are adapted to suffer, through a certain power externally moving and compelling. It remains, therefore, that animated natures must possess this representation, and that they are self-motive m a secondary degree, but that the soul which is in them, primarily moves itself, and is moved by itself, and that through a power derived from itself as it imparts life to bodies, so likewise it extends to them from itself a re- presentation of being moved by themselves. If, therefore, the self-motive essence is more ancient than alter-motive matures, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which the image of self- motion is imparted to bodies, soul will be beyond bodies, and the motion of every body, will be the progeny of soul, and of the motion it contains. Hence it is necessary that the whole heaven and all the bodies it contains possessing various motions, and being moved with these different motions, according to nature (for a circulation is natural to every body of this kind) should have ruling souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies, and which are moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with the power of being moved. It is necessary, therefore, that these souls which dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it con- tains, and who impart to every thing corporeal which is of itself destitute of life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose, with the cause of motion, should either move all things conformably to reason, or after a contrary manner, which it is not lawful to assert. But if indeed, this world and every thing in it which is disposed in an orderly mauner, and is moved equally and perpetually according to nature, as is demon- strated, partly in the mathematical disciplines, and partly in physical dis- cussions, is suspended from an irrational soul, which moving itself moves also other things, neither the order of the periods, nor the motion which is bounded by one reason, nor the position of bodies, nor any other of those things which are generated according to nature, will have a stable cause, Digitized by Google 44 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK. I. and which is able to distribute every thing in an orderly manner, and accord- ing to an invariable sameness of subsistence. For every tiling irrational is naturally adapted to be adorned by something different from itself, and is indefinite and unadorned in its own nature. Hut to commit all heaven to a thing of this kind, and. a circulation revolving according to reason, and with. an invariable sameness, is by no means adapted, either to the nature of tilings, or to our undisciplined conceptions. If however, an intellectual soul, and which employs reason, governs all things, and if every thing which is moved with a perpetual lation, is governed by a soul of this kind, and there is no one of the wholes in the universe destitute of soul (for no body is. honorable if deprived of such a power as this, as Theophrastus somewhere says) if this be the case, whether docs it possess this intellectual, perfect, and beneficent power, according to participation, or according to essence? For if, according to essence, it is necessary that every soul should be of tliis kind, since each according to its own nature is self-motive. But if, according to participation, there will be another intellect subsisting in energy, more ancient than soul, which essentially possesses intellection, and by its very being pre-assumes in itself the uniform knowledge of wholes ; since it is also necessary that the soul which is essentialized ac» cording to. reason, should possess that which pertains to intellect through participation* and that the intellectual nature should be twofold ; the one subsisting primarily in a divine intellect itself; but the other, which, proceeds from this, subsisting secondarily in. soul. To which, you may add, if you please, the presence of intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole of this heaven either spherical or moved in a circle, and whence does it revolve with a sameness of circulation according to one definite order? For how could it always be allotted the same idea and power immutably according to. nature, if it did not participate of specific formation accordiug to intellect? For soul, indeed, is the supplier of motion; but the cause of a firm establishment, and that which reduces the unstable mutation of things that are moved, into sameness, and also a life which is bounded by one reason, and a circulation which subsists with invariable sameness, will evidently be superior to soul. Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to things CHAP. XUL OF PLATO". 45 which are alter-motive. But soul is self-motive, binding ro itself all cor- poreal motions ; and prior to this is intellect which is immoveable. Let ho one, however, suppose that I assert this immobility of intellect to re- semble that which is sluggish, destitute of life,' and without respiration, but that it is the leading eause of all motion, and the fountain, if you are willing so to denominate it, of all life, both of that which is- converted to itself, and of that which has its hypostasis in other things. Through these causes also, the world is denominated by Timccus, an animal endued with soul and intellect ; being called by him an animal according to its own nature, and the life pervading to it from soul, and which is distributed about it, but animated or endued with soul, according to the presence of a divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual domination. For the supply of life, the government of soul, and the par- ticipation of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven. If, however, this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timaeus indi- cating that the essence of intellect is the same with its intellection, deno- minates it divine ; for he says, that soul receiving a divine intellect led aa upright and wise life ; if, therefore, this be the case, it is necessary that the whole world should be suspended from its divinity, and that motion in- deed should be present to this universe from soul, but that its perpetual permanency and sameness of subsistence should be derived from intellect, and that its one union, the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all- perfect measure should originate from that unity,* from which intellect is uniform, soul is one,' every being is whole and perfect according to its own nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection in its own proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity, from an order which is always established above it. For that which is corporeal being alter-motive, derives from soul the representation of self- motive power, and is through it an animal. But soul being self-motive participates of a life according to intellect, and energizing according to time, possesses a neverrceasing energy, and an ever-vigilant life from its ' For «£«» read a^tn. * For **< n)f emios, read, xat core nj$ tvafof. ' Eor xai e vou, ivoiiSi] fita xai n ^r/7l> resM*» *** • wu^Vt «« t ^-Xl '/*"** Digitized by Google 4C OS THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. proximity to intellect. And intellect possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in energy/ and fixing all its stable intellection at once in intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it has two-fold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this in- tellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god ; in the same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul. All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from the one through intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form of unity ; but soul has the form of intellect ; and the body of the world is vital. But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate, but the other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed* is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an intellectual nature ; but intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to other things ; and soul is divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium. But the body which participates of a soul of ttxis kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself divine ; for the illumination of divine* light pervades supernally as far as to the last dependencies ; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine. My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven, since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to the sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation, but they abide in the universe according to their wholenesses, and contain in them- selves partial animals. For every wholeness has posterior to itself more partial essences. As, therefore, in the heavens, the number of the stars proceeds together with the whole spheres, and as in the earth the multi- tude of partial terrestrial animals subsists together with their wholeness, thus also it appears to me to be necessary that in the wholes which have • For atxt ivtgytta, read, etfi cur mgytia. * The sense requires lliat f.MU should be here wpplied. Digitized by Google CHAP. XIII. OF PLATO. an intermediate subsistence, each element should be filled up with appro- priate numbers. For how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior to parts, be arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy of them in the intermediate natures ? But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established after the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as possessing life indeed, it will always primarily participate of soul, but as preserving its own order immutable in the world, it will be comprehended by intellect, and as one and a whole, and the leader and ruler of its proper parts, it will be illuminated by divine union. Not only the universe, therefore, but each also of its perpetual parts is animated and endued with in- tellect, and as much as possible is similar to the universe.' For each of these parts is a universe with respect to its kindred multitude. In short, there is indeed one corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe, but there arc many others under this, depending on this one ; there is one soul of the universe, and after this, other souls, together with this dispos- ing in an orderly manner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled purity ; one intellect, and an intellectual number under this, participated by these souls ; and one god who connectedly contains at once all mun- dane and supermundane1 natures, and a multitude of other gods, who distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these, and all the parts of the world. For it is not to be supposed that each of the productions of nature is generative of things similar to itself, but that wholes and the first of mundane beings should not in a much greater degree extend in themselves the paradigm of a generation of this kind. For the similar is more allied, and more naturally adapted to the reason of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner as the same than the different, and bound than the infinite. These things, however, we shall accurately survey in what follows. But we shall now direct our attention to the second of the things demonstrated in the Laws, viz. that the Gods providentially attend at once to wholes and parts, and shall summarily ' Instead of tftam fu] xmra. luittftn, it is necessary to read k%% xora fc/vapir rtf veam tfvm», ts both, the sense of the whole sentence and the version of Portus require. ' It seems requisite to supply here the word uxi'jx$&fmt> sii in ill© trails mi ion. Digitized by Google 43 OH THE THEOLOGY BOOK L discuss the irreprehensible conception of Plato -about the providence of the Gods. CHAPTER XIV. Fhom what has "been said, therefore, it is evident to every one, that the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic power. But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very being all secon- dary* natures to the perfection of life, according to the fountain and principle of all second and third progressions of motion. And others are unical, or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the whole genera of themselves, according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but are not the principle of another. But again others supply to secondary natures motion according to place or quality, but arc essentially the causes of motion to themselves. For every thing which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection. Farther still, that which is self-motive is again the principle of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to every thing in the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion, but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal energy. And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life proceed from a unical hy pant is, which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things. For of life iudecd, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor of intellect and a gnostic power ; but of the one all things participate, as far • For bvrffw read fevnga. Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 49 as to matter itself, both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to nature, and the contraries to these ; and there is not any thing which is de- prived of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being, if it is deprived of the one. If, therefore, the Gods produce all things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehensions of themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all things iu these compre- hensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial natures ? For it is every where fit that offspring should enjoy the providential care of their causes. But all alter-motive are the progeny of self-motive natures. And things which subsist in time, cither in the whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of eternal natures ; because that which always is, is the cause of that which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they give subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence. In short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not allotted iu generation from the one. It is necessary, therefore, that all these should be partakers of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods ; and participating of sameness and at the same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual gods ;' but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of measure, and of the distribution of good from the first Gods. It is necessary, therefore, either that the Gods should know that a provi- dential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only give subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence and union, but also previously comprehend in themselves the primary cause of the goods they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert, that being Gods, they are igooraut of what is proper and fit. For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who are the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted an hyparxis defined by the nature of the goodf But if they are ignorant, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect, nor are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the unities of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves all know- 1 It is necessary here to »udt>1t the words, ex ru> vhcm; $r*v. Proc. Vol.1. G Digitized by Google 50 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. ledge, which we have acknowledged they do through the former demonstra- tions. If, therefore, they are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers, leaders and governors of every thing in the world, and' to them as being, such a providential care of the things governed by, and following them, and generated by them, pertains, whether shall we say that they knowing the law which is according to nature, accomplish this law, or that through imbecility they arc depri\ed of a providential attention to their possessions or progeny, for it is of no consequence as to the present discussion which of these two appellations you are willing to adopt? For if through want of power they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of this want of power ? For they do not move things externally, nor are other tilings indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government of the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from the stern of a ship, themselves supplying being* themselves containing the measures of life, and themselves distributing to things their respective energies. W hether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or they do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential care ? And if they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether do they pro- videntially superintend greater things, but neglect such as are less ? Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater ? For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly y through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them a greater thing, viz. the production of all things, can we refuse to grant that which is naturally consequent to this, a providential attention to their produc- tions ? For it is the province of the power which produces a greater thing, to dispose in a becoming manner that which is less. But if they are curators of less tilings, and neglect such as are greater, how can this mode of providence be right? For that which is more allied, and more similar to any thing, is more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation of the good which that thing confers on it. If, however* the Gods think that the first of mundane natures deserve their providen- tial care, and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable ■ »«• is omitted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OF PT.ATO. 51 to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it which can restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things ? What is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy ? How can those who are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not be tlie lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains, there- fore, that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care of all things, and an exuberance of power, — if this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence in them ? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power? And on this account are things deprived' of their providential care ? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis ac- cording to which they are essentialised. For the very being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness? And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by the former demonstrations ? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according to every virtue. And again, it is con- sequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures, either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with * For oTjagqrM it is requisite to read, xaj w*t«k 52 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the trhole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of good. Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established re- mote from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not willing to be de- filed with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation and pain. But all labours and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If; however, it be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating what is fit, or exploring the good of every thing by ambiguous reasonings, or by looking externally, and following their effects as men do in the pro* vidence which they exert on their own affairs ; but pre-assuming in them- selves the measures of the whole of things, and producing the essence of every thing from themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them with good. Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to nature, energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deli- berate choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in con- junction with will, are they deprived of production according to essence ; but they contract both these into one union, and they will indeed such things as they are able to effect by their very being, but by their very essence being capable of and producing all things, they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant will. By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls, or of intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselves accomplished, unless it should be said, that to impart good in any respect is laborious to the Gods ? But that which is according to nature is not laborious to any thing. For neither is it labo- rious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OP PLATO. ^ bodies to energize according to their own proper powers. And prior to bodies, neither is it laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase. For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it labo- rious to souls. For these indeed produce many energies from deliberate choice, many from their very being, and are the causes of many motions by alone being present. So that if indeed the communication of good is according to nature to the Gods, providence also is according to nature. And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility, and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according to nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is the sup- plier of good ; just as life is the source of another life, and intellect is the source of intellectual illumination. And every tiling which has a primary subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary subsistence. That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it, neither is the exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary natures, through a pro- vidential care for things subordinate, nor is their providential presence with all things diminished through their transcending the whole of things with undefiled purity, but at the same time it assigns to them a separate subsist* ence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also the beipg extended to all things, and the taking care of and adorning their own progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal, as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible about bodies, in the same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate natures, in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate from body, and without conversion to it, is immaterial, unmingled, unre- strained, uniform, primary and exempt. In short, such a mode of the providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For it is evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods. For soul indeed, is said to provide for secondary natures in one way, and intellect in another. But the providence ot divinity who is prior to intel- lect is exerted according to a transcendency both of intellect and soul. And of the Gods themselves, the providence of the sublunary is different from that of the celestial divinities. Of the Gods also who are beyond the Digitized by Google £4 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. world, there are many orders, and the mode of providence is different according to each. CHAPTER XV. The third problem after these we shall connect with the former, and survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest degree subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their providential attention to all other things, and in the mutations of human affairs. I think therefore, that this is apparent to every one, that every where that which governs according to nature, and payB all possible attention to the fehcity of the governed, after this manner becomes the leader of that which it governs, and directs it to that which is best. For neither has the pilot who rules over the sailors and the ship any other precedaneous end than the safety of those that sail in the ship, and of the ship itself, nor does the physician who is the curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things for the sake of any thing else than the health of the subjects of his care, whether it be requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative medicine. Nor would the general of an army or a guardian say that they look to any other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded, and the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any other to whom it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour to subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his business to pro- cure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming manner every thing belonging to those whom he governs. If therefore we grant that the Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their providence ex- tends to all things, since they are good, and possess every virtue, how is it possible they should neglect the felicity of the objects of their provi- dential care? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the provi- Digitized by Google CHAP. XV. GF PLATO. 65 dence of subordinate natures? Since the Gods indeed always look to that which is better, and establish this as the end of all their government, but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, in consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved. And universally, whether you arc willing to call the Gods leaders, or rulers, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will appear to be in want of no one of such names. For all things that are venerable and honor- able subsist in them primarily. And on this account indeed, here also some things are naturally more venerable and honorable than others, because they exhibit an ultimate resemblance of the Gods. But what occasion is there to speak further on this subject ? For I think that we hear from those who are wise in divine concerns paternal, guardian, ruling and peeonian powers celebrated. How is it possible therefore that the images of the Gods which subsist according to nature, regarding the end which is adapted to them, should providentially attend to the order of the things which they govern, but that the Gods themselves with whom there is the whole of good, true and real virtue, and a blameless life, should not direct their government to the virtue and vice of men ? And how can it be admitted, on this supposition, that tbey exhibit virtue victorious in the universe, and vice vanquished? Will they not also thus corrupt the measures of justice by the worship paid to them by the depraved, subvert the boundary of undeviating science, and cause the gifts of vice to appear more honorable than the pursuits of virtue ? For this mode of providence is neither advantageous to these leaders, nor to those that follow them. For to those who have become wicked, there will be no liberation from guilt, since they will always endeavour to anticipate justice, and pervert the measures of desert. But it will be necessary, which it is not lawful to assert, that the Gods should regard as their final end the vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect their true salvation, and consequently be alone the causes of adumbrant good. This universe also «tnd the whole world will be filled with disorder and incurable perturbation, depravity remaining in it, and being replete with that discord which exists in badly governed cities. Though is it not perfectly impossible that parts ON THE THEOLOCY BOOK I. should be governed according to nature in a greater degree than wholes, human than divine concerns, and images than primary causes P Hence if men properly attend to the welfare of men in governing them, honoring some, but disgracing others, and every where giving a proper direction to the works of vice by the measures of virtue, it is much more necessary that the Gods should be the immutable governors of the whole of things. For men are allotted this virtue through similitude to the Gods. But if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and well-being of those whom they govern, imitate in a greater degree the providence of the Gods, we shall ignorantly at one and the same time entirely subvert die truth concerning the Gods, and the transcendency of virtue. For this I think is evident to every one, that what is more similar to the Gods is more happy than those things that are deprived of them ' through dissimi- litude aud diversity. So that if among men indeed, the uncorrupted and un deviating form of providence is honorable, it must undoubtedly be in a much greater degree honorable with the Gods. But if with them, mortal gifts are more venerable than the divine measures of justice, with men also earth-born gifts will be more honorable than Olympian goods, and the blandishments of vice than the works of virtue. With a view therefore to the most perfect felicity, Plato in the Laws delivers to us through these demonstrations, the hvparxis of the Gods, their providential care extend- ing to all things, and their immutable energy ; which things, indeed, are common to all the Gods, but are most principal and first according to nature in the doctrine pertaining to them. For this triad appears to per- vade as far as to the most partial natures in the divine orders, originating supernally from the occult genera of Gods. For a uniform hyparxis, a power which providentially takes care of all secondary natures, and an undeviating and immutable intellect, are in all the Gods that are prior to and in the world. ' For mm* it ii necemry to re*d mrrm CHAP. XV! OF PLATO. 57 CHAPTER XVI. Ac a ix, from another principle we may be able to apprehend the theo- logical demonstrations in the Republic. For these are common to all the divine orders, similarly extend to all the discussion about the Gods, and unfold to us truth in uninterrupted connexion with what has been before said. In the second book of the Republic therefore, Socrates describes certain theological types for mythological poets, and exhorts his pupils to purify themselves from those tragic disciplines, which some do not refuse to introduce to a divine nature, concealing in these as in veils the arcane mysteries concerning the Gods. Socrates therefore, as I have said, nar- rating the types and laws of divine fables, which afford this apparent meaning, and the inward concealed scope, which regards as its end the beautiful and the natural in the fictions about the Gods, — in the first place indeed, thinks fit to evince, according to our un perverted concep- tion about the Gods and their goodness, that they are the suppliers of all good, but the causes of no evil to any being at any time. In the second place, he says that they are essentially immutable, and that they neither have various forms, deceiving and fascinating, nor are the authors of the greatest evil lying, in deeds or in words, or of error and folly. These therefore being two laws, the former has two conclusions, viz. that the Gods are not the causes of evils, and that they are the causes of all good* The second law also in a similar manner has two other conclusions ; and these are, that every divine nature is immutable, and is established pure from falsehood and artificial variety. All the things demonstrated there- fore, depend on these three common conceptions about a divine nature, viz. on the conceptions about its goodness, immutability and truth. For the first and ineffable fountain of good is with the Gods ; together with eternity, which is the cause of a power that has an invariable sameness of subsistence : and the first intellect which is beings themselves, and the truth which is in real beings. Proc. Vol. L 11 Digitized by Google .38 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I CHAPfER XVII. That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its essence defined in the good, and which by its very being produces all things, must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil. For if there was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps some one might say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that he does not impart to beings every good. If, however, not only every God is good, but that which is primarily boniforra and beneficent is God, (for that which is pri- marily good will not be the second after the Gods, because every where, things which have a secondary subsistence, receive the peculiarity of their hyparxis from those that subsist primarily)— this being the case, it is per- fectly necessary that divinity should be the cause of good, and of all such goods as proceed into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things, lor as the power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, as the power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as well tl>e beauty which is in words, as that which is in the phenomena, and thus every primary cause produces all similars from itself and binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form,— after the same manner I think the first and most principal good, and uniform hyparxis, es- tablishes in and about itself, the causes and comprehensions of all goods at once. Nor is there any thing good which does not possess this power from it, nor beneficent which being converted to it, does not participate of this cause. For all goods are from thence produced, perfected and preserved ; and the one series and order of universal good, depends on that fountain. Through the same cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all good, and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsist- ence to every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment con- trary to itself; since that which is productive of life, is not the cause of the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and from Digitized by Google CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 5g the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny ; but the na- ture of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform. And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in itself, extending to all secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant partici- pation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the partici- pation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good in undented bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess inevitably an al- lotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures which are arranged in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed enjoy according to their nature the goodness of the Gods ; for it is not possible that things perfectly destitute of good should either have a being, or subsist at first ; but re- ceiving an efflux of this kind, they neither preserve the gift which pervades to them, pure and unmingled, nor do they retain their proper good stably, and with invariable sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material, and filled with the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to order indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue, the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which rank as wholes,' each of these is exempt from a perversion of this kind, things more perfect in them always having dominion according to nature. But partial natures through a diminution of power always diverging 1 into multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed the participation of good, but substitute the contrary in the mixture with good, and which is van. quished by the combination. For neither here is it lawful for evil to subsist / unmingled, and perfectly destitute of good ; but though some particular thing may be evil to a part, yet it is entirely good to the whole and to the universe. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, and which subsist according to nature. But that which is preter- natural is always evil to partial natures, and deformity, privation of sym- metry, perversion, and a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection, but to the universe it is incorruptible and inde- structible. ' For aM«n it is necessary to read o\x*. 1 For rfifiaiKirrst read txfbuwna. Digitized by Google CO ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. And every thing which is deprived of good, so fur indeed- as pertains to itself, and its own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility of na- \ turc ; but it is good to the whole, and so far as it is a part of the universe' For it is not possible that either a privation of life, or deformity and im- y moderation, or in short privation can be inserted in the universe ; but its whole number is always perfect, being held together by the goodness of wholes. And life is every where present, together with existence, and the being perfect, so far as each thing gives completion to the whole. Di. vinity therefore, as we have said, is the cause 1 of good ; but the shadowy subsistence of evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility of the natures which receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil in wholes, but in partial natures, nor yet in all these. For the first of partial natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform. But the media among these, and which energize according to time, con- necting the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion, are incapable of preserving the gift of the Gods immoveable, uniform and simple; by their variety obscuring* the simplicity of this gift, by their multiform its uniform nature, and by their commixture its purity and incorruptibility. For they do not consist of incorruptible first generar v.ox have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but such as arc composed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere says in the Phaedrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also materia), in a much greater degree pervert their proper good. For they are mingled with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling that of an image, since it is replete with much of non-entity, consists of things hostile I to each other, and of circumstances which are mutable and dispersed through the whole of time, so that they never cease to evince in every thing that they are given up to corruption, privation of symmetry, deformity, and all-various mutations, being not only extended in their energies, like the natures prior to them, but being replete both in their powers and energies with that which is preternatural, and with material imbecility. For things which become situated in a foreign place, by co-introducing whole together • It is necessary here to supply the word «ru». ' For .afWTMuatyvra it U requisite to read mftnmtfirr*. Digitized by Google chap. xvir. OF PLATO. 6l with form, rule over the subject nature ; but again receding to that which is partial, from their proper wholeness, and participating of partibHity, im- becility, war and the division which is the source of generation, they are necessarily all-variously changed. Neither, therefore, is every being perfectly good ; for there would not be the corruption and generation of bodies, nor the purification and punishment of soak. Nor is there any evil in wholes : for the world would not be a blessed god, if the most principal parts of which it consists were imperfect. Nor are the Gods the causes of evils, in the same manner as they are of goods ; but evil originates from the imbecility of the recipients of good, and a subsistence in the last of things. Nor is the evil which has a shadowy subsistence in partial natures unmingled with good. But this participates of it in a certain respect, by its very existence being detained by good. Nor in short, is it possible for evil which is perfectly destitute of all good to have a subsistence. For evil itself is even beyond that which m no respect whatever has an existence, just as the good itself fa beyond that which is perfectly being. Nor is the evil which is in partial natures left in a dis- ordered state, but even this is made subservient to good purposes by the Gods, and on this account justice purifies souls from depravity. But another order of gods purifies from the depravity which is in bodies. All things however are converted as much as possible to the goodness of the Gods. And wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and also the perfect and beneficent genera of beings. But more partial and imperfect natures are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner, become subservient to the completion of wholes, are called upward to the beautiful, are changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the good, so far as this can. be accomplished by them. For there cannot be a greater good to each of these, than what the Gods impart according to measures to their progeny : but all things, each sepa- rately, and all in common, receive such a portion of good, as it is pos- sible for them to participate. But if some things are filled with greater, and others with less goods, the power of the recipients, and the measures of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of this. For different things are adapted to different beings according to their nature. But the 62 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. Gods always extend good, in the same manner as the sun always emits light- For a different thing receives this light differently according to its / order, and receives the greatest portion of light it is capable of receiving. For all things are led according to justice, and good is not absent from any thing, but is present to every thing, according to an appropriate boundary of participation. And as the Athenian guest says, all things are in a good condition, and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore sav, that there are precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or in- tellectual paradigms of evils, in the same, manner as there are of goods, o or that there is a malific soul, or an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor x r let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good. For all these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being more remote from the truth wander into barbaric folly, and gigantic mythology. Nor if certain persqns speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise things of , this kind, shall we make any alteration in the apparent apparatus of what they indicate. But the truth indeed of those things is to be investigated, and in the mean time, the science of Plato must be genuinely received in the pure bosoms of the soul, and must be preserved undefiled and un- mingled with contrary opinions. CHAPTER XVIII. In the next place, let us survey the immutability and simplicity of the Gods, what the nature of each of them is, and how both these appear to be adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration of Plato. The Gods, therefore, are exempt from the whole of things. But filling these, as we have said, with good, they are themselves perfectly good ; each of them according to his proper order possesses that which is most excellent ; and The whole genus of the Gods is at once allotted predomi- nance according to an exuberance of good. But here again, we must Digitized by Google CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO- 6s oppose those who interpret in a divisible manner that which is most excel- lent in the Gods, and who say, that if the first cause is roost excellent, that which is posterior to the first is not so. For it is necessary, say they, that what is produced should be inferior to that by which it is pro- duced. And this indeed is rightly asserted by them. For it is necessary in the Gods, to preserve the order of causes unconfused, and to define separately their second and third progressions. But together with a pro- gression of this kind, and with ' the unfolding into light of things secon- dary from those that are first, that which is most excellent must also be surveyed in each of the Gods. For each of the Gods in his own charac- teristic peculiarity is allotted a transcendency which is primary and per- fectly good. One of them indeed, that we may speak of something known, is allotted this transcendency, and is most excellent as possessing a prophetic power, another as demiurgic, but another as a perfector of works. And Timfeus indicating this to us, continually calls the first de- miurgus the best of causes. For the world, says he, is the most beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer is the best of causes ; though the intelligible paradigm, and which is the most beautiful of intelligibles is prior to the demiurgus. But this is most beautiful and at the same time most excellent, as the demiurgic paradigm ; and the maker and at the same time father of the universe is most excellent, as a demiurgic God. In the Republic also, Socrates speaking of the Gods, very properly observes, that each of them being as much as possible most beautiful and most excellent, remains always with a simplicity of subsistence in his own form. For each of them being allotted that which is first and the summit in his own series, does not depart from his own order, but contains the blessed- ness and felicity of his own proper power. And neither does he exchange his present for a worse order ; for it is not lawful for that which possesses all virtue to be changed into a worse condition ; nor does he pass into a better order. For where can there be any thing better than that which is most excellent? But this is present with each of the divinities according to his own order, as wc have said, and also with every genus of the Gods. ■ For to it it netewary to read tj. Digitized by Google (J4 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. It is necessary therefore that every divine nature should he established immutably, abiding in its own accustomed manner. Hence from these things the selfcsufficiency, undefiled purity, and invariable sameness of sub' sistence of the Gods is apparent For if they are nol changed to a more excellent condition of being, as possessing that which is best in their own nature, they are sufficient to themselves, and are not in want of any good. Aod if they are not at any time changed to a worse condition, they re- main undefiled, established in their own transcendencies. If also they guard the perfection of themselves immutably, they subsist always with invariable sameness. What the self-sufficiency therefore of the Gods is, what their immutability, and what tlieir sameness of subsistence, we shall in the next place consider. The world then is said to be self-sufficient, because its subsistence is per- fect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes ; and because it is filled with all appropriate goods from iU generating father. But a perfection and self-sufficiency of this kind is partible, and is said to consist of many tilings coalescing in one, and is filled from separate causes according to participation. The order of divine souls also, is said to be self-sufficient, as being full of appropriate virtues, and always preserving the measure of its own blessedness without indigence. But here likewise the self-suffi- ciency is in want of powers. For these souls have not their intellections directed to the same intelligibles ; but they energize according to time, and obtain the complete perfection of their contemplation in whole periods of time. The self-sufficiency therefore of divine souls, and the whole- perfection of their life is not at once present. Again, the intellectual world is said to be self-sufficient, as having its whole good established in eternity, comprehending at once its whole blessedness, and being indigent of nothing, because all life and all intelligence are present with it, and nothing is deficient, nor does it desire any thing as absent. But this, in- deed, is sufficient to itself in its own order, yet it falls short of tho self- sufficiency of the Gods. For every intellect is boniform, yet is not good- ness itself, nor primarily good ; but each of the Gods is a unity, hy- parxis and goodness. The peculiarity however of hyparxis changes the progression of the goodness of each. For one divinity is a perfcetwe Digitized by Google CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO. goodness, another is a goodness connective of the whole of things, and another is a collective goodness. But each is simply a goodness sufficient to itself. Or it may be said, that each is a goodness possessing the self- sufficient and the all-perfect, neither according to participation, nor illumi- nation, but by being that very thing which it is. For intellect is sufficient to itself by 'participation, and soul by illumination, but this universe, ac- cording to a similitude to a divine nature. The Gods themselves, however, are self-sufficient through and by themselves, filling themselves, or rather subsisting as the plenitudes of all good. But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall we say it is ? Is it such as that of a [naturally} circulating body ? For neither is this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures, nor is it filled with the mutation arising from generation, and the disorder which occurs in the sublunary regions. For the nature of the celestial bodies is immaterial and immutable. But this indeed is great and venerable, as in corporeal hypostases, yet it is inferior to the nature of the Gods. For every body possesses both its being, and its perpetual immutability from other precedaneous causes. But neither is the impassive and the immu- table in the Gods such as the immutability of souk. For these commu- nicate in a certain respect with bodies, and are the media of an impartible essence, and of an essence divided about bodies. Nor again is the im- mutability of intellectual essences equivalent to that of the Gods. For intellect is immutable, impassive, and umuingled with secondary natures, on account of its union with the Gods. And so far iodeed as it is uniform, it is a thing of this kind ; but so far as h is manifold, it has something which is more excellent, and something which is subordinate, m itself. But the Gods alone having established their onions according to-this trans- cendency of beings, are immutable dominations, are primary and impassive. For there is nothing in them which is not one and byparxis. lint as fire abolishes every thing which is foreign to it and of a contrary power, as light expels all darkness, and as lightning proceeds through all things with- out defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite all multitude, and abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and all-perfect division. But they deify every thing which participates of them, receiving nothing from Froc. Vol. I. I Digitized by Google 66 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. their participants, and do not ' diminish their owu proper union by the participation. Hence also the Gods being present every where, arc similarly exempt from all things, and containing all things are vanquished by no one of the things they contain ; but they are unminglod with all things and unde- filed. In the third place, this world indeed is said to subsist with inva- riable sameness, so far as it is allotted an order in itself which is always preserved indissoluble. At the same time however, since it possesses a corporeal form, it is not destitute of mutation, as the Elean guest observes. The psychical order likewise is said to obtain an essence always established iu sameness ; and this is rightly said. For it is entirely impassive accord- ing to essence; but it has energies extended into time, and as Socrates says in the Pbaedrus, at different times it understands different intelligibles, and in its progressions about intellect comes into contact with different forms. Besides these also, much-honored intellect is said both to subsist and to understand with invariable and perpetual sameness, establishing at once in eternity its essence, powers, and energies. Through the multitude however of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible species and genera, there is not only an invariable sameness, but also a difference v of subsistence in intellect. For difference there is consubsistent with sameness. And there is not only a wandering of corporeal motions, and of the psychical periods, but likewise of intellect itself, so far as it pro- duces the intelligence of itself into multitude; and evolves the intelligible. For soul indeed evolves intellect, but intellect the intelligible, as Plotinus somewhere rightly observes, when speaking of the intelligible subjections. For such are the wanderings of intellect and which it is lawful for it to make. If therefore we should say that a perpetual sameness of subsistence is pri- marily in the Gods alone, and is especially inherent in them, we shall not deviate from the truth, and we shall accord with Plato, who says in tlie Politicus, that an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence alone per- tains to the most divine of all things. The Gods, therefore, bind to them- selves the causes of a sameness of this kind, and guard with immutable ' nx is omitted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. XIX. OF PLATO. ^ < sameness their proper hyparxis established accord ing to the uuknown union of themselves. And such is the immutability of the Gods, which is con- tained in self-sufficiency, impassivity and sameness. CHAPTER XIX. I n the next place, let us consider what power the simplicity of the Gods possesses ; for this Socrates adds in his discourse concerning a divine nature, not admitting that which is various, and multiform, and which appears different at different times, but referring to divinity the uniform and the simple. Each of the divinities therefore, as he says, remains simply in his own form. What then shall we conclude respecting this simplicity? That it is not such as that which is defined to be one in number. For a thing of this kind is composed of many things, and abun- dantly mingled. But it appears to be simple so far as it has distinctly a common form. Nor is it such as the simplicity which is in many things according to an arranged species or genus. For these are indeed more simple than the individuals in which they are inherent, but are replete with variety, communicate with matter, and receive the diversities of material natures. Nor is it such as the form of nature. For nature is divided about bodies, verges to corporeal masses, emits many powers about the composition subject to it, and is indeed more simple than bodies, but has an essence mingled with their variety. Nor is it such as the psychical sim- plicity. For soul subsisting as a medium between an impartible essence, and an essence which is divided about bodies, communicates with both the extremes. And by that which is multiform indeed in its nature it is conjoined with things subordinate, but its head is established on high, and according to this it is especially divine, and allied to intellect. Nor again is the simplicity of the Gods such as that of intellect. For every intellect is impartible and uniform, but at the same time it possesses multitude and progression ; by which it is evident that it has a habitude Digitized by Google 68 ON TliK THEOLOGY' BOOK I. to secondary natures, to itself, and about itself. It b also in itself, and is not only uniform, but also multiform, and as it is said, is one nwny. It is therefore allotted au essence subordinate to the first simplicity. But the Gods have their hyparxis defined in one simplicity alone, being exempt indeed from all multitude so far as they are gods, and transcending all di- vision and interval, or habitude to secondary natures, and all composition. And they indeed are in inaccessible places, expanded above the whole of things, and eternally ride on beings. But the illuminations proceeding from them to secondary natures, being mingled iu many places with their participants which are composite and various, are filled with a peculiarity similar to them. Let no one therefore wonder, if the Gods being essentia alized in one simplicity according to transcendency, various phantasms are hurled forth before the presence of them ; nor, if they being uniform the appearances are multiform, as we have learnt in the most perfect of the mysteries. For nature, and the demiurgic intellect extend corpo- real-formed images of things incorporeal, sensible images of intelligible, and of tilings without interval, images endued with interval. For So- crates also in the Phadrus indicating things of this kind, and evincing that the mysteries into which souls without bodies are initiated are roost blessed, and truly perfect, says, that they are initiated into entire, simple and immoveable visions, such souls becoming situated there, and united with the Gods themselves, but not meeting with the resemblances which are emitted from the Gods into these sublunary realms. For these are more partial and composite, and present themselves to the view attended with motion. But illuminated, uniform, simple, and, as Socrates says, immoveable spectacles exhibit themselves to the attendants of the Gods, and to souls that abandon the abundant tumult of generation, and who ascend to divinity pure and divested of the garments of mortality. And thus much is concluded by us respecting the simplicity of the Gods. For it is necessary that the nature which generates things multiform should be simple,' and should precede what is generated, in the same manner as the uniform precedes the multiplied. If, therefore, the Gods are the causes of 1 After a»Aw» ia.che original, it U requisite to insert hvm mi. Digitized by Google CHAP XX OF PLATO. all competition, and produce from themselves the variety of beings, it is certainly neoessary that me aw of their nature which is generative of the whole of tilings, should have its subsistence in (simplicity. For as incor- poreal causes precede bodies, immoveable causes things that are moved, and impartible causes all partible natures, after the same manner uniform intellectual powers precede oiuitiibrm natures, unmingled powers, things that are mingled together, and simple powers, things of a variegated na- ture. CHAPTER XX. Iir the next place, let us speak concerning the troth which is in the Gods ; for this in addition to what has been said is concluded by Socrates, because a divine nature is without falsehood, and is neither the cause of deception or ignorance to us, or to any other beings. We most under- stand therefore, that divine truth is exempt from the truth which consists in words, so far as this truth is composite, and in a certain respect is mingled with its contrary, and because its subsistence consists of things that are not true. For the first parts do not admit of a truth of this kind, unless some one being persuaded by what Socrates asserts in the Cratyl us, should say that these also are after another manner true. Divine truth also is ex- empt from psychical truth, whether it is surveyed in opinions or in scien- ces^ far as it is inacertain respect divisible, and is not beings themselves, but is assimilated to and co-harmoniied with beings, and as being perfected in motion and mutation falls short of the truth which is always firm, stable and of a principal nature. Divine truth is likewise again exempt from intellectual truth, because though this subsists according to essence, and is said to be and is, beings themselves, through the power of sameness, yet again, through difference, it is separated from the essence of them, and preserves its peculiar hypostasis unconfirmed with respect to them. The 70 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I truth therefore of the Gods alone, is the undivided union and all-perfect communion of them. And through this the ineffable knowledge of the Gods, surpasses all knowledge, and all secondary forms of knowledge participate of an appropriate perfection. But this knowledge alone of the Gods contractedly comprehends these secondary forms of knowledge, and all beiogs according to an ineffable union. And through this the Gods know all things at once, wholes and parte, beings and non-beings, things eternal and tilings temporal, not in the same manner as intellect by the universal knows a part, and by being, non-being, but they know every thing immediately, such things as are common, and such as are particulars, though you should speak of the most absurd of all things, though you should speak of the infinity of contingencies, or even of matter itself. If, however, you investigate the mode of the knowledge and truth of the Gods, concerning all things that have a subsistence in any respect whatever, it is ineffable and incomprehensible by the projecting energies of the human intellect ; but is alone known to the Gods themselves. And 1 indeed admire those Platonists that attribute to intellect the knowledge of all things, of individuals, of things preternatural, and in short, of evils, and on this account establish intellectual paradigms of these. But I much more admire those who separate the intellectual peculiarity from divine union. For intellect is the first fabrication and progeny of the Gods. These therefore assign to intellect whole and first causes, and such as are according to nature, and to the Gods a power which is capable of - adorning and generating all things. For the one is every where, but whole • is not every where. And of the one indeed matter participates and every being; but of intellect and intellectual species and genera, all things do not participate. All things therefore are alone from the Gods, and real truth is with them who know all things unically. For on this account also, in oracles the Gods similarly teach all things, wholes and parts, things eternal, and such as are generated through the whole of time. For being exempt from eternal beings, and from those that exist in time, they con- tract in themselves the knowledge of each and of all things, according to one united truth. If therefore any falsehood occurs in the oracles of the Gods, we must not say that a thing of this kind originates from the Gods, Digitized by Google CHAP. XX. OF PLATO. 71 bat from the recipients, or the instruments, or the places, or the times. For all these contribute to the participation of divine knowledge, and when they are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they receive a pure illumination of the truth which is established in them. But when they are separated from the Gods through inaptitude, and become discordant with them, then they obscure the truth which proceeds from them. What kind of falsehood therefore can be said to be derived from the Gods, who produce all the species of knowledge? What deception can there be with those wh«» establish in themselves the whole of truth ? In the same man- ner, as it appears to me, the Gods extend good to all things, but always that which is willing and able receives the extended good, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus. And a divine nature indeed is causeless of evil, but that which departs from it, and gravitates downward, is elongated through, itself ; thus also, the Gods indeed are always the suppliers of truth, but those natures are illuminated by them, who are lawfully their participants. For the Elean wise man says, that the eye of the soul in the multitude, is not strong enough to look to the truth. The Athenian guest also celebrates this truth which subsists primarily in the Gods ; for he says that truth is the leader to the Gods of every good, and likewise of every good to men. For as the truth which is in souls conjoins them with intellect, and as intellectual truth conducts all tlie intellectual orders to the one, thus also the truth of the Gods unites tlie divine unities to the fountain of all good, with which being conjoined, they are filled with all boniform power. For every where the hyparxis of truth has a cause which is collective of multitude into one ; since in the Republic also, the light proceeding from the good, and which conjoins intellect with the intelligible, is denominated by Platp truth. This cha- racteristic property theref ore, which unites and binds together the natures that fill and the natures that are filled, according to all the orders of the Gods, must be arranged as originating supernally and proceeding as far as to the last of things. 7; ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. CHAPTER XXI. To us however discussing what pertains to every divine nature, what we assert will be known from those commonly received truths adduced in the Phaedrus, and which we have before mentioned. Socrates therefore says that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good,' and he indicates that this triad pervades to all the progressions of the Gods. What there- fore is the goodness, what the wisdom, and what the beauty of the Gods ? With respect to the goodness of the Gods therefore, we have before ob- served, that it preserves and gives subsistence to the whole of things, that it every where exists as the summit, as that which fills subordinate natures, and as pre-existing in every order analogous to the fir*t principle of the divine orders. For according to this all the Gods are coo joined with the one cause of all things, and on account of this primarily derive their subsistence as Gods. For in all beings there is not any thing more perfect than the good, and the Gods. To the most excellent of l)eiiigs therefore, and which are in every respect perfect, the best and most perfect of things is adapted. CHAPTER XXII. Btt in the Philebus, Plato delivers to us the three most principal ele- ments of the good, vis. the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. For it is necessary that it should convert all things to itself, and fill all things, and that it should be in no respect deficient, and should not diminish its exuberance. Let no one therefore conceive the desirable to be such as that which is frequently extended in sensibles as the object of appetite. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXII. OF PLATO. 73 For such is apparent beauty. Nor let him suppose it to be such as is in- deed able to energize upon and excite to itself the natures which are able to participate it, but which at the same time may be apprehended by in- telligence, and is educed by us according to a projecting energy, and an adhesion of the dianoetic power. For it is ineffable, and prior to all knowledge extends to all beings. For all things desire the good, and are converted to it. But if it be requisite summarily to unfold the characte- ristic peculiarity of the desirable, as the supplier of light proceeds by his rays into secondary natures, converts the eye to himself, causes it to be solar-form, and to resemble himself, and through a different similitude conjoins it with his own fulgid splendour, thus also I think the desirable of the Gods allures and draws upward all things to the Gods in an ineff- able manner by its own proper illuminations, being every where present to all things, and not deserting any order whatever of beings. Since even matter itself is said to be extended to this desirable, and through this desire is filled with as many goods as it is able to participate. It is there- fore the centre of all beings, and all beings, and all the Gods have their essences, powers and energies about this. And the extension and desire of things towards this is inextinguishable. For all beings aspire after this desirable which is unknown and incomprehensible. Not being able there- fore either to know or receive that which they desire, they dance round it, and are parturient and as it were prophetic with respect to it. But they have an unceasing and never-ending desire of its unknown and in- effable nature, at the same time that they are unable to embrace and embosom it. For being at once exempt from all things, it is similarly present to and moves all things about itself, and is at the same time by all of them incomprehensible. By this motion also and this desire it preserves all things. But by its unknown transcendency through which it surpasses the whole of things, it preserves its proper union un mingled with secondary natures. Such therefore is the desirable. But the sufficient is full of boniform power, proceeds to all things, and extends to all beings the gifts of the Gods. For we conceive such a sufficiency as this to be a power pervading and protending to the last of things, extending the unenvyiug and exuberant will of the Gods, and Proc. Vol. I. K Digitized by Google 74 ON THE THEOLOGY ROOK I. not abiding in itself, but unically comprehending the super-plenitude, the never-failing, the infinite, and that which is generative of good in the divine hyparxis. For the desirable being firmly established, and surpas- sing the whole of things, and arranging all beings about itself, the suffi- cient begins the progression and multiplication of all good, calls forth that which is primary in the uniform hyparxis of the desirable, by its own pro- lific ' exuberance, and by the beneficent replenishings which pervade to all things, and copiously produces and imparts it to every being. It is owing to the sufficient therefore, that the stability of divine natures, and that which proceeds from its proper causes is full of goodness, and that, in short, all beings are benefited, abiding in, proceeding from, and being united to their principles, and essentially separated from them. Through this power therefore, the intellectual genera give subsistence to natures similar to themselves, souls desire to generate, and imitate the beings prior to souls, natures deliver their productive principles into another place, and all things possess, in short, the love of generation. For the sufficiency of the goodness of the Gods, proceeding from this goodness, is dissemi- nated in all beings, and moves all things to the unenvying communication of good ; intellect indeed to the communication of intellectual, but soul of psychical, and nature of natural good. All things therefore abide through the desirable of goodness, and gene- rate and proceed into second ami third generations through the sufficient. But the third thing, the perfect, is convertivc of the whole of things, and circularly collects them to their causes ; and this is accomplished by divine, intellectual, psychical and physical perfection. For all things participate of conversion, since the infinity of progression is through this again re- called to its principles ; and the perfect is mingled from the desirable and sufficient. For every thing of this kind is the object of desire, and is generative of things similar to itself. Or in the works of nature also, are not perfect things every where lovely and prolific through the acme fof their beauty ? The desirable therefore establishes all things, and com- prehends them in itself. The sufficient excites them into progressions 1 Instead of pwi/i? it it necessary to read yw.p». Digitized by Google CHAP. XXIII. OF PLATO. 75 and generations. And the perfect consummately leads progressions to conversions and convolutions. But through these three causes, the good* ness of the Gods fixing the unical power and authority of its proper hy- postasis in this triad, is the primary and most principal fountain and vestal seat of things which have any kind of subsistence whatever. CHAPTER XXIII. After this, wisdon\is allotted the second order, being the intelligence • of the Gods, or rather the hyparxis of their intelligence. For intelligence indeed, is intellectual knowledge ; but the wisdom of the Gods is ineffa- ble knowledge, which is united to the object of knowledge and the intel- ligible union of the Gods. But it appears to me that Plato especially surveyed this in the triad [of the beautiful, the wise and the good,] as may be inferred from the conceptions scattered about it in many places. I say then that Diotima in the Banquet is of opinion that wisdom is full of that which is known, and that it neither seeks, nor investigates, but possesses the intelligible. Hence, she says, that no one of the Gods phi- losophizes, nor desires to become wise ; for a God is wise. Hence that which is philosophic is imperfect, and indigent of truth ; but that which is wise is full and unindigent, and has every thing present which it wishes and desires nothing. But the desirable and the appetible are proposed to the philosopher. Socrates, however, in the Republic considers that which is generative of truth and intellect, as affording an indication of wisdom, to our souls indeed the ascent to divine plenitude being accom- plished through knowledge,' but to the Gods intellect being present from the fulness of knowledge.1 For the progression in them is not from an ' For ymqnots it is requisite to read ynxrinf. 1 The same emendation is necessary here as above. i Digitized by Google 76 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. imperfect habit to the perfect ; but from a self-perfect hyparxis a power prolific of inferior natures proceeds. But in the Theatetus he indicates that the perfective of things imperfect, and that which calls forth con- cealed intelligence in souls, pertain to wisdom. For he says, it compels me to obstetrication, but prevents me from generating. It is evident therefore, from these things, that the genus of wisdom is triadic. Hence it is full of being and truth, is generative of intellectual truth, and is perfective of intellectual natures that are in energy, and itself possesses a stable power. We must admit therefore, that these things pertain to the wisdom of the Gods. For this wisdom is full indeed of divine goodness, generates divine truth, and perfects all things posterior to itself. CHAPTER XXIV. In the next place let us consider the beautiful, what it is, and how it primarily subsists in the Gods. It is said therefore to be boniform beauty, and %telligiblc beauty, to be more ancient than intellectual beauty, and to be beauty itself, and the cause of beauty to all beings ; add all such like epithets. And it is rightly said. But it is separate not only from the beauty which is apparent in corporeal masses, from the symmetry which is in these from psychical elegance, and intellectual splendour, but also from the second and third progressions in the Gods ; and subsisting in the intelligible place of survey, it proceeds from this to all the genera of the Gods, and illuminates their superesscntial unities, and all the essences suspended from these unities, as far as to the appa- rent vehicles of the Gods. As therefore through the first goodness all the Gods are boniform, and through intelligible wisdom they have a knowledge ineffable, and established above intellect, thus also, I think, through the summit of beauty, every thing divine is lovely. For from Digitized by Google CHAP. XXIV. OF PLATO. 77 thence all the Gods derive beauty, and being filled with it, fill the natures posterior to themselves, exciting all things, agitating them with Bacchic fury about the love of themselves, and pouring supernally on all things the divine effluxion of beauty. Such therefore, in short, is divine beauty, the supplier of divine hilarity, familiarity and friendship. For through this the Gods are united to and rejoice in each other, admire, and are delighted in communicating with each other, and in their mutual replenishings, and do not desert the order which they arc always allotted in the distributions of themselves. Plato also delivers three indications of this beauty, in the Banquet indeed, denominating it the delicate ; for the perfect and that which is most blessed, accedes to the beautiful through the participation of goodness. But hethus speaks of it in that dialogue : "That which is truly beauti- ful is delicate, perfect and most blessed." One of the indications there- fore of the beautiful, is a thing of this kind, viz. the delicate. But we • may assume another indication of it from thePhtedrus, viz. the splendid. For Plato attributing this to the beautiful says : " It was then that we were permitted to see splendid beauty shining upon us Sec" And after- wards he adds : " And arriving hither we apprehended it shining most manifestly through the clearest of the sepses." And at last he says : " But now beauty alone has this allotment to be most splendid and most lovely." These two things therefore are to be assumed as indications of beauty. Another indication of beauty is this, that it is the object of love, which now also Plato appears to me to have called most lovely. And in many other places he shows that the amatory fury is conversant with the beautiful, defining, and in short, suspending love from the monad of beauty. " For love, says he, is conversant with the beautiful." Because, therefore, beauty converts and moves all things to itself, causes them to energize enthusiastically, and recalls them through love, it is the object of love, being the leader of the whole amatory series, walking on the extremities of its feet, and exciting all things to itselr through desire and astonishment. But again because it extends to secondary natures plenitudes from itself, in conjunction with hilarity and divine facility, alluring, enflaming, and elevating all things, and pouring on Digitized by Google 78 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 1. them illuminations from on high, it is delicate, and is said to be so by Plato. And because it bounds this triad, and covers as with a veil the ineffable union of the Gods, swims as it were on the light of forms, causes intelligible light to shine forth, and announces the occult nature of goodness, it is denominated splendid, lucid and manifest. For the goodness of the Gods is supreme and most united ; their wisdom is in a certain respect now parturient with intelligible light, and the first forms ; but their beauty is established in the highest forms, b the lumin- ous precursor of divine light, and is the first thing that is apparent to ascending souls, being more splendid and more lovely to the view and to embrace than every luciferous essence, and when it appears is received with astonishment. This triad therefore filling all things, and proceeding through all things, it is certainly necessary that the natures which are filled should be converted to and conjoined with each of the three through kindred, and not through the same media. For of different things that are filled by this triad there is a different medium ; and different powers are converted to a different perfection of the Gods. I think therefore, it is manifest to every one, and it is frequently asserted by Plato, that the cause which congregates all secondary natures to divine beauty, which familiarizes them to it and is the source of their being filled with it, and of their derivation from thence, is nothing else than love, which always conjoins according to the beautiful, secondary to the first ' Gods, and the more excellent genera, and the best of souls. But again, truth is certainly the leader to, and establishes beings in, divine wisdom, with which intellect being filled, possesses a knowledge of beings, and souls participating of this energize intellectually. For the full participation of true wisdom is effected through truth, since this every where illumi- nates intellective natures, and conjoins them with the objects of intellection, just as truth also is tfie first thing that congregates intellect and the intelligible. To those however who hasten to be conjoined with the good, knowledge and co-operation are no longer requisite, but collo- cation, a firm establishment and quiet are necessary. ' Instead of wp t{ mntr it U requisite to read ^wrwTWf. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXV. OF PLATO. 79 CHAPTER XXV. What therefore is it which unites us to the good? What is it which causes in us a cessation of energy and motion ? What is it which establishes all divine natures in the first and ineffable unity of goodness ? And how does it conic to pass that every tiling being established in that which is prior to itself according to the good which is in itself, again establishes things posterior to itself according to cause ? It is, in short, the faith of the Gods, which ineffably unites all the genera of the Gods, of daemons, and of happy souls to the good. For it is necessary to investigate the good neither gnostically, nor imperfectly, but giving ourselves up to the divine light, and closing the eyes of the soul, after this manner to become established in the unknown and occult unity of beings. For such a kind of faith as this is more ancient than the gnostic energy, not in us only, but with the Gods themselves, and according to this all the Gods are united, and about one centre uniformly collect the whole of their powers and pro- gressions. If however it be requisite to give a particular definition of this faith, let no one suppose that it is such a kind of faith as that which is conver- sant with the wandering about sensibles. For this falls short of science, and much more of the truth of beings. But the faith of the Gods sur- passes all knowledge, and according to the highest union conjoins secon- dary with first natures. Nor again, let him conceive a faith of a similar species with the celebrated belief in common conceptions ; for we believe in common conceptions prior to all reasoning. But the knowledge of these is divisible, and is by no means equivalent to divine union ; and the science of these is not only posterior to faith, but also to intellectual simplicity. For intellect is established beyond all science, both the first science, and that which is posterior to it. Neither, therefore, must we say that the energy according to intellect is similar to such a faith as this. For intellectual energy is multiform, and is separated from the Digitized by Google 80 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. objects of intellection through difference ; and in short, it is intellectual motion about the intelligible. But it is necessary that divine faith should be uniform and quiet, being perfectly established in the port of goodness. For neither is the beautiful, nor wisdom, nor any thing else among beings, so credible and stable to all things, and so exempt from all ambiguity, divisible apprehension and motion, as the good. For through this intellect also embraces another union more ancient than intellectual energy, and prior to energy. And soul considers the variety of intellect and the splendour of forms as nothing with respect to that transcendency of the good by which it surpasses the whole of tilings. And it dismisses indeed intellectual perception, running back to its own hyparxis ; but it always pursues, investigates, and aspires after the good, hastens as it were to embosom it, and gives itself to this alone among all things without hesitation. But why is it necessary to speak of the soul ? For these mortal animals, as Diotima somewhere says, despise all other things, and even life itself and being, through a desire of the nature of the good ; and all things have this one immoveable and ineffable tendency to the good ; but they overlook, consider as secondary, and despise the order of every thing else. This, therefore, is the one secure port of all beings. This also is especially the object of belief to all beings. And through this the conjunction and union with it is denominated faith by theologists, and not by them only, but by Plato likewise, (if I may speak what appears tome to be the case) the alliance of this faith with truth and love is proclaimed in the Laws. The multitude therefore are ignorant, that he who has a conception of these things, when discoursing about their contraries, infers the same thing with respect to the deviations from this triad. Plato then clearly asserts in the Laws that the lover of false- hood is not to be believed, and that he who is not to be believed is void of friendship. Hence it is necessary that the lover of truth should be worthy of belief, and that he who is worthy of belief should be well adapted to friendship. From these things therefore, we may survey divine truth, faith and love, and comprehend by a reasoning process their stable com- munion with each other. If, however, you arc willing, prior to thesp things we will recall to our memory that Plato denominates that virtuo Digitized by Google CHAP. XXVI. OF PLATO. 81 fidelity which conciliates those that disagree, and subverts the greatest of wars, I mean seditions in cities. For from these things faith appears to be the cause of union, communion and quiet. And if there is such a power as this in us, it is by a much greater priority in the Gods them- selves. For as Plato speaks of a certain divine temperance, justice and science, how is it possible that faith which connectedly comprehends the whole order of the virtues should not subsist with the Gods ? In short, there are these three things which replenish divine natures, and which are the sources of plenitude to all the superior genera of beings, viz. good- ness, wisdom and beauty. And again, there are three things which collect together the natures that are filled, being secondary indeed to the former, but pervading to all the divine orders, and these are faith, truth and love. But all things are saved through these, and are conjoined to their primary causes ; some things indeed, through the amatory mania, others through divine philosophy, and others through theurgic power, which is more excellent than all human wisdom, and which comprehends prophetic good, the purifying powers of perfective good, and in short, alt such things as are the effects of divine possession. Concerning these things therefore, we may perhaps again speak more opportunely. CHAPTER XXVI. Again, let us, if you are willing, from other dialogues investigate the common dogmas of Plato about divine natures. Whence therefore, and what dogmas shall we assume, while we proceed in our search according to nature? Are you willing that we should in the next place recall to our memory what is written in the Phsedo ? Socrates therefore says in the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul which are derived from its similitude to divinity, that the essence which is superior to the soul, Proc. Vol. I. L Digitized by Google 82 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. (and to which the soul is naturally similar, and being similar participates of an immortal allotment) is divine and immortal, intelligible and uniform, indissoluble and possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence; but that the essence which is inferior to the soul, is entirely the contrary, to which also it pertains to be corrupted and to be passive. For a thing of this kind is sensible and multiform, and is dissoluble because it is a composite ; and he predicates among these all such things as pertain to a corporeal subsistence. Let us therefore direct our attention to these common dog- mas, and examine after what, manner each of them pertains to the Gods. In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak of that which is said to be divine ? From what has been said therefore, it is evident that every God subsists according to the highest union of beings. For to us ascending from bodies, the Gods have appeared to be sujxi essential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers of essences, and who bind all first essences to themselves. But that which is divine, is not only hyparxis and the one in each order of being, but at the same time is that which participates and that which is participated ; of which the latter is a God, but the former is divine. Whether however, prior to the participated unities, there is something which is separate and partici- pated will he evident in what follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a thing of this kind, viz. being* which partici- pates of the one, or the one subsisting contractedly together with being. For we assume all things in the Gods except the one, as suspended from them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these in themselves, but are not defined in them. But it is necessary not to be ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each other. In many places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the participants of the Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods. For not only the Athenian guest in the Laws calls a divine soul a God, but also Socrates in the Phsedrus. For he says " that all the horses and charioteers of the Gods are good and consist of things good ;" and afterwards still more clearly, " and this is the life of the Gods." But this is not yet wonderful. For is it not admirable that he should denominate those beings Gods who Digitized by Google CHAP. XXVI. OF PLATO. S3 arc always conjoined with the Gods, and who together with them give completion to one series ? For in many places he calls daemons Gods, though they are essentially posterior to, and subsist about the Gods. For in the Phaidrus and Timrcus, and in other dialogues, you will find him ex- tending the appellation of the Gods even as far as to daemons. But what is still more paradoxical than these things, he does not refuse to call cer- tain men Gods; for in the Sophista he thus denominates the Elean guest. From all that has been said therefore, this must be assumed, that with respect to a God, one thing is simply a God, another according to union, another according to participation, another according to contact, and an- other according to similitude. For of super-essential natures indeed, each is primarily a God ; of intellectual natures, each is a God according to union; and of divine souls, each is a God according to participation. But divine daemons are Gods according to contact with the Gods ; and the souls of men are allotted this appellation through similitude. Each of these however is, as we have said, rather divine than a God. Since the Athenian guest calls intellect itself divine ; but that which is divine is posterior to the first deity, in the same manner as that which is united is posterior to the one, that which is intellectual, to intellect, and that which is animated, to soul. And always those natures that are more uniform and simple have the precedency ; but the series of beings ends in the one itself. Let this, therefore, be the definition and distinction of that which is divine. In the next place, let us survey the immortal. For with Plato there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high as titr as to the last of things ; and the last echo, as it were, of immortality, is in those visible natures that are perpetual ; which the Elean guest, in his discourse about the circulation of the universe, says, are allotted from the fatlier a reno- vated immortality. For every body is allotted a being and a life depen- dent on another cause ; but is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. The immortality of partial souls is, I tlrink, more manifest and more perfect than this ; which Plato evinces by many demonstrations in the Phacdo, and in the 10th book of the Republic. Digitized by Google 84 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. But I mean by the immortality of partial souls, that which has a more principal subsistence, as containing in itself the cause of eternal perma- nency. Wc shall not, however, err if prior to both these we establish the immortality of daemons. For the genera of these through which they subsist aie incorruptible, and they neither verge to mortality, nor are filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. But I infer that the immortality of divine souls is still more venerable and es- sentially more transcendent than that of daemons; which divine souls we say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and principles of the life divided about bodies, and through which bodies obtain a renovated immortality. If, however, prior to these you conceive the Gods them- selves, and the immortality in them, and how in the Banquet Diotima does not attribute an immortality of this kind even to daemons, but defines it to subsist in the Gods alone, such an immortality as this will appear to you to be separate, and exempt from the whole of things. For there eter- nity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality, and through it all things live and possess life, some things indeed a perpetual life, but others a life dispersed into non-being. In short, therefore, that which is divine is immortal so far as it generates and comprehends in itself a perpetual life. For it is immortal, not as participating of life, but as the supplier of a divine life, and as deifying life itself, whether you are willing to call such a life intelligible, or by any other name. In the next place let us direct our attention to the intelligible. It is denominated, therefore, in opposition to that which is sensible and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. For the intelligible is first unfolded into light in the most principal causes. For soul is in- deed intelligible, is of this allotment, is exempt from sensibles, and obtains an essence separated from them. Prior to soul also intellect is intelli- gible; for we rather think it fit to arrange soul in the middle, than to con- numerate it with the first essences. That likewise is denominated intelli- gible, which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is itself by itself perfective of it, and which Timams arranges prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy, in the order of a paradigm. But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according to i Digitized by Google CHAP.XXV1I. OF PLATO. 8.5 union itself, aud a divine hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as perfecting and comprehending intellect, and as the plenitude of being. In one way, therefore, we must denominate the intelligible as the hyparxis of the Gods ; in another way as true being and the first essence ; in another way as intellect and all intellectual life ; and in another way as soul and the psychical order. It is likewise neces- sary not to fashion the different natures of things conformably to names. Such, therefore, is the order of this triad; so that what is divine indeed is umningled and ranks as the first ; that which is immortal is the second ; and that which is intelligible the third. For the first of these is deified being ; the second is life subsisting according to the immortality of the Gods; and the third is intellect, which is denominated intelligible in con- sequence of being replete with union. CHAPTER XXVII. A fter this, it follows in the next place, that we should consider the uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence, from the same causes, and these as the precursors of, and pervading through all the divine orders. For the uniform, indeed, has the highest subsistence, is present with the divine monad, and appears to lie especially adapted to that which is primarily being,' and in which also every participable genus of unities ends. For the one is prior to these, as will be evident as we proceed. But the indissoluble is the second. For it comprehends and binds the extremes according to divine union ; since the dissoluble is such as it is through the want of connexion and of a power which collects multitude into one. And that which has an invari- able sameness of subsistence is eternal, and is full of the perpetuity of the ' For t» o> it is necewarj to read ry om. Digitized by Google 86 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 1. Gods; from which also tl»e participation of immortality and eternal same- ness is derived to other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the same thing as the divine ; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the immortal ; and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we must refer to the intelligible. And do you not see how these are severally after a manner co-adapted to each other? For the first of tliesc, through the first unity which is par- ticipated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform. For if a God sub- sists according to the one, that which is divine will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life is immortal, is also similarly in- dissoluble. For life is the bond of dissoluble natures ; which also Timaeus indicating to us, opposes the dissoluble to the immortal: " for you are not immortal, says the demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be subject ' to the fataJity of death." Every thing mortal, therefore, is dis- soluble ; but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a renovated immortality is for the same reason neither indissoluble, nor mortal. For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes, ac- cording to each opposition. But the third of these being established ac- cording to the plenitude of whole intelligible^ subsists at once and is in- variably the same. For tlie intelligible is the cause of sameness and of eternal permanency; and intellect through this is entirely eternal. These triads, therefore, proceed from the first and most principal causes, in the same manner as we demonstrated of the before-mentioned triads. But these things, indeed, we shall consider hereafter. These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention to the uobegottcn in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it to be. For we say that all [true] being is without generation, and Socrates demon- strates in the Phajdrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior to these, also, the Gods themselves are established above generations and a subsistence according to time. How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason ? Is it because divinity is exempt from all generation, uot only from that which subsists ' For yw-vif read tw£kt9«. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 87 in the parts of time, such as wc assert the generation of material natures to be, nor from that only which is extended into the whole of time, such as Timseus demonstrates the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but also from the psychical generation ? Since Timseus denominates this to be unbegotten according to time, but to be the best of generated natures. And in short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the natures prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves the things produced. The indivisible, therefore, the unscparated and the united are- in reality unbegotten. So that if certain generations of the Gods are spoken of by Plato in fabulous figments, as m the fable of Diotima, the • generation of Venus is celebrated, and of Love at the birth of Venus, it is- necessary not to be ignorant after what manner things of this kind are as- serted, and that they are composed for the sake of symbolical indication v and tliat fables for the sake of concealment call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes, generatioti. For in the Orphic writings, indeed, the first cause is on this account denominated Time ; since again, for another' reason, it is thus denominated, in order that a subsistence according to cause may be the same as a subsistence according to time. And the pro- gression of the Gods from the liest of causes is properly denominated ge- neration according to time. To Plato, therefore, mythologizing, it is adapted to devise things of this kind conformably to theologists; but when lie is discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding divine natures intellectually and not mystically, it is then adapted to him to celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods. For the Gods primarily establish in themselves the paradigm of non-generation. But an intellec- tual nature is in a secondary degree unbegotten, and after this the psy- chical essence. And in bodies there is an ultimate resemblance of unbe- gotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have indefinitely shown that the whole heaven is unbegotten. The Gods, therefore, arc unl>egotten. But there is an order in them of first, middle, and last pro- gressions, and a transcendency and subjection of powers. There are also in them uniform comprehensions of causes ; but multiform progenies of Digitized by Google 88 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I. things caused. And all things, indeed, are consubsistent in each other ; but the mode of subsistence is various. For some things as replenishing subsist prior to secondary natures ; but others, as being 61led aspire after more perfect natures, and participating of their power become generative of things posterior to themselves, and perfective of their hyparxis. CHAPTER XXVIII. Looking to these things, therefore, we may unfold what is said of pa- • ternal causes, and of the prolific powers of mothers in fables. For every where, we may suppose that the cause of a more excellent and more uni- form nature is paternal ;* but we may say that the cause of a more sub- ordinate and partial nature pre-exists in the order of a mother. For with the Gods a father is analogous to the monad, and the cause of bound ; but a mother, to the duad, and to the infinite power which is generative of beings. The paternal cause, however, is with Plato uniform, and is es- tablished in a more elevated order than the natures which proceed from it, and subsists prior to its progeny in the allotment of the desirable. Again, the maternal cause has the form of the duad ; and at one time presents itself to the view in fables as more excellent than its progeny, but at another time as essentially subordinate to it ; as in the Banquet, Plato calls Poverty the mother of Love. And this is not only the case in fabulous figments, but also in the philosophic theory of beings, as is evi- dent in the Timaeus. For there Plato calls being the father, but matter the mother and nurse of generation. The powers, therefore, which are prolific and perfective of secondary natures, and the suppliers of life and causes of separation are mothers, being established above the natures produced by them. But the powers which receive the natures that pro- • »rfwr is onytted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXtX. OF JfLATO. 8g ceed into light, which multiply their energies, and extend even the subor- dinate allotment of the progeny, are also themselves called mothers. Again, however, the progeny of such like causes, at one time indeed, pro- ceed according to union from their proper principles, and are filled from both the paternal and maternal cause ; but at another time they contain the bond of them, being arranged in the middle, conveying the gifts of the fathers to the maternal bosoms, and converting the receptacles of them to the completions of primary causes. But of the natures which subsist from twofold preexisting principles, some arc assimilated to the paternal cause ; and such like genera of Gods are productive, defensive, and com- prehensive. For to produce, to contain, and to defend, pertain to the cause of bound. But others are assimilated to the maternal cause, and arc prolific, and vivific, and the suppliers of motion, of the multiplication of powers, of variety and progressions. For all these are the progeny of infinity and the first multitude. CHAPTER XXIX.' Thus much therefore may suffice concerning the unbegotten hyparxis of the Gods. It now remains, I think, to speak of divine names. For Socrates in the Cratylus thinks fit to unfold in a remarkable degree the rectitude of names in divine natures. And Parmenides indeed, in the first hypothesis, as he denies of the one every thing else that is known, and all knowledge, so likewise he denies of it name and language. But in the second hypothesis, besides all other things he shows that this one may be spoken of and ' that it has a name. In short therefore, it must be admitted that the first, most principal and truly divine names are es- tablished in the Gods themselves. But it must be said that the second names, which are the imitations of the first, and which subsist intellectu- ' ** it omitted in the original. Proc. Vol. I. M Digitized by Google 90 ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO. BOOK I. ally, are erf" a demoniacal allotment. And again, we may say that those names which are the third from the truth, which are logically devised, and which receive the ultimate resemblance of divine natures, are unfolded by scienti6c men, at one time energizing divinely, and at another intel- lectually, and generating moving images of their inward spectacles. For as the demiurgic intellect establishes resemblances about matter of the first forms contained in himself, and produces temporal images of things eternal, divisible images of things indivisible, and adumbrated images as it were of true beings, — after the same manner I think the science that is with us representing intellectual production, fabricates resemblances of other things, and also of the Gods themselves, representing that which is void of composition in them, through composition ; that which is simple, through variety ; and that which is united, through multitude ; and thus fashioning names, ultimately exhibits images of divine natures. For it generates every name as if it were a statue of the Gods. And as the theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the exuberant and unenvy- ing goodness of the Gods into the illumination of artificial statues, thus also the intellectual science of divine concerns, by the compositions and divisions of sounds, unfolds the occult essence of the Gods. Very pro- perly therefore, does Socrates in the Pbilebus say, that on account of his reverence of the Gods, he is agitated with the greatest fear respecting their names. For it is necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of the Gods, and venerating these to become established in the first para- digms of them. And thus much concerning divine names, which at pre* sent may be sufficient for the purpose of understanding the theology of Plato. For wc shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial powers. Digitized by Google BOOK II. CHAPTER I. The most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by us is that from which we may be able to discover the first cause ' of all beings. For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our con- ceptions purified respecting it, we shall with greater facility be able to dis- tinguish other things. About these things therefore we must speak from the beginning as follows : It is necessary that all beings, and all the natures of beings should either be many only, there being no one in them, neither in each, nor in all of them ; or that they should be one only, there being no multitude, but all things being compelled into one and the same power of existence ; or it is necessary that they should be both one and many, and that being should be one in order that neither multitude itself by itself may vanquish beings, nor that we may be forced to bring together into the same thing all things and their contraries at once. These things therefore being three, which of them shall we chuse ? And to which of the above mentioned assertions shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary therefore severally to discuss the absurdities which attend these positions, and thus to survey after what manner the truth subsists. ♦ * For ewr.«r it u Decenary to read arnca. ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If. If then beings are many, and in such a manner many, as we have men- tioned from the Ijcginning, so that the one is not any where to be found, many absurdities will hap|>en to be the result, or rather all the nature of beings will at once from the first be destroyed, as there will immediately be nothing which is capable of participating the one. For it must be admitted that every being is either one certain thing, or nothing. And that indeed which is a certain being, is also one ; but that which is not even one being, has not any existence whatever. Hence, if many things have a subsistence, each of the many is something or a certain one. But if each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for the many to exist ; for the many are many so far as each individual of the multitude exists. If, therefore, the many alone have a subsistence, and the one in no respect is, neither will the many exist. For things which are in no respect one have not any existence whatever. But if the one is not, by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence. For it necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many consist will have a subsistence. Farther still, if the many aloue have a subsistence (as has been said) art things will be infinitely infinite ; and if you receive any one of the in- finites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite. And with respect to the things from which this consists and which are infinite, each of these likewise will be infinite. For let something of the many be assumed* which we say is not one, this therefore will be multitude according to its own nature, since it belongs to beings, but is not nothing. If however it is multitude, this also will consist of many things, and will be many. And if you assume something of these manys, this will immediately appear to you not to be one, but many. There will likewise be immediately the same reasoning in these, and in a similar manner each, (because we falsely speak of each) will be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite, or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which will not be something of this kind ; since a part is many, and in a similar manner the part of a part ; and this to infinity. For multitude proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being deprived of the nature of the one. To make beings however, to be infinitely infinite, is impossible both with respect to truth, and to the thing proposed by us. Digitized by Google CHAP. I. OF PLATO For if being is infinitely infinite, being can neither be known, nor disco- vered ; since the infinite is entirely incomprehensible and unknown. If also being is infinitely infinite, there will be something more infinite than the infinite. But if that something is more infinite, this will be less infinite. That, however, which is less infinite, since it is not perfectly infinite, will evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the infinite. If, therefore, there is something which is itself according to multitude more infinite than that which is infinite in multitude there will be something more than the infinite, and the infinite will be less, yet not according to multitude. This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely infinite. Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be according to the same, similar and disimilar. For if all the manys are not one, and each thing according to all things is not one, that which is not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence of the pri- vation of the one. All things therefore being deprived of the one, after the same manner, they will on this account subsist similarly with respect to caeh other. But things which subsist similarly, so far as they thus sub- sist, are evidently similar to each other. Hence the many will be similar to each other, so far as they are deprived of the one. They will likewise according to this privation of the one be perfectly dissimilar. For it is necessary that things which are similar should suffer the same passion ; so that things which do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be similar. But things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also one thing. Hence things which arc deprived of every one, will not suffer any thing that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dis- similar according to the same. But this is impossible. Hence it is im- )K>ssible for the many to exist which are in no respect one. Moreover, tl>e many will be the same with and different from each other according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of the one, so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they Mill be the same according to this privation; since things which subsist after the same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which are after the same manner deprived according to privation. Bu t so far in 94 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. short, as each of them is deprived of every one, so far the many will be different from each other. For if the one in the many is the same, that which is in no respect one, will in no respect be the same. The many therefore will be the same and not the same with each other. But if they are the same and not the same it is evident that they are different from each other. For that which is the same and not the same, so far as it is not the same, is not the same, by nothing else thau the different. Farther still therefore, these many will be moveable and immoveable, if the one is not. For if each of them is not one, they will be immoveable accord- ing to the privation of the one. For if that which is not one should be changed, each of them would have the one ; since privations being changed, entirely lead into habits the things that are changed. It is necessary however that what is not one should remain immoveable according to the privation of the one, though this very thing is itself impossible, viz. that the many should stand still. For every thing which stands still is in something which is the same, via. it is either in the same form, or in the same place. But every thing which is in the same, is in one thing which is the same. For the same in which it is, is one thing. Every thing therefore which stands still is in one thing. The many, however, do not participate of the one. But it is perfectly impossible that things which do not participate of the one, should be in one certain thing. And things which are not in one thing cannot stand still, since things which stand still are entirely in one and the same thing. It is impossible there- fore, that the many should stand still, and remain immoveable. It has been demonstrated however, that the many must necessarily stand im- moveable. The same things therefore, and the same passion, (I mean the privation of the habit of the one,) are moveable and immoveable. For things immoveable, and things which stand still, so far as they are unstable, so far they must necessarily appear to be moveable. Moreover, there is no number of beings if the one in no respect is; but all things and each thing will be not one. For the particle of number, the monad, is one, and every number itself is one. For if there are five monads, there is also the pentad ; and if three monads, the triad. But the triad itself is a certain unity, and so is the pentad. So that if there is no one, there will neither be any part, nor the whole of numbers. For Digitized by Google CHAP. I OF PLATO. 95 how can there be any number the one not existing ? For the one is the principle of numbers. But the principle not existing, neither is it pos- sible that the things which proceed from this principle should exist. Hence the one not existing, neither will there be any number. Again, therefore, neither will there be any knowledge of beings if the one is not. For it will not be possible either to speak or think of any being. For each thing itself, and every thing of which we can speak, and in which we impress the nature of the one, will have no existence, because neither does the one exist. Hence neither will there be any discourse nor any knowledge. For discourse is one thing consisting of many things, if it is perfect. And knowledge then exists, when that which knows be- comes one with that which is known. .But union not existing, there will at tin; same time be no knowledge of things, and it will be impossible to speak about things which we know. To which we may add, that the in- explicable in the several infinites, will necessarily always fly from the bound of knowledge. For immediately each apparent infinite which he who possesses knowledge desires to understand, will escape the gnostic power hastening to come into contact with, and adhere to it, since it in incapable either of contact or adhesion. If, therefore, the many alone have an existence, the one having no subsistence whatever, so many ab- surdities, and a still greater number must necessarily happen to those who adopt such an hypothesis. But if the one which is the one itself alone has a subsistence, and there is nothing else (for if there were there would not only be one but many things ; since one and another thing are more than one, and are not one thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among all things either % whole, or that which has parts. For every thing which has parts is many, and every whole has parts. But the one is in no respect many. Neither therefore will there be a whole, nor that which has parts. Farther still, neither is it possible that there should be a beginning, or end of any thing. For that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, is divisible. But the one is not divisible, because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a beginning, nor a middle,nor an end. Again, if the one alone has a subsist- ence, no being will have figure. For every thing which has figure is either rectilinear or circular, or mixt from these. But if indeed it is rectilinear, g6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes. If it is circular, there will be one thing in it as a middle, but other things as extremes, to which the middle extends. And if it is mixed from the right and circular line, it will consfst of many things, and wHl not be one. Moreover, neither will any being be in itself, nor in another thing. For that which is in another thing is different from that in which it is. Bui the one alone existing and nothing else (for it will by no means be in another thing) there will be no being which is in another thing. Hut that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend and be compre- hended ; and in this, to comprehend will not be the same thing as to be comprehended ; nor will there be tlie same * definition of both. There will therefore be two things, and no longer the one alone. Again, neither will any being be moved. For being moved indeed, it must necessarily be changed. But being changed it must be in another thing. If the one however alone has an existence, it is not possible for any thing to appear to be in something else. I^ence it is not possible for any being to be changed. But every .thing which stands still is necessarily in the same thing. And that which is in the same is in a certain same thing. The one however is in no same thing. For that which is in a certain thing, is either in itself, or in something else. But it has been demonstrated, that it is neither in itself, nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain same thing. Neither therefore does any being stand still. Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different from any thing. For if there is nothing besides the one itself, there is not any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another thing. For there will not be any other being. And the one itself will not be different from itself ; for it would be many and not one. Nor will it be the same with itself. For this thing which is same is in another, and same is not the one itself. For the one is simply one, because it is not many. But that which is same is the same with another thing. Again, neither is it possible for any thing to be similar or dissimilar to any thing. For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion ; but every '* For wT>i it 1» neceWarj to read Digitized by Google CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 97 thing dissimilar a certain different passion. The one, however, "cannot suf- fer any thing, nor can this he the case with any thing else besides the one ; since no tiling else has any existence whatever, if the one alone has a sub- sistence. Farther still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it possible for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else besides the one. For how can things which have no existence be separate, or conic into contact with any thing? But neither can the one either be separate from itself, or touch itself. For it would thus be passive to the being touched, and the being separate. But the one suffers no other tlung besides itself. It is likewise requisite that no one thing should either be equal or unequal to any thing. For that which is equal to another thing, is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be said of that which is unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence, if the one alone has a subsistence. But neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater, but another as less ; so that it will be two things and not one. And if the one is equal to itself, the one will measure itself. This however is im- possible. For the one will measure and be measured by itself, so that it will not be the one itself. Neither therefore will there be any equality or inequality in beings. If however these things are impossible, neither can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be moved, or in short be in any thing, or have figure, or be a whole, or have parts, if the om alone has a subsistence which is void of multitude, and is without all these things. Neither however, i3 it possible for the many alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it is necessary that every being should be both many and one. If this however is the case, either the many must participate of the one, or the one of the many, or both must participate of each other, or neither of each other; but the many indeed must, be separate, and the one must also be separate, in order that the many and the one may subsist, as reason evinces. If, therefore, neither the one participates of the many, nor the many of the one, the same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in Proc. Vol. I. N 93 ON THE 'IDEOLOGY HOOK II. the hypothesis of the many alone having a subsistence. For again there will be the many separate from the one. For if the one subsists by itself, and the many do not in any respect participate of the one, the many will be infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same and different, moved and stable, and there will neither be any number nor any know- ledge of the many. For the absence of the one compels all thc»e conse- quences to be apparent in the many. It is impossible therefore, that neither the many should participate of the one, nor the one of the many. If however, the one participates of the many, and the many of the one, and both these are in each other, itis necessary that there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor many. For both these being mingled in each other, it is necessary that there should be a cause of their mixture which conjoins multitude to the one, and the one to multitude. For it is necessary that every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of the mixture. For in short, if the one and multitude participate of each other, neither the one is the cause of essence to multitude, nor multitude to the one, but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to both, and which is prior to these. For what will that be which makes this to be multitude, and that to be one ? And what is the cause of this communica- tion and association with each other, the one so far as it is one never having any communication with the many ? For the many so far as many, and the one so far as one arc different from each other. And so far as neither is from neither, they have no sympathy with each other. What therefore is it which collects these into one, since they fly from and are unmingled with each other? For being thus discordant with each other, they cannot desire each other, or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For if this should happen to be the case, there was a time when these were separate from each other, since now also they subsist together casually. It is however impossible for the many to subsist separate from the one. The mixture therefore is not casual. But neither is the mixture from the. many, if neither the one is the cause of the many, nor the many of the one. What, therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But if indeed, it is the one itself, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates of Digitized by Google CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 99 multitude or of nothing. For if this participates, it is evident tbat some other thing prior to this, will for the same reason present itself to the view, and this will be the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely roid of multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true, viz. that the many do not participate of the one, nor the one of the many. I mean however that which is the most principal and primarily one. But there is indeed a certain one in the many, and there is also the imparticipa- blc one, and which is simply one, and nothing else. If however that which is prior to both, is not ' one, it is necessary that this not one should be more excellent than the one. All things however arc, and are gene- rated what they are, through the one. And together with the one indeed every being is preserved ; but separate from the one proceeds to the cor- ruption of itself. The mixture also of the one and multitude, which the non-one affords to beings, is communion and union. The one* therefore, and that which is not one, ' are the cause of nothing else to beings than of their being one. If however the one is the cause of a thing of this kind, that which is not one will not be the cause of that which is more excellent [than union.] But it is every where necessary that what is more excel- lent should be the cause to beings of another more excellent thing, accor- ding to its own power. For thus it will be more excellent as being more good, and as the cause from its own nature of a greater and more excel- lent good to those things to which a less good is the cause of less good- ness. From these things therefore it is necessary, that the many should participate of the one, that the one should be unmingled with multitude, and that nothing should be better than the one, but that this should also be the cause of being to the many. For every thing which is deprived of the one, flies immediately into nothing, aud to its own corruption. But that which is not mauy, is dot at one and the same time not many and nothing. For to the one that which is nothing, or not one, is opposed, and to the many that which is not many is opposed. If, therefore, the one and the ' Ou% is omitted in the original. * Instead of to or it is necessary to read to «. ' The » in the original which immediately precedes o«x n seems to be superfluous, and is therefore omitted in the translation. Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. many are not the same, the not being many will not be the same with nothing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears that the one is beyond multitude, and is the cause of being to the many. CHAPTER II. It is necessary however, that discussing the same subject after another manner, we should again see if we can in a certain respect follow what has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore, that there should either be one principle, or many principles ; or rather, we should begin from hence. And if there are many principles, they must either possess sympathy with each other, or they must be divulscd from each other, and they must be either finite or infinite. But if there is one principle, this must either be not essence, or essence. And if it is essence, this must either be corporeal or incorporeal. And if incorporeal, it must cither be separate from, or inseparable from bodies. And if separate, it must either be moveable or immoveable. But if it is not essence, it must either be inferior to all essence, or participated by essence, or imparticipable. If therefore there are many principles, and which have no sympathy with each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will they be common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what commu- nication can there be between things which are naturally foreign, or tvhat co-operation between things which are entirely of* a different kind? In addition also to these things, there will be the many which do not partici- pate of the one. For if there is a certain one common in all of them, they will not be perfectly separated essentially from each other. If therefore they are different, and there is nothing which is the same about them, they are alone many and by no means one. But if there are many principles, and which possess sympathy with each other, they will have something Digitized by Google CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 101 common, which leads all of them to sympathy, and similarly unfolds all of them to the view. For we call those things sympathetic, which happen to be passive to the same thing. But similars are entirely similar from participating one form and one nature. If however this be the case, it is necessary that that all [or universal] which is every where, and in all the principles, should be of a more principal nature than the many. This therefore gives them the power to generate sympathy with each other, and affords them communion according to nature. Again, if there are indeed infinite principles, either the things which proceed from them are infinite, and there will thus be the infinite twice, or they are finite, and thus all the principles will not be principles. For things finite in number, will entirely proceed from finite principles. The principles therefore are in vain infinite. To which may be added, that in- finity makes both the principles to be unknown, and the things which proceed from them. For the principles being unknown, it is necessary that the things which proceed from them should be unknown ; since we then think that we know any thing when we know the causes and the first principles of it. But if the principles are finite, it is evident that there will be a certain number of them : for we say that number, is a definite multitude. If however, there is a number of the principles, it is necessary that there should be a cause of the whole number of them. For every number is from one ; and this, viz. the one is the principle of numbers. This therefore will be the principle of principles, and the cause of finite multitude, since number itself is one, and the end in the many is one, and it bounds the many by that which is one. But the principle being one, and this being essence, it is necessary if this is admitted to be cither cor porcal or incorporeal, that it must be acknowledged to be the principle of other things. If therefore, body is the cause of the generation of beings, it is neces- sary indeed, that it should be divisible and have parts. For every body is in its own nature divisible ; since every magnitude is a certain whole and that which is a whole consists of parts. These parts therefore, (but I mean each of them) must either severally participate a certain one, or not participate it. If therefore they do not participate it, they wdl be Digitized by Google 102 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK. If. many alone, and by no means one. Hence, neither will that which con- sists from them be a whole. For there being no one, that which consists of all of them will not be one. But if each of the parts participates of something of this kind, and there is something which is the same in all of them, a thing of this kind must necessarily be incorporeal, and impar- tible according to its own nature. For if this also is itself corporeal, it is either wholly in each of the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is in- deed wholly in each, it will itself be separated from itself. For the parts in which it is are separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in each of the parts, this also will be divisible, aud will have parts after the same manner as the above mentioned parts ; and there will again be the same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something common, or nothing ; since if there is nothing common, we shall place the many separate from the one. Let us however consider the whole ; for every body is a whole, and has parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts, since they are many ? For it is necessary to say either that the whole is unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third thing prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part, connects and unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the whole. But if the whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will be in- digent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts ; and this will be the case to infinity. But if the parts are connective of the whole, how can the many be connective of 'Ac one ; and things divided, of that which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary that the one should have the power of uniting the many, and not the many of uni- ting the one. And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor has parts, it will be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, itis also necessarily without interval. For every thing which has interval has parts, and is divisible. But being without interval it is incorporeal ; for every body possesses interval. Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual ; for every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that Digitized by Google CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 103 this may be corrupted, there will be no beiug incorruptible. For the princi- ple being destroyed, it will neither be itself generated from any tiling, nor will another thing be generated from it. For it can neither be able to ge- nerate itself (since it is not, if it is not perpetual) nor can another thing be abje to generate it, if it is the principle of all things. But if it is incorruptible, it will have the power of not being corrupted, and this* power will be infinite, in order that it may exist to infinity through the whole of time. For every finite power of existence pertains naturally to that which is corruptible. But an infinite power pertains to perpetual natures, the existence of which continues to infinity. This infinite there- fore, I mean the infinite according to power, is either impartible or partible. But if it is partible indeed, there will be the infinite in a finite body. For the principle is finite ; since if it were infinite, there will be nothing else besides itself. But if it is impartible, the power of infinitely existing will be incorporeal. And the principle of beings is incorporeal,' so far as it is this power through which the subject of it always is. That it is impossible therefore, the principle of beings can be corporeal is from these things evident. If however it is incorporeal, it must either be separate, or inseparable from bodies. But if inseparable indeed, it will have all its energies in bodies, and subsisting about them. For that is inseparable from body which is not any where naturally adapted to energize except in and with bodies. But if the principle is a thing of this kind, it is evidently ne- cessary that none of the things which subsist according to it should be more powerful, or possess greater authority than the principle of all beings. If however, nothing is more excellent in bodies than the power which subsists in and energizes about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will not any where be intellect and the power which energizes according to in- tellect. For every such like motion, [i, e. energy] proceeds from a power, which is entirely in its energies independent of body. But it neither was, nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes. For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures, ' The words aavyjrtoi i it is necessary to read n. ' Digitized by Google no ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. itself. Every being, therefore, being infinite, and consisting of infinites, will render all things infinitely infinite, and there will neither be a know- ledge of any being, nor any evolution of powers. For the power of the infinite is perfectly uuknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to whom it is infinite. But if things are infinite in a descending progression, whether is each of them infinite always proceeding most downward, in the same manner as we say all things do, or is each whole indeed finite, but the beings which arc produced from these are infinite? For if every being according to the beginning of itself is definite, but according to its end is infinite, there will neither be in parts nor in wholes, a conversion of beings to their proper principle, nor will that which is second in order ever have a sub- sistence so as to be assimilated to the extremity of a pre-existent order; though as we frequently say, the summits of inferiors are conjoined with the boundaries of superiors. For where there is no last, by what contriv- ance can such a similitude of progression as this, and such a mutual cohe- rence of beings be left, according to which secondary things are always conjoined to the natures prior to them ? But if all things alone ha\e an infinity of this kind, each being bounded by that which is posterior to it- self, wholes will be subordinate to parts, and the parts of beings will be naturally more perfect [than wholes.] For wholes, indeed, will be without conversion to the principle prior to themselves; but parts will be con- verted to it after their progression. By how much the more, however, every being hastens to conjunction with that which is more perfect than itself, by so much the more must it necessarily excel, as it appears to me. And if this whole proceeding to infinity is not couvolvcd to the summit of itself, and circularly converted and perfected according to such a conver- sion [it will not desire its proper good.] If, however, we admit that there is an infinity both ways these things must necessarily happen. In addition to these things, also, there will be no common object of desire to all beings, nor any union nor sympathy of them. For things which are perfectly infinite have not that which is first in them ; but not having a first, we shall not be able to say what is the common end of beings, and why some things are more excellent, but others are allotted a Digitized by Google CHAP. III. OF PLATO. Ill subordinate nature. For we call one thing better and another less excel* lent, from proximity to that which is best, just as we define the more and the less hot from communion with that which is hot in the first degree. And in short, we form a judgment of the more and the less from a refer- ence to that which is a maximum. It is necessary, therefore, that the boundary in beings should be that which is first and that which is last. • But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be older and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and each thing will be first and last. For it makes no difference, whether these are from each other, or the things which subsist between these. For the extremes being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation according to essence should intervene? But if the one is from the other, whether is the first derived from the last, as some say, who generate things more excellent from things subordinate, and things more perfect from such as are more imperfect? In this case, however, must not that which is allotted the power of generating and producing the perfect, by a much greater priority perfect and adorn itself by its present power? And how is it possible that leaving itself to be of an inferior allotment it should definitely assign a more excellent order to another thing? For every thing aspires after its proper perfection, and simply desires good ; though not every thing is able to participate of a thing of this kind. If, therefore, it has the power of producing this most perfect thing, that which is last will energize on account of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and all per- fection, will be first established in itself. But if that which is last is produced from that which is first, and the most imperfect from that which is most perfect, whether, is each of them one, or is this one, but that not one ? If, however, that which is first, or that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be first or last. For, as there will be multitude in each, each of them will have the better and the worse ; and neither will that which is best be unmingled with that which is inferior to it, nor that which is the most obscure of all things according to being, have so great a subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect nature; but there will be something more extreme than that which is last, and something more perfect than tlis^t which is first. For every where, Digitized by Google \ H2 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. that which is best if it receives another addition through that which is in- ferior will be more perfect than that which docs not abide in the best, [through not receiving this very addition.] If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, the one is the principle of all things, and the last of beings is one. For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the progression of beings • should be assimilated to the principle, and that as far as to this, the power of the first should proceed. Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have said, it is necessary either that the first principle should be one, or that there should be alone many' first principles, or one containing multitude in itself, or many par- ticipating of one. But if there are many first principles only, there will not be one thing from them. For what will make one and a whole, if there are many principles, and there is nothing which produces one ? For it is certainly necessary that things posterior to the principles should be assimilated to them. Either, therefore, there will not be the one in any being, or it will not be from these principles ; *o that each of the things which in any respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multi- tude alone. And again each of the parts of any being will be a tiling of this kind, and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute parts essence and existence. For all things will be many, and the one will be no where in the universality of things, nor will either wholes or parts be apparent.. But if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles, and that they should participate of the one, the one will be co-ordinated in the many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the unco-ordinated should every where be more ancient than the co-ordinated, and the exempt than the participated. For how is the one in each of the many except from one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself ac- cording to the communion of the one? Again, if the first one were multi- plied, the one will be passive ; for at the same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unminglcd with ' in, which are multitude only without any participation of the one. Digitized by Google CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. 113 an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which is mingled, in the same manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled with a contrary nature ; and from that which is primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where th6 simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. The one therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude ; and that which is one, and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended ' from that which is primarily one ; through the principle, indeed, participating of the one, but through the diminution arising from multitude, now mani- festly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation. CHAPTER IV. • That the one therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to the one, is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpre- ters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency of the one, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder that tliis should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinus. For Origen ends in intellect and the first being, but omits the one which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things. But if he 1 For c£]pi|T«i it U necessary to read ffcymrraj. The punctuation also of the text in this place, tnust be altered agreeably to the translation. Proc. Vol. I. P 114 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If. omits it because the one is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any sub- sistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot as- sent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and con- numerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innova- tion. If you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against this dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that ac- cording to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have received the philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert. * We. shall begin, therefore, from the Republic ; for here Socrates clearly shows that the good is established above being, and the whole intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative of light, so it is necessary the good should be with reference to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of truth, — if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and must admit that the good transcends the natures which are always intel- lective, and also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, how- ever, to hear the Platonic words themselves: " You may say that the sun not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being him- self generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which are known, have not only this from the good that they are known, but like- wise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, accord- ing to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light. How, CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. 115 therefore, following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things, and the cause of all things ? How can we assert that being itself* and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all the di- vine progressions ? For essence and intellect are said to subsist primarily from the good, to have their hyparxis about the good, to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of this light, which is more di- vine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from the good, and affording in beings a similitude to that which is first For the light which is emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a light which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself, and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately imparted to it.* And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even sub- ordinate to the light proceeding from the good, and being perfected by this light, is conjoined according to its own order with the good itself. For we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same manner as the light [of truth ;] but the latter through continuity with the good is established in it without a medium ; while the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to the good ; since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illu- mination. These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the 1 For wno to i, it is necessary to read aim to or. * This sentence is very erroneous in the original, m will be evident from comparing it with the above translation. 110 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IT. memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary to the exempt transcendency of the one. If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testi- monies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the mul- titude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be sus- pended from the one being, [i. e. from being characterized by the one ;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from the one. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if perma- nency were being itself, motion would not be being ; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being. This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it is being alone,' so also it is primarily being.' It is, however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted to &e, from participation ; but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to the one. But it is being* primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to the one a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to the owe, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one ? Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing to those who arc able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all. Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every re- spect sufficiently it will reap the fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he -in the first place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect, because neither is this replete with all the elements of the • For it it is necessary to read «». * Here also o» must be substituted for n. Digitized by Google CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. ll7 r good. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of the first in- tellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined accord- ing to this alone, is it not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual perfection ? For if that which is primarily good subsisted according to total intellect, in us also and all other [intellectual natures,] self-sufficiency and appropriate good would be present through the participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is disjoined from the good, and is indigent, and on this account requires pleasure in order to the attainment of human perfection. But a divine intellect always participates of the good, and on this account is divine. For it is boniform through the participation of good ; but divine, as being suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore, which infers that the good is exempt from the first intellect, and which defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in the all-perfect presence of the gootl. For the intellectual form of energy is itself by it- self defective with respect to blessedness. And why is it requisite to be prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most clearly the difference of the one from essence and being, and shows that the one is exempt from all other things and from essence ; for this he evinces of the one at the end of the first hypothesis. But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in in- tellect there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates that the one transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to the ineffable cause of all things, which is prior to every intellect? And if every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but the one is demon- strated to be neither in itself, nor in another, how can we any longer con- sider intellect as the same with the first cause of all ? In what respect, also, will the one which is prior to being differ from the one being, which is the subject of the second hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things, and the first principle of all ? For the one being participates of the one ; but that which participates is secondary to that which is participated. That the one, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory. Digitized by Google 118 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. CHAPTER V. Ik the next place, if the one is neither intelligible nor intellectual, nor in short participates of the power of being, let us survey what will be the modes of leading us to it, and through what intellectual conceptions Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to his familiars, the ineffable and un- known transcendency of the first. I say then, that at one time he unfolds it through analogy, and the similitude of secondary natures ; but at an- other time he demonstrates itg exempt transcendency, and its separation from the whole of things, through negations. For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the good, through analogy to the sun ; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the differ- ence of the one with respect to all things posterior to it through negations. But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold the progres- sion from the first cause of all other things, and prior to other things, of the divine orders. For on this account the first cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it, because every where cause is established above its effects ; and on this account the first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him. For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings. But again, accord- ing to the other of these modes, he adumbrates the conversion to the first of the things which have proceeded from it. For in each order of beings, through similitude to it there is a monad analogous to the good, which has the same relation to the whole series conjoined with it, that the good has to all the orders of the Gods. The cause, however, of this similitude is entirely the conversion of the whole of things to the good. These, there- fore, proceed from thence and are converted to it. And the progression indeed of all things demonstrates to us the ascent to the first through ne? gations ; but the conversion of all things demonstrates this to us through analogies. Let not, however, any one considering these negations to be such things as privations despise such a mode of discussion, nor defining Di. CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 1 19 the sameness in words analogously, and words in habitudes, endeavour to calumniate this anagogic progression to the first principle. For negations, as it appears to me, extend a triple peculiarity in things. And at one time, indeed, being more primogenial than affirmations, they are procrea- tive and perfective of the generation of them. But at another time, they are allotted an order co-ordinate to affirmations, and negation is then in no respect more venerable than affirmation. And again, at another time, they are allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with which there is also a negation of beings, at one time considering it as be- yond being, we say that it is the cause and the supplier of beings ; but at another time we evince that it is equivalent to being ; just as I think, the Elean guest demonstrates [in the Sophista] that non-being is in no respect less, if it be lawful so to speak, than being ; and at another time we leave it as a privation of, and indigent of being. For indeed, according to this mode, we call every generation, and matter itself, non-being. Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the similitude of secondary natures to the first principle. And neither any reason, nor habitude, nor communion of this principle with things pos- terior to it, becomes apparent from these. For its exempt nature is not of such a kind as is beheld in the second and third orders of beings ; but the good transcends the whole of things in a much greater degree than intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself, whether it be the demi- urgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole world, or some other intellect from among the number of those that are called divine. Every intellect however, and every god, is allotted a transcendency with respect to subor- dinate natures, and those things of which it is the cause, inferior to that which the first principle has to every being ; for this principle similarly transcends all things, and not some in a greater, but others in a less de- gree ; since thus we should introduce a greater and less habitude of it to secondary natures. It is necessary, however, to preserve it without habi- tude to all things, and similarly exempt from the whole of things. But of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote from it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things Digitized by Google ■ 130 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK. II. according to one cause. And different things are indeed converted to it in a different manner, this principle in the mean time, receiving no habi- tude or communion with things posterior to itself. CHAPTER VI. Tiie mode of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to the one is, as we have said, twofold. For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names of the ineffable cause. In the Republic indeed he calls it the good, and demonstrates it to be the fountain of the truth which unites intellect and intelligibles. But in the Parmenides, he denominates such a prin- ciple as this the one, and shows that it gives subsistence to the divine unities. Again therefore, of these names, the one is the image of the progression of the whole of things, but the other of their conversion. For because indeed all things derive their subsistence and proceed from the first principle, on this account referring the one to it, we demonstrate that it is the cause of all multitude and every progression. For whence is multitude unfolded into light except from the one* But because again the progressions from it are naturally converted to it, and de- sire its ineffable and incomprehensible hyparxis, we denominate it the good. For what else is that which converts all things, and which is ex- tended to all beings as the object of desire, but the good f For all other things subsist distrihutedly, and are to some beings honourable, but to others not. And every thing which in any respect whatever is said to have a subsistence aspires after some things, and avoids others. But Me good is the common object of desire to all beings, and all things accord- ing to their nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however of desiring natures is every where to the appropriate object of desire. The good therefore converts, but the one gives subsistence to all secondary natures. Let not, however, any one suppose that the ineffable can on this. Digitized by GdOgle CHAP. VI- OF PLATO. 12! account be named, or that the cause of all union is doubled. For here indeed we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior to it, and to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to it. Because, in- deed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the appellation of the one ; but because all things even as far as to things that have the most obscure existence, are converted to it, we denominate it the good. We endeavour therefore to know the unknown nature of the first prin- ciple, through the things which proceed from, and are converted to it ; and we also attempt through the same things to give a name to that which is ineffable. This principle, however, is neither known by beings, nor is efiable by any one of all things ; but being exempt from all knowledge, and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it produces from itself according to one cause all knowledge, every thing that is known, all words, and whatever can be comprehended by speech. But its uuical nature, and which transcends all division, shines forth to the view dyadically in the natures posterior to it, or rather triad ically. For all things abide in, proceed from, and are converted to the one. For at one and the same time, they are united to it, are in subjection to its union which is exempt from the whole of things, and desire the participation of it. And union indeed imparts a stable transcendency to all secondary natures, and which subsists in unproceeding conjunction with the cause of them. But subjection defines the progression of beings, and their se- paration from the imparticipable and first unity. \nd desire-perfects the conversion of the subsisting natures, and their circular tendency to the ineffable. First natures therefore, being always entirely united, [to the ineffable] some more remotely, but others more proximately, and receiv- ing through this union their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we en- deavour to manifest through names the progression and conversion of the whole of things. But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it be lawful so to speak, in the first, and their union with the ineffable, this as being incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge, those who were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by words. But as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places, and isexemptfrom all beings, thus also the union of all things with it isoc- Proc. Vol. I. Q Digitized by Google 122 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. cult, ineffable, and unknown to all beings. For every being is united to it, neither by intellectual injection, [or projection] nor the energy of essence ; since things which are destitute of knowledge are united to the first, and things deprived of all energy, participate according to their order of a conjunction with it. That which is unknown therefore in beings according to their union with the first, wc neither endeavour to know, nor to ma- nifest by names, but being more able to look to their progression and conversion, we ascribe indeed to the first two names, which we derive as resemblances from secondary natures. We also define two modes of ascent to the first, conjoining that mode which is through analogy with the appellation of the good, but that which is through negations with the appellation of the one ; which Plato also indicating, in the Republic in- deed calls the first the good, and at the same time makes a regression to it through analogy ; but in the Parmenides establishing it as the one Uaelf, he unfolds the transcendency of it which is exempt from beings, through negative conclusions. According to both these modes therefore, the first principle transcends both gnostic powers, and the parts of speech ; but all other things afford us the cause of knowledge and of appellation. And the first principle indeed unically gives subsistence to all the unions and hyparxes of secondary natures ; but the things posterior to this cause participate of it in'a divided manner. These also, as we have before observed, become multiplied by abiding, proceeding and returning ; but the one is at once perfectly exempt from all the prolific progressions, conver- tive powers, and uniform hypostases in beings. What the modes there- fore are of the doctrine about the first, and through what names Plato en- deavours to indicate it, and whence the names and the modes of this indica- tion which is unknown to all things are derived, is, I think, through what has been said sufficiently manifest. Digitized by Google CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. m CHAPTER VII. It, however, it be requisite to survey each of the dogmas about it which are scattered in the writings of Plato, and to reduce them to one science of theology, let us consider, if you are willing, prior to other things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the Republic, conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through analogy he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of the good with respect to all beings, and the summits of the whole of things. In the first place therefore, he distinguishes beings from each other, and establishing some of them to he intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the knowledge of beings. But he conjoins sense with sensibles, and giving a twofold division to all things, he places one exempt monad over intelli- gible multitude, and a second monad over sensible multitude, according to a similitude to the former monad. Of these monads also, he shows that the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible light. And he evinces that by the intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles are deifomi, and boniform, according to participation from the first God ; but that by the sensible light, according to the perfection derived from the sun, all sensible natures are solarform, and similar to their one monad. In addition also to what has been said, he suspends the second monad from that which reigns in the intelligible. And thus he extends all things, both the first and the last of beings, I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to the good. Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears to me to be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology ; viz. to congregate all the Gods in the world into one union, and suspend them from their proximate monad ; but to refer the supermundane Gods to the intellec- tual kingdom ; to suspend the intellectual Gods from intelligible union ; and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and all beings through these, to that which is first. For as the monad of mundane natures is super- mundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual, and of intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that first intelli- Digitized by Google 124 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. gibles should be suspended from the monad which is above intelligible* and perfected by it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secon- dary natures with intelligible light. But it is necessary that intellectual natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but of good and a uniform hyparxis from the first cause, should connect su- permundane natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the Gods prior to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the in- tellectual Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a unical light from the father of the whole of things, should send into this apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess. On this account, the sun being the summit of mundane natures, and proceeding from the etherial profundities, imparts to visible natures supernatural perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be similar to the su- pcrcelestial worlds. These things therefore we shall afterwards mpre abundantly discuss. The present discourse, however, suspends all things after the above mentioned manner from the good, and the first unity. "For if indeed the sun connects every thing sensible, but the good produces and perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad [i. e. the sun] is denominated the offspring of the good, and on this account causes that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good, because it imitates the primogeuial cause of itself, — if this be the case, all things will thus participate of the good, and will be extended to this one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without a.medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun.] Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle. For he sus- pends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful itself, all good things from the good, and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he con- siders some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles ; but the sum- mits of them ait; uniformly established in intelligibles. Again, from these intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends Digitized by Google CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. 125 that nil intelligibles, and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad - uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with in- telligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their divine hyparxis. IiCt not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same order of the good in intelligible forms, as there is prior to intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelligibles. For the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we are accustomed to call royals* or the good, is admitted to be something superessential, and more excellent than all beings both in dignity and power ; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly considered as many. Again, particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible tilings that arc beautiful and good, and in short from things that are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences, from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing beautiful and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader of many beau- tiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato else- where says ; and " all things are for its sake, and it is the cause of every thing beautiful." For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but the good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all know- ledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection ; but (he latter is the supplier, of good to the Gods so far as they arc Gods, and is Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. generative of goods which are prior to essences. We must not therefore apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle the good, from the name of idea, that he dkectly calls it the intelligible goodness ; but though the first principle is superior to all language and appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause of every thing beautiful and good, transfer- ring through the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about the good, that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the ,un. And after a certain admirable manner be presents us with an epi- tome of the negations of the one in the Parmeaides. For the assertion that the good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the same time separates it from the supereaseotial unities, and every s of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these axe the first things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from the principle of the whole of things. Moreover, neither when he celebrates the good the leader of the divine orders as the most splendid of being, does he denominate it most splendid as participating of light. For the first light proceeds from it to intelligi- bles and intellect, but he gives it this appellation as the cause of the light which is every where diffused, and as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane deity. For this light is nothing else than the narticipation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform through participating of the good, and are filled with the illuminat.on pro. ceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are pnmanly beings are deiform • and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences become divine through the participation. of deity. Looking therefore to all that has been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of the good with reference to all beings and the divine orders Bu aga.n ,n each order of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not onlv in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures and in the genera of Gods arranged from the good prior to these. For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and Digitized by Google CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. which participate of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it. And as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which are the leaders of more partial orders. And Plato indeed arranges the multi- tudes under the monads ; but extends all the monads to the exempt prin- ciple of the whole of things, and establishes them uniformly about it. It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded con- formably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary natures, subsisting according to and perfected about it ; but we should establish it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one excess of simplicity, and as unitfclly arranged prior to the whole orders [of Gods.] Pot as the Gods themselves enact the order Which is in them, thus also it is necessary that the truth concerning them, the precedancoUs causes of beings, and the second artd third progeny of these should be definitely distinguished. This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and that all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not Uftprolific, but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-eftablishes a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence- Nor does its fecundity tend to multitude and division ; but it abides with undented purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful so to speak) should be generative of the Whole of things, and give subsistence to them ; pro- ducing all things by being exempt from all things, and by beitig imparti- cipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings. Digitized by Google 128 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK ,11. You must not, however, suppose that tlus generation and progression is emitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secon- dary to the singleness of the first. For whether the good is moved, it will not be the good; since the good itself, and which is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. How, therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of good ? Or whether the good is multiplied through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through a diminution and want of its own power. But if the good produces all things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. But if to be the good ittelf is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition? For additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let the good therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is the progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does the good energizing give subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power docs it fill all thiugs with powers, nor being multiplied do all things participate of good, nor being moved do all beings' enjoy the first principle. For the good precedes all powers, and all energies, and every multitude and motion ; since each of these is referred to the good as to its end. The good therefore is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all desirable na- tures. All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings ; but that which pre-subsisls uncircumscribed by all things is the first good. ' For tmtix rufevr*, I read wmrrm t« sit*. Digitized by Google CUAP. VIII. OF PLATO. 129 CHAPTER V11L After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the concep- tions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable and immense tran- scendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with us for rashly drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato, and may say that the three kings of which he speaks are all of them intellectual Gods ; but that Plato docs not think fit to co-arrange or connumerate the good with secondary natures. For such a connumeration ought not to be considered as adapted to the exempt transcendency of the good with respect to other things, nor in short, must it be said that the good contributes as the first with reference to another second or third cause to the completion of a triad in conjunction with other natures ; but that it in a greater degree precedes every triad and every number, than the intelligible precede the intellectual Gods. How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings the good which is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and co- arrange one as the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the third ? Some one may also adduce many other things, indicating the transcendency of the first principle with respect to every thing divine. Such a one, however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remark- ably accord with us who assert the good to be im participate, to transcend all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above all the divine monads. That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things, and says that all things arc for his sake, and that he is the cause of all beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who consi- der his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by intro- ducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But that we do not assert these things connumeratiug [the first God with secondary Proc. Vol. I. R - Digitized by Google 1 jgQ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II, natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first king the first,, but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that some things are about him, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and third things about that which is third, but* he says, in short, that alt things are about him. And to the other kings, indeed, he introduces number and a divided kingdom ; but to the king of all things he neither attributes a part of number, nor a distribution of dominion opposite to- that of the others. Such a mode of words, therefore, neither connumerates the king of all things with the other kings* nor co-arranges him as the leader of a triad with the second and third power. For of a triad ic divi- sion the first monad, indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are co-ordinate with itself ; but the second of second ; and the third of third orders. If, however, some one should apprehend that the first monad is- the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments ; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehen- sion is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And to the king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one reaV son and one order ; but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order ; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remain- ing kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by Plato remarkably celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause, and his un-coordinatioa with the other kingdoms of the Gods ? Since he says that this cause si- milarly reigtis over all things, that all things subsist about biro, and that for his sake essence and energy are inherent in all things. If also Socrates in the Republic clearly' teaches that the sun reigns over the world analogous to the good, let no one dare to accuse this ana- logy as connumerating the good with the king of mundane natures. For unless* together with the similitude of secondary causes to the first principles, we think fit to preserve that exempt dominion [of the first 1 For x)( aiXffTi^r»{ I read T^t ««Xvn]ra. 3 For tw liov, it is necessary to read tmf 9»«r. Digitized by Google CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. all things subsist This part therefore is posterior to the otW, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Pla- tonic doctrine. Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause 1 inferior to the final. Whence also Plotmus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first God the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the good, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of eause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed the good ineffable, as it Is fit it should, but from the habitude of things- posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause : for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of the goodr it excites in us the conception of the communion andi co-ordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring na- tures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of alh beautiful things. But this to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and- not to abide in the conceptions of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. Pork is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from' all things, and at another from the best of things : for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the peculiarities of these. We ascribe to it therefore the one and the good, from the donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those' things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But the about which (™ npi «,) the ' For muty it u ocewwry to rtad «ur» famit is necessary to read m{ Proc. Vol. i. T 146 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II. the second or third progressions in the divine orders, but also that it sub- sists prior to the intelligible unities themselves, and this in a manner con- formable to the simplicity of their occult nature, and not through a variety of words, but through intellectual projection alone. For intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This therefore, Parmenides also evinces in reality, relinquishing logical methods, but energizing ac- cording to intellect, and asserting that the one is above essence, and being characterized by the one. For this assertion was not collected from the preceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first Gods them- selves would be without demonstration, if it derived its credibility from things subordinate. At the same time therefore, Parmenides contends that all knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of the one, and beautifully end in the ineffable of that God who is bevond all tlii lij^s. For after scientific energies, and intellec- tual projections, a union with the unknown follows, to which also Par- menides referring the whole of his discussion, concludes the first hypo- thesis, suspending indeed all the divine genera from the onef but evincing that the one is unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the participation of intelligibles and sensible*, and in an ineffable manner giving subsistence to the participated monads. Hence also, the one is said to be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the same time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities. Digitized by Google BOOK III. CHAPTER I. Such therefore is the theology with Plato concerning the first God, as it appears to me, and so great is the transcendency which it is allotted with respect to all other discussions of divine concerns ; at one and the same time venerably preserving the ineffable union of this God exempt from the whole of things, uncircumscribed by all gnostic com prehensions, and apart from all beings ; and unfolding the anagogic paths to him, per- fecting that parturient desire which souls always possess of the father, and progenitor of all things, and enkindling that torch in them, by which they are especially conjoined with the unknown transcendency of the one. But after this imparticipable, ineffable, and truly superessential cause, which is separated from all essence, power and energy, the discussion of the Gods immediately follows. For to what other thing prior to the unities is it lawful to be conjoined with the one, or what else can be more united to the unical God than the multitude of Gods ? Concerning these there- fore, we shall in the next place unfold the inartificial theory of Plato, in- voking the Gods themselves to enkindle in us the light of truth. I wish however prior to entering on the particulars of this theory, to convince the reader, and to make it evident to him through demonstration, that there are necessarily as many orders of the Gods, as the Parmenides of Plato unfolds to us in the second hypothesis. digitized by Google 148 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. This therefore is I think prior to all other things apparent to those whose conceptions are not perverted, that every where, but especially in the divine orders, second progressions, are completed through the similitude of these to their proper principles. For nature and intellect, and every generative cause, are naturally adapted to produce and conjoin to them- selves things similar, prior to such as as are dissimilar to themselves. For if it is necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum should intervene either in incorporeal natures, or in bodies, it is necessary that every thing which proceeds naturally should proceed through similitude. For it is by no means lawful that the thing caused should be the same with its cause ; since a remission and deficiency of the union of the producing cause generates secondary natures. For again, if that which is second were the same as that which is first, each would be similarly the same, and one would not be cause, but the other the thing caused. If however, the one by its very being, or essentially, lias an exuberance of productive power, but the other falls short of the power that produced it, these are naturally separated from each other, and the generative cause precedes in excellence the thing generated, and there is not a sameness of things which so greatly differ. But if that which is second is not the same with that which is first, if indeed it is different only, they will not be conjoined to each other, nor will the one participate of the other. For contact and participation, are indeed a communion of things conjoined, and a sympathy of participants with the natures they participate. But if it is at the same time the same with and different from that which is first, if indeed the sameness is indigent, and vanquished by the power which is contrary to it, the one will no longer be the leader of the progression of beings, nor will every generative cause subsist prior to things of a secondary nature, in the order of the good. For the one is not the cause of division, but of friendship. And the good converts generated natures to their causes. But the conversion and friendship of things secondary to such as are primary is through similitude, but not through a dissimilar nature. If therefore the one is the cause of the whole of things, and if the good is in an exempt manner desirable to all things, it will every where give subsistence to the progeny of precedaneous causes, Digitized by Google CHAP. 1. OF PLATO. I49 through similitude, in order that progression may be according to the one, and that the conversion of things which have proceeded may be to the good. For without similitude there will neither be the conversion of things to their proper principles, nor the generation of efFepts. Let this there- fore be considered as a thing admitted in this place. But the second thing besides this, and which is demonstrated through this, is, that it is necessary every monad should produce a number co-or- dinate to itself, nature indeed a natural, but soul a psychical, and intellect an intellectual number. For if every thing generative generates similars prior to dissimilar*, as has been before demonstrated, every cause wilt certainly deliver its own form and peculiarity to its own progeny, and before it gives subsistence to far distant progressions, and things which are separated from its nature, it will produce things essentially near to it, and conjoined with it through similitude. Every monad therefore, gives subsistence to a multitude indeed, as generating that which is second to itself, and which divides the powers that presubsist occultly in itself. For those things which are uniformly and contractedly in the monad, present themselves to the view separately in the progeny of the monad. And this indeed the wholeness of nature manifests, since it contains in one the reasons, [i. e. productive principles] of all things both in the heavens and in the sublunary region ; but distributes the powers of itself to the natures which are divided from it about bodies. For the nature of earth, of fire, and of the moon, possesses from the wholeness of nature its pecu- liarity and form, and energizes together with this wholeness, and con- tains its own allottment. This also the monad of the mathematical sci- ences and of numbers manifests. For this being all things primarily, and spermatically producing in itself the forms of numbers, distributes dif- ferent powers to different externally proceeding numbers. For it is not possible that what is generated, should at once receive all the abundance of its generator. And it is necessary that the prolific power of every thing that pre-exists in the cause ' itself should become apparent. The monad therefore gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to ' For airua it U Decenary to read «r/uu»> it U necessary to lead tp>tm. Digitized by Google 156 O.N THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. tures. For visible natures no otherwise become apparent, and known to the sight, than through the light which is ingenerated in them. All intelligibles therefore become boniform through the participation of light, and through this light, every true * being is most similar to the good. If, therefore, it makes no difference to speak of this light, or of the one (for this light conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one, as deriving its subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity proceeding from the first is participable, and all the multitude of unities is participable. And that indeed which is truly supercssential is the one. But each of the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by which he is a superessential God, is similar to the first ; but they are participated by essence and being. According to this reasoning therefore, the Gods appear to us to be unities, and participable unities, binding indeed all beings to themselves, but conjoining through themselves to the one which similarly transcends all things, the natures posterior to themselves. Since therefore each of the Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated by some being, whether shall we say that the same being participates of each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are more, but of others less numerous ? And if this be the case either the par- ticipants of the superior unities must be more, but of the inferior must be fewer in number, or vice versa. For it is necessary that there should be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that of numbers some are nearer to their principle, but others more remote from it. And that some are more simple, but others more composite, and exceed indeed in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power. But it is well that we have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to survey the order of the first monads with respect to each other, and their progression about beings, from these as images, in these also the monads which are nearer to the one will be participated by things which arc more simple in essence, but those which are more remote from it, will be participated by more composite essences. For thus the participation will be according to the analogous ; first monads being always participated by the first beings, but second monads by secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt ■ oirr<«{ U omitted in the original. CHAP II. OF PLATO. 157 from all things, and is imparticipable, but that which is connascent with the most simple nature and the one is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is connascent with a more various and multiform nature, and which has more powers suspended from it, — if this be the case, it is perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to the one are neces- sarily participated by the first and most simple essences ; but that those which are more remote are participated by more composite essences, which are less in power, but are greater in number and multitude. For in 6hort, additions in these unities are ablations of powers ; and that which is nearer to the one, which surpasses the whole of things by an admirable simplicity, is more uniform, and is consubsistent with more total orders. And it happens according to the ratio of power, that the simplicity of the first unities is transcendent. For those things which arc the causes of a greater number of effects, imitate as much as possible the cause of all things, but those which are the causes of fewer effects, have an essence more various than the natures that are prior to them.' For this variety distributes inio minute parts and diminishes the power which abides in one. Moreover, in participated souls also, such as are first and most divine subsist in simple and perpetual bodies. Others again are connected with bodies that are simple, but in conjunction with these with material bodies also. And others are connected at one and the same time with simple, material and composite bodies. For the celestial souls indeed rule over simple bodies, and such as have an immaterial and im- mutable subsistence. But the souls that govern the wholes of the elements, are at the same time invested with etherial garments, and at the same time through these are carried in the wholes of the elements, which as wholes indeed are perpetual and simple, but as material receive genera- tion and corruption, and composition from dissimilar natures. And the souls that rank in the third order, are those which proximately inspire with life their luciform * vehicles, but also attract from the simple ele- 1 Instead of n jut yaf *A«i»w»* out**, xcu rat wctvno* mrrmi xarct Tip ivra+ur rant *f* avrwr *«miX«ri{an> xmret tij» owiav tow, it U necessary to read ra pr, yaf *X|ior»» cutix, xcu raw wairaw """!«» xarm fovofuv pyuvno*, T« ttrwv i\atr wjg xvtwy ireixiA»Tff« xot« nf» cv»mw ten*. 1 For avTMifarir it if requisite to read j^miW* 158 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. ment material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary life, and through these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain through this participation another third life. If, however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some of these are arranged in the souls which rank as wholes, and in the most divine of mundane souls, which also they govern in a becoming manner. But others being arranged in the souls of the more excellent genera, are proximately participated by the rulers that are in them ; and are parti- cipated secondarily by more partial essences. But again they arrange third intellectual orders in partial souls. And according as the power which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion is participation in them more various, and far more composite than the participation of the natures that, are prior to them. If, therefore, this is the mode of par- ticipation in all beings, it is certainly necessary that of the Gods also those that are nearer to the one, should be carried in the more simple parts of being, but that those which have proceeded to a greater distance should be carried in the more composite parts of being. For the parti- cipations of second genera are divided after this manner according to a similitude to them. Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as self- perfect monads, participated by beings.' How many orders therefore there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show what beings are allotted a more simple, and what a more various hyparxis. Of all beings then, the last is that which is corporeal. For this derives its being, and all its perfection from another more ancient cause, and is neither allotted sim- plicity nor composition, nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from its own power. For no body is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten ; but every tiling which is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from cause, is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the cause of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of ex- • In the original here, about a line and a half is so defectire, that not being able to supply the deficiency, I hare not attempted to translate it. Digitized by Google CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 15g istence. Tor never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or depart from its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted through being separated from the power that supplied it with being. But that which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated from itself, is allotted through itself a perpetual essence. No body however, since it is not the cause of perpetuity to itself, will be perpetual. For every thing which is perpetual possesses an infinite power. But body being finite is not the cause of infinite power. For infinite power is incorporeal, because all power is incorporeal. But this is evident, because greater powers are every where. But no body is capable of being wholly every where. If there- fore, no body imparts to itself power, whether the power be infinite or finite, but that which is self-subsistent imparts to itself the power of being, and of existing perpetually, no body will be self-subsistent. Whence therefore is being imparted to bodies, and what is it which is adapted proximately to supply them with being ? Must wc not say that the cause of being to bodies primarily is that which by being present renders the nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are de- prived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the province of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence of secondary natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of essence. What there- fore is that of which bodies participating, are said to be better than the bodies which do not participate of it ? Is it not evident that it is soul? For we say that animated bodies are more perfect than such as are inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily beyond bodies ; and it must be admitted that all heaven and every thing corporeal is the vehicle of soul. Hence, these two orders of beings present themselves to our view ; the one indeed being corporeal, but the other which is above this, psychical. With respect to soul itself however, whether is it the same with or dif- ferent from intellect ? For as the body which participates of soul is per- fect, thus also the soul is perfect which participates of intellect. And of the soul indeed, which is able to live according to reason, all things do not participate : but of intellect and intellectual illumination rational souls participate, and also such things as partake of any kind of know- ledge. And soul indeed energizes according to time ; but intellect com- 4 Digitized by Google 1 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. prebends in eternity both its essence, and at the same time its stable energy. And not every soul indeed is adapted to preserve immutably and without diminution the perfection of itself ; but every intellect is always perfect, and possesses a never-failing power of its own blessedness. The intellec- tual genus therefore is essentially beyond the psychical ; since the former, neither in whole nor in partial intellects, admits the entrance of the na- ture of evil ; but the latter being undcfiled in whole souls, departs in partial souls from its own proper blessedness. What therefore is the first of beings? Shall we say intellect, or prior to this the extent of life? For soul indeed is self-vital, supplying itself with life; and intellect is the best and most perfect, and as we have said, an eternal life. But the life of intellect is indeed in a certain respect intellectual, and is mingled from the intellectual and vital peculiarity. It is necessary however, that there should be life itself. Whether therefore is life or intellect the more ex- cellent thing? But if gnostic beings only participate of intellect, but such beings as are destitute of knowledge participate of life, (for we say that plants live) it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged above intellect, being the cause of a greater number of effects, and im- parting by illumination more gifts from itself than intellect. What then ? Is life the first of beings ? And is to live the same thing as to be f But this is impossible. For if life is that which is primarily being, and to be vital is the same thing as to have being, and there is the same definition of both life and being, every thing which participates of life would also participate of being, and every thing which participates of existence would likewise participate of life. For if each is the same thing all things would similarly participate of being and life. All vital natures indeed have essence and being ; but there are many beings that are des- titute of life. Being therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that which is more universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to the one, as has been before demonstrated. Soul therefore is that which is primarily established above bodies; but intellect is beyond soul life is more ancient than intellect ; and being which is primarily being is established above all these. Every thing also which participates ' Instead of fas here it is necessary to read . Digitized by Google CHAP. II OF PLATO. l6l of soul, by a much greater priority participates of intellect; but not every thing which enjoys intellectual efficiency, is also adapted to participate of soul. For of soul rational animals only participate ; since we say that the rational soul is truly soul. For Plato in the Republic says, that the work of soul is to reason and survey beings. And every soul [i. e. every rational soul] is immortal, as it is written in the Phaedrus ; the irrational soul being mortal, according to the demiurgus in the Timaeus. And in short, it is in many places evident that Plato considers the rational soul to be truly soul, but 'others to be the images of souls, so far as these also are intellectual and vital, and together with whole souls produce the lives that are distributed about bodies. Of intellect however, we not only admit that rational animals participate, but also such other animals as possess a gnostic power ; I mean such as possess the phantasy, memory and sense ; since Socrates also in the Philebus refers all such animals to the intellectual series. For taking away intellect from the life which is according to pleasure, he likewise takes away not only the rational life, but every gnostic . power of the irrational life. For all knowledge is the progeny of intellect, in the same manner as allreason is an image of soul. Moreover, all things which participate of intellect, by a much greater priority participate of life, some things indeed more obscurely, but others more manifestly. But all living beings do not participate of intellectual power, since plants indeed are animals, as Timaeus says, but they jieither participate of sense, or phantasy ; unless some one should say that they have a co-sensation of what is pleasing and painful. And in short, the orcctic powers every where are lives, and the images of the whole of life* and the last productions of life ; but they are of themselves destitute of intellect and without any participation of the gnostic power. Hence also, they are of themselves indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge. Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and different animals a different portion, according to their respective natures; but all beings are not similarly able to participate of life ; since we say that qualities and all passions, and the last of bodies, receive the ultimate effective energy of being, but we do not also say that they participate of life. Being therefore is more ancient than life ; life than intellect ; and Proc. Vol. I. X 162 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III intellect than soul. For it is necessary that the causes of a greater number of effects being more ancient and according to order more principal, should preside over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer effects. Very properly therefore, does Plato in the Timeeus give subsist- * ence to soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to a sphere fashioned by a wheel.' For that which is moved, is moved by participating of life, and is nothing else than real life about motion. And in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera of things, and from motion. For being, says he, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither stands still nor is moved, is beyond eternal life. These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence, vis. essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of all the causes prior to itself, being allotted reason from its own peculiarity, but intellect, life and being, from more ancient causes. Hence it gives subsistence to things posterior to itself in a fourfold manner. For according to its being indeed, it produces all things as far as to bodies ; according to its life, all things which arc said to live, even as far as to plants ; according to its intellect, all things which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the most irrational natures; and according to its reason, the first of the natures that are able to participate of it.1 But intellect being established beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination the power of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but supplying the participation of life to a still greater number, and of being to all those to whom primary being imparts itself. But life being arranged above intel- lect, presubsists as the cause of the same things in a twofold respect, vivi- fying secondary natures indeed, together with intellect, and filling from itself with the rivers of life, such things as are naturally adapted to live, but together with being supernally producing essence in all things. But being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist- ' For flrrsMi; it is necessary to read sv npwic. * For «urw{ read avnjf. C Digitized by Google CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 163 ence, all lives, and intellects and souls, and is uniformly preseot to all things, and its exempt from the whole of things according to one cause which gives subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all things to the one, and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to the first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings, and non- being, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms subsist, which privations do not necessarily participate of being, but it is entirely neces- sary that they should participate of the one. These things as it appears to me persuaded the Elcan guest in the So- phista, when discussing that which is perfectly being, to admit that not only being is there, but also life, intellect and soul. For if true and real being is venerable and honorable, intellect is there in the first place, says be. For it is not lawful for that which is of itself venerable and immate- rial to be without intellect. But if intellect is in that which is perfectly being, intellect will entirely be moved. For it is not possible for intellect ever to subsist, either without motion or permanency. But if intellect is moved and stands still, there are in being both life and motion. Hence, from what has been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, life and intellect. Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through these things. For it is necessary, says lie, that life and intellect which before were by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a plenitude of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean guest indicating adds, " Shall we say that both these are inherent in it, but yet it does not possess these in soul ?" For to possess, as some one says in a certain place, is secondary to existing. And soul indeed parti- cipates of each of these according to the peculiarity of itself; but it mingles the rational form of its own hyparxis, with the intellectual vivific power. But both intellect and life subsist prior to soul, the former as being moved and standing still at one and the same time, and the latter as being motion and permanency. These four monads also, soul, intellect, life and being are not only mentioned by Plato here, but in many other places. And as in soul all things subsist according to participation, so in intellect the things which are prior to it subsist, and in life that which is prior to life. For we say that life exists, or has a being. Or how could i*be said to be arranged in being unless it participated of being? We Digitized by Google 1G4 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. likewise say that intellect is and lives. For it is moved, and is a portion of being. Hence it is the third of the more comprehensive monads. Prior however to beings which are participated, it is every where neces- sary that imparticipable causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated, conformably to the similitude of beings to the one. Being therefore which is primarily being, is imparticipable ; but life first participates of being, yet is imparticipable, being exempt from intellect. And intellect is filled indeed from being and life; but is imparticipable in souls, and in the natures posterior to itself. Intellect also presides over soul, imparting to it by illumination the participation of life and being; but being imparti- cipable subsists prior to bodies. The last order of beings therefore is that to which bodies are annexed ; celestial bodies indeed primarily, but sub- lunary bodies with the addition of material [vestments.] This therefore is the progression of beings, through life, intellect and soul, ending in a corporeal nature. If, however, it is necessary that the super essential unities of the Gods which derive their subsistence from the imparticipable cause ' of all things should be participated, some of them indeed, by the first orders in beings, others by the middle, and others by the last orders, as was before demon- strated, it is evident that some of them deify the imparticipable portion of being, but that others illuminate life, others intellect, others sou), and others bodies. And of the last unities indeed, not only bodies participate, but likewise soul, intellect, life and essence. For intellect in itself is a plenitude of life and being. But from the unities which are above this world intellect is suspended, and the psychical power, which preexists in intellect. From the unities above these, imparticipable and intellectual intellect is suspended. From those that are beyond these, the first and im- participable life is suspended. And from the highest unities, the first being itself, and which is the most divine of beings, is suspended. Hence Par- menides beginning from the one being, produces from thence the whole orders of the Gods. These things therefore being previously determined by us, let us speak concerning the divine dialogues, beginning from on high, and producing from the one the whole orders of the Gods. Let us also, ' For «tm» it is necemry to read wru* t Digitized by Google CHAP. III. OF PLATO. !gA following Plato, in the first place demonstrate the several orders from other dialogues, by arguments which cannot be confuted. Afterwards, let us thus conjoin and assimilate the conclusions of Parraenides to the divine progressions, adapting the first conclusions to the first, but the last to the last progressions. CHAPTER III. Aoaiit therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning the one must be re- sumed by us, in order that proceeding from the first principle, we may celebrate the second and third principles of the whole of tilings. Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and imparticipable cause preexists, — a cause ineffable indeed by all language, and unknown by all knowledge and incomprehensible, unfolding all tilings into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to, and converting all things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things. This cause therefore, which is truly exempt from all causes, and which gives subsist- ence unically to all the unities of divine natures, and to all the genera of beings, and their progressions, Socrates in the Republic calls the good, and through its analogy to the sun reveals its admirable and unknown transcendency with respect to all intelligibles. But again, Parmenides denominates it the one. And through negations demonstrates the exempt and ineffable hyparxis of this one which is the cause of the whole of things. But the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas, celebrates it us that about which all things subsist, and as the cause of all beautiful things. In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates it as that which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it is the cause of all deity. For all the Gods derive their existence as Gods from the first God. Whether therefore, it be lawful to denominate it the fountain Digitized by Google 166 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. of deity, or the kingdom of beings, or the unity of all unities, or the good- ness which is generative of truth, or an hyparxis exempt from all these tilings, and beyond all causes, both the paternal and the generative, let it be honored by us in silence, and prior to silence by union, and of the mystic end may it impart by illumination a portion adapted to our souls. But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding from and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange after the union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles ? What * the two principles therefore are of the divine orders after the first principle, we shall in the next place survey. For conformably to the theology of our ancestors, Plato also establishes two principles after the one. In the Phi- lebus therefore, Socrates says, that God gives subsistence to bound and infinity, and through these mingling all beings, has produced them, the nature of beings, according to Philolaus subsisting from the connexion of things bounded, and things infinite. If, therefore, all beings subsist from these, it is evident that they themselves have a subsistence prior to beings. And if secondary natures participate of these mingled together, these will subsist unmingled prior to the whole of things. For the pro- gression of the divine orders originates, not from things coordinated and which exist in others, but from things exempt, and which are established in themselves. As therefore the one is prior to tilings united, and as that which is passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable union, thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of and commixture with beings, arc themselves by themselves the causes of the whole of tilings. For it is necessary that bound should be prior to things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the similitude to the one of things which proceed from it For again, if we should pro- duce beings immediately after the one, we shall no where find the pecu- liarity of the one subsisting purely. For neither is being the same with the one, but it participates of the one, nor in reality is that which is the first the one ; for, as has been frequently said, it is better than the one, Where therefore is that which is most properly and entirely one ? Hence ' For Tin* it is neceisary to reail rms. Digitized by Google CHAP. in. OF PLATO. ^ there is a certain one prior to being, which gives subsistence to being, and is primarily the cause of it ; since that which is prior to it is beyond union, and is a cause without habitude with respect to all things, and im participate, being exempt from all things. If however this one is the cause of being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative of being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its own power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it were extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause. For being which is produced from these, and which is not the one itself, but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from the one, through the power which produces and unfolds it into light from the one; but its occult union from the hyparxis of the one. This one therefore which subsists prior to power, and first presubsists from the imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philcbus calls bound, but he denominates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But he thus speaks in that dialogue, " God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings." The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated by him God ; because each of the second Gods is participated by being, and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as being exempt ' from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the in- effable itself, the unical alone, and superessential. But the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown and imparticipable cause ; bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective deity ; but the infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every generative distribution. For all union and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended* from the first bound. But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, de- rive their subsistence from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we ' For (floral it it necessary to read rfafmjTiti. * Here alio it it neceuary for iftpfrai to read fftfnrrat. 168 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. say that each of the divine orders abides ' and at the same time proceeds, we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity. For from these two principles all things have their progression into being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of bound and infinity ; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it par- ticipates of bound ; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it pro- duces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eter- nity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul indeed, in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and pe- riods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of bound ; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the mcasores of its restitutions, is bounded. But ac- cording to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity. Moreover, the whole of generation, in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again, in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms, it is the image of infinity. And in addition to these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is ' furu* U (Knitted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 169 similar to bound, but according to its matter, resembles infinity. For these are suspended in the last place ' from the two principles posterior to the one, and as far as to these the progression of their productive power extends. Each of these also is one, but form is the measure and boun- dary of matter, and is in a greater degree one. Matter however is all things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative ' of all things according to energy. Very properly therefore is it said by So- crates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two in- telligible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds it- self into light through all beings is the one prior to the duad. And union indeed is derived to all things through that which is first ; but the division of the two orders of tilings is generated from these primary causes, and through these is extended to the unknown and ineffable principle. Let it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles of beings are, which become proximately apparent from the one, according to the theology of Plato. CHAPTER IX. In the next place let us show what the third ' thing is which presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both ' For 13^ straw it is necessary to read tv^antf. • The word ynmrnxq; u omitted in the original. * TfiTn is onutted in the original. Proc. Vol. I. Y 1 70 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK II!. these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled, is the first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than that which is highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than being. My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which we demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that hfe is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually ; and also that these three things being life and intellect are every where. But all things presubsist primarily and essentially in being. For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and the summit of beings. Life however is the middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life. But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelli- gibly, but in intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually. And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven together with the first principles, and does not depart from the one. But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with in- finite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to the principles, conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle. The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first prin- ciples, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially, another vitally, and another intellectually, but all things presubsisting in it essentially. I mean however by the first of beings essence. For essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence, and being is intelligible. If however every being is mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence is that which sub- sists as mingled from the two principles proceeding from the one. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and Digitized by Google CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 171 infinity." For they are unities deriving their subsistence from the one, and as it were luminous patcfactions from the imparticipable and first union. But with respect to producing a mixture, and mingling through the first principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into light, and generation to pate/action, by so much is that which is mixed allotted a progression from tfie one, inferior to that of the two principles. That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists pri- marily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are de- rived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause, but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds into light the two principles. But after him are the two principles bound and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing. If therefore the cause of the mixture is different from the first divine cause, this cause will be the fifth and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says it is. Far- ther still, in addition to these things, if we say that God is especially the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles is a union into the hypostasis of being, God is also certainly the cause of this primarily. Moreover, Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that the good is the cause of being and essence 1o intelligibles, in the same manner as the sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that which is mix- ed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to say that .it receives its progression from him ? If also the demiurgus in the Timauis, consti- tutes the essence of the soul itself by itself from an impartible and a par- tible essence, which is the same thing as to constitute it from bound and infinity ; for the soul according to bound is similar to the impartible, but according to infinity, to the partible essence;— if therefore the demiurgus mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately, from same and different, and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the cause of the first essence ? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as t 172 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. we have said, from the first (Jod, and does not subsist from the principles alone posterior to the one, but proceeds also from these, and is triadic. And in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union, and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis, and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. . And from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things. For in short, since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bound, but the , non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both these, and its wholeness, arc derived from the first Cod. That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the one; and it is biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles ; but it is a triad, so far as iu every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things however, we shall speak again. In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz. what that is which is primarily being, as the Elcan guest also somewhere says ; for it is most dubious how being is not less than non-being. In what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and infinity must be shown. For if bound and infiuity are superessential, essence may appear to have its subsistence from non-essences. How therefore can non-es- sences produce essence ? Or is not this the case in all other things which subsist through the mixture of each other ? For that which is produced from things mingled together, is not the same with things that are not min- gled. For neitheris soul the same with the genera, from which, bcingmingled together, the father generated it, nor is a happy life the same with the life which is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to plea- sure, nor is the one in bodies the same with its elements. Hence it is not wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though it is neither bound nor infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures them- selves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions from thein coalescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the Digitized by Google CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 173 uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity. For it is all things occultly, and on this account, is the cause of all beings ; which also the Elcan guest indicating to us, calls being the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elcan guest defines being to be power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as being all things uni- formly. For power is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multi- tude : but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause there- fore, I think, that every being, and every essence has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. -And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being is one many. The many however subsist occultly and without separation in the first natures ; but with separation in secondary natures. For by Bow much being is nearer to the one, by so much the more does it conceal multitude, and is defined according to union alone. It appears to me also that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form ' as ana- logous to the one, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they ap- pear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being consists of both these, as not only standing in the one, but receiving a multitude of unities and powers which are mingled into one essence. ' For w\tfti in the original it is necessary to read 174 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If I CHAPTER X. That therefore which is primarily being is through these things deno- minated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the in- finite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form and the morphe of this power. On this account we establish this power to be matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be bounded by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the power of being matter, since it is generative of energies, produces all beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings. For the power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being; and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of mul- titude in the power of being." Moreover, the form of matter imitates ultimately bound, since it gives limits to matter, and terminates its infi- nity. But it is multiplied and divided about it. It is also miugled with the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis of being, by its essence always advancing to existence, and always tending to decay. For those things which subsist in the first natures according to transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that also which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of in- finite life, and is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last ' of forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life ; since it pos- sesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes subsist prior to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as are imperfect. But here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses ' The punctuation in the latter part of this sentence in the original is erroneous : for instead of xeing. And the third triad principally subsists according to the beautiful. For there intelligible multitude, order and beauty, first shine forth to the view. Hence this being is the most beau- tiful of all intelligihka. This however will be discussed hereafter. As. there is a triad therefore, in each of the mixtures, the first indeed, sym- metry especially comprehends and connects ; the second truth, and the third beauty. And this induced the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato in these three defines the whole of the intelligible fjorder]. For all are in each, but one of these predominates more in one of the intelligible Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 181 monads than in another. Moreover, the third triad presents itself to the view after this. For it is necessary that the extremity of being should also be deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings are not more in number than the unities, as Parmenides says, nor are the uuities more numerous than beings ; but each progression of being par- ticipates of the one ; since this universe also, according to each part of itself, is governed by soul and intellect. By a mnch greater priority therefore, must the intelligible in its first, middle, and last hypostases, participate of the intelligible Gods. CHAPTER XIV, As the first unity therefore, after the exempt cause of all things, unfolds into light intelligible being, and the second unity, intelligible life, thus also the third constitutes about itself, intelligible intellect, and fills it with divine union, constituting poweras the medium between itself and being, through which it gives completion to this being, and converts it to itself. In this therefore, every intelligible multitude shi ncs forth to the view. For the whole of this being is intelligible intellect, life, and essence. And it is neither all tilings according to cause, in the same manner as that which is primarily being, nor docs it cause all things to shine forth, as the second being does, but it is as it were all things according to energy, and openly. Hence also, it is the boundary of all intelligiblcs. For since the progres- sion of beings is accomplished according to similitude, the first being is most similar to the one ; the second, is parturient with multitude, and is the origin of separation ; but the third, is now all-perfect, and unfolds into light in itself, intelligible multitude and form. Farther still, as the first triad abides occultly in bound, and fixes in itself every thing that is stable in intelligibles ; but the second abides 182 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI. and at the same time proceeds ; so the third, after progression converts the intelligible end to the beginning, and convolves the order to itself. For it is every where the province of intellect to convert and converge to the intelligible. All these likewise are uniform [i. e. have the form of one] and intelligible, viz. the abiding, the proceeding, and the returning. For each of these is not asserted after the same manner in intelligibles. And the' intelligible genus of Gods ' is unical, simple, and occult, conjoining itself to the one itself which is prior to beings ; and unfolds 1 into light nothing else than the transcendency of the one. For these three triads, mystically announce that unknown cause the first and perfectly imparti- cipable God. The first of them indeed, announcing his ineffable union ; the second his transcendency, by which he surpasses all powers ; and the third, his all-perfect generation of beings. For as they are able to comprehend the principle which surpasses both the union and the powers of all beings, so they exhibit to secondary natures, his 1 admirable transcendency ; receiving indeed separately the unical power and domi- nion of the first God ; but unfolding into light intelligibly the cause which is prior to intelligibles. For these Gods though they arc allotted a sim- plicity which is equally exempt from all the divine orders, yet they fall short of the union of the father. Of this triad therefore, which converts all intelligibles to the first principle, and convolves the multitude apparent in itself to the stable union of the whole of things, one thing is bound, and unity and hyparxis ; another, is infinity and power ; and another is that which is mixed, essence, life, and intelligible intellect. But the whole triad subsists according to being, and is the intellect of the first triad. For the first triad is an intelligible God primarily. But the triad posterior to it is an intelligible and intellectual God. And the third triad is an in- tellectual God. These three deities also, and triadic monads, give com- pletion to the intelligible genera. For they are monads according to their deities ; since all other things are suspended from the Gods, and also ■ The word* rm> ftn-a in the original immediately before T» nnrn lw ynof, are to be rejected a» superfluous. * ,*?«>n. is omitted in the original. * For txiiwi;, it is necessary to read exuvw. Digitized CHAR XiV. OF PLATO. J8S powers and beings. But they are triads according to a separate division. For bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, have a threefold subsist- ence ; but in one place indeed, all things are according to bound ; in another, all things are according to infinity ; and in another, all things are according to that which is mixed. And in one place, that which is mixed is essence ; in another, it is intelligible life ; and in another, intel- ligible intellect. In this last therefore, forms subsist primarily. For the separation of intelligiblcs, unfolds the order of forms; because form is being, but is not simply being. Hence that which is primarily being, is being itself, and is that which is being. But that which is the second being, is power, proceeding indeed from the first being, and existing as it were a duad generative of the multitude of beings, but not yet being multitude. And that which is the third being, is itself the multitude of beings ; being there existing with separation. For being is the exempt cause of those things which forms constitute divisibly. And of the things of which being is productive collectively, of these, forms are the cause in a way attended with separation. Because forms indeed, are causes produc- tive of separation in their effects, and also because forms are called the paradigms of beings. Being however, is the cause of all things posterior to itself, but is not the paradigm of them. For paradigms are the causes of things which are separated according to existence, and which have diffe- rent characters of essence. After the one therefore which is prior to beings, that which is one-many occultly, and the united subsists. On this account, it is that which is divided into multitude, and which tends from the uniform to the splendid. But the last of intelligibles, is that from which a certain distribution into parts originates, and which is compre- hensive of intelligible multitude. Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. CHAPTER XV. Socrates therefore, in the Philebus, affords us such like auxiliaries to the theory of the intelligible triads. It is requisite however, not only to abide in these conceptions, but also to demonstrate the theology of Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from them to point out one truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall assume therefore, what is written in the Timaeus, and shall follow our leader [Syrianus^ who has unfolded to us the arcane mysteries of these triads, and conjoin with the end of what has been said the beginning of the following discussion, in the Timaeus therefore, Plato investigating what the paradigm of the whole world is, discovers that it is comprehensive of alt intelligible ani- mals, that it is all-perfect, that it is the most beautiful of intelligible*, that it is only-begotten, and that it is the intelligible of the demiurgus. He likewise denominates it animal itself, as being the intelligible paradigm of every am mal, and of that which is the object of sense. Hence it is ne*. cessary that this animal itself, because it is all-perfect, and the most beau- tiful of intelligibles, should be established m the intelligible orders. For though there is intelligible animal m the demiurgus, yet it is rather intel- lectual than intelligible, and is not the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but is second to them in beauty and power. For primary beauty is in the intelligible Gods. In the demiurgus also, there are not only four forms of the things contained in the world, but there is all the multitude of forms. For in him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But animal itself is totally constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad. The demiurgus likewise is not like animal itself only-begotten among be- ings, but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together with which he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in the crater or bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the things of which in- telligible animal is effective and at the same time generative, of these the demiurgus is allotted the cause in a divided manner, in conjunction with Digitized by Google CHAP. XV. OF PLATO. 185 the crater. Hence, as I have said, animal itself is exempt from the de- mi urgus, and is, asTimseus every where denominates it, intelligible. Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because it is all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles. For neither that which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily being,1 is all-perfect. For the former is beyond all separation ; but the latter generates indeed, and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings. If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be all- perfect multitude ? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the third triad of intelligibles, as wa9 a little before demonstrated, but animal itself is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible ani- mals, is an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with any other principle) it is necessary that animal itself should be established accord- ing to this order. For either there will not be an intelligible paradigm, (and in this case, how will sensibles be images of intelligibles? or how will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of the whole of things >) or tf there is, it is the third in intelligibles. For the natures which are prior to the triad in intelligibles, are not all-perfect ; since they are exempt from the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not only-begotten. For they proceed together with others ; the male indeed, with the female, and those that are of a demiurgic together with those that are of a generative characteristic Nor are they the roost beautiful of intelligibles ; for beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all- perfect, and at the same time only begotten. The first paradigm of beings therefore, is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. Moreover, animal itself is eternal, as Timeeus himself says. For says he, "the nature of animal is eternal." And again, in another place he asserts, " that the paradigm is through all eternity being." If therefore it is eternal, it par- ticipates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to eter- nity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with the whole power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists proximately ' ro. Intelligible life, or life iuelf, or the fir* life. Proc. Vol. I. $ A Digitized by Google 186 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged proximately after them. CHAPTER XVI. Moreover, if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which, time has to that which is sensible, but the universe proximately partici- pates of time (for time was generated together with the uiyverse) it is certainly necessary that animal itself should primarily participate of eternity. Eternity therefore is beyond the first paradigm. For eternity indeed measures the existence of animal itself : but animal itself is mea- sured and filled with perpetuity from it. To which may bemadded, that we assert eternity to be the cause of immortality to all things. Hence eternity is that which is primarily immortal. For as that which is pri- marily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is effective of form is itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause of perpetuity and immortality, is itself primarily inunortal. The daemo- niacal Aristotle also rightly- calls eternity immortal and divine, and that from whence the existence and life of all things are suspended. If how- ever it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to partici- pation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, pos- sessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power of per- petuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is naturally adapt- ed to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subsists together with life. Hence Socrates in the Phredo," after many and beautiful demon- strations of the psychical immortality, says, " God therefore, my dear Cebes, and the form itself of life, are much more immortal." Hence, in- telligible life, and the God who is connective of this life, primarily pos- sess the immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity. But ' For lf*> it U necessary to read tfsuW Digitized by LiOOQle CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 187 this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life, and will be established in the middle of the intelligible order. Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is one of these thiee things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or ac- cording to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. For if being is being to all things, and essence is a thing of this kind, much more must this be the case with intelligible essence and that which is primarily being. For they are nothing eke than essence only. But being unfolds motion and permanency, and the other genera of beings, in the second and third progressions of itself. The first being therefore, as we have said, is at one and tlie same time exempt from motion and permanency. But eternity according to Timeeus abides in one. Hence also time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency of eternity. Eternity therefore does not subsist according to that which is primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.' For neither is soul time, which is moved through the whole of time. And in short, in divine beings, that which is participated is every where esta- blished above that which participates. But the eternal participates of eternity, just as that which is temporal participates of time. Eternity therefore is prior to intelligible intellect, and posterior to being ; so that it is established in the middle of the intelligible breadth. And as ani- mal itself is eternal, so likewise eternity is that which is always being. For as animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates of being, and is the cause of existence, of perpetual life, and intellection, and measures the essences, powers and energies of all things. » It is here necessary to supply «XV ovfc t*» vow tw mpw- Digitized by Google 188 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. CHAPTER XVII. Stock, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of in- teliigibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them, and the most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which is the first of intclligibles, and how is it denominated by Timaeus? He says there- lore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds according to number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which Timaeus says eternity abides ? For it is necessary either to say that it is the one of eternity, or the one which transcends all intelligibles, or the one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say that it is the imparticipable one, how is it possible that any thing can abide in that which is exempt from all things; and which neither admits the habitude nor communion Of secondary natures with itself? For every thing which abides in any thing, is in a certain respect on all sides comprehended by that in which we say it abides. It is however perfectly impossible that the first one should either comprehend any being, or be coarranged with beings. But if any one should suppose that it is the one of eternity, in which Timaeus says eternity abides, in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary however, that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding in that which is prior to itself. For to abide in that which is prior to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the same manner as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is infe- rior to it. If therefore eternity can neither abide in itself, nor in the one which is prior to beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Timaeus, it is established in the one of the first triad, or rather in the whole Digitized by Google / CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO. IQQ of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the cause of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle triad is the cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their principle. CHAPTER XVIII. Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to our view, according to the doctrine of Timaeus, viz. animal itself, eternity, and the oue. And through this one, and the firm establishment in it, eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through eternity, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods, according to a per- petual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed, having pro- ceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For eternity is tlu ever in conjunction with being. But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad, which Timams on this account denominates one, as being the monad and principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence of its being especially characterized according to bound, denominating it from bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, con- necting the names ; because this triad is defined according to intelligible jiower. And lie denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad. The first triad therefore is the union ofull the intelligibles, being in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is different from this which is ex- empt from intelligibles and im participate. It is also the supplier of stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eter- nity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the Digitized by Google 190 ON THE THEOLOGY nooK m. first triad is that on account of which this permanency is effected ; but that the second triad is that by vrhich it is produced. For the firm establish- ment of beings is indeed according to this second triad, but is on account of the first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all beings, and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There arc also at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity ; bound indeed, so far as it measures intelligibles ; but infinity, so far as it is the cause of perpe- tuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle, eternity is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power, and unsluggish energy. Neverthe- less, eternity is more characterised by infinity [than by bound.] For it com- prehends in itself infinite time. And time indeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For according to its continuity, it is infinite; but according to the now it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eter- nity establishes bound and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power. And according to the one indeed, it is bound ; but according to power infinite ; which time * also demonstrates as from images ; because the middle triad [of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. For whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal bound? For the temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner as the bound of eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of the one. Whence likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except from the power of the infinite ? For the latter is a stable infinity, but the former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still accord- ing to the one, so the former is moved according to number. Since whence i6 the alliance of time with lives, except from the first principle [of life, eternity ?] But time proceeds through all temporal life. Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity subsists according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here there is infi- nite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual, psychical, and that which subsists partibly in bodies. But eternity is the father and supplier of in- finite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpe- tuity. And Flotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the * • xfovo; U omitted in the original. Digitized by Google chap. xrin. OF PLATO". peculiarity ' of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being. For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior to itself, but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds indeed the uniform- transcendency of the first triad, but defines the termination of the Gods, and extends from the middle on all sides, and to all the intelligible breadth. Moreover the third triad is filled indeed with intelligible life,' and on this account is an intelligible animal, and the first animal. For it pri- marily participates of the whole nature of this life ; but unfolds into light in itself the first of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect extending itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the intelligible universe, and the apparent world the sensible universe. Hence also, Plato denomi- nates animal itself all-perfect Or rather, if you are willing we will speak thus : that in this third triad, there are bound, infinity, and that which kv mixed, which we have called intelligible intellect. Hence the whole triad is denominated only-begotten from the father which is in it. For the cause of bound imparts, that which is uncoordinated with other things,, and an exempt transcendency. For that which comprehends, says rfi- inreus, all such animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with any other ; since again, it would be requisite that there should be ano- ther animal about it. Hence that which comprehends in one all intelli- gible animals is a whole. But every where whole is referred ' to bound, and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itself is only-be- gotten, it will possess this peculiarity according to bound. But again, it is denominated eternal according to the power of it. For this power especially pertains to that which is eternal. For eternity is infinite power abiding in one, and proceeding stably. Animal itself, however, is all-perfect according to intellect. For that which unfolds in itself all the intelligible separation of being, is intelligible intellect. And that intel- ' Instead of aTiiozrrra, it U necessary to read itivnpa. * {anij is omitted in the original. 1 Instead of wpo rtu xtpuras, »ai *?<> ms *mfi*f, it is necessary to read TftS m aru5. Digitized by Google 19^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK in. lect, according to the decision of Plato, will be all-perfect, which compre- hends all intelligibles, and defines the boundary of the intelligible order. The only-begotten, therefore, the eternal, the all-perfect, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, manifest the nature of intelligible animal. On this account, Timreus also, in these three conclusions, reminds us of the paradigm, viz. in the conclusion which shews that the universe is only- begotten, and again, in the generation of time, and in the all-perfect com- prehension of all animals. If likewise Timieus says, that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles, and that this has the third order in intelligibles, it will not be wonderful. For it has beeu before asserted by us, that every where the cause of the best mixture is the triad symmetry, truth, and beauty. But beauty principally shines forth in the third progression of being, and exhibits its luminous nature together with intelligible forms, just as truth shines forth in the second, and symmetry in the first progression of being. If, however, truth is indeed the first, beauty the second, and symmetry the third, it is by no means wonderful, that according to order, truth and beauty should be prior to symmetry ; but that symmetry being more ap- parent in the first triad than the other two, should . shine forth as the third in the secondary progressions. For these three subsist occultly in the first triad. And truth indeed, so far as it is intelligible knowledge, is in the second triad ; but beauty so far as it is the form of forms is in the third triad. For that this triad subsists there first, is evident from this, that truth is primarily in that which is especially being, prior to know- ledge. But beauty, which pervades as far as to the last of beings, is ne- cessarily in the first being, from which the last of beings are derived. And the first symmetry is in that which is primarily mixed. For every mixture requires symmetry, in order that what is produced from it may be one certain thing. Though these three things, therefore, presubsist there, for we assume, as acknowledged universally, that symmetry is there, and the most beautiful of intelligible animals, as Timaeus says, yet at present we shall dismiss the further consideration of them, as we have elsewhere preccdaneously discussed them, and have especially endea- voured to enforce what we conceive to be the opinion of Plato concern- Digitized by Google C1IAP. XIX. OF PLATO. 193 ing their order. For we have spoken of these things in a treatise consist- ing of one t>ook, in which we demonstrate that truth is co-ordinate to the philosopher, beauty to the lover, and symmetry to the musician; and that such as is the order of these lives, such also is the relation of truth, beauty, and symmetry to each other. Animal itself, therefore, may with the greatest justice, be called most beautiful, so far as it is eminently coutained in intelligible beauty. For beauty is wont to be carried in forms, and is as it were the form of forms, unfolding that which is occult in the good, causing its loveliness to shine forth, and attracting to its own splendor the desire which is concealed about it. And to the good indeed, ail diings possess a silent and arcane tendency ; but we are excited to the beautiful with astonishment and motion. For the illumination from it, and its efficacy, acutely pervade throng!) every soul, and as being the most similar of all things to the good, it converts every soul that surveys it. The soul also, beholding that which is arcane shining forth as it were to the view, rejoices in, and ad- mires that which it sees, and is astonished about it. And as in the most holy of the mysteries, prior to the mystic spectacles, those that are ini- tiated, are seized with astonishment, so in intelligibles prior to the partici- pation of the good, beauty shining forth, astonishes those that behold it, converts the soul to itself, and being established in the vestibules [of the good] shows what that is which is in the adyta, and what the transcen- dency is of occult good. Through these things therefore, let it be appa- rent whence beauty originates, and how it first shines forth ; and also that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles. CHAPTER XIX. Since, however, Timazus says that the primary and intelligible para- digms have their subsistence in intelligible animal, and that all these are Proc. Voi» I. 2 B Digitized by Google 194 ON THE. THEOLOGY BOOK ill. four, unfold iug themselves first into light, according to the all-perfect te- trad,— this being the case, in the first place it deserves to be considered, that as species or forms present themselves to the view in the intelligible, it is necessary by a much greater pi iority, that the genera of beings should pre-subsist in intelligibles. For it is not possible to admit that forms arc intelligible, but that genera are intellectual only. But as forms exist intelligibly indeed, according to their first subsistence, but the pleroma, or plenitude of them shines forth in the intellectual ' gods, and divides that which is total into more partial decrements, produces the uniform into multitude, and expands that which is exempt into co-ordinate causes, thus also the genera of being are occultly and indivisibly in intelligibles, but are accompanied with separation in intellectuals. And on this ac- count the first triad indeed has essence for that which is mixed ; but the second has life, where there was motion and permanency, life both abiding and proceeding ; and in the third there are sameness and difference. For the all-perfect multitude indeed, is through intelligible difference, but the united and that which is comprehensive in common of parts according to genera, and according to one, is through intelligible same- ness. And all these subsist intelligibly, essentially, and uniformly in these triads. In the first place therefore, this deserves to be inferred by those who love to survey the nature of things, and it is also fit (hat they should attri- bute co-ordinate genera to intelligible forms. For it neither was nor will be lawful for genera to shine forth secondarily * after forms. Hence much more must it be admitted that genera subsist in the intelligible after the above-mentioned manner, by those who admit that there are intelligible forms. In the next place, in addition to these things we must sur- vey how this tetrad of forms subsists, and how it shines forth in intelli- gible intellect analogous to the principles. For it is divided into a mo- nad and triad. For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged prior to the others, it is defined according to a div ine cause. It appears * For mr™>s it U neeemry to read myoif . * For Sttrnps it U nectwary to read htuTtpat- Digitized by Google CHAP. XIX. OF PLATO. 193 however to me that intelligible intellect returning to the principles of the whole of thing*, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the ple- nitude of forms, and is all things intellectually and at the same time in- telligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and being full of the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes the monad of the gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of the gods. But re- ceiving the intellectual causes of the three principles posterior to the one, it exhibits three ideas after this, one of them indeed, being the cause of air- wandering and volant animals, this cause proceeding analogous to bound. Hence also it constitutes gods that are uniform, elevating, undefiled, united to the celestial gods, and which receive measures second in dignity to theirs, and have the same relation to those gods that govern generation co-ordinately, as the celestial gods have to these, according to exempt transcendency. But it exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, co-ordi- nate with generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that are tl>e suppliers of motion and prolific abundance, and that are the in- spective guardians of life ; since also this water itself which is the object of sense is under the dominion of effusion, infinite lation and indefinite- ncss. Hence likewise it is attributed to vivific powers. And intelligible intellect exhibits the precedancous cause of terrestrial and pedestrious gods, in a manner adapted to the nature of that which is mixed. It also generates gods who contain the end of the whole of things, who arc stable, who subdue the formless nature of matter by the last Ibrms, and fix the seat of mundaue natures in the one centre of the universe. For deriving their subsistence from the first Vesta as it were, or seat of brings, they sta- bly define this mundane seat. Thus therefore forms first unfold them- selves into light in intelligible intellect, possessing their progression and order according to the first principles. It is necessary however, in addi- tion to these things, to infer this in the third place, following Timaeua, that according to this triad, the multitude of intelligible parts shines forth, and the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts. For that, says he, of which other iutclligible animals both according to one, and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm of die universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts of this, it is OS THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. evident that it is a whole, comprehending in itself the multitude of in- telligible parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts. It must be inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production and fabrication. For if it contains the primary paradigms of things, it is evi- dent that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it. And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent, and all the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence ; and it will also comprehend the intelligible causes of all the vivific and demiurgic orders. CHAPTER XX. Sue ii conceptions therefore, as these, may be assumed from what is written in the Timaeus concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably to what is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we will show from what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as we have concerning the first principles. The Elean guest therefore, in that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the uni- verse is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and showing how it is sus- pended from the one, at first indeed, he argues from the one being [or being characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passiveto/Ae one, and participates of the one, but is not the one itself, nor that which is prima- rily one. But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the Digitized by Google CHAP. XX. OF PLATO. 197 all-perfect. For that which ii perfectly divided, and is connective of many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirely one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of mul- titude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in the demonstration of this through three arguments. And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves through the following words. " But what with respect to those who assert that the universe is one ? Must we not enquire to the utmost of our power what they say being is? Certainly. To this question therefore they may answer : Do you say there is one thing alone ? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call being any tiling ? Yes. Do you call it the owe, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say ? What will be their an- swer after this O guest ?' Through this therefore, Plato separating the one and being from each other, and showing that the conception of the one is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the form of one. But the one itst/fn exempt from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will di- minish its supreme and ineffahle union. Hence it is necessary to arrange the one prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For if the one and the one being were the same, and it made no difference to say one and being (since it' they differed, the one would a i« r the hist orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions arc asked, us there are pro- gressions of the divine orders. .And in the first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak ; since Plato speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly clearly untbldinghis meaning. It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following in so doing thedivine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For wealsa • For ff«x«iTi{ it it neccwary to reid xgo^omf. Digitized by Google 208 ON T,*K THEOLOGY BOOK III. through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury, and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane mystic discipline. And thus much concerning the mode of tl»e whole of the conclusions. But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the things proposed. The first and im participate one therefore, which preexists beyond the whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also those that are participated, is celebrated through the first hypothesis, being demonstrated to be the cause of ull things ineffably, but not being defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable one,] that which is aloae supercssential and surpassing, and unmingled with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about itself the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which is primarily one. This however is a superesscntial hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. the one and being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should be power, through which and together with which the one con- stitutes and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from the me, and its conversion to the one, is through power. For what else con- joins being to the one, or causes the one to be participated by being except power? For it is the progression of the one, and its extension to being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and generations. This triad therefore, the one, power and being, is the summit of intelhgibles. The first of these indeed producing ; the third being pro- duced ; and the second being suspended from the one, but coalescing with Digitized by Google CHAP. XXtV. OF PLATO. 209 CHAPTER XXIV. This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participa- tion of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being par- ticipates of the one, and the one of being. The participation however of these is different. For the one ' indeed so participates of being, as illumi- nating and filling, and deifying being ; but being so participates of the one, as suspended from the one, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For it is of the one, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion of the one, and its progression into being. Parmenides de- livers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows : " See there- fore from the beginning if the one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence ? It is not possible." But he ends speaking about it in the following words : " Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that the. one participates of essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that the one is ? It will not." This there- fore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of the one and the one of being, in a manner per- fectly admirable ; Plato indicating through these things, that the father is the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, anil that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of the triad, and bein*; is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intel- lect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says. • In the original n o», but the true reading is eridemlf r» alone. Proc. Vol. I. *2 D *10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOKIH. But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being ; since power is here occultly. For the triad docs not proceed from itself ; but subsists without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which participates of the one through power as the middle, which collects toge- ther and separates both the one and being. And it is supcressential in- deed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are su- peressential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly there- fore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things ; since they are not constitutive of supcrcssential natures. The first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parinenides. CHAPTER XXV. But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista, For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the ex- tremes with each other,— the second triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For all things being uuited and without distinction in the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and power arc more divided from each other. And that which con- Digitized by Google CHAP. XXV- OF PLATO. 211 sists of these is no longer one being [or being characterized by the one,] but is a whole, so that it has the one and being in itself as parts. For above indeed [i. e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and wholeness. But ip this triad there are both parts and a whole, power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts and the w hole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, the one and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle, connects the one and being, and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders the one one being ; but through its communion with the vnc, it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being con- sists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by the one, and of the one which is characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows : " Again therefore, let us say if the one is what will happen. Consider then if it is not ne- cessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a kind as to have parts f But- he ends in the following words : •* That which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part." Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligible* to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an nil-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Whole- ness therefore is triple, being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts, or .subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politico* indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timseus he says that the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes ; but each of the parts is n whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness there- fore, being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically compre- hending and constituting three wholenesses ; according to the hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts ; but according to its power, x Digitized by 'Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. the wholeness which is from parts ; and according to its being the whole- ness which is in a part. For the one is prior to all multitude ; but power communicates in a certain respect with both the extremes, and compre- hends in itself the peculiarities of them ; and being in a certain respect participates of the one. Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is derived from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes in a certain respect shiue forth to the view. And the third wholeness is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power and the one,' and possesses each of these partially. After the in- telligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according to the differ- ent orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible and occult order. CHAPTER XXVI. Immediately after this triad we may sec another proceeding, in which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation of the second, the progression of the third is generated, which has indeed its subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with the multitude of which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in this triad there is a unity, and power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and ' Instead of «vro; it is necessary to read m;. CHAP. XXVI. OF PLATO. 213 power. And thus all the triad indeed is a wholeness; but each of its ex- tremes, viz. the one and being, as it is multitude conjoined through collec- tive power, is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of some of these it causes each through progression to be being characterized by the one, but of others each according to participation to be the one characterized by be- ing. For here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and being ; but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it ; and being participates of the one. The one of being therefore, is again divid- ed, so that the one and being generate a second unity conjoined with the part of being. But being participating of the one, is again separated into being and the one. For it generates a more partial being suspended from a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings, and is a more specific monad. The cause however of this progression is power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of multitude. For the one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being con- verts to the participation of the divine unities. Whence therefore does Parmenides begin to teach us -concerning this triad? And where docs he conclude his discourse about it? The beginning, therefore, of what he says on this subject is as follows : " What then ? Can each of these parts of the one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one t It cannot be.'" But he ends thus : " Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner be an infinite multitude ? It seems so." In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intel- ligible monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we say that it consists of two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible multitude presents itself to the view from the monad and the duad. For when all things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things, and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then 1 It U necessary to cornet the text here, and to read as follow* : tuw; raw p*pun immpn rov» raw tow »»$• orr»{ to, ti it x«i ts oy ap* (nroXfnrraim, q to it. ». r. K. Digitized by Google 214 4 ON the ti]j:olo<;y HOOK lit. Parmenides delivers the union which pervades from the monad to the third triad. But when power separating and conjoining the unities and beings gives completion to multitude, then the participation of the duad becomes perfectly apparent, as 1 think Parmenides demonstrates when he says, " so that it is necessary two things should always he generated, and that there should never be one thing (only.)" This triad, therefore, pro- ceeds according to both the preexistent triads, flowing according to the Oracle, and proceeding to all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is indicative of this flux, and of the incomprehensible nature of power. Hence, in the first place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is through these things demonstrated to l>e suspended from the triads prior to it. And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parme- nides, is primogenial. For this first imparts the power of being generated; and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generation, [i.e. be- coming to be, or rising into existence^] For he says : " And the part w ill be generated from two parts at least." And again : " Whatever part is generated, will always have these parts." And in what follows : •* So that it is necessary it should always be generated two things, and should never be* one."' Does not he, therefore, who frequently uses the word ge- • Deration in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligible multi- tude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are more united to each other? But this order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult nature of the triads prior to itself, and is primogenial, unfolding in itself prolific power. In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the infinity of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume the infinite in quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of things, there are bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the union, but the latter of the separation of multitude^ Parmenides calls the first and intel- ligible multitude infinite, because all multitude indeed, according to its own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny of the first infinity. All in- telligible multitude, however, is a thing of this kind. For it is the first multitude, and multitude itself. But multitude itself is the first progeny of intelligible infinity. Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this ac- Digitized by Google CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 415 count infinite, as unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is the same with the all-perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all, and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite. For it cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible multitude is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed that which is primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity, it would be re- quisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite multitude of this kind. Since, however, the intelligible is infinite power, it is necessary that the partici- pant of the primarily infinite, should cause infinity to shine forth accord- ing to the power which is comprehensive of all prior natures. And if it be requisite to relate my own opinion, as that which is primarily one is primarily bound, so that which is primarily- multitude is infinite multitude. For it receives the whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and all beings, as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an incom- prehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude, it bounds and measures it by iufinite power, and through wholeness introduces bound to all things. These tlnngs, therefore, may be assumed from Par- uienides concerning the third intelligible triad. CHAFFER XXVII. Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible triads. With respect to the first triad, therefore, which is occult, and is allotted the intelligible summit in intelligibles, Plato at one time proceed- ing from the union which is in it, and its exempt transcendency with re- spect to the other triads, denominates it one, as in the Tiinacus. For eter- nity, says he, abides in one. Hut reason evinces that this one is the first triad of intelli»ibles. But at another time proceeding from the extremi- Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI. ties which arc in it, viz. that which is participated, and that which parti- cipates, he calls it the one being, considering the power which is compre- hended in these as ineffable, in consequence of its subsisting uniformly and occultly. And at another time, he uufolds the whole of it, accord- ing to the monads which are in it, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed; bound indeed indicating its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative power, and that which is mixed, the essence proceeding from this power. Plato, therefore, as I have said, teaches us through these names the first intelligible triad ; at one time indeed through one name, but at another through two names, and at another again through three names, unfolding it to our view. For there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is characterized ; and a duad according to which the extremes communicate with each other ; and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the first, through its own monads. But the second triad after this, Plato denominates in the Timseus in- deed, eternity ; but in the Parmenides the first wholeness. How these, however, arc allotted the same peculiarity we may learn by considering that every thing eternal is indeed a whole; viz. if it is perfectly eternal, and has the whole of its essence and energy at once present. For every intellect is a thing of this kind, perfectly establishing at once in itself, the whole of intellectual perception. It likewise does not possess one part of being, but is deprived of another part, nor does it partially participate of energy, but it summarily comprehends the whole of being, and the whole of intelligence. If, however, in its energies it proceeded according to time, but had an eternal essence, it would be allotted the whole of the latter, and this always stably the same, but would possess the former va- riably, so as to exert different energies at different times. Eternity, there- fore, is every where the cause of wholeness to the natures to which it is primarily present. But whole also is every where comprehensive of per- petuity. For no whole abandons cither its essence or its proper perfec- tion ; but that which is primarily corrupted and vitiated is a partial na- ture. For on this account also the whole world is perpetual, viz. because it is a whole, and this is likewise the case with all that the heavens contain, and with each of the elements. For every where wholeness is connective CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO U7 of subjects. Hence eternity is consubsistent with wholeness, and whole and eternity are the same. Each also Is a measure, the one of things eternal, and of all perpetual natures, but the other of parts and of all mul- titude. Since, however, there are three wholenesses, one indeed being prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in a part, — through the wholeness which is prior to parts, eternity measures those unities of divine natures which are exempt from beings ; but through the wholeness which derives its subsistence from parts, it measures the unities that are co-ordinate with beings ; and through the wholeness which is in a part, it measures all beings and whole essences. For these wholenesses being parts of the divine unities, they possess partibly what pre-exists unically in the unities. And, moreover, eternity is nothing else than the ever shining forth from the unity which is connected with being. But whole consists of two parts, viz. of the one and being, power existing as the collector of the parts. According to both these conceptions, there- fore, the duad pertaining to the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uni- form and occult hypostasis of the first triad. Moreover, in the Timseus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligible?, animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in the Par- menides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness compre- hensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he perpetually calh it the intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions, therefore, arc the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when Tim* us calls this triad intelligible animal, he also asserts it to be all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts, both ac- cording to one and according to parts. Hence nnimal itself is according to this a whole, comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts. And Parmenides, when he shows that the one being is all-perfect multitude, demonstrates that it is consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will be all-powerful and all-perfect, as wc have before observed, comprehend- ing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates; tome of these being more total, but others more partial, and as Tiroaeus says, both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parraenidcs first attri- Proc. Vol. I. 2 £ Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. butes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude, when he says, " And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever part is generated will always possess these two parts: for the one will always contain being, and being the one ; so that two things will necessarily always be gene- rated, and no part will ever l>e one." Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the primo- gcnial triad, as Pannenides, first assuming in this order generation and the ever, and so continually using each of these ? The same thing, therefore, is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful intelligible multitude. For the first infinity being power, and every intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful ; thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which dis- turbs the multitude. That, however, which in these things is both diffi- cult to understand, and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired, we must not omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For intelligible animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which it not only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent kind of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves ; for generating it extends the idea of air- wandering, the idea of aquatic, and the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal animals. Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas, and through the same paradigms produces totally divine, demoniacal and mortal animals,, this deservedly produces a doubt in those who love the contemplation of truth, how, the causes being the same, and the same primary paradigms preexisting, some of the natures which arc constituted are Gods, others daemons, and others mortal animals. For all these being generated with reference to one form, how is it possible they should not have the same form and nature ; since it is requisite that one idea should every where be generative of things that have a similar form ? For on this account we admit the hypothesis of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods may possess and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar natures. This doubt,' therefore, being so difficult, some oue may solve it logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one form ■ Instead of mnifu>h it is necessary to read b» after the words tj id rs^rav n&o;. Digitized by Google 220 ON T,,E THEOLOGY BOOK III. demoniacal summit of being which is one, and which adorns secondary natures. As to the unions, however, of secondary natures, it is not im- manifest that they approximate to multitude, and to the progression of the natures placed above them. Nor must you wonder if being w hich is one is the cause of angels, but the one being of daemons. Fof in one place, being which is one is a part of the one being, but in another the one being is a part of being which is one. And here, indeed, the union is essential, but there essence has the form of the one. For the summit of being which is one is a thing of this kind. Deservedly, therefore, is intel- ligible multitude all-powerful, and intelligible animal all-perfect, as being at once the cause of all things, and this as fur as to the last of things, Plato all but exclaiming, [in the words of the Ciialdfean Oracle,] " Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds." For the divine unities pro- ceeding gradually, generate the multitude of all mundane natures. This triad, therefore, is the fountain and cause of all things : and from it all the life, and all the progression of the Gods, and the genera superior to us, and of mortal animals subsist. For it produces totally and uniformly all things, and binds to itself the whole principles of the divisible rivers of vivification, and the production of forms. CHAPTER XXVIII. Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelligible* to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to ourselves, that this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt from all the other di- vine orders, and is neither called intelligible as known by a partial intel- lect, nor as comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, nor yet as^preexisting in all-perfect intellect. For it transcends both total Digitized by Google CI!A1>. XXVIII. OF PLATO. 221 and partial intelligible*, and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as the one with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible is impar- ticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all tilings from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, exist- ing itself by itself; and at-tbe same time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the co-ordinate being derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent, and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we are accustomed to assert of intelligibles. For in these the we becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual multitude. Hence 1 do not place intelligible simplicity in the order of idea. For this form b partial, and is subordinate to intelligible union. But I consider it as the hypai xis of divine natures, and as generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine self-sufficiency and divine power, ac- cording to which the Gods fill all things with good. In a much greater degree, therefore, are the intelligible Gods, because they are united to- the good, wholly full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very pro- perly, therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union; sub- sisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude uni- formly and unically ; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and be- ing uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as the good illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fa- Digitized by Google 222 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III. thers of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus of Gods, according to a similitude to the good, imparts from itself to all the secondary Gods, intelligible plenitude. Hence, according to each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But in. telligible multitude is the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency, power, essence, and all intelligible goods. For the Gods antecedently and intelligibly comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in them- selves all ' things according to supreme union. • Instead of rm xaf nwwiv, it it requisite to read varra xoJf tvtunv, and then the end of this book will be co mplete, and not defective is the Latin translatorPortus imagined it was. Digitized by Google BOOK IV. CHAPTER I. Let the discussion, therefore, of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us. But it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider after the same manner the narration concerning the intellectual Gods. Since, however, of intellectuals some are both intelligible and intellectual, viz. such as ac- cording to the Oracle perceiving intellectually are at the same time intel- lectually perceived ; but others are intellectual only; — this being the case, beginning from those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligi- ble, we will in the 6rst place determine what pertains to them in common, from which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them more perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those things which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three total monads which arc entirely beyond the Gods that arc divided accord- ing to parts, viz. essence, life arid intellect. And these prior to the par- tial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is exempt from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts the end of this triad to the beginning. -And all these are indeed intelli- gibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellec- Digitized by Google [ 224 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. • tually in intellect. And as secondary natures always participate of the natures placed above them, but these prior to participation presubsist themselves by themselves; and as in each order there are these three things, the cause of abiding, the cause of proceeding, and the cause of con- version, though intellect is more formalized according to conversion, but life according to progression, and essence according to permanency ; — this being the case, it is certainly necessary that the first intellectual Gods being essentialized according to life should conjoin imparticipable intel- lect, and the intelligible genus of Gods, and that they should uniformly connect the various progressions of secondary, but unfold and expand the stable hyparxis of precedaneous causes. For imparticipable life is a thing of this kind, circumscribing that which is primarily being and intellect, and participating indeed of being, but participated by intellect But tins is the same thing as to assert that intelligence is filled indeed from the intelligible, but fills intellect from itself. For being is the intel- ligible, but life is intelligence. And being indeed is characterized ac- cording to a divine hyparxis; but Kfe according to power ; and intellect according to intelligible intellect. For as being is to byparxis, so is intel- lect to being. . And as intelligible power is to each of the extremes, so n life to the intelligible and to intellect. And as power is generated from the one and byparxis but constitutes in conjunction with the one the nature of being, so life proceeds indeed from being, and gives subsistence to a power different from that which is in being. As also the one itself which exists prior to being, imparts to being from itself a second unity, so likewise life being allotted aa hypostasis prior to intellect, generates in- tellectual life. For true being and the intelligible which precede the rest, supply both life and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore, but which participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being, is generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, is illu- minated by Gods wlio are allotted a union secondary to the occult sub- sistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause the separation of intellectual natures. For the unical, indivisible, simple, and primary na- ture of intelligibles, subsides, through the medium of these Gods* into ■ Digitized by Google CHAP. I. OF PLATO. '2-25 multitude and separation, and the inexplicable evolution of the divine orders. Whence also, I think, the Gods who connectedly contain life which is infinite, being the middle of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and carried in the divisions of themselves as in a vehicle, are called intelligible and at the same time intellectual ; being filled indeed, from the first intelligibles, but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call the intelligible Gods intelligible, not as coordinate with intellect. For the intelligible which is in intellect is one thing, and that which produces the intellectual Gods another : and we denominate the Gods that subsist according to life intelligible and at the same time intellectual, not as giving completion to intellect, nor as being established according to intellectual intelligence, and imparting to intellect the power of intellectual perception, but to the intelligible the power of being intellectually perceived, but we give them this appellation, as deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads, but generating all the intellectual hebdomads. And because they are illuminated indeed with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals, according to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in com- mon, connecting their names from the extremes, in the same manner as they also are allotted a peculiarity collective of wholes in the divine orders. It is evident, therefore, that they subsist according to this medium, and that they are proximate to the intelligible Gods, who are both monadic and triad ic. For the intelligible triads, with reference indeed to the highest union and which is exempt from all things, are triads ; but with reference to the divided essence of triads, they are monads, unfolding into light from themselves total triads. Since intelligibles, therefore, in their triadic progression, do not depart from a unical hyparxis, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods subsist triadically, exhibiting in themselves the separation of the monads, and through divine difference, proceeding into multitude, and a variety of powers and essences. For the natures which subsist more remote from the one principle [of all things,] are more multiplied than the natures which are prior to them and are diminished indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of second- * For ( vm$«ij Digitized by Google CHAP. X. OF PLATO. 245 however receives forms alone ; but the mother and nurse of the Gods, not only receives, but also constitutes and generates secondary natures, together with the father. Nor does this generative deity produce from herself into an external place, her progeny, and separate them from Ler own com- prehension, in the same manner as the natures which generate here, deliver their offspring into light external to themselves; but she generates, comprehends and establishes all things in herself. Hence also she is the place of them, as being a seat which on all sides contains them, and as by her prolific, and primarily efficient powers, preoccupying and con- taining in herself, all the progressions, multitude and variety of secondary natures. For all beings subsist in ihe Gods, and are comprehended and saved by them. For where can they recede from tlie Gods, and from the comprehension which is in them? .And how, if they depart from them, con they remain even for the smallest portion of time? In a particular manner however the powers which are generative of divine natures, are said to comprehend their progeny, so far as they are the proximate causes of them, and constitute their essence with a more abundant division, and a more particular providence. For paternal causes produce secondary natures uniformly, exemptly, and without coordination, and comprehend, but unically their own progeny. And in simplicity indeed, they preoccu- py the variety of them ; but in union their multitude. It is evident therefore, from what has been said, that the supercelestial place is intel- ligible, and after what manner it is intelligible. In addition to these things also it is evident, how it is feminine ; for place is adapted to the generative Gods through the above-mentioned causes. And the meadow is the fountain of a vivific nature, as will be shortly demonstrated. Socrates likewise assumes all the divine natures that are in this place, to be of this hind, [viz. to be of the feminine genus] I mean science herself, justice her- self, temperance herself, truth herself, and Adrastia ; which may especi- ally be considered as a certain indication, that Plato particularly attri- butes the feminine to this order, and not only other theologists. ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. CHAPTER XI. What therefore is the cause through which Plato in the first place ce- lebrates this deity negatively, analogous to the one t And what are (ha negations ? For he denominates it, without colour, without figure, and without contact. And he takes away from it these three hyparxes, colour, figure, and contact. I say therefore, that this order being the summit of the intellectual Gods, is unknown and ineffable, according to its peculi- arity, and is [only] to be known through intelligible impressions. For being the summit of intellectuals, it conjoins itself with intelligibles. For how could intellectuals be conjoined with intelligibles, unless they ante- cedently constituted an intelligible transcendency of themselves ? But what connexion and communion could be surveyed of the whole orders of things, unless the extremities of such as are first possessed a certain similitude to the beginnings of such as are second ? For on account of this similitude, these are connascent with each other, and all things sub-' sist according to one scries. As therefore, the end of intelligibles was intellectual, so likewise the beginning of intellectuals is allotted an in- telligible hyparxis. And each of these indeed is intelligible ; but the one is intelligible simply ; and the other is not intelligible without the addi- tion of the intellectual. These therefore, are consubsistent with each other. And the one indeed, is the paternal cause of the whole of things, so far as it is intelligible, and the intellectual which is in it is extended in- telligibly. But the other is generatively constitutive of the same things, because it is intellectual, and intelligible good presides in the intellectual genus. All things therefore, are from both, exeinptly indeed, from the intellectual of intelligibles, but coordinately, from the intelligible of in- tellectuals. And both indeed, rejoice in unknown hyparxes; and are alone, as Plato says, known by intelligible, mystic, and ineffable impres- sions, iience also he calls the attempt boldness which endeavours to unfold the arcana concerning them, and to explain by words their un- known union. Digitized by Google CHAP. XI. OF PLATO. 24-7 From the end of the intelligible order however, the summit of intel- lectuals possesses its unknown peculiarity. For so far as it conjoint itself to the first intelligibles, and is filled with their unical, ineffable, and paternal hyparxis, so far also it exists in an unknown manner prior to intellectuals. Hence it is incomprehensible by the natures posterior to it; but it is known by those prior to it, being super-expanded into a continued union with them.' It likewise knows the natures prior to itself intelligibly ; but this does not at all differ from uniform and ineffable knowledge. For intelligible knowledge is the union, cause, summit, and unknown and occult hyparxis of all knowledge. Since therefore, the one and united triad is, if it be lawful so to speak, the intellectual image of the unknown union of intelligibles, and presides over the same uniform and unknown power in intellectuals, as its own cause does, hence Plato mystically unfolds it through negations. For every where that which is highest, and that which is unknown, are analogous to the unical God. As therefore, we are taught to celebrate this God through negations, after the same manner we endeavour to unfold negatively the uniform and unknown summits of secondary orders. And in short, since Socrates in the Phtedrus makes the ascent as far as to the supercelestial place, arranging it analogous to the first, as in this order, and in the ascent of souls, he celebrates it by negations. For in the Timasus, Plato contends that the one demiurgus through whom every demiurgic genus of Gods subsists is ineffable and unknown; and every where that which is highest has this transcendency with respect to secondary natures. For it imi- tates the cause which is at once unically exempt from all beings. We celebrate this cause however, through negations alone, as existing prior to all things; but we unfold the summits which proceed analogous to it, affirmatively and at the same time negatively. As participating indeed, the natures prior to themselves, we celebrate them affirmatively. For Plato calls the supercelestial place essence which truly is, the plain of truth, the meadow, and the intelligible place of survey of the Gods, and he docs not only call it without colour, without figure, and without 1 Fot *vtv, it i* necessary to retd mm*. Digitized by Google £48 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. oontadt, thus mingling affirmations with negations. For this order is a medium between the intelligible Gods and the first intellectual divine orders, containing the bond of both. And it guards indeed intellectual!/, according to a uniform and unknown transcendency, but transmits the plenitudes of intelligibles as far as to the last of things. It likewise derates all things at once, according to one common union, as fa r as to the intelligible father, and generates and produces them as far as to matter. Being therefore established between the unical and the multiplied Gods, it « unfolded, negatively indeed, through the unknown manner in which it transcends secondary natures, but affirmatively through its partici- pation of the first natures. For the first demiurgus is called in the Timsus fabricator and father, and good, and all such names, so far as he participates of preexistent causes; but so far as he is the monad of all fabrication, Plato leaves him unknown and ineffable, exempt from all the fabricators of things. For he says, " it is difficult to discover him, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Thus therefore Plato unfolds the supercelestial place, affirmatively indeed, as being filled from the first causes, at one time indeed calling it essence* which truly is, at another the plain of truth, and at another, something else of this kind; but' so far as it transcends the intellectual Gods, and •o far as -it is supreme and unical, he celebrates it negatively, in the same manner as the principle which is exempt from all things. CHAPTER XII. It follows therefore, in the next place, that we should consider what the negations are, and from what orders they are generated. In the Parmenides then, the negations of the one are produced from all the • 8. i» omitted in the original, which the vme eridently require, to be inawttA Digitized by Google CHAP. XII. OF PLATO. 249 divine orders, because the me is die cause of all of them. And every thing divine- according to the hypavxis of itself participates of the first principle ; and the one in consequence of transcending these is in a much greater degfee exempt from the natures posterior to these. For from these all things proceed; since they receive partibly the peculiarities of these. This however iB evident from (he otter hypotheses* in which Che same conclusions are again1 eircalated, at one time being connected together negatively, and *t anotlier affirmatively. For what is* there wlrichr could be able to subsist, unless it was- antecedently comprehended according Vo cause in wholes ? But in the Pined r us, the things which are denied of the intelligible summit of air intellectuals are the natures whieb am proximately established after this summit, vis. the sacred genera; the connective, tike perfective, and the' paternal of what are" properly called' intellectuals For this summit being exempt front these, it also, transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of the Gods is to Me one, that the three orders posterior to this* summit, arettr it- Plato therefore denominates the cctestia* order which connectedly con- tains wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, colour ; because likewise the apparent beauty of this sensible heaven is resplendent' with; all various colours, and with light. Hence he calls that heaven intel- lectual colour, and light For the light proceeding from the good is [in the orders] above [the heaven] unknown and occult, abiding in- the adyta of the Gods ; but it shines forth in this order, and from being unapparent becomes manifest. Hence it is assimilated to colour the offspring of light. Farther still, if the heaven is sight beholding the things above, the intelligible of it may very properly be called colour which is- conjoined1 with the sight. The cause therefore of the intelligibles in the heaven is- without colour, but is exempt from tfiem ; fbr sensible colour is the offspri ng of the solar light. But Plato denominates the order which proxi- mately subsists after the celestial order, and which' we have called- the subcelestiat arch, figure. For the arch itself is the' name of a figure. And in short, in this order, Parmenides also places intellectual figure. But Plato first attributes contact to the summit of intellectuals, as is Froc. Vol. I. 2 1 250 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. evident from the conclusions of the Parmenides. For in the first hypo- thesis taking away figure from the one, he uses this as a medium, viz. that the one does not touch itself. " But the one" says he, " does not touch itself." And the conclusion is evident. Here therefore contact first subsists, and subsists according to cause. For of those things of which the deraiurgus is proximately the cause, the father who is prior to him is paradigmatically the cause. In this order therefore, contact is the paradigm of the liberated Gods. Hence these three orders are successive, viz. colour, figure, and contact. And fromt hese the super, celestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is without colour, without figure, and without contact. Nor does it transcend these three priva.- tively, but according to causal excellence. For it imparts to colour from intelligibles the participation of light ; on figure it confers by illu- mination intellectual bound ; and in contact it supernally inserts union and continuity, and perfects all things by its power, things which are touched indeed, through union, those that are figured, through the par- ticipation of bound, and those that are coloured, through the illumination of light. But it draws upward, and allures to itself every thing ineffably, and through intelligible impressions, and fills every thing with unieai goods. . If therefore, we assert these things rightly, we must not admit the interpretHtion of those who are busily occupied in sensible colours, and contacts, and figures, and who assert that the supercclestia) place is exempt from these. For these are trifling, and by no means adapted to that place. For even nature, not only that which exists as a whole* but that also which \& partial, is exempt from sensible colours, from apparent figures, and from corporeal contact. What therefore is there venerable in this, if it is also present to natures themselves? But it is necessary to extend colours, and figures, and contacts, from on high as far as to the last of things, and to evince that the supercclestial place, is similarly exempt from all these. For soul also and intellect participate of figure; and contact is frequently in incorporeal natures, according to the communion of first with secondary beings, and it is usual to call these communications contacts, and to denominate the touchings of Digitized by Google CHAP. XIII. OF PLATO. 251 intellectual perceptions adhesions. We should not therefore be carried from things first to things last, nor compare the highest order of intel- lectuals with the last of beings, above which both soul and nature are established. For in so doing we shall err, and shall not attend to Plato, who exclaims that it is boldness to assert these things concerning it. For where is the boldness, and what the unknown power transcending our conceptions, in contemplating the truth of sensible colours, figures, and contacts. For an hypostasis of this kind is known by physiologists, and not by the sons of theoiogists. Such therefore is the power possessed by the negations through which Plato celebrates the supercelestial place. CHAPTER XIII. Again then, let us in the next place survey the affirmations, how they exist according to the participation of the first intclligiblcs themselves. The supercelestial place therefore, is said to be essence which truly is, because it participates of that which is primarily being. For to be, and truly to be are present to all things, as the progeny of the intelligible essence. For as the one is from the first principle which is prior to intelligibles, so the nature of being is from intelligibles. For there the one being subsists, as Parmcnides a little before taught us. But the supercelestial place is beheld by the governor of the soul, because it is allotted an intelligible transcendency with respect to the other intel- lectual Gods. Hence the intelligible good of it is rendered manifest from its being known by intellect. This intelligible therefore, in the same manner as that which is truly being, arrives to it from the unical Gods. For they are primarily and impnrticipably intelligibles, and the first efficient causes of all intelligibles. These things also concur with each other, viz. that which is truly being, and the intelligible. For every 552 ON THE THEOLOGY . BOOK IV- intelligible is truly being, and every thing which is truly being is intelligible. For intellect is intelligible according to the being which is in it ; but according to its gnostic power it is intellect. Hence also every intellect is the supplier of knowledge ; but every intelligible is the supplier of essence. For that which each is primarily, it imparts by illumination to tbe secondary orders. CHAFfER XIV. In tbe third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be established about tbe superceleslial place. For these two things ascend to the contemplation of that essence, viz. intellect the governor of the soul (but this is a partial intellect established indeed above souls, and elevating them to their paternal port) and true science which is the perfection of the soul. This therefore energies about that place, as transitively revolving in harmonic measures about being. But intellect contemplates it, as employing simple intellection. Farther still, the science which is in us is one thing, but that which is in the supercelestial place another. And the former indeed is true, but the latter is truth itself. What therefore is it, and whence does it subsist ? It is indeed a deity which is the fountain of all intellectual knowledge, and the 6rst efficient cause of undented and stable intelligence.' But it shines forth in the first triad of intellectuals, because this is perfective of all other things and likewise of divine souls. For these ascending to this uniform power of all knowledge, perfect their own knowledge. For each of the undefined souls, says Socrates, revolving together with Jupiter and tbe heaven, surveys justice, temperance and science. Hence, these three fountains are there, being intelligible deities, and the fountains of the ' - « 1 For nM»{ it i* neewsary to read r*y«>i- Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 253 intellectual virtues, and not being, as some think they are, intellectual forms. For Plato is accustomed to characterize these by the term itself, as for instance science itself and justice itself; and this Socrates says somewhere in the Phaedo. But here when he says justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself, he appears to unfold 10 us certain self-perfect and intelligible deities, which have a triadic subsistence. And of these scienee indeed is the monad ; but temperance has the second order ; and justice the third. And science indeed is the supplier of undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence ; but temperance imparts to all the Gods the cause of conversion to themselves ; and justice imparts to them the cause of the distribution of the whole of good according to desert. Aud through science indeed, each of the Gods intellectually pcrceives the natures prior to himself, and is filled with intelligible intel- ligence ; ' but through temperance he is converted to himself, and enjoys a second union, and a good coordinate to the conversion to himself ; and through justice he rules over the natures posterior to himself, in a silent path, as they say, measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapted to each. These three fountains therefore contain all the energies of the Gods. And science indeed proceeds analogous to the first triad of intelligibles. And as that triad imparts essence to all things, so this illuminates the Gods with knowledge. But temperance proceeds analogous to the second triad of intelligibles. For temperance imitates the connective and measuring power of that triad ; since it measures the energies of the Gods, and converts each of them to itself. And justice proceeds analogous to the third triad of intelligibles. For it also separates secondary natures according to appropriate desert,* in the same manner as that triad separates them intelligibly by the first para- digms. • Here also it is requisite to adopt the same reading as before, p. 258. * Instead of xtera tv xyw)x»uc/t«i) is indeed nutriment, but in a divided manner. The plain however of truth is the expansion and manifestation of intelligible light, the evolution of inward reasons, and perfection pro- ceeding every where. This therefore* is the peculiarity of the third monad. But fecundity is the peculiarity of the second ; and intelligible plenitude of the first For all the supercelestial place is indeed illumi- nated with the light of truth. Hence all the natures that are contained in it are called true. And Socrates says, " that whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality shall be free from damage, till another period takes place." For every thing in that place is truly being and intelligible, and is full of divine union. In the first monads however [i. e. in the plain of truth and the meadow,] this intelligible light subsists contracted ly, and is occultly established as it were in the adyta ; but in the third monad [viz. in the nourishing cause of the Gods] it shines forth, and is co-expanded, and is co-divided with the multitude of" powers. We may therefore from these things survey the differences of the three monads, in a manner conformable to the Platonic hypotheses. But if indeed science pertains to the first monad, temperance to the second, and justice to the third, from these things also the triad will be perfectly apparent. And does not science* which is stable, and the uni- form intelligence of wholes, and which at the same time is consubsistent with intelligibles, pertain to the power which is united to the intelligible . father, and which does not proceed, nor separate its union from the deity of that father ? but does not the genus of justice pertain to the power which is divided, which separates the intellectual genera, leads the intelligible multitude into order, and imparts by illumination distribution according to desert ? And does not the genus of temperance pertain to the power which is the medium of both these, which is converted to itself, and possesses the common bond of this triad ? For the harmonic, • Pot turn* I read «rw>, * i. e. Perfection proceeding every where. Proc. Vol. I. 2 K <2.)8 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. and a communication with the extremes according to reason, are the illustrious good of this middle power. That we may not therefore be prolix, what has been said being suffi- cient to remind us of the meaning of Plato, those three deities are , celebrated by us, which dividing the supercelestial place, are indeed all of them intelligible as in intellectuals, and are likewise summits, and collective of all things into one intelligible union. One of these however is so stably; another generatively ; and another convertively, possessing a primary effective power in intellectuals. For one of them indeed, unites the monads of all the Gods and collects them about the intelli- gible ; but another effects this about the progressions of the Gods; and another about their conversions. All of them however at the same time collect into one the whole of an hyparxis which always abides, proceeds, and returns. Heuce also Plato elevates the Gods that are distributed in the world, to this one place, aud converts them energizing about this as collective of the whole orders of the Gods to the participation of intelli- gibles. These monads, therefore, educe intelligible forms, fill them with the participation of divine union, and again recall the natures that have proceeded, and conjoin them to intelligibles. Concerning this whole triad however, what has been said may suffice. CHAPTER XVII. It remains therefore, that we should pass to the discussion of Adrastia, Socrates indicating that she possesses her kingdom in this place. For that which defines the measures of a blameless life to souls from the vision of these intelligible goods, is certainly there allotted its first evolution into light. For the elevating cause, being secondary to the objects of desire, Digitized by Google CHAP. XVU. OF PLATO 359 may be able to raise both itself and other things to the superceleBtial place, through conversion. Bnt that which defines and measures the fruits of the vision of the intelligible to souls, since it has its hyparxis in the intelligible, imparts by illumination beatitude to them from thence. It is established therefore, as I have said, in that place. But it rules over all the divine laws uniformly, from on high, as far as to the last of things. - It likewise binds to the one sacred law of itself, all the sacred laws, viz. the intellectual, the supermundane, and the mundane. Whe- ther therefore, there are certain Saturnian laws, as Socrates in the Gorgies indicates there are, when he says, " The law therefore which was in the time of Saturn is now also among the Gods ;" or whether there are Jovian laws, as the Athenian guest asserts there are, when he says, " But justice follows Jupiter, which i3 the avenger of those that desert the divine law ;" or whether there are fatal laws, as Timaeus teaches there are, when he says, " That the demiurgus announced to souls the laws of fate ;" — of all these the sacred law of Adrastia is connective according to one intelligible simplicity, and at the same time imparts ex- istence to all of them, and the measures of power. And if it be requisite to relate my own opinion, the inevitable guardian power of this triad, and the immutable comprehension of order pervading every where, presubsist in this goddess. For these three deities not only unfold and collect ail things, but they are also guardians according to the Oracle of the works of the father, and of one intelligible intellect. This guardian power therefore, the sacred law of Adrastia indicates, which nothing is able to escape. For with respect to the laws of Fate, not only the Gods are superior to them, but also partial souls, when they live according to intellect, and give themselves up to the light of provi- dence. And the Saturnian Gods are essentially exempt from the Jovian laws, and the connective and perfective Gods from the Saturnian laws; but all things are obedient to the sacred law of Adrastia, and all the dis- tributions of the Gods, and all measures and guardianships subsist on account of this. By Orpheus also, she is said to guard the demiurgus of the universe, and receiving brazen drumsticks, and a drum made from the skin of a goat, to produce so loud a sound as to convert all the Gods to Digitized by Google 260 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV- herself. And Socrates imitating this fabulous sound which extends a certain proclamation ' to all things, in a similar manner produces the sa- cred law of Adrastia to all souls. For he says, " This is the sacred law of Adrastia, that whatever soul has perceived any thing of truth, shall be free from harm till another period," all but expressing the Orphic sound through this proclamation, and uttering this as a certain hymn of Adras- tia. For in the first place indeed, he calls it flw/*^, a sacred law, and not Mpo;, a law, as he does the Saturnian and Jovian laws. For fa-p* is con- nected with deity, and pertains more to intelligibles [than to the intellec- tuals] ; but ycfiof indicating intellectual distribution, is adapted to the in- tellectual fathers. And in the second place, he speaks of it in the singular and not in the plural number, as Timaeus does of the fatal laws. In the third place therefore, he extends it to all the genera of souls, and evinces that it is the common measure of their happy and blessed life, and the true guard of those souls that are able to abide on high free from all passivity. For such is the meaning of the words, ** And the soul that is able to do this always, shall always be free from harm." This sacred law therefore, comprehends all the undeBled life of divine souls, and the tem- poral blessedness of partial souls. And it guards the former indeed in- telligibly, but measures the latter by the vision of intelligible goods. And thus much concerning Adrastia. CHAPTER XVIII. With respect to what remains therefore, we shall summarily say, that the supercelestial place is the first triad of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, possessing three peculiarities, the unfolding into ■ Far xvvyp«n, it U requiutc to read x^uyfMi u. CHAP. XIX. OF PLATO. 261 light, the collective, and the defensive. It likewise comprehends all these intelligibly, and in an unknown manner, conjoining indeed intellectuals to intelligibles, but calling forth the prolific powers of intelligible*, re- ceiving in itself the plenitude of forms from the intelligible paradigms, and producing its own meadow from the fontal summit which is there. But from the one intellect it gives subsistence to the three virtues, perfects all itself by intelligible impressions, and in its ineffable bosomB receives the whole of intelligible light. At one and the same time also it abides in the occult nature of the intelligible Gods, and proceeds intelligibly from thence, shines forth to the view of intellectuals, and converts and draws upward by ineffable powers all the images of its proper union which it has disseminated in every thing. To this place likewise it is necessary that we should mystically approach, leaving in the earth all the generation- producing life, and the corporeal nature, with which on coming hither we were surrounded as with a wall, but exciting alone the summit of the soul to the participation of total truth, and the plenitude of intelligible nutri- ment. CHAPTER XIX. After this intelligible and unknown triad however, which presides over all the intellectual ' genera, let us survey the triad which connectedly contains the bond of them, intelligibly and at the same time intellectually. For it is necessary that prior to intellect and the intellectual Gods, the - cause of connectedly containing should be in these Gods ; and that this being established in the middle of the intelligible and intellectual order, should extend to all the divine multitudes, all the genera of beings, and ' For it ia necessary to read n,f>«». 262 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. all the divisions of the world. For what is it which primarily connects tilings ? If, as some say, the nature of spirit and local motion, body it- self which is connective of other things will require connexion. For every body according to its own composition is dissipable and divisible ; which also the Elean guest indicating to those who make corporeal principles, says that the essence which is so much celebrated by them, is broken and dissipated. Body therefore, is not naturally adapted to be connective of other things, nor even if a power of this kind pertained to bodies, would spirit be able to afford us this power, because it is always defluous and dissipated, and diffusing itself beyond that which bounds is wanting in the original, and I have therefore supplied it in the translation. Digitized by Google 286 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. of the odd asmber, but things tliai are less excellent and more various, to the aalure of the eve* number. For every where indeed,, the odd number is the leader ot impartible, simple, and unheal goods; bnt the even num- ber is the cause of divided, various, and generative progressions. And thus we may see all the orders of beings woven together according to di- vine number which is moat ancient, intellectual, and exempt irorn all the dinumerated genera. For it is necessary that number should exist prior to the things that are numbered, and that prior to things which are separated there should be the cause of all separation, according to which the genera of the Gods are divided, and arc distinguished in an orderly manner by appropriate numbers. If therefore in intellectuals there are divisions, contacts, and separa- tions of the proceeding natures, and likewise communications of coordi- nate natures, it is necessary that number should be prior to intellectuals, which divides and. collects all things intelligibly by the powers of itself. And if all things subsist occultly, intelligibly, in an unknown manner and exeraptly in this summit, ' there is a number of them* and a peculiarity unical and without separation. Number therefore subsists according to the middle bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, being indeed expanded above intellectuals through; intelligible goods but subordinate to intelligi- bles through intellectual separations. And it is assimilated indeed to intelligibles according to the power which is collective of many things into union, but to intellectuals according to the power which is generative of the many from the otic. But from this highest place of survey of the intellectual Gods, it constitutes the first intellectual numbers themselves which have, the nature of forms, arc universal, and preside over the whole of generation and production. It likewise constitutes the second num- bers, which are supermundane, and vivific, and measure the Gods that ure in the world. But it constitutes as the third numbers, these celestial governors of the perpetual circulations, and who convolve all the orbs according to the intellectual causes of them. And it constitutes as the last numbers those powers that in the sublunary region connect and ■ It is requisite to supply ia this place n tj eing, of essential numbers. Since however, from this deity which is intelligible, that which is posterior to it proceeds, it is evidently necessary that the monad, duad, and triad, should severally have prolific power. These powers therefore; Parmenides calls once, twice, thrice. For each of these is a power which is the cause of the above-mentioned essences that produce either separately, or connectedly. For there with respect to the generations of them, some of them are entirely peculiar, but others are common to secondary natures. The progeny therefore of these are, the oddly-odd, the evenly-even and the evenly-odd.' And of these, the oddly-odd indeed, as we have before observed, is collective into union of the divine progressions. But the evenly-even is generative of wholes, and proceeds as for as to the last of things. The evenly-odd however, is mixed, having its subsistence from both the even and the odd. Hence we must establish the first as analogous to bound, but the second as analogous to power, and the third as analogous to being. And you may see, how indeed in the first order all things had a primary subsistence, viz. monad, duad, triad; but how in this order, all things arc secondarily and subordi- nate^. And the mixture which is the triad, subsisted there indeed in one way, but here the evenly-odd subsists in another way. For there the extremes were odd, because they were intelligible; but here the even is more abundant, and the intelligible summit only is odd. For the middle of the triad is analogous to power. And there indeed, is the monad, which has all the forms of odd numbers according to cause, and the duad is there, which is occultly all the forms of even numbers, and also the triad, which is number primarily. But here both the odd and the even number now subsist in a twofold respect, in one place ir* « t» «{rMff|irra is omitted in the original. I CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 293 an unmingled, and in another in a mingled manner. All tilings there- fore, are here prolifically, but there, paternally and intelligibly. But that monad docs not proceed from intelligiblcs, but subsists in them in unprocceding union. Hence, after these, and from these, we may survey the whole of number subsisting according to a third progression. "For these things," says Parmenides, " preexisting, no number will be absent." Every number therefore, is generated through these in the third monad, and both the one and being become many, difference separating each of them. And every part indeed of being participates of the one; but every unity is carried as in a vehicle in a certain portion of being. Each of these however, is multiplied, intellectually separated, divided into minute parts, and proceeds to infinity. For as in intelligibles, we attribute infinite multitude to the third triad, so here, in this triad we assign infinite number to the third part of the triad. For in short every where, the infinite is the extremity, as proceeding in an all-perfect manner, and comprehending indeed all secondary natures, but being itself participated by none of them. In the first monad therefore, there were powers, but intelligibly. In the second, there were progressions and generations, but both intelligibly and intellectually. And in the third, there was all-powerful number, unfolding the whole of itself into light; and which also Parmenides denominates infinite. It is likewise especially manifest that it is not proper to transfer this infinity to quantity. For how can there be an infinite number, since infinity is hostile to the nature of number? And how are the parts of the one equal to the minute parts of being? For in infinites there is not the equal. But this indeed has been thought worthy of attention by those who were prior to us* * Digitized by Google 294 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. CHAPTER XXXII. The division therefore into three, having been demonstrated by us, we shall briefly observe, that the one appears to be many according to this order, the one itself proceeding into a multitude of unities, and being in a similar manner becoming generated in conjunction with the one. For those three monads are the intelligible comprehensions of all orders, and they at once preside over all the progressions from intelligibles, produce all of them in an exempt manner, and collect them to the intelligible causes. Since however, Plotinus admits that number is prior to animal itself, and says that the first being produces from itself number, and that this is established as a medium between the one being, and animal itself, but is the basis and place of beings, it is worth while to speak likewise concisely about this. For if he says that animal itself has intelligible and occult number, as comprehended in the monad, he speaks rightly, and accords with Plato. But if he says that animal itself comprehends number, now separated, or which has a multiform subsistence, and is the progeny of difference, intelligible multitude is not a thing of this kind. For there indeed, the one. is being, and being is the one. Hence animal itself is according to all things perfect. But in number, the one is separated from being, and being from the one, and each of the parts is no longer an intelligible whole, as an animal itself. For that is a whole of wholes; and every where the one was with being in the parts of it, and animal itself was only-begotten. But number proceeded after the two- fold coordinations, I mean the monad and duad, the odd and the even number. How therefore, can we place in animal itself the first number? If however, some one should say that number exists there, it i8 according to cause and intelligibly. But it is intellectually separated by diflerence. And farther still, in addition to these things, if animal itself is surveyed by some one in the demiurgic order, and he denominates it the plenitude Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXII. OF PLATO. of forms, and the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, it will thus have intellectual number, as being arranged near the intellectual end. But if he should call intelligible animal number, in this case there will be separation and difference in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be established above the whole of things, according to supreme union. For all section and division originate from the intellectual Gods; since here difference proceeds, adorning things in conjunction with the one and being. How therefore, does the division of the unities into minute parts, or the multiform nature of beings pertain to intelligibles? And how can the multitude of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the tetrad was there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind being adapted to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the one being is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is con- joined with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triad. Since however, it comprehends in itself the cause of all number, Timoeus denominates it the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four first- effective causes. For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the production of forms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triad subsist unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner. Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with sepa- ration. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the peculiar form of the natures that exist prior to them.' Hence, the first multitudes proceed indeed from the one, but they are unical, without separation, and without number, imitating the one principle of the whole of things. Very properly therefore, does Parmenitles constitute multitude in intelli- gibles, according to the end [of the intelligible order]; but number in intellectuals accordiug to the beginning [of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.] And these are conjoined with each other. Parmcnidcs also pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the cause of intellectual numbers. And Timneus shows that animal itself is only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of • Instead of «««- <£i«r w /w{fi|», it is necessary to read ■xxrrxxw yttf ra wjgutjff ir. Digitized by Google 296 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, wc have abundant!/ shown. CHAPTER XXXIII. But Parmenides begins to speak about it as follows: " Proceed therefore, and still farther consider this. What? We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account the one being appears to be many." But he completes his discourse about the first monad thus : ** Are not three things odd, and two even ? How should they not ?' And about the second monad, as follows : " Hence there will be the evenly-even, and .the oddly-odd, and the oddly-even, and the evenly-odd." But he .completes his discourse about the third and all the succeeding triad, as follows : " The one being therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that the one which is distributed by being should be many. Entirely so." The first triad, therefore, of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, is through these things unfolded to us by Plato, and which possesses indeed, according to the first monad the first powers of numbers, I mean the odd and the even, and is completed through these principles which were in intelligibies occultly, viz. monad, duad, triad. But according to the second monad it possesses the second powers of numbers which subsist from these [i. e. from the first powers]. For the section of the forms of the even number, is allotted a second order. And the oddly-odd is subordinate to the first odd numbers. But according to the third monad, it possesses the more partial causes of divine numbers. Hence also, a separation into minute parts, infinity, CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 297 all-perfect division, and unical and essential number are here ; receiving indeed, the unical and the essential from unity and being, but the sepa- ration of number from difference. For every where difference is in the three monads, but it particularly unfolds the multitudes of numbers, according to the third monad, generates more partial Gods, and divides being in conjunction with the Gods. For neither is deity in these imparticipable, because unity is not separate from being, nor is essence destitute of deity, because neither is being deprived of the one. Since however, all things are in each of the monads, but unically and intelligibly in the first, generative!}', and according to the peculiarity of difference in the second, and intellectually, and according to being in the third ;— this being the case, Plato when unfolding to us the first monad, very properly begins from the monad, and proceeds as far as to the triad; but when teaching about the second, he begins from evenly-even num- bers, and proceeds as far as to those that are evenly-odd, both which belong to the nature of the even number. Aud when he adds the third monad, he begins from being, and recurs through difference to the one* For having shown that being participates of number, he from hence leads us round to unical number, employing the mode of conversion in the conception of this monad. CHAPTER XXXIV. If, however, it be requisite to survey the unknown peculiarity of divine numbers, and how the first order of intelligibles and intellectuals, and number which subsists according to this order, is the most ancient of all numbers, in the first place, we should consider the infinity mentioned by Parmenides, and see whether he does not say that intelligible multitude is infinite on account of this number, in consequence of its being unknown Proc. Vol. I. 2 P Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. and incomprehensible by partial conceptions. For the all-perfect, and all-powerful peculiarity of divine numbers is exempt from the compre- hension of partible natures, [such as ours]. They are therefore unknown, and on this account are said to be inexplicable, and not to be investigated. For number also in the last of things, and multitude, together with the known have likewise the unknown. And we are notable to comprehend the progression of every number iu consequence of being vanquished by infinity. The incomprehensibility therefore, of this power which is un- known according to a discursive energy, is comprehended according to cause, in intelligible numbers and multitudes. For there would not be a thing of this kind in the last of numbers, unless the unknown preexisted in intelligible numbers, and unless the former were ultimate imitations of the exempt incomprehensibility of the latter. In the second place, after this, we may also add, that unical numbers are likewise of themselves unknown. For they are more ancient than beings, more single than forms, and being generative of, exist prior to the forms which we call intelligible. But the most venerable of divine ope- rations manifest this, since they employ numbers, as possessing an ineffa- ble efficacy, and through these effect the greatest, and most arcane of works. And prior to these nature ineffably, according to sympathy, im- parts different powers to different ' things, to some solar, but to others lunar powers, and renders the productions of these concordant with* numbers. For in these monadic numbers also, the forms of numbers,, such as the triad, the pentad, and the heptad, are one thing, but the unions of the forms another thing. For each of these forms is both one,, and multitude. Hence form is unknown according to the highest union. If therefore, monadic number participates of a certain unknown power, much more must the first number possess this peculiarity unically exempt from the whole of things. And besides this, we may also assume the anagogic power of numbers, not only because they define the periods of the physical restitutions, circumscribing our indefinite lation by appropriate measures, perfecting us according to these measures, and conjoining us. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 299 to our first causes, but because likewise, number in a remarkable manner possesses a certain power of attracting to truth, as Socrates says in the Republic, leading us to intelligibles from a sensible nature. ' As there* fore, the last number is allotted this peculiarity, what ought we to say about the first number? Is it not this, that it unfolds intelligible light, especially persuades to an establishment in intelligibles, and through its own order announces to us the uniform power of principles? If there- fore, we rightly assert these things, we shall in a greater degree admire Timaeus, who having placed time over the perfections of souls, and the whole world, through which it would become move similar to animal itself says, that time proceeds according to number, and by number mea- sures the existence of total souls. And as in intellectuals, number is established above the celestial circulation, collecting and causing it to be one, thus also in sensibles Timaeus says, that time being number measures the celestial periods, and comprehends in itself the first causes of the per- fection of the periods. If also, Socrates in the Republic, in the speech of the Muses, speaks about the one and entire period of the universe, which he says a perfect number comprehends, does it not through these things appear that divine number is perfective of wholes, and restores them to their pristine state, and that it measures all periods? The power likewise of collecting things imperfect to the perfect, accedes to all things from number, which elevates souls from things apparent to those that are un* apparent, illuminates the whole world with the perfection of motion, and defines to all things measures, and the order of periods. But if not only a perfect number contains the period of a divine generated 1 nature, but another second number after this is the lord of better and worse genera- tions, as the same Socrates says, number will not only restore things to their pristine state, but will also be of a generative nature. And it is evident that these things subsist in a divided manner, according to the second and third periods of numbers; but at once, and contractedly inthefirstof ' Instead of *w*yw> ^t «T« tuj* v^tw on ri|v *i»*ifti)f fun*, it U necetaary to read ira*/»» rti To)* voijtx* **a ttj; ai«4qn|{ $ui. " Eyery perpetually circulating body is called by Plato, a divine generated nature. Digitized by Google 30Q ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. numbers, The first number therefore, is generative, mensurative, and perfective of generated natures. CHAPTER XXXV. The first order therefore of mtelligiblcs and intellectuals is thus sur- veyed by Parmenides. But after this the order which possesses the middle place of intelligibles and intellectuals, and which a little before wc called connective, presents itself to the view. It is however denominated in a three-fold respect, viz. one, many, whole, parts, finite, infinite. For since the separation of unities and beings from number, extends to it, the one and being, which we have said difference divides, become wholes. But the thing* proceeding from these, are the parts of these. And wholeness indeed connectedly contains parts, but these are contained by their wholeness, in one way indeed, by the one, but in another by being. For there indeed, I mean in the summit of the intellectual Gods, unity was the cause of multitude, at the same time being exempt from multi- tude, and generative of the many. But here unity is coarranged with multitude. Hence also it is a whole which has reference to many unities as to parts. Since however, the connective order is triple, one division of it being intelligible, another intelligible and intellectual, and anotheF intellectual, the first monad indeed subsists according to the one and the many ; but the second, according to whole and parts ; and the third, ac- cording to the finite and the infinite. For where the first triad ends, there the second has its beginning. Hence, in the triad prior to this> Parmenides infers that the one is many. And in this triad, he concludes the same thing together with what remains. There however, the one was generative of infinites; but here the one is comprehensive of many, the whole of parts, and the finite of infinites. Hence, there indeed, unity is Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXV. OF PLATO. 301 exempt from the many ; but here it is coarranged with multitude. Hence also, the first coarrangement generates whole together with parts; but the subsistence of whole and parts produces the finite and at the same time infinite. For these are successive to each other, viz. the one, the whole, the finite, and the things which are as it were in an opposite arrangement to these, the many, parts, infinites. And the one itself is indeed the prin- ciple of the rest. But whole has now a habitude Avith respect to parts, and a representation of the duad, and proceeds into a coarrangement with reference to the parts. The finite however, is now multitude, participating of bound and the one, and is as it were a triad. For it is neither bound alone, as the monad, nor infinite alone, as the duad, but it participates of bound, which is primarily a triad. Every thing finite therefore, is a whole, but not every whole is finite. For the infinite is a whole, whether it is multitude, or magnitude. And every whole indeed, is one, but not every one is a whole. For that which is without habitude to multitude is not a whole. The one therefore, is beyond whole ; but whole is beyond the finite. After the same manner also, infinite parts are said to be the parts of that which is finite. For the infinite of itself has no subsistence; by which also it is evident that the infinite is not in quantity in energy,' but in capacity. All parts however are not infinite. For according to bound they are characterized by one of the parts. And again, parts indeed are many, but the many are not entirely parts. The niauy therefore, arc prior to parts : and parts are prior to infinites. Hence, as the many are to the one, so are parts to whole, and so are infinites to the finite. And these three connectedly-containing monads, give completion to the middle order of inlelligibles and intellectuals. For unity indeed, is the supplier of stable and intelligible connection to all the secondary orders. But wholeness connects the progressions of divine natures, and produces one habitude of the orderly distribution of wholes. And the finite monad imparts by illumination to the conversions of second natures, connection with the natures prior to them. And one of these iudced is analogous* ' iv Tfl mfytix is omitted is the original- Digitized by Google 302 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. to the one being, on which account also it is intelligible. But another is analogous to the third order, in which there wns the one, and the duad which generates inBnite multitude. Such is the connective triad, which Parmenidcs exhibits to us through these things. The one therefore, is one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite multitude. Let no one however, be disturbed that Plato calls the one or being infinite mul- titude. For he calls the one and being when they have proceeded and are divided, infinite in multitude. For all multitude indeed, is referred to the intelligible infinity. But divided multitude, and which has pro- ceeded perfectly, is most signally infinite. Since therefore, all the primary causes of intellectuals are in this triad, and all things are disseminated in its bosoms, the first Synocheus indeed, comprehends these causes as multitude, being himself an intelligible unity, and the flower as it were of the triad. But the second comprehends indeed secondarily these causes, but co-arranged and co-multiplied with them. And the third, together with all-perfect division, connects the multitude, comprehended in himself. Each of them also is connective, but one as bounding, another as giving completion to a whole, and ano- ther as uniting. Plato therefore made, and makes as he proceeds his demonstrations of the one. For the whole theory is concerning the one. But it is evident that being is co-divided with the one. For universally, it has been before observed, that every deity proceeding thence is parti- cipate, und that every portion of being participates of deity. It is ne- cessary however, not to stop in the one alone, but to consider the same peculiarity * as imparted to being in a secondary degree, since Plato also produces the one itself ' by itself according to the differences of the divine orders ; which occasions me to wonder at those who think that all the conclusions of the second hypothesis are concerning intellect, and do not perceive that Plato omitting being surveys the one itself by itself, as pro- ceeding and generated, and receiving different peculiarities. For how in discoursing concerning intellect could he omit being, according to which intellect has its subsistence, power, and energy. For the one is beyond ' For M&i«ngr*c, h is necessary tofead iSionjTo;. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXVI. OF PLATO. 303 the nature of intellect; but being gives hyparxis to intellect, and intellect is nothing else than being. This opinion however of these men may be confuted by many other arguments. But if the three connective Gods are divided after the above-mentioned manner, and the intelligible con- nective deity is one many, but the intelligible and at the same time intel- lectual deity is whole and parts, and the intellectual is finite and infinite, each of them is very properly called much. For each of the Synoches according to his own peculiarity is a multitude. For the first about the many, receives many Synoches of a more partial nature. The second receives these according to parts. And the third, according to infinites. If therefore, there are certain partial Gods who are allotted this peculia- rity, they are comprehended in this first triad. CHAPTER XXXVI. Mo r bo v En, it is easy for every one to sec how these things accord with what is written in the Phaedrus. For the connective one accords with the back of the heaven that comprehends these. For the one and the back are the same, comprehending according to one simplicity the whole circulation. But whole is the same with the profundity of the heaven, and with as it were the bulk of it. For the celestial profundity is a whole extended from the back as far as to the arch. And end is the same with the arch. This therefore, is evident beyond every thing, and each of the other conclusions, is to be referred to the same concep- tions. Hence from what has been said, it may be collected, that these three things pertain in a remarkable degree to the Synoches, viz. theoney whole, and the end [or the finite]. For what is so able to connect multi- tude as the one which is co-arranged with it ? What is so connectedly- compreheusive of parts as whole ? And how is it possible that the end Digitized by Google 304 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. {or bound,] should not be the cause of binding together things which arc borne along to in6nity. It terminates therefore, their progression, and brings back their dispersed section to the one essence of connection. And thus much concerning the connective triad. CHATTER XXXVII. But the third, as they say, to the saviour, and let us also following Plato in what remains celebrate the perfective order of the Gods. Because, therefore, the end of the connective order was the finite, [or the bounded] the perfective order has extremes. For the end [or bound] is the extremity. There however indeed the one was said to be the finite, but here it is said to have an extremity, as receiving according to participation that which has the power of terminating many things. And there indeed, the one was end or bound, which also connectedly contains the infinite ; but here having an extremity, it will also have a middle and beginning, and will be perfect. For that which receives its com- pletion from all these, is perfect. Here, therefore, the perfection which consists of parts is apparent. For the consummation of the parts, produces the perfect. Moreover, because such a one as this has a middle and extremes, it will have the figure of a circumference, or it will be rectilinear, or it will be mixed (jfroui the right and circular line]. For all these require a middle and extremes ; some indeed with sim- plicity, but others with connexion. Three peculiarities, therefore, again present themselves to our view ; the first, indeed, being that which we said was to have extremes ; the second, being according to the perfect ; and the third, according to figure. And there are also three perfective Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXVIII. OF PLATO. 305 leaders of wholes ; one indeed being intelligible ; another, intelligible and intellectual ; and the third, intellectual. The intelligible leader, therefore, is said to have extremes, as being directly arranged under the end of the connective Gods, and in the boundaries of himself intelligibly comprehending all the intellectual orders. But the intelligible and intellectual leader, is defined according to the perfect, comprehending in himself the beginnings, middles, and ends of beings, and giving completion to the middle bond of the whole perfective triad. And the intellectual leader proceeds according to triadic figure, being the cause of bound and divine perfection ; and imparting termination to things indefinite, but intellectual perfection to things imperfect. And this triad indeed is produced according to the connective triad. For the end in them is the cause of the possession of the extremity. But it is also produced from itself. For that which has extremes, having become a whole, constitutes the perfect through end [or bound]. But the perfect comprehending beginnings, middles and ends, unfolds figure. And thus the perfective triad proceeds supernally, as far as to the last of things, pervading to all things, and perfecting both whole and partial causes. CHAPTER XXXVIII. And do you not see how each of the triads conjoins the summit of itself with the ends placed above it? For the one many was the end of the collective and unknown triad ; and the same is the beginning of the connective triad. The end of the connective triad was the finite; and this again is the beginning of the perfective triad. For to have extremes manifests that which consists of ends or bounds. And thus the whole Proc. Vol. I. 2 Q Digitized by Google 3(H) ON TlllS THEOLOGY BOOK IV. middle order is connected with and united to itself, and is truly the bond of total orders, itself establishing an admirable communion with itself; but conjoining intellectuals to intelligibles, and convolving them to one impartible union ; above indeed, having the intelligible and unknown triad, but in the middle producing the triad which is connective of progressions, and at the end, the convertive empire, through which it proximately converts the intellectual to the intelligible Gods. For on what account does intellect look to itself, and is in itself? Is it not because it is on all sides finite or bounded, converges to itself, and convolves its appropriate energies about itself? But why is it perfect,, and full of intellectual goods ? Is it not because it first participates of the perfection [of the above mentioned] leaders, and subsists according to them, possessing a self-perfect essence and intellectual perception? After what manner likewise, is it Baid to be a sphere, both by Plato, and other theologiste? Is it not because it is the first participant of figure, and is intellectually figured according to it? All conversion, therefore, all perfection, and every intellectual figure, accede to the intellectual Gods, from the perfective triad. For the intelligible leader of perfection, gives perfection to the ends and summits and hyparxes of" wholes. But the intelligible and intellectual leader terminates their progressions which extend from on high as far as to the last of things. And the intellectual leader comprehends in his own perfection, the conversions of all the Gods, and bounds and perfects through figures their progressions to infinity. CHAPTER XXXIX. Looking therefore to this division, we may be able to survey causally many things which are to be found among other theologiste. For why Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. 307 is one of the deities of tbe unknown triad carried in the first of the worlds, but another in the middle breadth, and another in the extremity ? It is because the first of these was uniform, but the second proceeded according to difference, and the third, according to the infinite number of beings. But why of the three connective Gods, is the first empyrean, the second etheria], and the third material ? It is because the first indeed subsists according to the one, and connectedly contains the one world. But the second subsists according to whole, and divides the etherial world. And the third according to the finite, and rules over material infinity. But why again, are the Teletarchs co-divided with the Synoches? Because the first having extremes governs like a charioteer the wing of fire. But the middle comprehending beginnings, ends and middles, perfects ether, which is also itself triple. And the third, which comprehends according to one union, the orbicular, the rectilinear, and the mixed* figure, perfects unfigured and fbrmlcM matter; giving form indeed (/^wp«(r«f) to the inerratic sphere, and the first matter, by the orbicular ; but to the planetary sphere, and the second matter, by the mixed figure. For the spiral is there. And it gives form to the sublunary region, and the last matter by the rectilinear. For the motions according to a right line are in this region. Hence, the first triad is uniformly the cause of the division of the worlds. But the second has a more abundant representation of section, and of progression into parts ; yet does not exhibit to us tbe multitude of the worlds. And the third unfolds the seven worlds, and the monad together with two triads. So great is the divine conception of Plato, that from these things we may survey the causes of what after his time became apparent. For this, indeed, from what has been said appears to be very admir- able* that according to each of the triads, the middle is characteristic of the whole triad. Thus for instance, in the unknown triad, difference is established as the middle between the one and being. But in the connective triad whole is the characteristic, which is the middle of the one, and the finite. And in the perfective triad, the perfect is the ' r* ftixror is omitted in the origitut. Digitized by Google 308 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV. characteristic, which is itself established as the middle of that which has extremes, and of figure. For difference is the feminine itself, and the prolific nature of the Gods. And whole is itself the form of connected comprehension, binding together many parts. And the perfect is itself the good of perfection, possessing a beginning, middle, and end, and conjoining the end to the beginning, according to the peculiarity of conversion. Being also nothing else than a perfect governor it is the cause of the peculiarity of these Gods subsisting every where according to the middle centres. Hence the whole order of the intelligible, and at the same lime, intellectual Gods, may be surveyed as having its subsistence in the middle. For the intelligible Gods, indeed, are especially defined according to hyparxes and summits ; on which account also, they are called fathers, and unical Gods. For the one and father are in them the same. But the intellectual Gods are defined according to ends or extremities ; and on this account, all of them are denominated intellects and intellectual. The intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, however, being middles, especially present themseLves to the view according to the middles of the triads. Farther still, this also may be considered in common about all these triads, that each according to the end proceeds to infinity. For the end of the first triad is number ; of the second, the infinite in multitude; and of the third, the rectilinear, which itself participates of the nature of the infinite. And of this the cause is, that each of the triads according to its extremity is curried as in a vehicle in the material worlds, and comprehends according to one cause the infinity of the natures that are generated in them. In addition, likewise, to what has been said, we may survey the order of the triads, from the ends that are in them. For the end of the first triad, is number : but of the second, the finite and the infinite; and of the third, the orbicular, the mixed figure, and the rectilinear. It is evident, therefore, that the first triad is monadic ; but the second dyadic; and the third triadic. And the first of these indeed is analogous to the one being ; but the second to the intelligible whole; and the third, to the all-perfect whole. But that these have this order with respect to each other, has been before pbserved. In short, there- Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. fore, every intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triad, is according to its summit indeed conjoined to the intelligible ; but according to its middle, unfolds its proper power; and according to its termination, comprehends the infinity of secondary natures. And here we shall end the doctrine concerning the intelligible and intellectual Gods. S10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. BOOK V. CHAPTER I. In the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but termi- nating the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to their principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient and all- perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us to the imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders and diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration of Plato. This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an illustrious empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion all the partial progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated indeed intellectual, because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged Digitized by Google CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 311 with intellect, nor as with those which are alone divided from intellect by the conception of the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all multitudes, and occultly containing the evolutions of the Cods into light, and the hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of divine natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression* [of the Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and * firmly established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and' through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes. The intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior to them,, receiving indeed unions from the one that is prior to intelligibles; but essences from intelligibles; and being allotted lives all-perfect, connective and generative of divine natures, from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods; but the intellectual peculiarity from themselves. They likewise convert to themselves all the divided orders, but establish themselves in intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and unknown knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they, are all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through sub- sisting from themselves, and being neither diminished by their progres- sion, nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through their own. never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes, and leaders of all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny, nor do they depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once, and according to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders, and convolve them, to the intelligible, and to occult good. "Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think that it is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that was impartici* pable, but this is participated. And that indeed, was generative, but this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these differ from each other. For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things ' For nfMiov it it necessary to read »foeio«. * After km it is necessary to supply m ftn nwrtu km. • 312 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. unfiguted, bound to things indefinite, and perfection to tilings imperfect. Or whether I may denominate the cause in intellectuals intelligible, it must not immediately be conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of which we have before spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior to intellectuals, itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not being denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting uniformly uncoordinated with it. The intelligible however which is now the subject of consideration, is participated, and co-arranged with intellect, is multiform, and contains in itself the divided causes of all things. Or whether we may call the Gods in this order fathers and fabricators, it must be admitted that this paternal and fabricative characteristic, is different from the hyparxis of the intelligible' fathers. For they indeed were generative of whole essences; but these pre-exist as the causes of divisible emanations, and of definite productions of form. And they indeed contained in themselves powers fabricative of the divine progressions; but these separate from themselves prolific causes, and are not conjoined to them according to union, but according to a commu- nion subordinate to union. For the marriages which arc celebrated by fables, and the concordant conjunction of divine natures, arc in the intellectual Gods. But the demiurgic being mingled with the vivific effluxions, every genus of the Gods is unfolded into light, both the supermundane, and the mundane. This, however, will be hereafter ■discussed. i ' For ntiw, it is necemrr to read »«^t«*. Digitized by Google CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 31S CHAPTER II. Since however, we have, in short, surveyed the peculiarity of the intellectual Gods, it remains that we should deliver an appropriate theory concerning the division of them. For the intellectual order is not one and indivisible, but is allotted progressions more various than those of the more elevated genera. There will therefore be here also three fathers, who divide the whole intellectual essence; one indeed, being arranged according to the intelligible, but another according to life, and another according to intellect. They also imitate the intelligible fathers, who divide the intelligible breadth in a threefold manner, and who are allotted a difference of this kind with respect to each other. For one of these intellectual fathers proceeds analogous to the first [intelligible] father, and is intelligible. But another proceeds analogous to the second [intelligible] father, and binds to himself the whole of intellectual life. And another proceeds analogous to the third father, and closes the whole intellectual, in the same manner as he closes the intelligible order. ' But these fathers being three, and the first indeed, abiding in himself, but the sccoud proceeding and vivifying all things, and the third glit- tering with fabricative productions, it is evidently necessary, that other triple Gods should be conjoined with them; of which, one indeed will be the source to the first intellectual God, of stable purity ; but another, of undefiled progression, to the second God; and another of exempt fabrication, to the third. For in the Gods prior to these, the un defiled deities were according to cause, through union without separation, and a sameness collective of powers which are not in want of the communion of these. But in the intellectual Gods, where there is an all-perfect Proc. Vol. I. 2 R 314 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. separation, as in total orders, and a greater habitude to secondary natures, unpolluted deity or power is necessary, which has the ratio of sameness, and undeviating subsistence, to the paternal cause, and which is co-divided with the fathers, so that each of the undefiled Gods is conjoined with a peculiar father. These two triads therefore have presented themselves to our view, one indeed, of the intellectual fathers, but the other of the undefiled Gods. There is however, besides these two, a third other triadic monad, which is the cause of separation to intellectuals, and which subsists together with the above mentioned triads. For the fathers indeed are the suppliers of all essence; but the inflexible Gods, of sameness. But it is evidently fit that there should be also the cause of separation, and that this should be one and at the same time triple, separating the intellectual Gods from the above mentioned orders, from themselves, and from inferior natures. For why are they the leaders of another order, if they are not divided from the first orders? Why are they multiplied, and why do they differ from each other in their kingdoms, unless they are separated? Why also do they transcend the partial [Gods] unless they are also separated from these? The cause of separation therefore, will be for us one and a triple monad. But the paternal and undefiled causes will be each of them a uniform triad. And what is most paradoxical of all, the separative cause is more monadic; but the paternal and also the undefiled cause, are each of them more triadic. For the separative monad indeed, is the cause of separation to the other monads; but the others are the sources of communion and union to it Hence each of these, being separated, becomes triadic; but the separative monad is monadic, in consequence of being united by these. For all intellectuals pervade through each other, and are in each other, according to a certain admirable communion, imitating the union of intelligibles, through being present and mingled with each other. The sphere also which is there, is the intellectual order, energizing in and about itself, and proceeding into itself hebdomatically, being a monad and a hebdomad, the image, if it be lawful so to speak, of the all-perfect intelligible monad, and unfolding Digitized by Google CHAP. IL OF PLATO. 315 its occult union, through progression and separation. This first pro- gression therefore of the intellectual Gods, which is separated by us into a heptad, we have perfectly celebrated. Other secondary seven hebdomads, however, are to be considered under this, which produce as' far as to the last of things, the monads of this heptad. For each monad is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad conjoined with it, and extends this hebdomad from on high, from the summit of Olympus, as far as to the last, and terrestrial orders. I say, for instance, the first paternal monad, indeed, constitutes seven such monads. But the second again constitutes seven vivific monads. And the third, seven demiurgic monads. Each likewise of the un defiled monads constitutes a number equal to that produced by the fathers. And the monad of separation constitutes seven [separative monads]. For all these causes proceed in conjunction with each other. And aa the first triad of the fathers subsists together with the uudefiled triad,, and the divisive monad, after the same manner also, the second triads are allotted seven coordinate undefiled triads, and separative monads* Whence, therefore, does so great a number of intellectual Gods present itself to our view ? It is evident, indeed, from what has been said. For the first hebdomad, indeed, the cause of the second hebdomads, and which has the relation of a monad to them, and which u little before wc denominated an intellectual sphere, subsists according to the intelligible breadth, imitating the paternal nature of it through the paternal triad ; but the eternity of its power, through undefiled sameness; and the multitude shining forth in its extremities, through the monad which is divisive of wholes. The remaining hebdomads, however, which are derived from this, proceed according to the intelligible and intellectual genera. For each monad, conformably to the summits of those genera, constitutes a monad co-arranged with the multitude proceeding from it ; since every summit is uniform [i. e. has the form of the onc,J as we have before demonstrated. But according to the middle and third progressions of those genera, each monad generates two triads. For the separation of them was apparent in the middle and ultimate progressions, as we have before observed. As, therefore, the intelligible* Digitized by Google 316 ON THE THEOLOGY ROOK V. and at the same time, intellectual genera, prodaccd the intelligible breadth, which is of a unical nature, into a triad ic multitude, after the same manner also the intellectual monads call forth the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triads, into intellectual hebdomads. And they constitute indeed the monads which are coarranged with the hebdomads, according to the summits of the triads ; but the two triads, according to the second and third decrements of those triads. Hence every hebdomad has the first monad indeed intelligible ; but the second after this, and which is triad ic, intelligible and intellectual; and the third triad, which is the next in order, intellectual. All these likewise subsist as in intellectuals. For they are characterized according to the peculiarity of the constitutive monad. In short, the intellectual powers proceed according to the intelligible orders ; but they constitute these seven hebdomads according to the first intellectual orders. For it is indeed necessary that exempt causes should he assimilated to the intelligible Gods ; but that co-arranged causes, and which proceed every where, should be assimilated to the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods ; since these also are the first that divide the worlds triadically, and pervade as far as to the last of things, connectedly containing and perfecting all things. But the intelligible Gods contain the causes of wholes uniformly, and occultly. You may also say, that the intelligible Gods produce all things uniformly ; for numbers subsist in them monadically. But the intelligible and intel- lectual Gods produce all things triadically. For the monads in these are divided according to number. And what the monad was in the former, that number is in the latter. And the intellectual Gods produce all things hebdomad ically. For they evolve the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual triads, into intellectual hebdomads, and expand their contracted powers into intellectual variety ; since they define multitude itself and variety by numbers which are nearest to the monad. For the numbers of the partial are different from the numbers of the total orders in the Gods. And the whole of this intellectual number is indeed more expanded than the natures prior to it, and is divided into more various progressions, yet it docs not desert its alliance with the Digitized by Google CHAP. III. OF PLATO. 317 monad. For hebdomad ic multitude has an abundant affinity with the nature of the monad ; since it is measured according to it, and primarily subsists from it. And the Pythagoreans, when they denominate the heptad light according to intellect, evidently admit its hyparxis to be intellectual, and on this account suspended from the monad. For the unical, which light manifests, is inherent from this in all the divine numbers. And thus much concerning the division of these intellectual Gods. CHAPTER III. It follows in the next place, that we should adapt the theory of Plato to this order, and show that he does not dissent from any of the theological dogmas concerning it. Since, therefore, we have demonstrated, that the celestial order, which wc find in the Cratylus perfectly celebrated, possesses the middle bond of the intellectual, and at the same time, intelligible Gods, but that under this another order of Gods is imme- diately arranged, as Socrates shows in the Pheedrus, called the subce- lestial arch, and which we have considered as not divided from the heaven, — this being the case, what order is it which divides itself from the kingdom of the heaven, but is the leader of the intellectual order of the Gods, and is primarily the supplier of intellect, according to the doctrine of Plato, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, except that which the mighty Saturn comprehends ? For he calls this God the first and most pure intellect. This God, therefore, is the summit of a divine intellect, and, as he says, the purest part of it ; separating himself indeed from the celestial order, but reigning over all the intellectual Gods ; Digitized by Google 313 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V\ because he is full of intellect, but of a pure intellect, and is a God extended to the summit of the iutellectual hypostasis. Hence also, he is the father of the mighty Jupiter, and is simply father. For Ue who is tlie father of the father of all things, is evidently allotted in a much greater degree the paternal dignity. Saturn, therefore, is the first intellect; but the mighty Jupiter is also an intellect, containing, as Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal soul, and a royal intellect. And these Gods are two intellects, and intellectual fathers ; the one* indeed, being intellectual ; but the other intelligible, iu intellectuals. For the Saturn ian bonds which Socrates mentions in the Cratylus, are unific of the intelligence of Jupiter about the intelligible of his father* and fill the Jovian intellect with the all-perfect intelligence of the Saturnian intellect. And this I think is likewise evident from the analogy of souls to Pluto. For as he binds souls about himself, filling them with wisdom and intelligence, thus also Saturn being the object of desire and love to Jupiter, contains him in himself by indissoluble bonds.. And these things Socrates indicates in the Cratylus, jesting, and at the same time being serious in what he says. The object of desire therefore* and the intelligible to Jupiter, is Saturn. But the mighty Jupiter himself is a divine and demiurgic intellect. Hence, it is necessary that there should be a third other intellectual cause, generative of life. For Jupiter indeed is the cause of life, as Socrates says, but intellectually- and secondarily. But we say that life is every where arranged prior to intellect. Hence, we roust say that the queen Rhea, being the mother of Jupiter, but subordinate to the father Saturn, gives completion to this middle, existing as a vivific world, and establishing in herself the causes of the whole of life. These three paternal orders, therefore, have appeared to us in intellectuals : one of them indeed subsisting according to the intelligible power of intellectuals;' but another according to divine and intellectual life; and another according to intellectual intellect. For we celebrate the middle deity, herself by herself, as the mother of the demiurgus, and of wholes. When, however, we survey ' It appears from the version of Porta*, that the words o pr» tuna rr/t yoynjv twafui rm ntfm, are omitted in the original. Indeed, the sense requires that they should be inserted. Digitized by Google CHAP. III. OF PLATO. 319 her together with the extremes, we denominate her a paternal cause, as being comprehended in the fathers ; and as generating some things together with Saturn, but others in conjunction with Jupiter. Moreover, Plato following Orpheus, calls the inflexible and undefiled triad of the intellectual Gods Curetic, as is evident from what the Athe* nian guest sajs in the Laws, celebrating the armed sports of the Curetes, and their rythmical dance. For Orpheus represents the Curetes who are three, as the guards of Jupiter. And the sacred laws of the Cretans, and all the Grecian theology, refer a pure and undefiled life and energy to this order. For ro x«p«* to koron, indicates nothing else than the pure and incorruptible. Hence, we hare before said, that the mighty Saturn, as being essentially united to the cause of undefiled purity, is a pure intellect. The paternal Gods therefore are three, and the undefined Gods also are three, Hence it remains that we should survey the seventh monad. If, therefore, we consider the fabulous elections, both the Saturn ian and the Celestial, of which Plato makes mention, and thinks that such like narrations should always be concealed in silence, that the arcane truth of them should be surveyed, and that they are indicative of mystic con- ceptions, because these things are not fit for young men to hear,— [if we consider these] we may obtain from them what the separative deity is, who accomplishes the divisions, and segregates the Saturnian genera indeed from the Celestial, and the Jovian from the Saturnian, and who separates the whole intellectual order from the natures prior and posterior to it, disjoins the different causes in it from each other, and always im- parts to secondary natures, secondary measures of dominion. And let not any one be disturbed, or oppose me on hearing these things. How therefore does Plato reject exertions* bonds, and the tragical apparatus of fables ? For he thinks that all such particulars will be condemned by the multitude and the stupid, through ignorance of the arcana they con- tain ; but that they will exhibit to the wise certain admirable opinions. Hence, he indeed does not admit such a mode of fiction, but thinks it proper to be persuaded by the ancients who were the offspring of the Gods, and to investigate their arcane conceptions. As therefore he 320 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. rejects the Saturnian fables, when they are narrated to Euthyprhon, aud the auditors of the Republic, yet at the same time admits them in the Cratylus, placing about the mighty Saturn and Pluto, other secondary bonds, — thus also, I think he forbids exections to be introduced to those who know only the apparent meaning of what is said, and does not admit that there is illegal conduct in the Gods, nnd nefarious aggressions of children against their parents, but he opposes, and confutes as much as possible such like opinions. He assents however to their being narrated to those who arc able to penetrate into the mystic truth, and investigate the concealed meaning of fables, and admits the separation of wholes, whether [mythologists] are willing to denominate them exections for the purpose of concealment, or in whatever other way they may think fit to call them. For bonds and exections are symbols of communion and se- paration, and each is the progeny of the same divine mythology. Nor is there any occasion to wonder, if from these things we endeavour to confirm the opinion of Plato; but it is requisite to know how the philosophy of Plato admits all such particulars, and how it rejects them, and in what manner he apprehends they may be the causes of the greatest evils, and of an impious life to those that hear them. The seven intellectual Gods, therefore, will through these, conceptions appear to have been thought worthy of being mentioned by Plato. CHAPTER IV. It is, however, 1 think, necessary syllogistically to collect the progres- sion of them according to hebdomads, from images. The demiurgus therefore, [in the Timaeus] fabricates the soul of the universe an image or all the divine orders, in the same manner as he fabricates this sensible Digitized by Google CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. world an image of intelligibles. And in the first ' place indeed, he consti- tutes the whole essence of the soul, and afterwards divides it into numbers, binds it by harmonies, and adorns it with figures, I mean the rectilinear and the circular. After this also, he divides it into one circle and seven circles. Whence therefore, arc this monad and hebdomad derived, except from the intellectual Gods? For figure, number, and true being, are prior to them. And as in the fabrication of the soul, after the subsistence of the psychical figure, the division of the circles according to the monad and hebdomad follows, thus also in the Gods, after intellectual and intelligible figure, the intellectual breadth, and that sphere of the Gods succeed. The multitude therefore of the seven hebdomads subsist from the divine intellectual hebdomad entering into itself. And on this account, the demiurgus thus divides the circles in the soul, because he, and every intellectual order, produce an intellectual hebdomad from each monad. I do not however assert, and now contend, that the seven circles are allotted an hyparxis similar to the seven Gods that proceed from the demiurgus, but that the demiurgus dividing the soul according to circles, introduces number to the sections from the intellectual Gods, I mean the monadic and the hebdomadic number. For the monad indeed subsists according to the circle of sameness, but the division, according to the circle of difference. Shorly after however, it will appear that same and different belong to the demiurgic order. Farther still, after the division of the circles, the demiurgus assumes some things which are symbols of the assimilative, and others which are sym- bols of the liberated Gods, and through these, he refers the soul to these orders of the Gods. If therefore figure is prior to the intellectual Gods, but the similar and dissimilar are posterior to them, it is evidently neces- sary that the monadic and at the same time hebdomadic, should be referred to this order, and that the progression from the monad to the hebdomad should pertain to this order. Each therefore of the seven intellectual Gods, is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad, as we may ' For Tjaornt, it is necessary to read nprnra;. It was also requisite to alter the punctuation in the preceding sentence. Pioc. Vol. I. 2 S ON THE THEOLOGY HOOK V. learn from images. There however indeed, the hebdomad is one, and allied to itself. But in souls, the circles differ from each other, according to the divine peculiarities. For they receive number in such a manner as to preserve the proper nature which they are allotted, connectedly containing mundane natures, and convolving the apparent by their own circles. And thus much concerning these particulars, which afford argu- ments that are not obscure of the arrangement of them by Plato. CHAPTER V. Again however, making another beginning, let us speak about each f_of the intellectual Gods,] as much as is sufficient to the present theology. Let Saturn therefore, the first king of the intellectual Gods, be now cele- brated by us, who according to Socrates in the Cratylus illuminates the pure and incorruptible nature of intellect, and establishing his own all- perfect power in his own summit of intellectuals, abides in, and at the same time proceeds from his father f_HeavenJ. He likewise divides the intellectual government from the connective, and establishes the tran- scendency of the other intellectual Gods in connexion with his own; but comprehends in himself the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, and the plenitude of beings. Hence the Saturnian bonds, mystically, and obscurely signify the comprehension of this intelligible, and a union with it. For the intelligible is comprehended in intellect. As therefore, the intelligible is indeed exempt from intellect, but intel- lect is said to comprehend it, thus also Jupiter is said to bind his father. And in placing bonds about his father, he at the same time binds himself [to him}. For a bond is the comprehension of the things that are bound. But the truth is as follows : Saturn is indeed an all-perfect intellect ; and Digitized by Google CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 333 the mighty Jupiter is likewise an intellect. Each therefore being an intellect, each is also evidently an intelligible- For every intellect is' converted to itself ; but being converted to it energizes towards itself. Energizing however towards itself, and not towards externals, it is intel- ligible and at the same time intellectual ; being indeed intellectual, so far as it intellectually perceives, but intelligible, so far as it is intellectu- ally perceived. Hence also the Jovian intellect is to itself intellect, and to itself intelligible. And in a similar manner the Saturnian intellect is to itself intelligible, and to itself intellect. But Jupiter indeed is more intellect, and Saturn is more intelligible. For the latter is established according to the intellectual summit, but the former according to the intellectual end. And the one indeed is the object of desire, but the other desires. And the one fills, hut the other is filled. Saturn therefore being intellect and intelligible, Jupiter also is in the second place intellect and intelligible. The intellectual however of Sa- turn is intelligible ; but the intelligible of Jupiter is intellectual. Jupiter therefore, being at the same time intellectual and intelligible, intellectu- ally perceives and comprehends himself, and binds the intelligible in himself. But binding this in himself, he is said to bind the intelligible prior to himself, and to comprehend it on all sides. For entering into himself, he proceeds into the intelligible prior to himself, and by the intelligible which is in himself, intellectually perceives that which is prior to himself. And thus the intelligible is not external to intellect For every intellect possesses that which is in itself without any difference with respect to itself. But again, it intellectually perceives in itself that which is prior to itself. For every thing which is external to intellect, is foreign and adventitious, and pertains to an inferior nature. But that which is pre-established in the order of cause, and which pre-exists as the object of desire, is in the desiring natures themselves. For being con- verted to, and verging to themselves, they discover the causes of them- selves, and all more ancient natures. And by how much more perfect and uniform the conversion of the desiring natures is about the objects of desire, by so much the more are they present with their own desirables. Hence every intellect, by intellectually perceiving itself, intellectually Digitized by Google 324 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. perceives likewise, all the natures prior to itself. And by how much the more it is united to itself, in a so much greater degree it is established in the intelligibles prior to itself. For the cause of any being, and which is the source of essence or of perfection to it, is not external to that being ; but that which is subordinate to any being, is external to it, and is not the intelligible. On this account also, each of the divine natures is unconverted lo that which is inferior to itself, but is converted to itself, and through itself reverts to that which is more excellent. And the in- telligible indeed is not inferior to any intellect ; but every intellect ener- gizing towards itself, and comprehending the intelligibles prior to itself, intellectually perceives them. Some intelligibles likewise are such as are conjoined with intellect. But others are such as are proximately participated by it. And others are such as it sees more remotely, and which are more exempt from its nature. On this account, the demiurgic intellect is indeed at the same time intelligible and intellect, but has the intelligible of his father, which he binds as the fable says. He sees however animal itself, which is, according to Timaeus, the most beautiful of all intelligibles, And if the illustrious Amelius, forming such conceptions as these, said that in- tellect is threefold, one being that which is, another that which has, and another that which sees, lie rightly apprehends the conception of Plato, according to my opinion. For it is necessary that the second intellect should not only have the intelligible, but that it should be and have the intelligible; that it should be indeed the intelligible coordinate with itself, but have the intelligible prior to itself, so far as it participates of it. And it is necessary that the third intellect should see the intelligible, and should alsoie and hate it ; that it should see indeed the first intelligible; but have that which is proximately beyond itself ; and that it should be the intelligible which is in itself, and which is conjoined with its own in- telligence, and should be inseparable from it. If therefore, as we said from the beginning, Jupiter intellectually per- ceives his father Saturn, Saturn is indeed intelligible, but Jupiter is intellect; being one intelligible himself, but participating of another. Hence also Plato does not simply call Saturn intellect, but a pure and Digitized by Google CHAP. VI. OF PLATO. incorruptible intellect. For he ' in the intellectual is intelligible. Since however, he is not simply intelligible, but as in intellectuals, he is intellect, and is himself paternally so, being both father and intellect, and having the paternal intellectually. In intelligibles therefore, intellect is also father ; but in intellectuals father is intellect. Hence Saturn is a pure, immaterial and perfect intellect, established above fabrication in the order of the desirable. But possessing such a peculiarity as this, he is full of all intelligibles intellectually, is as it were exuberant with intellections, and establishes twofold genera of Gods, some indeed in himself, but others posterior to himself. And he leads forth, indeed, the prolific powers of his father Heaven as far as to the last of things ; but fills the demiurgic order with generative goods. CHAFFER VI. Saturn however is the only one of the Gods who is said both to receive and give the royal dignity with a certain necessity, and as it were violence, cutting off the genitals of his father, and being himself castrated by the mighty Jupiter. For he bounds the kingdom of his father, and is bounded by the God posterior to himself. He is also filled from the natures placed above him, but fills the whole fabrication [of the universej'with prolific perfection. But separating himself from his father, he is exempt from his progeny. Being however one all-perfect intel- lect, he contains in himself the multitude of total intelligibles. And as he deifies the intellectual summit, he illuminates all things with intelli- gible light. ' For t» yaf it ia necessary to read tn*m{ yaq. Digitized by Google 326 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V CHAPTER VII. Very properly therefore, has this universe twofold lives, periods, and convolutions; the one being Saturnian, but the other Jovian, as tl»e fable in the Politicus says. And according to one of the periods indeed, it produces all goods spontaneously, and possesses an innoxious and unwearied life. But according to the other it participates of material error, and a very mutable nature. For the life in the world beiug twofold, the one unapparent, and more intellectual, but the other more physical aud apparent, and the one being defined according to provi- dence, but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according to fate ; — this being the case, the second life indeed, which is multiform, and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian order ; but the more simple, intellectual, and unapparent life, is suspended from the Saturnian order. And these things the Elean guest clearly teaches, calling one of the circulations Jovian, but the other, Saturnian ; though Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent life of the universe, is the supplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection ; but he elevates all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and being a leader in conjunction with his father, constitutes the whole mundane intellect. And if it be requisite to speak the truth clearly, each of the periods indeed, I mean the apparent, and the unapparent, participates of both these Gods; but the one indeed is more Saturnian, and the other is perfected under the kingdom of Jupiter. That the mighty Saturn therefore is allotted a kingdom different from that of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly manifests in what he asserts prior to the fable. For he says, " We have heard from many respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder." According to this wise man therefore, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence also Digitized by Google CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. 327 he presides over a kingdom different from that of his father. And while his father connectedly contains the middle centres of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders and supplies all intellectual life, first indeed, to the Gods, but secondarily to the natures more excellent than ours, and in the last place to partial souk, when they are able to be extended to the Saturnian place of survey. For this universe, and all the mundane Gods, always possess this two- fold life, and imitate the Saturnian intelligence indeed through unapparent and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter, through a providential attention to secondary natures, and in short, through the visible fabrication. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually, and consecrate themselves to Saturn, but at another time after a Jovian manner, and pay a providential attention to secondary natures, without restraint. When however they revolve analogous to those" deities [Saturn and Jupiter] they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and dispose sensibles in an orderly manner, and live both these lives, in the same manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods are twofold ; one being intellectual, but the other providential. Their paradigms also are twofold ; the Saturnian intellect being the paradigm of the one, but the Jovian intellect of the other. For the mighty Jupiter himself has a twofold energy, containing indeed intelligibles in intellect, but adorning sensibles by demiurgic production. Since however the circulations are twofold, not only in wholes, but also in partial souls, the Elean guest says that in the Saturnian period, the generation of these souls is not from each other, as in men which are the objects of sensible inspection, nor as the first man with us is alone earth-begotten, so in partial souls one first soul is the offspring of man, but all of them are earth-begotten. For they are elevated from ultimate and terrestrial bodies, and embrace an unapparent,* relinquishing a sen- sible life. He also says that neither do they verge to old age, and change from being younger to becoming older ; but on the contrary, they are ' For ,w.wif, it U necessary to read * For ru*cMvf it is Decenary to read Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. rendered more vigorous, proceed intellectually in a way contrary to generation, and as it were, divest themselves of the variety of life with which in descending they became invested. Hence likewise all the symbols which are adapted to youth are present with these souls, when they pass into this condition, such as a privation of hair, and a smooth- ness of the cheek instead of hoariness and beards. For they lay aside every thing which adheres to them from generation. But being situated there with Saturn, and living the life which is there, he says that there are abundance of fruits from trees, and many other [vegetable] sub- stances, which the earth spontaneously produces. Being likewise naked, and without coverlets, they are for the most part fed in the open air ; for they have a temperament of the seasons which is always the same. But they make use of soft beds, grass in abundance being produced for them from the earth. Souls therefore derive these and such like goods from this mighty God, in the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled indeed with vivific goods, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes ; but do not procure for themselves perfection and blessedness, from partial energies. For doxastic nutriment indeed has divisible and material conceptions ; but intellectual nutriment has pure, impartible, and native conceptions, which the spontaneous obscurely signifies. The production from the earth also signifies the prolific intellect of the Gods, which imparts to souls by illumination perfection and self- sufficiency. For on account of the exuberant abundance of good, they are able to impart an influx of it, according to the measure of felicity adapted to them. Hence, they are neither covered with garments, as when they proceeded into generation, nor have they superabundant additions of life, but they are purified themselves by themselves from all composition and variety, and extending their intellect to total good, they participate of it from the intellectual father, being guarded by the intellectual Gods, and receiving from them the measures of a happy life. They likewise pass through the whole of their existence with facility, lead a sleepless and pure life, being established in the generative powers of intelligibles ; and being filled with intellectual goods, and nourished with immaterial and divine fonns, they are said to live a life under Saturn, Digitized by Google CHAP. VIII. OF. PLATO. 329 CHAPTER VIII. Because, therefore, this God is the leader of all intellectual life, and every intellect as well that which is im participate, as that which is participate proceeds from this cause, hence it lielongs to this mightj God to feed in a distributed manner, and to nourish souls. For because indeed he is intelligible in intellectuals, he nourishes souls, and souls are called the nurselings of Saturn. But because he does not fill them with first, and unical intelligibles, but with those that are multiplied by his own cause of separation, he is said to feed them distributedly, and as it were in a divided manner. And do you not see how through these things, this God appears to be coordinate to the first triad of the intelligible and intellectual Gods ? For as Socrates, in the Phaedrus, say*, that souls are nourished in the supercelestial place, and in the intelligible meadow, so the Elean guest asserts that the souls that are fed under Saturn, are filled with intelligible goods. And it is not at all wonderful if souls are perfected by both these; intellectually indeed, under the kingdom of Saturn ; but intelligibly under the order of the first intel- lectual Gods. For this God himself is nourished by that order. And on this account he is allotted a leading and primary transcendency in intellectuals, because they are filled • from that order (^through him] with occult and unapparent powers. And he is that among the intellectual fathers, which the order of the first intellectual Gods is in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders. Hence the intelligible every where becomes nutriment to ascending souls, but the connexion with it is effected through the second and third Gods. As therefore, the demiurgic order elevates souls to the Saturnian place of survey, thus also the Saturnian order elevates them to the subcelestial ' • for wtftuvqamin in this place, it is ueccssirj to toad vwwpman. rroc. Vol. I. 2 T Digitized by Google 330 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. arch. For having made many and blessed discursive energies in the- kingdom of Saturn, they are again extended from hence to the per- fective, and from thence to the celestial triad, from which contemplating the supercelestial place, they arc now ineffably conjoined with the supreme goods of intelligibles. And after this manner the sectfnd orders always connect souls with the orders prior to them. Hence also, the theurgic art imitating the unapparent periods of souls, arranges initiations in the mysteries of the second Gods, prior to the more sublime mysteries. And through these, it causes us to pass to the intelligible place of survey. These things, therefore, Plato indicates concerning the Saturn ian life, and the polity of souls under Saturn, not in the Polkicus only, but also in the discourses of the Athenian guest. For in the fourth book of the Laws he celebrates the life under Saturn, obscurely signifying the undented nature, the facility, plenitude, and self-sufficiency of that energy, through fabulous fictions. CHAPTER IX. If, however, it be requisite from these things, and from all the mystic discipline concerning this God, to consider and discuss the orders which he constitutes in wholes, in the first place, we must direct our attention to the three kings mentioned in the Goigias, who distributing the kingdom of Saturn were produced by him, as being allotted in a divided manner a uniform and impartible* dominion, and over whom he places .the divine law, which is the cause of distribution according to intellect, both to the Gods themselves, and to all the natures posterior to the Gods. In the second place, we must consider th« rulers and kings Digitized by Google chap. ix. OF PLATO. 331 mentioned in the Laws, who are said to preside over the different allotments of souls, and who are not men, but daemons of a more divine and excellent genus, who distribute to souls the measures of good, cut off their generation-producing lives, restrain their disorderly lation, retain them in the intelligible, and comprehend them in the kingdom of Saturn. In the third place, therefore, we must direct our attention to the daemon Gods, who preside over the parts of the world, and the herds [of souls] that are in it, as the Elean guest says in the Pnjiticus, and who at oue time come into contact with the objects of their government, and distribute to them intellectual, and all unapparent goods, but at another time withdraw themselves from the physical life of the world, recur to their own place of survey, and imitate the exempt transcendency of the demiurgus and father of the universe. But after these things, wc must survey the twofold circulations of the mundane Gods, viz. the Saturnian and the Jovian ; for these Gods always have each of these, as the fable says in the Politicus. For it is evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun takes place in each of the revolutions. This period, therefore, being twofold, it is obvious to every one that the periods are full of Saturnian goods, and participate of the Saturnian series. And not only the mundane Gods, but likewise ail the more excellent genera that follow the Gods, energize according to both these energies, and revolve according to the twofold circulations, through which souls also sometimes participate of an intellectual life, and proceed in this path, exchanging for sense intellect as the leader of their motion and circulation. Saturn, therefore, extends his kingdom superually from the first Gods, as far as to partial souls, perfects all things, and fills them with intellectual goods, distributing to different natures different measures of good. For on account of this, law also subsists with him, as Socrates says in the Gorgias : " This law therefore was in the time of Saturn, and always was, and now is, among the Gods." For law is the distribution of intellect ; but this God is the* first, most pure, and incorruptible intellect. If, however, this God is the primary leader of all division, and is the origin of intellectual separation, it is necessary on this account, that law S3* ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. should be with him, which distinguishes the orders of beings, divides the intellectual genera, and separates all forms according to a well- ordered progression ; but imparts to all things by illumination the measure of hyparxis, connecting the order which is in them, preserving the boundaries of divine distribution immutable, and possessing the same dignity in the kingdom of Saturn, and in intellectuals, as Adrastia in the- supercelestial place, and in the intelligible, and at the same time,, intellectual orders. For from each of them an immutable guard, and the progression of order to all things are generated. But they differ from each other, because law indeed divides the one into multitude, defines the measures of intellectual subsistence, and distributes to every thing an appropriate good, producing the different measures of beings from the one [Saturnian] intellect. But Adrastia abiding in the intelligible,, guards all things uniformly, and preserves total order in a firm unde> viating manner, exempt from all division. Law, therefore, is a certain' G od which divides divine forms, and definitely imparts to every thing that which is adapted to it according to the plenitude proceeding from one uniform cause ; and it is also co-existent with the Saturnian order, in which the separations of beings, tmd the all-perfect progression of forms first subsist. Hence the deinurrgus likewise looking to this conducts all things according to law, and constitutes mundane provi- dence an image of the union of the father ; but fate and the fatal laws, an image of the division according to law. Souls, therefore, live according to law ; in the Jovian period indeed being governed con- formably to the laws of Fate; but in the Saturnian period living according to divine law they are subservient to the multitude [of divine forms] and are extended to the one cause of all ; and ascending to the intelligible place of survey, they are subjected to the sacred law of Adrastia. For this law extends from on high as far as to the last of things, and defines to souls the measures of whole periods, as Socrates says in the Pbsedrus. Who therefore this greatest God is, and what the goods are of which he is the cause to souls, and prior to these, to Gods and daemons, the loaders of souls, let it, from these things be manifest. Digitized by Google CHAP. X. OP PLATO. 333 CHAPTER X. Since Itowever, theologists assert that an exemption from old age pertains to this order, as the Barbarians say, and Orpheus the theologist of the Greeks, (for he mystically says that the hairs of the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary) I admire the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato which unfolds the same things concerning this God to Uiose who proceed in his steps. For be says that souls in the Saturn- ian period abandon old age, but return to youth, and remove from them- selves hoarincss, but have black hair. For he says that the white hairs of the more elderly become black ; but the cheeks of those that have beards being rendered smooth, they are restored to the past season [of youth.] These things indeed are averted by the Elean guest; similar to. which are the assertions of Orpheus concerning this God. — under Saturniao Jove Men liv'd immortal ; moist and fragrant hair From the pure chin then sprouted, nor wasmiVd With the white flower that marks hiurni old age ; But iu ita stead, a florid down appear'd. In these verses he delivers the similitude of Saturnian souls to this God. For he says that they remove from the view the old age which they had acquired from generation and abandon material imbecility; and that they exert the juvenile and vigorous life of intellect. For it is no otherwise lawful for them to be assimilated to the God who is exempt from old age, than through intellectual puberty, and undefiled power. But the cause of this is, that king Saturn himself is the source of the unallured Gods, and the inflexible triad. Hence be is, as Socrates says, a pure intellect. For be is at the same time the intellect of the un^ 334 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. defiled order, ranking as a summit, and riding as in a vehicle in the flou- rishing and vigorous ' Gods that govern wholes. The souk also which are sent to him, wonderfully advance, in conjunction with intellectual energy, in vigour, and in a power undeviating, and free from any tendency to matter. Partial souls therefore, when they change their periods, at one - time proceed to a more juvenile, and at another, to a more aged condi- tion. But whole souls always live according to both these periods, and are conversant with Saturn according to the unapparent period, but go- vern the universe in conjunction with Jupiter, according to visible pro- vidence, at once receiving an increase according to both these periods, and becoming at one and the same time both older and younger. And this is what Parmenides indicates when he says, that the one proceeding according to time becomes at once younger and older. These things Jtrowever, will hereafter be more manifest. CHAPTER XL Having therefore brought to an end the information concerning the king of the intellectual Gods, it evidently follows that we should in the next place celebrate the queen Rhea. For both Plato and Orpheus assert that she is the mother of the demiurgus of wholes, but a divinity posterior to Saturn. Thus therefore, we must speak concerning her. The stable and united cause of all intellectuals, and the principal and original monad, abiding in herself, unfolding into light all intellectual multitude, and again convolving it into herself, and embosoming her progeny, and the causes of wholes that emerge from her, analysing as it were after 1 For axueuoi, it is neccsiary to read «xp«i»t{. . Digitized by Google CJIAP. XI. • OF PLATO. 335 division the natures that are divided, and being paternally allotted the highest kingdom in intellectuals, — this being the case, the vivific Rhea proceeds as the second from her proper principle, being allotted a ma- ternal order in the whole paternal orders, and producing the demiurgus of wholes, prior to other Cods, and the immutable guard of the Gods. For this Goddess is the middle centre of the paternal intellectual triad, and the receiving bosom of the generative power which is in Saturn, calling forth indeed, to the generation of wholes, the causes which abide in him, but unfolding definitely all the genera of the Gods. And being filled indeed from the father prior to her with intelligible and prolific power, but filling the demiurgus and father subsisting from her, with vivific abundance. Whence also the demiurgus is the cause of life to all things, as containing in himself the plenitude of intellectual life, and extending to all things the prolific cause of his mother. For as the middle Goddess multiplies the uniform powers of Saturn, and produces and causes them to preside over secondary natures, so the third father, at one and the same time unfolds, divides, and produces as far as to the last of things, the all* perfect abundance ot the Saturnian monad, and the dyadic generation of the mother Rhea, so as not to leave the most material and disorderly part of the universe destitute of the power of Saturn. This Goddess therefore,, being the middle of the two fathers, one of which collects, but the other divides intellectual multitude, and the one through transcendency desiring to abide and to be established in himself, but the other hastening to produce, generate and fabricate all things, she educes indeed into herself, the demiurgic causes of wholes, but imparts her own proper power to secondary natures, in unen vying abundance. Hence also Plato assimilates her prolific exuberance to streams, as So- crates says in the Cratylus, evinces that this Goddess is a certain flux, and in what he asserts of her obscurely shows nothing else than her fontal nature, and a power unically comprehensive of the divisible rivers of life. For the first-effi-ctive flux is fontal ; which also Socrates indicating in this Goddess, shortly after clearly says that the name of Tethys is the name of a fountain. Why therefore, is it any longer necessary to doubt about these things, and to say where does Plato make mention of fontal 336 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. Gods? For he himself denominates the causes of the subsistence of all the Gods, fontal fluxions. And besides this, if he admits that the mun- dane soul is the fountain and principle of life, because it proceeds both from an impartible and partible vivification, how is it possible that he should not in a much greater degree and more truly call the Goddess who comprehends in herself all life, fontal? Concerning names however, it is not, 1 think, at all proper to contend, but we should survey the orders themselves of the first effective Gods, and see how Plato following theologists copiously unfolds them to us, celebrating after the Saturnian monad the kingdom of Rhea, constituting from these the demiurgus of wholes, and all the multitude of Gods which is woven together with him. For this Goddess binding together the breadth of intellectuals, and embosoming total life, emits all the intellectual powers in herself of the rivers of life ; and by the summit of herself indeed, is conjoined to the first father, and together with him generates wholes, and the genera of Gods that abide in him ; but by her extremity is connascent with fabrication, and according to a kindred conjunction with fabrication, constitutes all the orders of Gods that are prior to the world, and that are in the world. Hence there also the causes of the demiurgi of wholes primarily subsist, and the more partial genera of lite : aud the union and total deity of all these, is at once exempt from the plenitudes of herself, and is at once co-arranged with them. Thus therefore, she is both uniform and multiform, one and simple, though being self-perfect, she is a vivific world, proceeding from on high as far as to the last of things, and as far as to the extremities of the universe, giving subsistence to the vivific powers of the breadth of life. Hence also Plato refers the vivific cause of wholes to this Goddess, and through the last gifts of this divinity, indicates her total energy ; which primarily indeed fills the whole demiurgus with intellectual and pro- lific power, but secondarily perfects all the genera of the Gods with the intellectual fruits of herself. According to a third order also, her total energy nourishes the souls that are the attendants of the Gods, with the rivers of divine perfection. And in the last orders, it imparts to mortal animals the gift of nature. This therefore is, I think, more known than Digitized by Google CHAP. XL OF PLATO. 337 every thing to those who admit that things divine are beyond the works of nature. That however, which it is more fit the lovers of the contemplation of truth should consider, I say, is this, that Plato divides Ceres from ' the whole vivific deity, and coarranges her, at one time with Proserpine, at another with Juno, and at another with the progeny of Jupiter, as we may learn in the Cratylus. In which dialogue indeed, he co-arranges Hhea with Saturn, but connects a certain common investigation and theory about Ceres, Jupiter, and Juno. In the Laws likewise cele- brating the legislative Goddesses, he refers the whole of a legitimate life to the union of Ceres arid Proserpine; since according to Orpheus this middle Goddess being conjoined with Saturn by her summit, is called Rhea ; but producing Jupiter, and together with Jupiter unfolding the whole and partial orders of the Gods, she is called Ceres. And all the order of middle life is comprehensive of the other Titanidse, and likewise of Ceres. For it preestablished this monad as a middle collective of all the orders in it, both those that are occult, and those that are divided about the generative powers of the Goddess. Each of these powers, however, are triple. And this monad indeed conjoins the superior triad to Saturn, but weaves the inferior, together with the demiurgic order. It also evinces that the Cerealian monad being the middle, is coarranged with, and is at the same time exempt from the demiurgus of wholes. For in conjunction with the whole order it constitutes, and together with Jupiter generates Proserpine. And thus we have celebrated the primo- genial Goddess who is the middle of the fathers. ' «ic ii omitted in the original Froc. Vol. I. 2 U Digitized by Google 338 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V CHAFFER XII. Now however, after this Goddess, the detniurgus of wholes is in the third place to be celebrated, according to the order which he is allotted in the intellectual Gods, peculiarly unfolding for this purpose all the truth concerning him. And in the first place, we must remember that it is necessary the peculiarity of this third father should be demiurgic; and thus in the next place, following Plato, we must direct our attention to other particulars [respecting this God]. The first of the intellectual Gods therefore, who is parturient with multitude, who is the leader aud source of all separation, and who separates himself from the uniform and first Gods, but generates the divided principles of wholes, — this God again converts his progeny to himself, and weaves together these parts with his own sameness, and exhibits himself as one intelligible world in intellectu- als, bringing forth in himself, and retaining with himself his own offspring. But the second of the intellectual deities, is the vivific Goddess, who brings forth indeed in conjunction with the first intellectual God, occult multitude, (for she is conjoined to him according to supreme transcen- dency) but cannot endure to remain in this mode of generating, and in collecting the separation of wholes into unseparated union. Hence she separates the third intellect from the [first] father; but produces the multitude of the Gods, and of intellectual reasons, and fills thedemiurgus with generative power. If, therefore, the first intellectual God is partu- rient with the generation of wholes ; but the prolific vivification of the intellectual orders causes this generation to shine forth ; — it is evident tliat the intellect of the intellectual fathers, according to his own order, produces and adorns all things, and calls forth indeed, the occult nature of his father, into separation and progression, but prepares total vivifica- tion to send forth the rivers of itself, as far as to the last of things. For it is every where the peculiarity of intellect to divide and unfold multitude, the plenitudes of life, and the unions of intelligibles. Intelligible Digitized by Google CHAP. XII. OP PLATO. S3[) intellect however contains multitude uniformly, or according to the form of one ; for multitude preexists in the intelligible according to cause. But the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual intellect, has indeed secondary measures of union, but is exempt from all perfect separation, abiding in the first principles of wholes. And intellectual intellect is the source of all division, and of the subsistence of partial natures ; since it preestablishes in itself all the multitude of forms, and this not tetradically only, as intelligible intellect, but it possesses one all-perfect intellectual cause of all forms. It is necessary therefore that the whole demiurgic principles should pertain to this intellect, that all the demiurgic Gods should proceed from this one third father, and that this should be the demiurgus of wholes. For as the first of paradigms co-subsists in intelligible intellect, and in the third triad and the first father, so likewise we must place the first demiurgic monad in intel- lectual intellect, and the third father of the intellectual Gods. For on this account also the demiurgic is conjoined with the paradigmatic cause, according to the analogy which each is allotted among ths fathers; one indeed in intelligibles, but the other in intellectuals. For one is the boundary of the intelligible, but the other of the intellectual order. But this is evident from what has been before said. Farther still, fabrication being fourfold, and one indeed adorning wholes totally, another adorning wholes but partially, another adorning parts, but totally, and another weaving parts together with wholes, partially, — this being the case, it is evident that the cause of wholes which is the cause of them uniformly and indivisibly, is the most ancient of all the causes. It is necessary however, that this cause should either be prior to, or in, or posterior to the intellectual Gods. Where therefore shell we place it ? For all the parts which are constituted by intellectuals are more partial than the one and total fabrication. For the division of wholes into three, and the leaders of divisible production, present them- selves to the view in these orders. The natures therefore, that are prior to intellectuals, are defined according to other peculiarities of the Gods, as was before shown, and in short, they subsist according to union, and are expanded above the separation of intellectual forms. Digitized by Google 340 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. CHAPTER XIII. It remains therefore that the one demiurgus of wholes must be arranged in intellectuals. But if indeed, he is the first father, he will be intelligible, will contain his progeny in himself, and will be the collector of separation. How therefore, does he divide the worlds? How does he generate the multitudes of mundane natures? How does he speak to all the junior demiurgi at once ? For the first father is uncoordinated with the whole number of mundane natures, and also converts his first progeny to himself, flying as it were from multitude to union, and hastily with- drawing himself from all-various separation into intelligible transcen- dency. But if the one demiurgus of wholes is the vivific order, all things indeed, will be full of life, on account of the whole demiurgus. And the cause of souls, according to a probable reason will here become apparent subsisting prior to multitude. But how will he convert all things to himself? How is he called demiurgus and father? For the vivific deity, herself by herself, has a maternal dignity among the Gods, and is the supplier of progression to all things. But to produce forms, and to convert, are the illustrious and peculiar good of intellect. Neither therefore, is the demiurgus of wholes in the supermundane order. For all the natures there arc partial, and either partially preside over wholes, or comprehend the productions of parts totally. Nor is he in intellU gibles. For all the Gods there are fathers ; and no one there is called * demiurgus and father. But the divine orders antecedently comprehend all things in a manner perfectly occult and uuical. Not is he in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. For to collect, connect, and perfect multitudes, is uot the province of the demiurgic peculiarity. For this is the source of separation, and the production of forms, glittering with intellectual sections. But the iutclligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to the 1 For itiynrai, H appears to me that we should read i*u $if^rai. Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. .'HI union of intelligibles. Nor again, is it possible to admit that the demi- urgic cause is in the first or second order of intellectuals. For the summit of intellectuals is imparticipable by mundane natures, and is rather proposed to them in tbe order of the desirable; but is not productive of them. Hence, all the Gods in the world are elevated to the Saturnian place of survey ; but proceed from another secondary principle, and through it are converted and conjoined to the exempt kingdom. And the middle centre being vivific, is not defined according to the paternal characteristic. For the generative very much differs from the paternal, arid the vivific from the demiurgic genus ; so far, I think, as the principles of the whole orders, I mean bound and infinity, differ from each other. For the demiurgic and paternal order is referred to bound ; but all vivific and generative power, to infinity. CHAPTER XIV. I wonder therefore, at those interpreters of Plato, who do not make one fabrication but many, who assert that there are three demiurgi of wholes, and pass at one time to the second, and at another to the third dcraiurgus ; and who divide what is said in the Timaeus, and think fit to refer some of the assertions to one, but others to another cause. For that there is a demiurgic triad, and another multitude of Gods characterized according to the producing cause, I also admit, and think it will be granted by Plato. It is necessary however in each order prior to the triad, and prior to every multitude, that there should be a preexistent monad. For all the orders of the Gods originate from a monad; because each of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole progression of the Gods. As therefore the subsistence of the Gods has the cause of its generation from the imparticipable one, thus also it is necessary that the perfect orders in the Gods, should have a preexistent monad, and a first-eflective principle. According to the same reasoning, all the vivific 342 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. progressions are suspended from one vivification, and the demiurgic orders are extended to one fabrication. And it is not proper that there should be multitude without the monad. For there will neither be co*arrangement, nor a division of multitude according to intellect, unless the one and whole preexist. For on this account prior to all the divine progressions, the order of wholeness subsists, in order that it may compre- hend parts, and may define them in, and about itself. How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiurgi divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated to any thing which naturally subsists in the form of a part, but to all perfect animal ; and on this account he demonstrates that the world is only- begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were not one, but many paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be another animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be more right to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many paradigms, but to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary that the one paradigm should precede the many, in the same manner as the one good subsists prior to participated goods, and that the whole world should be the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether it is alone the image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one and a whole ? And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable than its parts? For these indeed, are assimilated to intelligibles, but the whole world is similar to no one of real beings. Or whether all the world subsists from a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed there are many paradigms of one world, these also will be similar to each other, if they are the causes of the same image. It is necessary therefore, that sameness should be communicated to these from one form ; or again, the world will be more venerable than its paradigms according to union. But if the paradigm is one, after the same manner also the demiurgic cause is one. For as there is one image from one paradigm, thus also the progeny being one, derives its subsistence from one demiurgus and father. For it is necessary that the paradigmatic cause should either be the same with the demiurgus, and should be established in him, or that it should be prior to Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. or PLATO. the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the demiurgus, as some think proper to assert. If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiur- gus will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm, which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more will the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are allotted a more uniform hypostasis ; since also the first cause of wholes is one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order in beings, but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe the last order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny of the latter, how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude should be without the monad ? For it is necessary that the paradigm being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of union to the universe than the demiurgic cause. And as the paradigm being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be compre- hensive of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begotten subsistence from the paradigm, but through the demiurgus, the demi- urgus also is indeed entirely one. Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account of tliis we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellec- tual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied, and divided prior to the indivisible monad ? For it is necessary that as all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended from one fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods ? For 344 OX THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. forms indeed, liavc their hypostasis mingled with multitude ; but the Gods are defined according to union itself. If therefore all the multi- tudes of forms arc the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which through monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the case, it is necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause of the generation of the universe. Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many. But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same cause without a medium ? For all the natures that proceed from the one fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only, whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude, if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the good, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause is one. But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it belongs indeed to partial genera, how is it extended to the first and intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally ? For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial nature ; but it belongs to a partial principle, to produce parts either totally ' or partially, as we before observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it is necessary that it should either be intelligible or intellectual, or intelli- gible and intellectual. If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is ' c\ix»f b emitted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 345 it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures? How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being does it produce soul, and the natures posterior to soul ? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligiblcs, viz. figure, the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How docs he divide the pai ts, or the circles that are in them ? For that which is generative of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And that which has the power of dividing multitude .will not [on this hypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the Gods. And in short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called byTiimeus intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same time intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, divide all things triad ically. But the demiurgus, at one time indeed, divides the world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things sufficiently apparent at present. Proc. Vol. I. 2X Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. CHAPTER XV. Bett Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this- God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that he sees intelligible*, but admitting that they are visible to him according to nature, for that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself according to this hypantis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intel- lect also, is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment ; but is said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has out its own nature un mingled with the intelligible. But intel- lectual intellect alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellec- tual itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of inlelligibles, is* primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which wc denominate the one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellec- tual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses the summit, but intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature. And the intelligibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect ac- cording to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligible according to participation ; and the natures that are collective of these, conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since, therefore, Timaeus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and neither denominates him life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his pecu- liarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should be established at the end of the intellectual Gods. For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incor- Digitized by Google CHAP. XV. OF PLATO. S47 ruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals, transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the dcmiurgus is simply intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles, so that which is simply intellect, is the last of intellectuals. For all things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect preexist ; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures, intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, and life according to essence. As therefore, that whjch is most vital in life is the middle, and as that which is especially intelligible is the summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intel- lect, and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timsus says. For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe. Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all other things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect. Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives sub- sistence to participated intelligible, is that winch is primarily being, so since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be im- participable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timasus. S4S ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. CHAPTER XVL Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the pecu- liarity of the dciniurgus, receiving from the Timaeus the principles of the- arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that Timaeus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning of what he says concerning him. For lie says, " It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Hence, he does not think fit to call him either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two, father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what respect fabricator and father differ from each other ; and in the next place, in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fa- bricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal pecu- liarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus. If therefore, Ave divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the Gods, and tliis is the same thing as to divide them into superessential monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed will be generative of the Gods and superesseutial unities ; but fabricator will give subsist- ence to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timaeus says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to the Gods ; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential pecu- liarity. Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with re- spect to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the Digitized by Google CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 349 intellectual deraiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures. But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father indeed, •will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are generated ; J but the latter proximately. And the former, produces indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis ; but the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpe- tual and mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual na- tures to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the fabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that which is ge- nerated from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior to himself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being, and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but the latter of the production of forms. And the former is the cause of wholes, but the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one indeed, is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite na- tures. Again however, in these the generative cause, and the cause which is productive of life, are opposed to each other ; because the paternal cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the effective with vivific powers. Ami as the paternal and the effective causes pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prolific and vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity. These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that the paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible Gods. For they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to supreme intelligi- ble union. And on this- account, Plato also calls the first God father, from the natures which are proximately established after him, transfer- ring to him the appellation of father. For every where indeed, it is usual with Plato to introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes, 350 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. and the causes which are posterior to it. But at one time indeed, he introduces the names from all beings, and at another from the first beings. For it neither was nor is lawful to refer names to him who is exempt from all beings, from subordinate natures, and which are placed in an order very remote from him. If therefore, all beings participate of the paternal peculiarity, wc must say that Plato gives this name to the one from all beings ; for there is not among all beings such a cause as this. Hence it is evident that Plato introduces to the one an appellation of this kind, from that which is the first and highest in the Gods. The intelligible Gods, liowever, are more ancient than all the divine orders, and subsist immediately aller the one. The paternal cause therefore of beings is in the intelligible Gods, and the intelligible Gods are the fathers of all the divine genera, being established in the highest essences, and occultly pro- ducing wholes. And the first God indeed, is beyond the appellation of father, as he is likewise beyond all other names ; and he is neither properly called the good, or the one, through his ineffable and unknown transcen- dency. But the intelligible Gods are primarily superessential unities and goodnesses, and are the exempt fathers of beings. The paternal peculiarity, therefore, originates supernally from the first intelligible triad ; but the fabricative first presents itself to the view in the third triad. For that which generates all forms, and adorns all things with forms is the third triad of intelligibles. For there, as we have said, all-perfect animal subsists, which is comprehensive of the first and intel- ligible paradigms. Here therefore, the effective also or fabricative at the same time subsists. For animal itself constitutes the Gods, and produces the forms of all beings. Hence it is allotted the paternal peculiarity, according to the divine cause, but according to the formal cause, it un- folds into light the effective principle of wholes. But again, on the con- trary, the effective and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is allotted its hypostasis in the demiurgic monad. Hence also the demiurgus of wholes is the hypostatic cause of Gods. In a particular manner however, he fabricates the world, energizing with forms and demiurgic reasons. For he constitutes intellect, aouls and bodies, adorning all things with forms, some indeed with first, others with middle, aud others with last forms. Digitized by Googl CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 351 Do you not see, therefore, how the end of intelligibles indeed, was paternal and at the same time effective ; but the end of intellectuals is effective and at the same time paternal. There however, the paternal peculiarity is more predominant ; but here the effective. For in both indeed, both causes preexist; nevertheless in the paradigm [i. e. in ani- mal itself] the paternal is more prevalent, but in the demiurgus the effective. For the former produces by his very being ; but the latter by energizing. And in the former indeed, fabrication [or effective energy] is essential ; but in the latter essence is effective. Forms also are with both; but in the former intelligibly, and in the latter intellectually. From these things therefore, it is evident, that the demiurgic cause subsists analogous to the paradigmatic cause; and that it has the same order with respect to intellectuals, as that has with respect to intelligibles. And on this account Timeeus also says that the demiurgus of wholes was extended to that paradigm. For lie says, " Whatever ideas intellect perceived by the dianoetic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe to contain." And together with this analogy, there is a diminution of the intellectual with reference to the intelligible. For the latter is more united ; but the former is more separated. And the one indeed is preestablished in the order of the desirable ; but the other is moved about the desirable. And the one fills with paternal power ; but the other absorbs as it were and embosoms the whole prolific abundance of the desirable. And after this manner, the demiurgus of the universe is all-perfect, receiving whole intelligible powers, from all-perfect • animal. For the universe is threefold ; one indeed beiug intelligibly [all] ; another intellectually ;- and another sensibly. For the world is perfect, from perfect natures, as Timreus says. And animal itself is perfect ac- cording to all things, as the same Timaeus asserts. The demiurgus like- wise, being the best of causes, is all-perfect. Again therefore, resuming what we have said, we repeat, that the paternal cause commences from the supreme union of intelligibles; but the paternal and at the same time effective cause is consubsistent in the intelligible paradigm ; and the effective and at the same time paternal cause is defined according to the whole demiurgus. But the cause whicu Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. is alone effective and fabricative, pertains to the junior Gods who give subsistence to partial and mortal things. The peculiarity therefore of the demiurgic cause is effective and paternal. And this Timseus asserts, not only in the beginning of the discourse about it. in which he says, " [To discover] therefore, the artificer and father of this universe, &c.;" but also in the speech to the junior Gods, he does the same thing ; for the demiurgus in a simitar manner says to them : " Gods of Gods of whom I am the demiurgus and father, [Whatever is generated by me is indissolu- ble, I being willing that it should be so.]" For he does not call himself father and demiurgus, but demiurgus and father, just as there fTimaeus calls him] fabricator and father. And not in the Timaeus only is this mode of the arrangement of the names defined, but in the Politicus also, the FJean guest speaking about the world says that it imitates the instruc- tion of its demiurgus and father ; and in the beginning indeed, he uses these names more accurately, but in the end more negligently. Since Plato therefore, every wliere preserves this order of names unchanged, it is evident to those who are not entirely unskilled in things of this kind, that he defines the demiurgic monad according to this peculiarity, and that he considers it to be effective and at the same time paternal. For because indeed, it is the end of the intellectual triad, it is allotted a pa- ternal transcendency with respect to all the second genera of Gods ; but because it produces from itself all the partial genera and species of beings, it possesses an effective cause of the natures to which it gives subsistence. And because indeed, it is father, power is in it, and at the same time in- tellect. For the demiurgus himself says, " Imitating the power which I employed iu your generation." And again, Timaeus says concerning the demiurgus ; " Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itself, such and so many he conceived by the dianoetic energy it necessary for this universe to contain." Hence he is father, and the power of the father is in him, aod intellect. All these however, are in him intellectually, and not intelligibly. Hence, I think he is called father indeed, not simply, but together with effector and demiurgus; and power, not by itself, but the power of the demiurgus and father. For he who calls himself demi- urgus and father, says that it is the power of himself. But he is immedi- Digitized by Google ■ CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 553 ately called intellect, without the addition of power, and the other appellations. *' Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived," &c. For all things are in him intellectually, and both power and father, by which he imitates the intelligible paradigm. Tor in him all things were intelli- gibly, ' viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mixed from both these. These, however, arc father, power, and intellect. But the intellectual of the paradigm indeed was intelligible in the intelligible Gods, sub- sisting prior to an intellectual cause. The intellectual however of the demiurgus, is of itself intellectual, being intellectual in intellectuals, as was before observed. Because indeed, as we have said, he is father, power is in him, and also intellect. But because these are defined ac- cording to the effective and demiurgic, he is coarranged with the vivific order, and together with it constitutes the genera of life, and vivifies the whole world. What this order is however, and where it is arranged, we shall shortly survey. But thus much is evident from what has been said, that so far as he is the demiurgus, he requires contact with the vivific order, together with it generates total lives, and conjoins it to himself. Disseminating, however, all the measures of life in it, and together with it adorning and producing them, he again converts them to himself. For it belongs to him to generate all things, and to recall all things to him- self, no less than to generate them, because he is established at the end of the intellectual order, and is the demiurgic intellect. As he is there- fore demiurgic, he gives subsistence to all thirigs; but as intellect, he convolves multitude to union, and converts it to himself. He also accomplishes both these, by the words which he delivers to the junior Gods. For he fills them with demiurgic and prolific power, collects them to himself, constitutes himself the object of desire as it were to the mul- titude of Gods, and extends about himself all the demiurgi in the world, ' For rsrpas,-, it u necessary to read rmrrcef. Proc. Vol. I. 9 Y Digitized by Google 354 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. CHAPTER XVII. In the third place therefore, let us purify our conceptions about the de- miurgic cause according to other projecting energies of intellect, following for this purpose Timams. In the first place then, Timseus in the begin- ning of the theory concerning the demiurgus, sufficiently exhibits his good- ness, and his unenvying and abundant communication of demiurgic reasons, being impelled to this from the seat of goodness which is in- herent in him, and from his exuberant deity. For his goodness and his unenvying abundance, are not as it were a certain habit of good, and a power, or a form itself by itself existing prior to many goods, but it is one ineffable participation of good, and the one of the demiurgic order; ac- cording to which the demiurgus also is a God, and fills all things with their proper good. For because there is deity in him which desires to adorn and arrange all things, and an hyparxis which is extended to the providence of the whole of things, on this account he establishes the prin- ciple of fabrication. His goodness therefore is nothing else than demi- urgic deity. But his will is the progeny of the energy of his goodness, bounding the end of his power. For since in the demiurgus of wholes there are, as we have said, father, power, and intellect, and these subsist in him intellectually, according to each of these he is filled with the par- ticipation of the one. And through goodness indeed, that which is paternal in biro, and which is as it were the intelligible of intellect, is illuminated. But through will, his power is governed, and is extended to one intelligible good. And through providence, his intellect is perfect, and gives subsistence to all things. All these likewise are the progeny of the one deity in the demiurgus. In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timaeus unfolds through these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the second Digitized by Google CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 355 place, he presents to our view the intelligible cause which is in him, and also the united paradigmatic cause of wholes which he contains. For to make all things similar to himself, evinces that he is the intelligible paradigm of every thiug beautiful and good in the world. For because he gives subsistence to all things by his very being, that to which he gives subsistence is the image of himself. And according to this reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he contains in himself the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently comprehends not only the final cause of mundaoe natures, but also the paradigmatic cause. But again, in the third place, Timseus celebrates the demiurgic power, and the principle which abolishes every thing disorderly and indefinite, and prepares the beautiful alone and the good to have dominion in wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus to the utmost of bis power suffered nothing evil and vile to exist, indicates his unconquerable power, which adorns things material in an unpolluted manner, and imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and order to disorderly In which part of the Tiro feus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving matter occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it all the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and the whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power, are able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and the whole world is fabricated an image of intelligible*, through the commu- nication of forms. Ia the fourth place,, therefore, let us survey how Timacus unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect. " By a reasoning process," says he, " the demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become more beautiful than that which possesses intellect." What therefore is this reasoning ? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate ? 356 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to itself, and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons, passes from one thing to another, and being converted to himself, searches after good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning and arranging the universe subsists analogously to him who reasons ; for he emits the divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intel- ligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes uniformly and excmptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distri- buting into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates. Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the intelligible, and an all- perfect union with it. By which also it is evident that it is not fit to think this reasoning [of the demiurgus] is either investigation or doubt, or a wandering of divine intellect, but tliat it is stable intelligence intellectually perceiving the multiform causes of beings. For intellect is always united to the intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles. And in a similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For at one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived, discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds what this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the intelligence of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the discovery of that which h absent; for all things are always present to the intellect of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not separated from intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to itself may be called reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles invention. And intelligibles themselves may be denominated things visible according to nature. For because Tim sens had denominated the unadorned subject of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure vestiges of forms, visible, hence, I think, ho calls intelligibles visible according to nature. For it is according to nature, to intellect to look to these, and not to things subordinate to these. As, therefore, he says, that intellect itself sees intelligibles, after the same manner also he calls intelligibles things naturally visible, and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which sees to that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself is Digitized by Google CHAP. XVIH. OF PLATO. 357 visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of intelligibles subsists ; and this is that which we before demonstrated, when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, wbieh Socrates, in the Phsednts, denominates splendid and fulgid. CHAPTER XVIII. Such therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived. We shall however obtain one perfection of the summit of the dogmas concerning it, if we are able to survey the words which this cause extends to the junior demiurgi, and to unfold the concealed meaning of them. This, therefore, we shall also do, establishing the following principle of the explanation of them : The energies and powers of the Gods are twofold. And some indeed abide in, and energize about them, and have for their end one hypostasis, and which is united to essence. But others proceed from them, exhibit an efficacious power about secondary natures, and coexist with the multitude of their recipients, and with the peculiarity of essence. These, however, being twofold, the secondary are suspended from those that are prior to them, are defined about them, and receive their proper hyparxis according to them. For it is every where necessary that externally proceeding should be the images of internal energies, evolving the at-once-collected nature of their indi- visibility ; multiplying that in them which is united, and dividing their impartibility. According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is also twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which it connects itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other proceeding from it, Digitized by Google 358 0N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. through which also bodies are filled with these physical powers, which being moved by nature, act on each other, and physically suffer by each other. Again, the motion of the soul likewise is twofold. And the one indeed is self-motive, is converted to itself, is of itself, concurs with the life of the soul, and is without any difference with respect to it. But the other is incumbent on alter-motive natures, moves these, and about these extends the power of itself. The energy of intellect, therefore, is likewise twofold. And one indeed is intellectual, is united to true beings, and is impartible, being co-existent with the intelligible itself of intellect, or rather being the intelligible itself, and intellect. For intellect is not of itself in capacity, and afterwards receiving energy, intellec- tually perceives the intelligible ; but it is one simple energy. For the multitude of it is unical, and its energy is directed to itself. But the other energy of intellect is directed to externals, and to things which are able to participate of intellect. For these intellect causes to be intel- lectual through itself, splendidly as it were emitting the light of its own intelligence, and imparting it to others. It is necessary, therefore, that the divine and demiurgic intellect itself, should always indeed be united to the intelligible, and that it should have the plenitude and self- sufficiency of demiurgic intelligence eternally established according to a union exempt from wholes ; to which, as it appears to me, Timaeus also looking says, that the father of the universe abides in his accustomed manner, and withdraws himself to his own place of survey, delivering the fabrication of mortal natures to the mundane Gods. For so far as he is exempt from the beings posterior to himself aud is uncoordinated with the more partial multitude of Gods, so far he is converted to himself, and surveys and intellectually perceives the natures prior to himself, according to one uniform union. But in consequence of the more ruling and leading Gods being extended towards him, he emits from himself secondary energies, to all the partial orders. Timaeus, therefore, fashions through words, these powers and effica- cious energies which proceed from the whole and one fabrication to the demiurgic multitude of Gods. For words are the images of intellections ; because indeed they evolve that which is contracted in intelligibles, but Digitized by Google CHAP. XVTII. OF PLATO. 359 lead forth that which is impartible into a partible hypostasis. They likewise transfer that which abides in itself into habitude to another thing. And it is evident that the reasons which are impelled from nature, are certain natural [powers], and render that which receives them physical. But the reasons which arc generated from soul, are indeed vivific, but render the inanimate nature which participates of them ([animated] and moved from itself, through the power of soul, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus, and communicate to it the resemblance of self- motion. And the reasons which are generated from intellect, illumi- nating the natures posterior to it, distribute all intellectual goods to their recipients, being the suppliers of true knowledge, of purity and a more simple life. After the same manner also the demiurgic words produce in the junior Gods, whole, impartible, and united measures of exempt fabrication, and fill their essences with demiurgic providence. They likewise render them second demiurgi, and emulous of their father. For he indeed gives subsistence to the whole plenitudes of the world. But they, imitating him, fabricate all partial natures in conjunction with wholes. And he produces the essence of perpetual natures. But they fashioning mortal natures according to one generation-producing circle, likewise transmute these. And as the one demiurgus governs the whole periods of the universe, thus also the many demiurgi convolve the divisible circles of the natures that are borne along 1 in generation. If, therefore, we assert these things rightly concerning the words proceeding from the demiurgus to the multitude of mundane Gods, and they are efficacious, fabricative, and convertive of their recipients to a union with him, and are also perfective of the beneficent reasons which they contain, we shall no longer seem to speak paradoxically, if we say that these words extend to the Gods in the world the participation of all the powers that are firmly established in the father, and of the causes prior to, and subsisting after him. And as he convolving the end of the intellectual Gods, is the plenitude of all things, so likewise the demiurgic words proceeding from him, produce in the junior Gcds the peculiarities, ' For tupyif/ar read ? tf»p«n»>. Digitized by Google 360 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. as I may say, of all the divine genera that are above the world, through which they are suspended from all the orders prior to them ; just I think as the whole of this world [is suspended from the mundane Gods who '] fabricate all mortal natures, and impart to different things a different power, and an efflux of divine powers. What, therefore, in short, is it whieh Plato indicates the Gods derive through these words from the first demiurgus, and the all-perfect fabri- cation ? In the first place, indeed, they derive this, that they are Gods of Gods. For the vocal address proceeding to thent from the father, is the supplier of divine power, and is allotted an efficacious preseuce in its participant, as we before observed. But in the next place, these xvords impart to them an indissoluble power. The demiurgus of wholes, however, comprehends in himself the cause of dissolution, in order that they may indeed be essentially indissoluble, but according to the cause of binding, not indissoluble. In the third place, therefore, the demiurgus produces in them from on high, through these words, a renovated immortality. For the assertion that they are neither immortal, nor shall be subject to the fatality of death, establishes them in this form of immortality, which the fable in the Politicus denominates renovated. In addition to this also, the words testify that they derive from the father a power perfective of wholes. For if the world is imperfect without the subsistence of mortal animals, it is doubtless necessary that those who preside over the generation of them should be the causes of |>erfcction to the universe. And in the last place, these words impart to the junior Gods a paternal and generative empire derived from the exempt and intellectual cause of wholes; and insert in them the proximate powers of regeneration. For through these words, the junior Gods again receive in themselves the natures that are corrupted, fabricate parts from wholes, and again effect the dissolution of parts into their wholes. And universally tlic words of the demiurgus subject the perpetually-generated course of uature, to the fabrication of the junior Gods. In short, ■ There is evidently something wanting in the original in this part ; and as it appears to me after xaJsnrij (otp-eti) mm o intellect, it is evidently necessary that the demkirgus of wholes should be the same with Jupiter, and that there should be one byparxis of both, which administers every thing in the world according to rectitude, and ' circularly leads every thing confused and disorderly into order. For, says Timaeus, it is not lawful for that which is best to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful. How therefore is it possible that he who adorns and arranges wholes through Themis, and together with ber produces all things, should not essentially possess in himself the whole of the political science ? How is it possible likewise that he should not be the first Jupiter, who definitely imparts to ail things that which is divine, and weaves one polity from all things, but is exempt from all partial causes and the Titannic genera, and is guarded by his own undefiled powers, beyond the whole Digitized by Google CHAP. XXV. OP PLATO. 379 world ? For the guards which surround him, obscurely signify his immu- table order, and the undeviating defence of fabrication, through which being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is according to supreme transcendency expanded above wholes. Moreover, the citadel of Jupiter, according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circula- tion, and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend from the intellectual watch tower of Jupiter, to which he extends all the mundane Gods, imparting to them from thence intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations, and compressing all the profundi- ties of the worlds by one most simple circulation, through which the summit also of the apparent worlds is denominated the period of same- ness, and the most prudent and uniform circulation, as Timeeus says, expressing the unical intellectual power of demiurgic conversion, and being allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the sensible world that the supreme summit of Jupiter possesses with respect to all the arrangement of the firmaments. These things may also be assumed by us as subservient to the proposed investigation, from the fabulous fictions in the Protagoras. RAPIER XXV. Wb may, however, approach still nearer to the truth, and assume in the present discussion, the fable in the Politicus. For in this it will ap- pear that Plato in a remarkable manner considers the demiurgus of the universe to be the same with Jupiter, and even as far as to the very names asserts the same things a6 Timaeus. The Elean guest, therefore, as we have before observed, assigns £in this dialogue] twofold circulations 380 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. to the whole of this world, the one intellectual, and which elevates souls but the other proceeding into nature, and imparting things contrary to the former. And the one indeed, being unapparent, and governed by divine providence, but the other apparent, and convolved according to the order of Fate. He also places twofold motive causes over these circulations. For every mutation and period require a certain moving cause. And prior to the causes that move the circulations, he asserts that there are as it were twofold ends of the periods, and assigns first- effective canscs of the motions, coordinate to the moving causes, and to the circulations themselves which differ from each other. Jupiter there- fore moves, and circularly leads one of the periods, whether you are wil- ling to call it intellectual, or providential, or in whatever other way you may denominate it, and he also supplies the world with life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality. But he prcestablishes his father Saturn as the object of desire to, and the end of the whole of this circulation. For he leads back wholes, and converts them to himself. Moreover, he extends happy souls to the watch-tower of his father, viz. those souls whose corporeal nature is obliterated, and whose circulation is to the incorporeal and the impartible. All the generation-producing* symbols likewise of these souls are amputated, and the form of their life is transferred to the intellectual summit. For these souls are also said to t>e the nurselings of Saturn, but to commit the government of themselves to Jupiter, and through him to be extended to the intelligible, and the Saturnian dominion. For the intelligible is nutriment, as it is said by the Gods themselves. And as Socrates in the Phaedrus elevates souls through the circulation of the heaven to the supercelestial place, where souls are nourished, survey true beings, and the unknown order of the Cods, with the highest powers of themselves, and as he there says, intel- lectually perceive with the lieads of the charioteers,— thus also the Elean guest circularly leads souls under Jupiter, to the Saturnian watch-tower, and asserts that such as have ascended are nourished by Saturn, and calls them the nurselings of the God. For every where indeed, the intelligible is perfective of, and has the power of filling an intellectual life, and the • For Tttovtwpy*, it is necessary to read yntvMp/x. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXV. ©F PLATO. pate of the natures that are beyond, establish themselves in more elevated intellectuals, and ascend as far as to the unknown order, but remote from the good, and the one principle of all things. But the souls [that ascend through the circulation of the heaven] are extended to the first intellect, which is imparticipable, and the intelligible itself, and when they are there, and have established their life in the occult order as in a port, they ineffably participate of the union proceeding from the good, and of the light of truth. With respect however to what remains respecting the twofold periods, as we have said, the world itself indeed moves itself, being moved according to its own nature, and giving completion to the order of Fate. But the nrst-eflective cause of this motion of the world, and of its life, i» the God who illuminates it with the power of being moved and of living, and is the mighty Jupiter. Hence also this period is said to be Jovian, so far as Jupiter is the cause of this apparent arrangement, just as Saturn is the cause of the intellectual and unapparent arrangement. It is better, however, to hear Plato himself discussing these things. That there are, therefore, twofold circulations of the universe, and that the God who moves it is the leader of the one, but of the other the world itself convolv- ing itself, Plato here teaches us. But as was just now said, and which is the only thiug that remains, the universe is at one time co-governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated immortality from the deouurgus; but at another time, when he lays aside as it were the handle of his rudder, the world being left by itself, moves for a time by itself, so as frequently to proceed in an inverted order. Again, however, that one of the periods, viz. the apparent, in Jovian, but that the other is referred to the kingdom of Saturn, Plato himself determines in what follows, subjoining these words, after the celebration of that life, and of the undented polity of the souls that are there, which is liberated from all corporeal pains, and the servitude about matter : " You have beard, Socrates, what was the life of men under Saturn ; but youyourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said to be under Jupiter." And moreover, that of these two circulations, OW THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. (since the apparent is under'" Jupiter) Jupiter is the cause and maker of it, is obvious to every one, and that again Jupiter is the power that moves the unapparent circulation, which is Saturnian, may be demonstrated from what in written. For it is necessary that these two Gods should cither rule over each of these circulations, or that one of them should rule over the unapparent, but the other over the present circulation. If, however, Jupiter moves the universe according to this period, the world can no longer be said to convolve itself, and to govern every thing it contains. Nor will it be true neither that the whole is convolved by divinity with twofold and contrary circulations, nor again, that two certain Gods convolve it whose decisions are contrary to each other. For if Saturn indeed moves it according to one circulation, but Jupiter moves it according to a period contrary to that of Saturn, two Gods will move it according to contrary circumvolutions. If, however, these things are impossible, it is indeed manifest to every one that both the divine causes preside over the circulation according to the Saturnian convolution; Saturn indeed as the supplier of an intellectual life; but Jupiter, as elevating all things to the Saturnian empire, and establishing them in his own intelligible. And thus that period may be called Sa- turnian, in consequence of Saturn imparting the first effective cause of the whole [of an intellectual] life. But according to this more physical circulation, and which is known to every one, Fate and connate desire move the universe. Jupiter, however, is the cause of this motion esemptly, who gives Fate and an adscititious life to the world. These things, therefore, being demonstrated by us, let us consider what the particulars are which are asserted of the God who moves the world according to the other period. And they are these; " that the world indeed at another time is conjointly governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated immortality from the demiurgus." It is obvious, therefore, to every one, that the Elean guest says, that the God who moves the universe according to the Saturnian period, supplies it with life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality, and that he clearly calls him the demiurgus. Hence, if it is Jupiter who conjointly governs that Digitized by Google CHAP. XXV. OF PLATO. period, as has been demonstrated, he will be the demiurgus of the world, and the supplier of immortality. And what occasion is there to say much on the subject ? For if the same God is the cause of life, and is denominated the demiurgus, again the Cratylus will present itself to us, and Jupiter according to this will be the same with the demiurgus. For life accedes to all things from Jupiter, as it is asserted in that dialogue. Moreover, in what follows, as Timteus calls the cause of the . circulation of Fate, demiurgus and father, after the same manner the Elean guest denominates this cause, and also calls it the maker. " For the world," says he, " revolves, remembering the doctrine of the demi- urgus and father." Properly, therefore, do we denominate the whole of this period Jovian, because the world moves and convolves itself, according to the doctrine of Jupiter, and the order imparted to it from him. Again, therefore, Jupiter is demiurgus and father. And here also the Elean guest preserves the same order of the divine names as Timaeus. For he does not' call him father and demiurgus, but on the contrary, in the same manner as Timseus, demiurgus and father ; because the demi- urgic peculiarity in him is more manifest than the paternal deity. These things, however, have been copiously investigated before ; and it has been shown in what respect the demiurgic is different from the paternal genus, how they are complicated with each other,* where the paternal subsists essentially, but the demiurgic according to cause, and where again, the demiurgic subsists essentially, but the paternal, according to participation. ■ For uu ymf it if oecemry to read ov yaj. * For i* **)*>s, it it requisite to read n> 384 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. CHAPTER XXVI. It will remain, therefore, that we should make mention of what is written in the Laws concerning Jupiter. For perhaps in them alto it will appear that Plato assigns the same order to the demiurgus and to Jupiter. As the equalities therefore, according to which polities are adorned, are twofold, and the one polity indeed proposes the equal according to number, and proceeds through things which differ from each other according to an equal law ; but the other embraces in all things, the equality winch is according to desert; and also, since equality subsists according to ratio, — this being the case, each of these equalities exists in the providence of the world. For the essence of the soul, indeed, is primarily divided by its fabricator by the equality according to ratio ; but it is also consummately filled with the remaining middles, and bound with them through the whole of itself. The several bodies [of the world] likewise, participate of a certain common essenoe, m the fabrication of things ; and on this account they are allotted the equality which is according to number. But all things are arranged and adorned through the best of analogies, and the demiurgus according to this inserts both in wholes and parts, an indissoluble order in the universe, and an adaptation of tliem to each other. This equality, therefore, the Athenian guest exhorts his citizens particularly to honour, in consequence of assimilating his city to the universe. He also says that it is a thing of this kind, but that it is not likewise easy for every one to perceive the most true and excellent equality ; for it is the judgment of Jupiter. What therefore is the cause on account of which the Athenian guest asserts this analogy to be the judgment of Jupiter? What other cause can we assign than its con- tributing to the perfection of the world, and its power and dominion in Digitized by Google CHAP. XXVI. OF PLATO. 385 the fabrication of wholes ? For that which gives an orderly distinction to the genera of causes, contrives the most beautiful bond of them, and weaves together one order from wholes, is according to Tim&eus the power of this analogy. For it established soul in the middle (of the universe) analogous to intellect and a corporeal nature. For soul is the middle of an impartible and partible essence. And by how much it surpasses a partible, by so much it falls short of an impartible hypostasis. The power of this analogy, however, binds the soul from double and triple ratios, and connects the whole of it proceeding from and at the same time returning to (its principles,) by the primary and self-motive boundaries of equality. It likewise constitutes the corporeal series from the four first genera. And it adapts indeed the extremes to each other through the middles, but mingles the middles according to the pecu- liarity of the extremes. It reduces, however, all things to one world, and one indissoluble order connectedly comprehended in the universe. If, therefore, we acknowledge that this equality has dominion in the whole fabrication of things, the best of analogies is the judgment of the demiurgus, and according to the decision of him who generated wholes it is allotted that great dominion in the fabrication of the universe, which we have before shown it to possess. Hence if the same analogy is the judgment of Jupiter, as the Athenian guest says it is, it is obvious to every one that the nature of Jupiter is demiurgic. For it is not any thing else which judges of the dignity of this analogy than that which employs it in the arrangement of wholes. And to this the legislator establishing himself analogous, binds and in a particular manner adorns the city which is assimilated to the universe, by this analogy. Proc. Vol. I. 3 C ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V CHAPTER XXVII. Fbom these things, therefore, and from all that has been previously said, we confidently assert, following Plato and paternal rumours, that Jupiter is the demiurgus of the universe ; and we may collect into one, the scattered opinions of the ancients on this subject ; of whom, some, indeed, refer the paradigm of the world, and the demiurgic cause to the same order ; but others divide these from each other. And some place all- perfect animal prior to the demiurgus ; but others afford an hypostasis to it after the demiurgus. For if the demiurgus is, as has been said, the great Jupiter, and the paradigm proposed to the demiurgus in order to the generation of the world, is all-perfect animal, these are at the same time united to each other, and are allotted an essential separation. And animal itself, indeed, intelligibly comprehends in itself the whole Jovian series ; but Jupiter the demiurgus of the universe intellectually pre-establishes in himself the nature of animal itself. For animal itself is the supplier of life to all things, and all things primarily live on account of it, and Jupiter being the cause of life, possesses the paradigm and the generative principle of the essence of all animals. Justly, therefore, does Timaeus, in Plato, having called the intelligible paradigm animal, conjoin the demiurgic intellect to the first intelligible animal ; and through the all-perfect union of the demiurgus and father with it, he also arranges and adorns this universe. For Jupiter binding to himself the fabrication of the universe, and being an intellectual animal, is united to intelligible animal, and being allotted a progression analogous to it, constitutes all things intellectually, which proceed from animal itself intelligibly. For, as we have said, the intelligible hypostases being triple, and one indeed, being allotted its hyparxis according to existence and the one Digitized by Google CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 387 being; but another according to intelligible life, and the middle centre of the intelligible breadth, where eternity, all life, and intelligible life subsist, as Plotinus somewhere says; and another according to intel- ligible multitude, the first plenitude of life, and the all-perfect paradigm of wholes, — this being the case, the three kingdoms of the intellectual Gods are divided analogous to the three intelligible hypostases. And one indeed, the mighty Saturn, being allotted an hyparxis according to the summit of intellectuals, and having a paternal transcendency, possesses a dominion analogous to the summit of the intelligible Gods, and the occult order. And as in that order, all things are uniformly, and are ineffably, and without separation united, thus also this God again converts to himself, and conceals in himself the natures that have proceeded from him, imitating the occult of the first summit. But again, the order which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, and is filled indeed, from the generative power of Saturn, but fills from itself the whole fabrication wilh vivific rivers, has the same order in intellectuals which eternity has in intelligibles, and the uniform cause of the life which is there. And as eternity proximately generates intelligible animal, which is also denominated eternal, through the participation of eternity, thus also the middle bosom of the intellectual Gods, unfolds the deraiurgus of the universe, and the vivific fountain of wholes. But the third king, viz. the fabricator and at the same time father, is indeed co-ordinate to the remainder of the intelligible triad, viz. to all-perfect animal. And as that is an animal, so likewise is Jupiter. And Jupiter indeed is intelligibly in all-perfect animal ; but all-perfect animal is intellectually in Jupiter. The extremities likewise of the intelligible and intellectual Gods are united to each other ; and in them, separation is co-existent with union. And one of them, indeed, is exempt from fabrication ; but the other is converted to the intelligible, is filled from thence with total goods, and is allotted a paternal transcendency through the participation of it. The maker, therefore, and father of the universe, who has firmly established in himself the uniform strength and power of all fabrication, who possesses and comprehends the primary cause of the generation of wholes, and who stably fixes in himself all things, and Digitized by Google :388 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. again produces them from himself in an undefiled manner, being allotted such an order as this among the intellectual fathers, is celebrated, as I may say, through the whole of the Timaeus, in which dialogue, his prolific and paternal power is unfolded, and his providence which pervades from on high as far as to the extremities of the universe. He is also frequently celebrated by Plato in other dialogues, so far as it is possible to celebrate his uniform and united power,' and which through transcendency is exempt from wholes. CHAPTER XXVIII. If however some one recollecting what is said in the beginning of the Timaeus about him, viz. that it is difficult to discover him, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men, should enquire in the first place, why since the Grecian theology ascribes such a name to the demiurgus, as we have before mentioned, Timaeus says that he is ineffable, and established above all the indication which subsists in words. In the next place, if he should inquire why intelligible animal which is arranged above the demiurgus is both denominated, and is made known by many signs, but the demiurgus who has established his kingdom in an order secondary to that of all-perfect animal, and is an intellectual God, (all-perfect animal receiving an intelligible transcendency) is left by Timaeus ineffable, as we have said, and unknown, perhaps we also, following Plato, may be able to dissolve all such doubts. For every order of the Gods originates from a monad, and presides over its 1 Svrayu, is omitted in the original. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXV III. OF PLATO. 5gp proper series according to the 6rst-erTective cause. And such things indeed as are nearer to this principle arc more total than those that are more remote from it But more total natures are manifestly seen to be less* distant from the monad, and conjoin things which are diminished according to essence to the natures that are prior to them. Every order of the Gods likewise is a whole united to itself through the whole, is allotted one indissoluble connexion, both in wholes and parts, and through the monad which collects every order into one, it is converted about itself, is suspended from this, and is wholly convolved according to it. If, therefore, we assert these things truly, in each order a monad is allotted a transcendency with respect to multitude, analogous to the good. And as the unical cause of whole goods, and which is incom- prehensible by all things, is exempt from all things, constitutes all things about itself, generates them from itself, and hastily withdraws the unions of all things to its own ineffable superunion, thus also the uniform and generative principle of every co-ordinate multitude, connects, guards and perfects the whole series of itself, imparts good to it from itself, and fills it with order and harmony. It is likewise that to its own progeny, which the good is to all beings, and is the object of desire to all the natures that originate from itself. Thus, therefore, the union of the intelligible father subsists prior to the whole paternal order; the one wholeness of the Sy noches is prior to the connective order ; and the first effective cause of life, to the vivi6c order. Hence also, of every demiurgic series, which is suspended from the triad of the sons of Saturn, the monad which proximately fabricates wholes, and is established above this triad, comprehends in itself all the demiurgic Gods, converts them to itself, and is of a boniform nature. The one fountain likewise of all the demiurgic numbers, subsists, as I may say, with respect to all this order analogous to the one, and to the one principle of all things. Timaeus therefore, indicating these things to us, asserts directly in the beginning of the generation of the world, ' For w&fo* if is evidently necessary to read ijrror. Digitized by Google 390 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. that this monad which proximately fabricates wholes, is difficult to be known, and is indescribable, as having the same ratio as the ineffable and unknown cause of all beings. Whence likewise, I think, he calls the demiurgus the best of causes, and the father of this universe, as being allotted the highest order among the demiurgi, and convolving to himself, and producing from himself all the effective principles. That one how- ever, Parmenides demonstrates to be perfectly unknown and ineffable ; but Timaeus says that it is difficult to discover the maker and father of the world, and impossible to speak of him to all men ; which assertion falls short of the cause that flies from all knowledge, and all language, and appears to verge to the nature of things known and effable. For when he saj'S that it is impossible to speak of him to all men, he does not leave him entirely ineffable and unknown. And the assertion that it is difficult to discover him, is not the sign of a peculiarity perfectly unknown. For because the demiurgus has established a kingdom analogous to the good, but in secondary and manifold orders of it, he participates indeed of the signs of the good, but is allotted the participa- tion in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity, and a communion with beings adapted to him. And as he is good, but not the good itself, so likewise he is difficult to be known by the natures posterior to him, but is not unknown. He is also celebrated in mystic language, but is not perfectly ineffable. You may see however, the order of things, and the remission in* them proceeding in a downward progression. For the good indeed, is exempt from all silence, and all language. But the genus of the intelligible Gods rejoices in silence, and is delighted with ineffable* symbols. Hence also, Socrates in the Pbaedrus, calls the vision of the intelligible monads the most holy of initiations, as being involved in silence, and perceived intellectually in an arcane manner. But the vision of intellectuals is indeed effable, yet is not effable and known to all men, but is known with difficulty. For through diminution with respect to the intelligible, it proceeds from silence and a transcendency which is to be apprehended by intelligence alone, into the order of things which are now effable. • For a|^T».f, ic it necessary to read « sr)™t . Digitized by Google CHAP. XXIX. OF PLATO. 391 If however, this be the case, all-perfect animal is much more ineffable and unknown than the demiurgic monad. For it is at once the monad of every paradigmatic order, and is intelligible, but not intellectual. How therefore, do we endeavour to denominate, and as it were unfold it, but thus magnificently celebrate the demiurgic cause ? And how do we class this cause in the same rank with things ineffable ? For this will not be acting conformably to Plato, who arranges animal itself beyond the demiurgus ; but this will be giving an hypostasis to it in a secondary order of Gods, where it will be ranked, and will be effable and known more than the demiurgic monad. To which may be added, that to denominate that all-perfect animal most beautiful, but the demiurgus the best of causes, gives indeed the same analogy to these causes with respect to each other, as there is of the good with respect to the beautiful* And as the good is prior to the beautiful, (for the first beauty, as Socrates says in the Philebus, is in the vestibules of the good) so likewise the best ' is prior to the most beautiful, and the demiurgus is prior to all-perfect animal. For the best indeed, remarkably participates of the good, but the most beautiful, of beauty. In addition to these things therefore, it must also be asserted by us, that the most beautiful and the best, are simply indeed related to each other according to order, as the good is to the beautiful. For the series of the whole of goodness is expanded above all the progression and arrangement of the beautiful. Every where, therefore, the best is prior CHAFFER XXIX. ■ For offrrc,, it is Digitized by Google 392 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. to the most beautiful. And the one, indeed, with reference to an inferior order, will be the best, but the other with reference to a more excellent order, will be the most beautiful. I say for instance, that the most beautiful, as in intelligibles, will have this peculiarity ; but the best as in intellectuals. And if the most beautiful, in supermundane natures, is a thing of this kind, the best will be said to be best as with reference to the Gods in the world. Hence, if the best of causes is the leader of the demiurgic series, and according to it is allotted a transcendency of this kind, but the most beautiful of intelligible animals preestablishes the illustrious power of beauty in a higher order, by what contrivance can it on this account be shown that intelligible and all-perfect animal is subordinate to the intellectual cause ? And that the demiurgus is converted to that which is posterior to himself? Or how can it be said that animal itself is visible to him, and all-perfect animal, and that which is comprehensive of all intelligibles, if it is made to be comprehended by another? For thus the demiurgus will be more comprehensive than animal itself, if the former indeed being characterized according to the best, is expanded above the paradigm, but the latter being denominated as most beautiful is secondary to the demiurgic cause. Moreover, as that all-perfect and intelligible animal is particularly considered by Timaeus according to a formal nature, and not according to the union which is in it, and an hypostasis which is above all forms,' he very properly grants that animal itself may be known and manifested by words, but considers the demiurgus as in a certain respect ineffable, and superior to knowledge. For both indeed, I mean the demiurgus and animal itself, participate of union, and prior to a formal essence, are con- tained in the one. And if you assume the unities which are in them, you must admit the unity of the paradigm to be intelligible, but the demiurgic unity to be intellectual, and that an intelligible hyparxis is nearer to the first one, which is unknown and incomprehensible by all things, than an intellectual hyparxis. But if you are willing to survey the forms of the ' Instead of too warn*, it it doubtless necessary to read ra xarra. For the demiurgus also has an hypostasis which is above the forms of the universe. CHAP. XXIX. OF PLATO. 393 paradigm by themselves, according to which it is said to be the paradigm of every thing in the world, and the goodness and union of the demiurgus, the former will appear to you to be known and effable ; but the demiur- gic cause will be seen to participate of the unknown and ineffable pecu- liarity of the Gods. For again, Timajus was in a remarkable degree in want of the demiurgus and father, as the producing cause of wholes, and the generator of the world- But to generate, to produce and provide are the peculiarities of Gods, so far as they are Gods. Hence also Ti- maeus denominates the peculiarity of the demiurgus according to which he is a God, the cause of the generation of the universe, and the most proper principle of the arrangement of wholes. But he denominates the pecu- liarity of the paradigm to be that which comprehends the first forms, according to which the world also is invested with forms. For it is the image of the paradigm, but the effect of the demiurgus. It belongs, therefore, to the paradigm to be the first of forms, but to the demiurgus to be the best of causes, according to his goodness, and the hyparxis of essence. For, as we have said, to generate, to give subsistence to, and to provide for other things, especially pertain to the Gods, and not to the natures which are primarily suspended ' from them ; but the latter are allotted through the former an abundance prolific of secondary natures. It appears to me that Socrates in the Republic indicating these things, does not say that the sun is the cause of generation, till be had declared him to be the progeny of the superessential principle of all things ; just as Timoeus does not begin the fabrication of the universe, till lie had cele- brated the goodness of the demiurgus of wholes. For each [i. e. the demiurgus and the sun] is a producing cause according to tht good, the former indeed of the universe, but the latter of a generated nature; but not according to the intellect which is in them, or life, or any other form of essence. For these through the participation of the good constitute the natures posterior to themselves. And thus through these things we have answered the before-mentioned doubts. • For i^munn, it is necessary to read ttyryunif . * Prcc. Vol. I. 3D Digitized by Google S04 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V CHAPTER XXX. Of the problems pertaining to total fabrication, it now remains for me to relate what my opinion is respecting the Crater, and the genera that are mingled in it. For these also Timae us co-arranges with the demiurgic monad, in the generation of the soul. The demiurgus, therefore, mingles- the elements of the hypostasis of souls ; but the middle genera of being are mingled. The much-celebrated Crater, however, receives this mix- ture, and generates souls in conjunction with the demiurgus. Hence, in the first place, the genera of being must be admitted to be twofold. And it must be granted indeed, that some of them give completion to total hypostases, but others, to such as are partial ; and that the hyparxes of first effective and united causes, are established in the intelligible Gods- For there essence subsists primarily in the summit of intelligibles, and motion and permanency are in the middle centre. For intelligible eter- nity abides in one, and at once both abides and is the occult cause of all life. Hence, Plotinus also calls eternity life which is one and total : and. again, in another part of his works he calls it intelligible life. But the third from him, Theodorus, denominates it permanency. And both these opinions harmonize with each other ; because permanency also is ia eternity, (for according to Timaeus, eternity abides in one) and motion. For eternity is intelligible life, and that which participates of it is intelli- gible animal. Moreover, sameness and difference, are in the extremity of intelligibles. For whence does multitude originate, but from differ- ence? And whence is the communion of parts with wholes, and the hyparxisof things which are divided in each other derived but from same- ness? For that one participates of being, uud being of the one. All the parts likewise of the one being pervade through each other in an uncon- fused manner ; for at one and the same time sameness and difference are there occultly. And the whole intelligible breadth is allotted its hypo* Digitized by Google CHAP. XXX. OF PLATO. stasis according to the first and most uniform genera. As essence likewise presents itself to the view in conjunction with the one, according to the first triad, so motion and permanency shine forth in the second, and sameness and difference in tlie third triad. And all things are essentially in the intelligible; just ns life and intellect are there intelligibly. For since all beings proceed from intelligibles, all things preexist there according to cause. And motion and permanency arc there essentially, and sameness and difference uniformly. Again, in the middle genera of the intelligible and intellectual hypo- stases, the same things subsist secondarily and vitally. In the summit of them indeed, essence subsists. For Socrates in the Pluedrus speaking about this order, characterizes the whole of it from essence. For the truly-existing essence which is without colour, without figure, and without contact, subsists after this manner. But in the middle centre there are motion and permanency. For there the circulation of the heaven sub- sists, as the same Socrates says; being established indeed undeviatingly, in one form of intelligence; but being moved in, and about itself; or rather being motion and eternal life. But in the extremity of thiB order, sameness and difference are vitally established. Hence it is converted to the beginning according to the nature of sameness, is divided uniformly, proceeds into more numbers, and generates from itself more partial monads. Again, in the third orders, the highest of the intellectual Gods possesses all things according to essence, and is the intelligible itself and true being in intellectuals, again recalling the separation which is iu himself into undivided union. But the middle order subsists according to motion and at the same time permanency. For it is a vivific deity, abiding and at the same time proceeding, being established with purity, and vivifying all things by prolific powers. And the third progression subsists accord- ing to sameness, together with difference. For this separates itself from the fathers, and is conjoined to tltein through intellectual conversion. And it binds, indeed, at once the natures posterior to itself, to each other, according to the common powers of forms, and at the same time separates them by intellectual sections. But in this order, all genera and species Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK T- first shine forth to the view ; because it is especially characterized according to difference, being allotted the end of all the total hypostases. From this likewise it proceeds to all things, viz. to participated intellect, the multiform orders of souls, and the whole of a corporeal nature. For, in short, it constitutes triple genera of the natures posterior to itself; some indeed, being impartible and the first; others being media between partible and impartible natures; and others being divided about bodies. And through these things it generates all the more partial genera of beings. That we may therefore again return to what has been before said,, the genera must be admitted to subsist every where, yet not every where after the same manner; but in the highest orders of divine natures indeed, they subsist uniformly, without separation, and unitedly, where also permanency participates of motion, and motion of permanency, and there is one united progression of both. In the more partial orders, however, it must be admitted that the same things subsist in a divided manner, and together with an appropriate remission. For since the first and most total of forms are m the extremity of intelligibles, it is indeed necessary that genera should have the beginning of their hypostasis in intelligibles. And if the demiurgic cause is generative of all the partial orders, it com- prehends the first genera of the hypostasis of them. As likewise the fountain of all forms subsists in this cause, though there arc intelligible forms, so the genera of being, preexist in it, though there are other whole genera prior to it. And the divine Jamblichus somewhere rightly observes that the genera of being present themselves to the view in the ex- tremity of the intelligible Gods. The present theology likewise, following things themselves, gives a progression to these as well as forms supernallyr from the intelligible Gods. For such things as subsist according to cause,- occultly, and without separation in the first essences [i. e. in intelligibles] these subsist in a divided and partible manner, and according to the nature ofeach,in intellectuals. For from hence, all the divisibleorders of beings are filled both with these genera, and with formal hyparxes. And on this ac- count, the demiurgus also is said to comprehend all genera, and to have the fountain of forms, because he generates all the partial rivers [of life] and imparts to them from himself by illumination all the measures of subsistence.' CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 397 Hence triple genera of all beings proceed from the derniurgus, some indeed being impartible, others partible, ' and others subsisting between these, being more united indeed than the partible, but more separated than the impartible genera; but subsisting according to the middle of both, and connectedly containing the one bond of beings. And the derniurgus indeed produces the intellectual essence, through the first and impartible genera; but the corporeal essence through the third and partible genera ; and the psychical hypostasis which is in the middle of these, through the middle genera in beings. Moreover, he generates every intellectual and impartible nature from himself, and fills thein with total generative power. But he constitutes the psychical essence, in conjunction with the Crater; and the corporeal essence, in conjunction with total Nature. CHAPTER XXXL 1 • That in this arrangement likewise we follow Timaeus, any one may learn from the following considerations : The derniurgus producing the intellect of the universe, himself produces it from his own essence alone, unfolding it at once according to one union, in consequence of consti- tuting it eternally, and no mention whatever is here made of the Crater. But the derniurgus in arranging and adorning soul prior to body, mingles the genera, and energizes in conjunction with the Crater. And in fa- shioning the body of the universe, and describing the heaven, he fabri- cates it in conjunction with Necessity. For the nature of the universe, says Tiuia:us, was generated mingled from intellect and necessity. And nei- ther does he here assume the Crater in order to the arrangement of bodies. * The words rm h fufurr* arc omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted. Digitized by Google 3.Q8 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. But it has been abundantly shown by us elsewhere, that Plato calls physical production, a production through necessity, and does not, a* some suppose, consider necessity to be the same with matier. It is evident, therefore, that the demiurgus produces the generation of bodies together with total Nature, mingles the partible genera in the first Nature, and thus produces bodies from intellect and necessity. For bodies receive' from intellect indeed, good and union; but from necessity a progression which terminates in interval and division. He arranges and adorns, however, the 6elf-motive essence of souls, in conjunction with the Crater. And neither intellect, nor bodies, require a cause of this kind. The demiurgus indeed is the common source of the triple genera. But the Crater is the peculiar cause of souls, and is co-arranged with the de- miurgus and filled from him, but fills souls. And receiving from thence indeed the powers of prolific abundance, it pours them on souls according to the measures of their respective essences. To some of them likewise it orderly distributes the summits of the genera [of being], to others the middle progressions of the genera, and to others, the terminations of them. Hence the Crater is indeed essentially vivific, since souls also are certain lives, but it is the first-effective cause of souls, according to the peculiarity of hyparxis, and is the uniform and all-perfect monad, not of every life, but of that which is psychical. For from this Crater the soul of the universe subsists, and likewise the second and third genera of partible souls, and of those souls that are allotted a progression between these. The whole number, therefore, of the psychical order proceeds from the Crater, and is divided according to the prolific powers which it contains. Hence the Crater is said to be the cause of souls, the receptacle of their fabrication, and the generative monad of them, and the like. For it is said to be so rightly, and conformably to the mind of Plato. If, how- ever, the Crater is co-arranged with the demiurgus, and equally consti- tutes with him the genera of souls, it is indeed necessary that this Crater should be fontal, in the same manner as the whole demiurgus. Hence ■ For hxofuia, it is necessary to read g^spou. CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 399 the Crater is the fountain of souls, but is united to the demiurgic monad. And on this account, Socrates also in the Philebns says, that in Jupiter there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect. For that which we at present denominate fontal, he calls royal; though the name of fountain when applied to souls is well known to Plato. For Socrates, in the Phredrus, says, that the self- motive nature is the fountain and principle of motion to such other things as are moved. And you see that as a twofold divine monad prior to souls is delivered by theologists, the one being indeed fontal, but the other of a primary ruling nature, Plato likewise gives to the progeny of these twofold appellations, assuming one name from the more total, but the other from the more partial monad. For the self-motive nature, is a fountain indeed, as being the offspring of the fontal soul, but it is a principle, as participa- ting of the primary ruling soul. If therefore, the name of fountain, and also of principle is assigned by Plato to souls, what occasion is there to wonder if we denominate the exempt monads of them, fountains and principles? Or rather from these things that is demonstrated. For whence is a ruling power imparted to all souls except from the ruling monad ? For that which similarly extends to all souls, is necessarily imparted to them from one and the same cause. If therefore, some one should say it is imparted by the demiurgus, so far as he is the demiurgus, it is necessary that in a similar manner it should be inherent in all other things which proceed from the demiurgic monad. But if it proceeds from the definite and separate cause of souls, that cause must be denominated the first fountain and principle of them. Moreover, that of these two names, the ruling is more allied to souls than the fontal, as being nearer to them according to order, Plato manifests in the same dialogue. For calling the self-motive nature the fountain and at the same time principle of the motion of the whole of things, he nevertheless frames his demonstration of its un begotten subsistence from principle alone. For, says he, principle is unbegotteu. For it is necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from a principle. If therefore, demonstrations are from things proximate to the things demonstrated, it is necessary that principle Digitized by Google 400 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. should be more proximate to souls than fountain. Farther still, if every thing which is generated is generated from a principle, as Plato says, but souls are in a certain respect generated, as Timaeus says, there is also a precedaneous principle of souls. And as they are the principles of things which are generated according to time, so after another manner principle subsists prior to souls, which are generated. And as they are unbegotten according to the generation of bodies, thus also the principle of souls is exempt from all generation. Through these things therefore, it is demonstrated by us, that tbeCrater is the fountain of souls, that after the fountain there is a primary ruling monad of them, and that this monad is more proximate to souls than the fountain, but is established above them, as being their prolific cause. And all these particulars we hav e demonstrated from the words of Plato. i CHAPTER XXXII. Again therefore, let us return to the things proposed, and teach in a greater degree the lovers of the contemplation of truth, concerning this Crater. For the whole vivific deity having established in the middle of the intellectual kings the prolific cause of divine natures, and according to her highest, most intellectual and all-perfect powers, being occultly united to the first father, but according to more partial and secondary causes from them, being conjoined to the demiurgus, and establishing one conspiration together with him of the generation of the partial orders, Timaeus mystically mentions those more ancient powers of the Goddess, and which abide in the first father. But with respect to those powers that are co-arranged with the demiurgus, and adorn together with him Digitized by LiOOQle CHAP. XXXII. OF PLATO. 401 the natures in the universe, some of these he delivers more clearly but the whole of others through indication. For the secondary monads themselves of the Goddess are triple, as the wise assert, one of them being the fountain of souls, the second, being the fountain of the virtues, but the third being the fountain of Nature which is suspended from the back of the Goddess. The demiurgus therefore, also assumes these three hypostases to his own prolific production. And the Crater indeed, as we have said, is the fountain of souls, unically containing the whole and perfect number of them.' And as the demiurgus is allotted a paternal cause with respect to the psychical generation, so the Crater is prolific, and is allotted the ratio and order of a mother. For such things as Jupiter produces paternally in souls, the fountain of souls produces maternally and generatively. Virtue however, energizes by itself, and adorns and perfects wholes. And on this account, the universe having participated of soul, immedi- ately also participates of virtue. " For the demiurgus, says Timseus, having placed soul in the middle, extended it through the universe, and besides this surrounded the body of it externally with soul as with a veil, and causing circle to revolve in circle, constituted heaven one, alone and solitary, but through virtue able to converse with itself, and being in want of no other thing, but sufficiently known and friendly itself to itself." At one and the same time therefore the world is animated, lives through the whole of its life according to virtue, and possesses from the virtues as its highest end, friendship with itself, and an all-perfect knowledge of itself. For it is itself sufficiently known and friendly to itself through virtue. Moreover, nature also is consubsistent with the generation of body. For the demiurgus generates body through necessity, and fashions it together with its proper life. And on this account, shortly after, having constituted partial souls, he shows to them the nature of the universe, and the laws of Fate. For in consequence of possessing the cause of total Nature and Fate, he also exhibits these to souls. For the demiurgus is not converted to things posterior to himself, but primarily ' For ivrw, it U necessary to read oantn, Proc. Vol. I. 3 E Digitized by Google 402 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. contains in himself the things which are exhibited, and unfolds to souls the powers of himself. Hence, the paradigm of all Nature, and the one cause of the laws of Fate pre-subsist in him. For the fountain of Nature, is called the first Fate by the Gods themselves. "You should not look upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal." Hence also, Tinneus says, that souls at one and the same time see the laws of Fate, and the nature of the universe, viz. they see as it were mundane Fate, and the powers of it. And the Elean guest in the Politicus, denominates the motive cause of the more physical circulation of the universe, Fate. For he says that "Fate and connate desire convolve the world." And the same person likewise clearly acknowledges that the world possesses this power from the demiurgus and father. For he say* that all the apparent arrangement and circulation are derived from Jupiter. It is demonstrated therefore, that according to these three causes of the vivific Goddess which are co-arranged with the demiurgus, the world is perfec- ted by him, viz. according to the fontal Crater, the fountain of the virtues, and the first-effective cause of nature. It is likewise manifest that again in these things Plato does not refuse to- employ the name of fountain. For in the Laws he calls the power of prudence which is essentially inherent in souls, and which is productive of the virtues in us, the fountain of intelligence. And he also says, that two other fountains are imparted to us by nature, viz. pleasure and pain. As, therefore, we before demonstrated that souls are called the fountains of motions, on account of the one fountain of them, of which they participate, thus also when Plato calls the first progeny of Nature fountains, it is obvious to every one, that he will permit the exempt cause itself of them to be denominated a fountain. After the same manner, likewise, since he magnificently celebrates the essential power of virtue in us, as the fountain of intelligence, he will not be compelled to hear a name which does not at all pertain to his philosophy, if some one should be willing to denominate, the first monad of the virtues, a fountain. But where shall we have the name of fountain posited by him in the intellectual Gods? In the Cratylus, therefore, he says that Tethys is the occult name of a fountain, and he calls Saturn himself and the Digitized by Google .CHAP.' XXXIII. OF PLATO. 403 queen Rhea fluxions. For these divinities are rivers of the intelligible fountains, and proceeding from fountains placed above them, they fill all the natures posterior to themselves with the prolific rivers of life. And the Crater itself likewise is fontal. The Gods, therefore, also denominate the first>eftective causes of partial natures, fontal Craters. These things, however, we shall more fully investigate elsewhere. Let it be considered also, that we have here sufficiently examined the particulars concerning the demiurgic monad, according to the narration of Plato. CHAPTER XXXIII. In the next place, let us survey those causes and leaders of uncon- taminated purity, and see if Plato any where appears to remind us of this order of Gods, and of the inflexible power proceeding from them to all the divine genera. For the first-effective triad of the immutable order, is united to the triad of the intellectual kings and the progressions of the former are co-divided with the monads of the latter. And the summit of the triad, and as it were, the flower of the inflexible guard of wholes is united to the first intellectual king. But the middle centre of the triad, is in a kindred manner conjoined to the second intellectual king, proceeds together with him, and subsists about him. And the extremity' of the whole triad is connected with the third intellectual king, is converted with him to the principle [of the intellectual order,] and together with him is convolved to the one union of the father of all the intellectual Gods. And after this manner, indeed, the three • to is omitted in the original. Digitized by Google 404 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. unpolluted guardians of the intellectual fathers, are monadically divided. But together with this division they have also an hypostasis united to each other. All of them, likewise, are in a certain respect in each of the fathers, and all of them energize about all. And after a certain manner indeed according to their proper hypostasis, they are divided from the fathers ; but after another manner they are impartibly assumed with them, and at one and the same time they arc allotted an equally- dignified order with the fathers, and appear to possess an essence subordinate to them. Such, therefore, being their nature, they preserve, indeed, the whole progressions of the fathers undefiled, but supply them with inflexibility in their powers, and immutability in their energies. They are suspended, however, from total purity. And if some of the ancients have in any of their writings surveyed in intellect that which always subsists with invariable sameness, which receives nothing into itself from subordinate natures, and is not mingled with tilings inferior, they celebrate all such goods as these, as pervading to intellect, and other natures, from these Gods. For the oration in the Banquet of Plato, celebrates in a remark- able manner the immiscibility of the divine essence with secondary natures ; and that which transcends the whole of things in purity and immutable power, arrives to the Gods through the guardian cause. And as the intellectual fathers, are the suppliers of prolific production, both to all other things, and to the inflexible Gods, thus also, the undefiled, Gods, impart the power of purity, both to the fathers, and to the other divine orders. At one and the same time, therefore, the three unpolluted Gods subsist with the three intellectual kings, are the guardians of the fathers themselves, establish about them an immutable guard, and firmly fix themselves in them. Hence also, the Athenian guest, as he arranges and adorns his polity through the best analogy, through which the demiurgus binds and constitutes the whole number [of the elements,] so likewise he appoints a guard to all the inhabitants of the region, that nothing, as much as possible, may be without defence ; imitating in this the intellectual Gods themselves who guard all things by the undefiled leaders. And it appears to me that on tins account he calls the rulers Digitized CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 405 [of his polity] guardians of the laws, or [simply] guardians, because the inflexible guardians are consubsistent with the intellectual leaden of the whole worlds. CHAPTER XXXIV. These arguments, however, will be more remote from that divine triad, and are referred to it from ultimate images. But perhaps omitting these, we may abound with greater conceptions, and more conducive to the investigation of the thing proposed, and speculating together with Plato the divine genera, we may discover how he also celebrates this order of Gods, and constitutes them together with the three kings that are now discussed, just as by other theologists also, we are mystically instructed in the truth concerning them. In the fable therefore of Protagoras, Plato indicating to us the exempt watch-tower of Jupiter, and the transcendency of his essence which is unmingled with all secondary natures, through which he is inaccessible and unrevealed to the partible genera of Gods, refers the cause of this to his ' immutable guard, aiid the defensive order by which he * is surrounded. For on account of this, all the demiurgic powers indeed are firmly established in themselves. But all the torms [that are in him] are according to supreme transcendency exempt from secondary natures. And in short, the demiurgic intellect [through this order] abides after its accustomed manner. For the fable says that the guards of Jupiter are terrible to all things. And on this accoant such [partible] genera of Gods (one of • For mnm, it i* necewary to read mnau. ' The tame emendatioo it here also necessary, U abort. Digitized by Google ■106 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. which also Prometheus is) cannot be immediately conjoined with the undented and Olympian powers of the demiurgus. If, therefore, Socrates himself in the form of a fable clearly delivers to us the guard about the demiurgus, is it not through these things evident that the guardian genus is consubsistent with the intellectual Gods ? For as the Oracles say, that the demiurgio order is surrounded with a burning guard, thus also Plato says that guards stand round it, and defend inflexibly the summit of it exempt from all secondary natures. But in the Cratylus, Socrates unfolding through the truth which is expressed in names, who Saturn is, demonstrates indeed his ' peculiar hyparxis, according to which he subsists as the leader of the total intel- lectual orders. He likewise unfolds to us the monad of the unpolluted order, which is united with Saturn. For Saturn, as he says in that dialogue, is a pure intellect. For, he adds, the koron (to xogo*) of him, does not signify his being a boy, but the purity, and incorruptible nature of intellect. After an admirable manner therefore, the fabricator of these divine names, has at one and the same time conjoined the Saturnian peculiarity, and the first monad of the unpolluted triad. For the union of the first father with the first of the unpolluted Gods, is transcendent, and hence this inflexible God is called silent by the Gods, is said to accord with intellect, and to be known by souls according to intellect alone ; because he subsists in the first intellect according to one union with it. Saturn therefore, as being the first intellect, is defined according to its proper order, but as a pure and incorruptible intellect, he has the unde- fined conjoined in himself. And on this account, he is the king of all the intellectual Gods. For as intellect he gives subsistence to all the intellectual Gods, and as a pure intellect, he guards the total orders of them. The two fathers therefore, [Saturn and Jupiter] are shown by the words of Plato to be co-arranged with the immutable Gods, according to union indeed, the first, but according to separation the third. If you are willing however, to survey the one inflexible guard of them with respect to each other, according to which the third father is stably 1 For avrqt, it it requisite to read utrw. » Digitized by CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO 407 in the first, as being the intellect of him, and energizing about him, again direct your attention to the bonds in the Cratylus, of which indeed, partible lives, and the lives deprived of intellect, and which are stupidly astonished about matter, are unable to participate. But a divine intel- lect itself, and the souls which are conjoined to it, participate of these bonds according to an order adapted to them. For the Saturnian bonds, appear indeed to bind the mighty Saturn himself, but in reality, they • connect about him in an undefiled manner the natures that throw the. bonds around him. For a bond is the symbol of the connective order of the Gods, since every thing which is bound is connected by a bond. Again therefore from these things, the guardian good which extends from the connective Gods to the intellectual kings is apparent, since it unites, and collects them into one. For a bond guards that which is connected by it. But the immutable Gods inflexibly preserve their own appropri- ate orders. For the guardship of these Gods is twofold ; the one indeed, being primary and uniform, and suspended from the triad of the connective Gods ; but the other being co-existent with the intellectual kings, and defending them from a tendency to all secondary natures. For all the intellectual fathers ride on the unpolluted Gods, and are established above wholes, through their inflexible, undeviating, and immutable power. If however, it be not only necessary that these two fathers should participate of this guardian order, but that the middle vivific deity of them should be allotted a monad of the immutable Gods coordinate to herself, it is indeed necessary that the first [guardianship] of the unpol- luted leaders in the intellectual fathers, should be triad ic, and should have the same perfect number with the three intellectual Gods. It is likewise necessary that the first of these leaders should be stably united to the first [of the intellectual kings] ; but that the second should in a certain respect be separated from the second of these kings, together with a union with him. And that the third should now be entirely separated from the third king. And thus the unpolluted proceeds conformably to the paternal order, and is after the same manner with it triadically divided. The first of the unpolluted Gods likewise guards the occult Digitized by Google 408 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. nature of Saturn, and the first-effective monad which transcends wholes, and establishes perfectly in him the causes that proceed from, and again return to him. But the second, preserves the generative power of the queen Rhea, pure from matter, and undented, and sustains from the incursions of secondary natures her progression to all things, on which she pours the rivers of life. And the third preserves the whole fabrica- tion of things established above the fabrications, and firmly abiding in itself. It likewise guards it so as to be inflexible, one, and all-perfect with respect to the subjects of its providential case, and expanded above CHAPTER XXXV. Let us now then from this indefinite and common doctrine about these Gods, adduce the Grecian rumour concerning it, as delivered to us by Plato, and demonstrate that he as far as to the very names follows the theologists of the Greeks, just as in the mystic theory of the three kings, and the narration of the unpolluted Gods, he does not depart from their interpretation. For who that is in the smallest degree acquainted with the divine wisdom of the Greeks, does not know that in their arcane mysteries, and other concerns respecting the Gods, the order of the Curetes, is in a remarkable manner celebrated by them, as presiding over the undefiled peculiarity, as the leader of the goddess £Rhea,] and as binding in itself the guardianship of wholes? These Gods therefore, are said to guard the queen Rhea, and the demiurgus of wholes, and proceeding as far as to the causes of partible vivification and fabrication, to preserve the Proserpine and Bacchus which are among these causes, Digitized by Google » CHAP. XXXV. OF PLATO. 40g exempt from secondary natures, just as here [i.e. in the intellectual order], they defend the vivifications of total life, and the first-effective monads of all-perfect fabrication. Not only Orpheus therefore, and the theologists prior to Plato knew this Curetic order, and knowing, venerated it, but the Athenian guest also in the Laws celebrates it. For he says, that the nnncd sports of the Curetes in Crete, are the principal paradigms of all elegant motion. And now, neither is he satisfied with having mentioned this Curctic order, but he also adds the one unity of the Curetes, viz. our mistress Minerva, from which the mystic doctrine also of theologists prior to him, suspends the whole progression of the Curetes. He like- wise, surrounds them above with the symbols of Minerva, as presiding over an ever-flourishing life, and vigorous intellection ; but beneath, he • manifestly arranges them under the providence of Minerva. For the first Curetes indeed, as being the attendants of the intelligible and occult Goddess, are satisfied with the signs that proceed from thence ; but those in the second Jind third orders, are suspended from the intellectual Minerval monad. What then is it, that the Athenian guest says concerning this monad, which converts to itself in an undefiled manner the Curetic progressions ? "The core i.e. virgin, and mistress that is with us, being delighted with the discipline of dancing, did not think it proper to play with empty hands ; but being adorned with an all-perfect panoply, she thus gave perfection to dancing." Through these things therefore, the Athenian guest clearly shows the alliance of the Curetic triad to the Minerval monad. For as that triad is said to sport in armour, so he says that the Goddess who is the leader of them [i.e. of their progression] being adorned with an all-perfect panoply, is the source to them of elegant motion. And as he denominates that triad Curetic, from purity, so like- wise he calls this goddess Core, as being the cause of undefiled power itself. For koron (-nxop*) as Socrates ' says in the Cratylus, signifies the pure and incorruptible. Whence also the Curetes are allotted their appellation, as presiding over the undefiled purity of the Gods. Aud 1 Kf *tij{ is erroneously printed in the original for X'wxgtrrm. Proc. Vol. I. 3 F Digitized by Google 410 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. the monad of them is particularly celebrated as a mistress and as Core [a virgin] she being the supplier of an inflexible and flourishing dominion to the Gods. The word koron therefore, as we have said, is a symbol of purity, of which these Gods are the primary leaders, and according to which ■ they are participated by others. But their being armed, is a symbol of the guardian power according to which they connect wholes, guard them exempt from secondary natures, and preserve them estab- lished in themselves. For what other benefit do men derive from arms except that of defence? For these are in a particular manner the safe- guard of cities. Hence fables also ascribing to the unpolluted Gods an unconquerable strength, give to them an armed apparatus. Hence adorning the one unity of them with an all-perfect panoply, they estab- lish it at the summit of the progression of these Gods. For the all-perfect precedes things which are divided according to parts, and the panoply exists prior to the partible distribution of guardian powers. And it appears to me that through these particulars Plato again asserts the same things as were afterwards revealed by the Gods. For what they denomi- nate every kind of armour, this Plato celebrates as adorned with an all-perfect panoply. [For the Gods say,] "Armed with every kind of armour, he resembles the Goddess." For the all-perfect in the habit of Pyrrhich arms, and the undefiled in power, pertain, according to Plato, to the Minerval monad ; but according to the narration of the Oracles they pertain to that which is furnished with every kind of arms. Farther still, rythm and dancing are a mystic sign of this deity, because the Curetes contain the undefiled power of a divine life ; because they preserve the whole progressions of it always arranged according to one divine boundary ; and because they sustain these progressions from the incursions of matter. For the formless, the indefinite, and the privation of rythm, are the peculiarities of matter. Hence, the immaterial, the definite, and the undefiled, are endued with rythm, are orderly, and intellectual. For on this account, the heavens also are said to form a perpetual dance, and all the celestial orbs participate of rythmical and ' For xtJf nitii necessary to read x«J" v CHAP. XXXVI. OF PLATO. 411 harmonious motion, being filled with this power supernally from the unpolluted Gods. For because they are moved in a circle thejr express intellect, and the intellectual circulation. But because they are moved harmonically, and according to the first and best rythms, they participate of the peculiarity of the guardian Gods. Moreover, the triad of the unpolluted leaders is suspended from the summit of the intellectual Gods. And that it proceeds from this summit, Plato himself teaches us, by placing the first cause of purity in Saturn the king of all the intellec- tual hebdomad. For purity (to xogw) is there primarily, as he informs us in the Cratylus, and the first-effective cause of purity, preexists unically in Saturn. For on this account also, the Minerval monad, is called Cote (a virgin) and the Curetic triad is after this manner celebrated, being suspended from the purity in the intellectual father. CHAFFER XXXVI. Concerning the undefiled leaders, thus much we have had to say, according to the narration of Plato. The monad therefore, now remains, which closes the number of all the intellectual hebdomad, and is the first and uniform cause of all division, which must in the next place be discussed by us. The sections therefore, of the intellectual Gods which are celebrated by all the wise in divine concerns among the Greeks, and which obscurely signify the separations in those Gods, are effected in them through the seventh monad, which is the cause of division, and according to which they separate themselves from the Gods that are placed above them, proceeding into another order, are allotted a union exempt from subordinate natures, and by themselves have a definite Digitized by Google 412 ON TE1E THEOLOGY HOOK V. order, and a progression bounded according to number. Plato however,, allows indeed poets that are inspired by Phoebus, to signify things of this- kind obscurely and mystically; but he excludes the multitude from hearing these things, because they believe without examination in the fabulous veils of truth. And thi9 is what Socrates reprobates in Euthy- phron, who was thus affected in consequence of being ignorant of divine concerns. According to the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato therefore, transferring all such particulars to the truth concerning wholes, and unfolding the concealed theory which they contain, we shall procure for ourselves the genuine worship of a divine nature. For Socrates himself in the Cratylus, unfolds to us the Saturnian bonds, and their mystic meaning, and in a remarkable manner demonstrates that the visions of those ancient and illustrious men do not fall off from the truth. After the same manner therefore, he will permit his friends to assume intellectual sections, and the power which is productive of these, accord- ing to divinely-inspired conceptions, and will suffer them to survey these together with bonds in the intellectual Gods. Farther still, the fable in the Gorgias, in a clearer manuer separates the empire of Jupiter from the Saturnian kingdom, and calls the former the second from, and more recent than the latter. What is the cause, therefore, which separates these paternal monads ? What intellectual power produced the intel- lectual empire from that which is exempt from it ? For it is necessary that there should be with the Gods themselves the first-effective fountain of division, through which Jupiter also separates himself from tlie monad his father, Saturn from the kingdom of the Heaven, and the natures posterior to Jupiter, proceeding into an inferior order, are separated from his all-perfect monad. Moreover, the demiurgus himself in the production of the genera posterior to himself, at one and the same time is the cause to them of union, and the source of their all-various divisions. For fabricating the soul one whole, he separates it into parts, and all-various powers. And in the Timaeus where the demiurgus is said to do this, Plato himself does not refuse to call these separations, and essential divisions, sectiom. Digitized by Google chap, xxxvii. OF PLATO. 413 He likewise cuts off parts from thence, places tliem in that which h between these, and again separates parts from the whole, and thus the mixture from which he had cut off these parts, was now wholly con- sumed. Is it therefore any longer wonderful that the framers of fables should denominate the divisions of the intellectual leaders, sections, since even Timaeus himself who does not devise fables, but indicates the essential progression of souls into multitude, uses as a sign the word section ? And does not also Plato in the greatest degree accord with the highest of theologists, when he delivers to us the demiurgus glittering with intellectual sections ? As therefore the demiurgus, when producing the essence of souls, constitutes it according to true being, when gene- rating life, he generates it according to the life which is in real beings, and produces the intellect which is in souls according to the intellect which is in himself, — thus also when cutting the essence of the soul from itself, and separating it, he energizes according to the sections and separations which are in the intellectual order, and according to the one and intellectual cause of them. According to Plato, therefore, there is a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals, and together witb the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the undefiled, it gives completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And we, following Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things. CHAPTER XXXVII. Let us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual heb- domad, and that he produces this hebdomad ic aibn {eternity) and the peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in continuity with. Digitized by Google 414 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey what he says concerning the father of the intellectual Gods, and the undefilcd power which is co-arranged with him. For after the threefold figure, and the order of the Gods which perfects all things, that which is in itself and in another, becomes apparent. These things, however, are demonstrated to be signs of the intellectual summit of the intellectual monads. For the first father of the Gods in this order, at one and the same time is allotted a paternal transcendency with respect to those posterior to him, and is the intellect of the first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is said to be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them, from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in theni as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the demiurgic intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and proximately indeed of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds, but eminently of the intelligible unities beyond [Saturn]. The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual father, and a paternal intellect. lie is, however, the intellectual father indeed of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is the paternal intellect of the intelligibles prior to himself. For he is indeed intellectual essentially ; but he has an intelligible transcendency in intellectuals ; because he is also established analogous to the unknown order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult order of the intelligible triads. And as they are expanded above the triadic hypostases of the Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the father of intellectuals, is a father expanded above the whole intellectual hebdomad, in consequence of being a paternal intellect. And analo- gously to the above-mentioned orders of Gods, he establishes himself in them, and is filled from them with paternal and intelligible union. On this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes them in, and converts them to himself. ' For w ovnp, it is necessary to read n tam*. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXVII OF PLATO. 415 These things, therefore, Parmcnides also indicating, magnificently celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the first king and father of the intellectual 1 Gods through these peculiarities. For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intel- ligibles prior to himself, he establishes in another the all-perfect intelli- gence of himself. For, indeed, this subsistence in another, is more excellent than the subsistence of a thing in itself ; since, as Parmenides himself concludes, the subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him according to whole, but the subsistence of him in himself, according to parts. Where, therefore, does the another pre-exist? And to what order of the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this another, remarkably pertains to that order, according to which the power of difference first shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible and paternal power. Hence in the first triad the another was occultly, so far as power also had there an occult subsistence ; but it particularly shines forth in the first order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there the first difference, the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal and unvocal power subsist. [Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the intelligible triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled with united and occult goods. And on this account he is said to be in another. With respect to those triads indeed, the another is occultly and according to cause in the intelligible [i. e. in the first triad] of intelligibles ; but according to essence in the intelligible of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. All intelligibles therefore are united ; the intelligible indeed of the intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the intelligible of the intelligibles prior* to intellectuals; but the intelligible of intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres * For voir*,, it U olmotwly neceiwry to read >«pw>. * For rpmrm, it U neceswry to read *?o row. Digitized by Google 416 ON THE THEOLOGY ROOK V. to the difference which is according to uuical number. But unical number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which account also it is unical. Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine natures, to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to themselves). And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably ; but the intelligible and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable life, impart the original cause of progression to all things; and the intellectual Gods arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion. Hence, it is indeed necessary that the summit of iutellectuals which pours forth from itself the whole and all-perfect form of conversion, should be characterized by both the couvertive symbols, and should be at one and the same time converted to itself, and to the natures prior to itself. Hence, because indeed, it is converted to itself, it is in itself; but because it is converted to the intelligible orders beyond itself, it is in another. For the another is more excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the summit of intelligiblcs primarily subsists according to the intelligible peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as the summit of intelligiblcs and intellectuals primarily unfolds the peculiarity of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity, and being to all things the cause of all-various progressions ;— thus also the intelligible deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself according to union the twofold forms of conversion, being indeed in another according to the more excellent form of conversion, but in himself according to the less excellent form. For to be converted to himself is inferior to the conversion to more excellent natures. Again, therefore, the subsistence in another, is the illustrious prero- gative of the intelligible aud paternal peculiarity. For the another is intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from the intelligible fathers, and from the natures firmly established in them. Hence, that which is comprehended in this power, and is fdled from it, is paternal and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing in itself is the proper ■ Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXVII. OF PLATO. 417 sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we have before observed, the summits of the two intellectual triads are conjoined. And the monad .of the guardian triad has eternally established itself iu the paternal •monad, and again establishes in, and converts to itself the natures which ;have proceeded from itself. And the first intellectual father is indeed father on account of himself, but on account of the unpolluted [monad,] ihe comprehends in himself the genera of himself, stably recalls them j[when they have proceeded from him] to himself, and in his own allness ' contains the intelligible multitudes of intellectuals in onpro- rceeding* union with their monad. The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in conjunction with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the unpolluted cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles. And as he is intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself, and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods. Id the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the intelligible place of survey, and on this account being in another, so far as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and immaterial, being converted to himself, and shuttiug in himself aH his own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all sides established and -comprehended by the wholeness. And the whole- ness itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, toeing parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and us the more tragical fables say* absorbiug and depositing them in itself. For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed -into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it •through the first unpolluted monad ; but others proceeding according to the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the ' for sauToniTi read rarontrt. * For ik^t** teU «**4«,nfwu Proc. Vox. I. 3 G Digitized by Google 418 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order there- fore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides. CHAPTER XXXVIII. Th£ second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of ihe intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire, but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with being, (for the one here is notimparticipable, and exempt from all power) so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but iuteUect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call the one and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being, they call' the first intellect, conformably to this analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles ; ' For anOuorrts, it is necewary to read «i«x«cAowmf. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXX VIII. OF PLATO. 419 but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is according to essence ; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hvparxis; and an intellectuals,' according to participation, it is indeed necessary that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because it has the most excellent life. The. first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intel- lectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that the one in this order is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phaedrus calls this middle triad Heaven ; for the whole of it is life and motion. Hut that which is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i. c from the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;.] since eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, the middle is life according to cause ; but in intellectuals, it is life according to participation ; and in the order between these, it is life • la the original, alter n U wi* m/Toi; mi it it nemury to supply *mf vwmtfir, rv I, nif »«ip»S, *. r. X. Digitized by Google ON THE THEOLOGY boor r. according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Par men ides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the ' wholeness in intelligibies is different from that which is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaveu, and to intellectual and -intelligible life: Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not one certain genus of being,. as neither is motion. For beings indeed are naturally adapted to participate of the genera > of being; but the super- essential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, ■ therefore, Parmenides here* assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does not attribute the ele- ments of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate* all-perfect, and transcending wholes* And thus asserting that Me owe is moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivifie hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the un- polluted monad coordinated with motion, and which connectcdly-contains the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the guardian triad, is united to the first lather, according to the first hypos- tasis, thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from itself. And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [[ Rhea} is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative power that proceeds to all things ; but the latter,' establishes the whole vivifie fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the pro- gression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which, ' In the original * U is omitted. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. 421 is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the natures posterior to it. And after the same manner, the highest of the unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. On this account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsist- ence in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them. CHAPTER XXXIX. The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with tl»e coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the communion of the one with other things, is apparent, and we must no longer consider the one alone by itself, but according to its habitude towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what occasion is there to say that the term other things, is a sign of a corporeal condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to cha- racterize an incorporeal nature by the one, but indicated to us the nature which is divisible about body, through the term others f In the second place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides} is doubled. For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from Digitized by Google 422 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V. itself,' and to be different from other things, and the same with other things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates in the Cralylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order is apparent, the prolific power co-ordinate with it, the undefiled monad the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes ; and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all tilings, and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of his father. How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become apparent ? We reply, that the same with itself (for this Par men ides first demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of the one, the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists. Hence, likewise, the one is said to be the same with itself. For the another is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different causes ; but the same, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demi- urgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that which is allied to bound. But the same with other things, is the singular good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading through :dl tilings without impediment. For the demiurgus is present to all things which he produces, aud is in all things the same, which he arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and infinity subsist in him demiurgically. And the one iudeed is in the sameness which is separate from oilier things, but the other is in the • After %K\x in the original it i* necesnrr to wpply the word* xai twtov Mrm», %%i ir«for mvtki. Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. 423 power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis. Moreover, the different from other things, manifests his undefined purity* and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or communion ' with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as Timneus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other participants. Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he is the same with then. For he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity, undented power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is disjoined from them, and is im participate by other things. And as the first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through the guard which is united to him, and through the undented monad ; and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and indexible power from the second cause of the guardian Gods ; thus also the demiurgic intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate with the deiniurgus, who hastens to produce' all things, and to pervade through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power, • For xtwavuo, it is necessary to read xonwv.aj. 1 The word ra^ayup is omitted in the original, but ought doubtless to be inserted. Digitized by Google 424 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK r. is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellec- tual conceptions [i. e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts an undented union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order, and which Par men ides also producing for us together with the whole demiurgus, defines it in difference, in the same manner as he does the undefined cause in the demiurgus. He says however, that this difference separates the demiurgic moo ad itself from itself. For we have before observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods. As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the pater- nal union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this power? From being in himself, says Parmcnides, and in another. For these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Separation therefore, preexisted there according to cause; but in the demiurgus k shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself. That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in the first father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis, when he says, " that every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect a duad, and is separated from itself." There however, the duad is occultly ; but here it subsists more clearly, where also all intellectual multitude shines forth to the view. For difference i»* the progeuy of the firmly-abiding duad which is there. This therefore separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and divides the monads in it from each other. For if so far as it is in another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far as it is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according to each order of its own intelligible,- — if this be the case, it is necessary that this difference should be the cause to it of separation from its father. All the intellectual monads therefore, have appeared to us to subsist coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, in another is fXw sign of the father. Jiut the subsistence in itself, is the sign of the Digitized by Google CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. 42j first unpolluted monad. Again, motion is the sign of vivific goodness ; but permanency of the indexible power conjoined with motion. And same- ness with itself, and with another, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity ; but the being different from other things, is the sign of the guard about the demiurgus. And in the last place, the being (liferent from itself, is the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to cause indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its hypostasis more clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears to me, when dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in the middles themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad, and of the dividing monad, so far as they also are in a certain respect comprehended in the fabrication. For he shows in the first of the conclusions that the one is the same with itself; in the second, that it is different from itself ; in the. third, that it is different from other thing* ; and in the fourth that it is the same with other things. For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing power with the paternal union; but connects with a transcendency separate from secondary natures, the providential cause of them. For in the Gods, it is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and and a purity unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential inspection of them ; through which likewise, being every where, they are no where, being present with all things, they are exempt from all tilings, and being all things, they are not any of their progeny. END OP VOL. I. JVoc. Vol. I. 3 II Digitized by Google Digitized by Google Just Published, Price 6s. [Continued Quarterly.] %\>t Classical journal, NO. XXVI. CONTAINING AVARIRTYO* CLASSICAL, BIBLICAL, AND ORIENTAL LITERATURE. THE FOLLOWING SCARCE TRACTS J re inserted in the Ncm be its already Published. A Complete Set of which may be hud, in 87 No*, or 13 Vols. Pr. 8/. It. T. tie Grttrornm Verhatx Ke^iii ftettendts ; aC. S. G. Hauptmann. II. An Introductory Kuay on the Prrpotitiont of the Greek Langin>j c ; Ry James Moor, LL. D. Gr. Prof, in the Univ. of Glu»gow. III. A Chart often AVnwrn/i, in 200 Languages, Kith a Deuriptite Enwv. 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